Kenya Defence Forces
The Kenya Defence Forces are the armed forces of the Republic of Kenya. The Kenya Army, Kenya Navy, Kenya Air Force comprise the national Defence Forces; the current Kenya Defence Forces were established, its composition laid out, in Article 241 of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. The President of Kenya is the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces; the military is deployed in peacekeeping missions around the world. Further, in the aftermath of the national elections of December 2007 and the violence that subsequently engulfed the country, a commission of inquiry, the Waki Commission, commended its readiness and adjudged it to "have performed its duty well." There have been serious allegations of human rights violations, most while conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Mt Elgon area and in the district of Mandera central. Kenya’s military, like many government institutions in the country, has been tainted by corruption allegations; because the operations of the military have been traditionally cloaked by the ubiquitous blanket of "state security", the corruption has been less in public view, thus less subject to public scrutiny and notoriety.
This has changed recently. In what are by Kenyan standards unprecedented revelations, in 2010, credible claims of corruption were made with regard to recruitment, procurement of Armoured Personnel Carriers. Further, the wisdom and prudence of certain decisions of procurement have been publicly questioned. In 1907 the idea was discussed of a White settler defence force; the Kenya Defence Force was established under the Defence Force Ordinance 1928. The Ordinance "made provision for the compulsory registration of all European males of British nationality in the Colony up to the age of fifty years and for their division into three classes according to age. However, those over fifty could enrol in a fourth class." After questions were raised about control of weapons and potential settler threats to the Kenya Government in 1936, the Force was disbanded and replaced by the Kenya Regiment, formed 1 June 1937. The Manoj between 1896 and 1900 saw the East African Rifles deployed in a number of campaigns in line with British colonial policies.
In collaboration with Major Cunningham's Uganda Rifles, expeditions were organized against the Nandi who put up a strong resistance. It was not until 1906. Another one in 1900 commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hatch, Commandant of the East African Rifles, followed this. Two medals were issued after these expeditions namely "1898" and "Jubaland 1900"; the East African Rifles sent troops to help Uganda Rifles suppress a mutiny by Sudanese troops in Uganda. Captain Harrison who led this expedition was decorated. After being deployed on this expedition, he remained behind to form the 1st Battalion of the Uganda Rifles; this battalion became 5 KAR. In 1901 the British government decided to organize all the existing troops in Central Africa, East Africa and British Somaliland under one command. Lieutenant Colonel Manning, an officer in the Indian Corps was appointed Inspector General for all the troops and promoted to the rank of general. After the troops based in different parts of British East and Central Africa territories were placed under a central command, the regiment born thereof was designated "King's African Rifles" on 1 January 1902.
The composition of this regiment was as follows:- The 8 companies of 1 Central African Rifles became 1 Battalion King's African Rifles. The 6 companies of 2 Central African Rifles became 2 Battalion King's African Rifles; the 7 companies and one camel company of East African Rifles became 3 Battalion King's African Rifles. The 9 companies of the Uganda Rifles became 4 Battalion King's African Rifles; the 4 companies of the Contingent of Uganda Rifles became. On 1 April 1902, 3 KAR moved its headquarters from Mombasa to Nairobi, together with 4 KAR and 5 KAR, was used by the British colonial government in expeditions against those who resisted British rule. In 1904 5 KAR, made up of Indian troops, was disbanded chiefly because of maintenance costs and because the British felt they had contained the resistance to their rule, it was however stationed in Meru. In 1926, 5 KAR was again disbanded and their colours were handed over to 3 KAR for safe custody. On 1 March 1930 the unit was once again reconstituted, presented with their colours and stationed in Nairobi.
After World War II both battalions were used by the colonial government to contain the Mau Mau rebellion. On the dawn of independence the Kenya National Assembly passed a bill to amend the status of the military forces in Kenya. Accordingly, the former units of the King's African Rifles were transformed to the Kenyan Military Forces and the Independent Kenyan Government was empowered to assign names to the units as deemed necessary with effect from midnight, 12 December 1963, thus 3 KAR, 5 KAR, 11 KAR became 3 Kenya Rifles, 5 Kenya Rifles, 11 Kenya Rifles respectively. The transformation of King's African Rifles to Kenya Military Forces on the midnight of 12 December 1963 was a major milestone in the foundation of today's Kenya Army units. Between 1963 and 1967, Kenya fought the Shifta War against Somali residents who sought union with their kin in the Somali Republic to the north. On the evening of 24 January 1964, the failure of the Kenyan Prime Minister to appear on television, where 11th Kenya Rifles junior soldiers had been expecting a televised speech and hoping for a pay rise announcement, caused the men to mutiny.
Parsons says it is possible that the speech was only broadcast on the radio
Somali Civil War (2006–2009)
The Somali Civil War was an armed conflict involving Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government forces and Somali troops from Puntland versus the Somali Islamist umbrella group, the Islamic Court Union, other affiliated militias for control of the country. There is a clear connection between Somali Civil War and the War of 2006; the war began shortly before July 20, 2006 when U. S. backed. The TFG in Somalia invited Ethiopians to intervene, which became an "unpopular decision". Subsequently, the leader of the ICU, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, declared "Somalia is in a state of war, all Somalis should take part in this struggle against Ethiopia". On December 24, Ethiopia stated it would combat the ICU. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, said Ethiopia entered hostilities because it faced a direct threat to its own borders. "Ethiopian defense forces were forced to enter into war to protect the sovereignty of the nation," he said. "We are not trying to set up a government for Somalia, nor do we have an intention to meddle in Somalia's internal affairs.
We have only been forced by the circumstances."The ICU, which controlled the coastal areas of southern Somalia, engaged in fighting with the forces of the Somali TFG, the autonomous regional governments of Puntland and Galmudug, all of whom were backed by Ethiopian troops. The outbreak of heavy fighting began on December 20 with the Battle of Baidoa, after the lapse of a one-week deadline the ICU imposed on Ethiopia to withdraw from the nation. Ethiopia, refused to abandon its positions around the TFG interim capital at Baidoa. On December 29, after several successful battles, TFG and Ethiopian troops entered Mogadishu unopposed; the UN stated that many Arab nations including Egypt were supporting the ICU through Eritrea. Although not announced until a small number of U. S. Special Forces troops accompanied Ethiopian and TFG troops after the collapse and withdrawal of the ICU to give military advice and to track suspected al-Qaida fighters. Both American support for the TFG and various Arab Nations' support for the ICU were isolated cases from the central motive of the war between the allied Ethiopian & Somali government forces and the allied ICU & Eritrean forces.
As of January 2007, Ethiopia said it would withdraw "within a few weeks" but the TFG, US and UN officials oppose Ethiopian withdrawal because it would create a "security vacuum," while the ICU has demanded immediate Ethiopian withdrawal. The two sides had traded war declarations and gunfire on several occasions before. Eastern African countries and international observers fear the Ethiopian offensive may lead to a regional war, involving Eritrea, which has a complex relationship with Ethiopia and whom Ethiopia claims to be a supporter of the ICU; as of January 2009, Ethiopian troops withdrew from Somalia following a two-year insurgency, which led to loss of territory and effectiveness of the TFG and a power-sharing deal between Islamists splinter group led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia and TFG Prime Minister Nur Hassan in Djibouti. The al Shabaab who has separated from the ICU rejects the peace deal and continued to take territories including Baidoa.
Another Islamist group, Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'ah, allied to the transitional government and supported by Ethiopia, continues to attack al Shabab and take over towns as well. After the parliament took in 200 officials from the moderate Islamist opposition, ARS leader Sheikh Ahmed was elected TFG President on January 31, 2009. Since the al shabab radical Islamists have accused the new TFG President of accepting the secular transitional government and have continued the civil war since he arrived in Mogadishu at the presidential palace. Forces involved are difficult to calculate because of many factors, including lack of formal organization or record-keeping, claims which remained masked by disinformation. Ethiopia for months leading up to the war maintained it had only a few hundred advisors in the country, yet independent reports indicated far more troops. According to the BBC, "The United Nations estimated that at least over 9,000 Ethiopian troops may be in the country while the AP suggests the number closer to 12–15,000, while regional rival Eritrea has been accused of deploying some 2,000 troops in support of the Islamic group.
This claim are there any indications that they are true. Wars between Somalia, or its precursor Islamic states, Ethiopia, stretch back to 16th century. For example, Ahmad ibn Ibrihim al-Ghazi was a 16th-century Islamic leader popular in Somali culture for his jihad against the Ethiopians during the rise of the Adal Sultanate; the painful living history and cultural traditions, long-standing ethnic divisions and sectarian differences lay a foundation of conflict between the two nations. More boundary disputes over the Ogaden region date to the 1948 settlement when the land was granted to Ethiopia. Somali disgruntlement with this decision has led to repeated attempts to invade Ethiopia with the hopes of taking control of the Ogaden to create a Greater Somalia; this plan would have reunited the Somali people of the Ethiopian-controlled Ogaden with those living in the Republic of Somalia. These ethnic and political tensions have caused cross-border clashes over the years. 1960–1964 Border Dispute 1977–1978 Ogaden War 1982 August Border Clash 1998–2000 Cross-border warfare during the chaotic fraction leader-led era.
Before the beginning of the war, there have been significant assertions and accusations of the use of disinformation and propaganda tactics by various parties to shape the causes and course of the con
Operation Linda Nchi
Operation Linda Nchi was the Kenya Defence Forces operation - in many ways an invasion - covering the entry of Kenyan military forces into southern Somalia beginning in 2011. The Kenyan government declared the operation completed in March 2012, but its forces joined AMISOM in Somalia and are not expected to leave before 2020. Ostensibly the Kenyan government aimed to create a buffer zone between Al-Shabaab and instability in southern Somalia, the Kenyan homeland. However, at a deeper level, the Kenyans desired "to be seen as a reliable partner in the U. S.-led ‘global war on terrorism’, there were institutional interests within the KDF, key political elites within the Kenyan government, notably Minister for Internal Security George Saitoti, the Defence Minister Yusuf Haji and several senior security chiefs, advocated for intervention to advance their own economic and political interests." Kenya's incursion into southern Somalia started after the 13 October kidnapping of two Spanish women who were working for Médecins Sans Frontières at the Dadaab refugee camp.
The abductions were carried out by Al Shabaab militants. Médecins Sans Frontières issued a press statement at the time disassociating itself from any armed activities and related declarations launched following the abduction; the Kenyan government claimed its troop deployment had received approval from the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Kenya's Foreign Affairs Minister, Moses Wetangula, stated that the deployment of Kenyan troops was at the request of the TFG; the Kenyan military said that there was no set exit date for the operation, but the indicator of the mission's success would be a crippling of Al-Shabaab's capacity. According to The Guardian, "several sources agree that the Kenyan intervention plan was discussed and decided in 2010 finalised with input from western partners, including the US and to a lesser extent France", with Nairobi using the kidnappings "as an excuse to launch an operation ready and waiting."On 16 October 2011, Reuters reported that Somali and Kenyan military officials had met over the weekend for talks in the town of Dhobley, situated in Somalia near the Kenya border.
According to an unidentified security source, "the meeting was to prepare a joint operation between the two forces... to launch an offensive against Al-Shabaab rebels who are scattered in different parts of southern Somalia". The same day, an unnamed Somali military commander said that Kenyan troops had crossed the border and, in a joint operation with Somali forces, pushed Al Shabaab out of two bases near the Kenya border. Abdi Yusuf, a senior Somali military commander, confirmed that two warplanes had attacked Al Shabaab bases, but did not confirm their origin, he noted: "I can't identify the military aircraft, but our neighbour Kenya is supporting us militarily and our mission is to drive Al-Shabaab out of the region". Somalia's ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, responded "We cannot condone any country crossing our border." TFG spokesman Abdirahman Omar Yarisow contradicted Nur, asserting that "the governments of Somalia and Kenya are now cooperating in the fight against Al-Shabaab."On 27 October Kenyan government spokesman Alfred Mutua said Linda Nchi was planned months in advance and had been "going on for quite some time", as well as denied any participation by western forces.
The operation had a high approval rating from the Kenyan population. On 18 October, Somalia's President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and other TFG officials hosted a Kenyan delegation in Mogadishu to discuss security co-operation against Al-Shabaab. Somalia's Defence Minister Hussein Arab Isse and Kenya's Defence Minister Mohamed Yusuf Haji signed an agreement to collaborate against Al-Shabaab. Both countries pledged to "co-operate in undertaking security and military operations", including "co-ordinated pre-emptive action"; the agreement restricted Kenyan activities to the southern Lower Juba region. Despite media reports claiming otherwise, Kenyan Defence Minister Yusuf Haji denied the involvement of the Kenyan military in the capture by TFG forces of some Al-Shabaab bases in Lower Juba, he added that "Kenya trained more TFG troops in the past and they are battling now against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia regions and we are giving them both logistical and financial support." Somalia's Defence Minister Isse welcomed Kenya's participation, stating that Somalia "need the support of Kenya so that our forces will be able to end al-Shabaab or any other threats against both Kenya and Somalia".
On 24 October, President Ahmed stated again that although he welcomed Kenyan logistical support, he was against the Kenyan military presence. These statements before the press appeared to contradict the signed cooperative agreement between the Somali and Kenyan Defence ministers on 18 October. Ahmed claimed his administration and people in Somalia opposed the presence of Kenyan troops since the Somali federal government "had no agreement with Kenya beyond helping us with logistics". According to media, Ahmed's remarks may have stemmed from fears that the Kenyan government supported the establishment of an autonomous Jubaland in the south of Somalia. Ahmed had previously protested the deployment of 2500 Somalis trained in Kenya to southern Somalia, arguing that the forces be sent to Mogadishu to support the TFG there. A leaked 2010 cable detailing a meeting between the TFG and the United States government stated that "Sharif offered a qualified "yes" when asked if he supported the Lower Juba initiative" and that he "told the GOK that the TFG did not want to see Somalia further divided The GOK had reassured the TFG that it did not want to see Somalia divided and that it intended to use the troops
Big five game
In Africa, the Big Five game animals are the lion, rhinoceros and Cape buffalo. The term was coined by big-game hunters, refers to the five most difficult animals in Africa to hunt on foot, but is now widely used by safari tour operators; the 1990 and releases of South African rand banknotes feature a different big-five animal on each denomination. Countries where all can be found include Angola, Zambia, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Malawi; the African elephant is a large herbivore having thick hairless skin, a long, prehensile trunk, upper incisors forming long curved tusks of ivory, large, fan-shaped ears. The two distinct species of African elephant are: African forest elephant and the African bush elephant. Elephants are difficult to hunt because, despite their large size, they are able to hide in tall grass and are more to charge than the other species; the black rhinoceros is a large herbivore having two upright horns on the nasal bridge. Its thick protective skin, formed from layers of collagen positioned in a lattice structure, is hard to puncture.
It is now critically endangered, hunting is limited due to this. In the context of big-game hunting in Africa, the term "rhinoceros" may refer to the white rhinoceros, but among big five game hunters, the black rhinoceros is preferred; the African buffalo or Cape buffalo is a large horned bovid. They are the only animals within the Big Five that threatened; the Cape buffalo is considered by many to be the most dangerous of the big five to hunters, with wounded animals reported to ambush and attack pursuers. The lion is a large carnivorous feline of Africa and northwest India, having a short, tawny coat, a tufted tail, in the male, a heavy mane around the neck and shoulders. Lions are desirable to hunters because of the real danger involved in hunting them; the leopard is a large, carnivorous feline having either tawny fur with dark rosette-like markings or black fur. The leopard is considered the most difficult of the big five to hunt because of their nocturnal and secretive nature, they will take flight in the face of danger.
The leopard is solitary by nature, is most active between sunset and sunrise, although it may hunt during the day in some areas. Leopards can be found in brush land and forested areas in Africa. Of the big five, it is most difficult to acquire hunting licenses for. Africa's Big Five have become major concerns for wildlife conservationists in recent years; the African lion, African leopard and African bush elephant are all classified as vulnerable. The southern white rhinoceros is classified as near threatened while the black rhinoceros is classified as critically endangered, so hunting them is restricted for the latter; the African buffalo is the most popular big five game animal to hunt, as its conservation status is least concern, but it is experiencing a population decline in uncontrolled areas due to poaching and urbanization. Big game hunting Elephant gun Game reserve Little five game Trophy hunting Weight, life span and other lifestyle details of the Big Five
The Ogaden is a subclan of the Darod family clan. The Ogaden people inhabit in Somali Region, Jubaland and NFD. Members of the Ogaden clan live in the central Ogaden plateau of Ethiopia, the North Eastern Province of Kenya, the Southern Somalia, they inhabit Somalia's major city such as Kismayo. The Ogaden clan is known for resisting colonialism during the Dervish era and in Jubaland and North Eastern Province in Kenya when both were colonized by the British. Members of the Ogaden clan were fighting European colonizers in 2 of the 3 regions, the Somali territories were split into by colonial borders; the most known anti-colonial Somali, Sayid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan hails from the Ogaden clan. According to Human Rights Watch, the Ogaden is the largest Darod clan in Ethiopia's Somali Region, may account for 80 to 90 percent of the Somali population in Ethiopia; the Ogaden clan "constitutes the backbone of the ONLF". In particular, the ONLF operates in Ogaden areasFrank Linsly James, one of the first Europeans to travel deep into Ogaden territory while being accompanied by Lord Philips and armed with Martini-Enfield rifles, describes his first encounter with Ogadens in 1884.
After marching for six hours, we were joined by two Ogadayn natives, who said they would show us the wells, which were close at hand. They asked their use; when we said, "for killing men and beasts," they laughed, replied " they would be no use against sticks, let alone swords and spears." A Hornbill was sitting on a tree listening to this conversation, echoed the natives' laugh with an assenting croak of scorn. Lord Phillips raised his despised firearm, down fell the lifeless hornbill. Down, fell the Ogadayn natives, remained for some time with their faces pressed against the ground, invoking the protection of the great Allah. There is no clear agreement on the clan and sub-clan structures and many lineages are omitted; the following listing is taken from the World Bank's Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics from 2005 and the United Kingdom's Home Office publication, Somalia Assessment 2001. Darod Marehan Red Dini Rer Hassan Cali Dheere Kabalah Absame Ogaden Cawlyahan Bahgeri mohamed zuber Abdalla Abudwaq Jidwaq Harti Dhulbahante Warsangali Dishiishe Majeerteen In Puntland the World Bank shows the following: Darod Harti Absame Marehan Awrtable Lelkase Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, the Sayyid.
Admiral Mohammed Omar Osman, current ONLF chairman Bashir Bililiqo, leader of the anti-Barre Somali Patriotic Movement Asli Hassan Abade, first Somali female pilot Farah Maalim, former Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of Kenya Aden Duale, the mijority leader of the Kenyan parliament Hassan Abdullah Hersi al-Turki, Islamist leader in Somalia and military leader in the Islamic Courts Union Mohamed Gandhi, former Minister of Defense of Somalia. "Collective Punishment: War Crimes and crimes against Humanity in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia's Somali Regional State", Human Rights Watch Report
Al-Shabaab (militant group)
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, more known as al-Shabaab, is a jihadist fundamentalist group based in East Africa. In 2012, it pledged allegiance to the militant Islamist organization Al-Qaeda. In February 2012, some of the group's leaders quarreled with Al-Qaeda over the union, lost ground. Al-Shabaab's troop strength was estimated at 7,000 to 9,000 militants in 2014; as of 2015, the group has retreated from the major cities, however al-Shabaab still controls rural parts of southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab began as the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union, which splintered into several smaller factions after its defeat in 2006 by Somalia's Transitional Federal Government and the TFG's Ethiopian military allies; the group describes itself as waging jihad against "enemies of Islam", is engaged in combat against the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission to Somalia. Al-Shabaab has been designated as a terrorist organization by Australia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.
As of June 2012, the US State Department has open bounties on several of the group's senior commanders. In early August 2011, the Transitional Federal Government's troops and their AMISOM allies managed to capture all of Mogadishu from the al-Shabaab militants. An ideological rift within the group's leadership emerged, several of the organization's senior commanders were assassinated. Due to its Wahhabi roots, al-Shabaab is hostile to Sufi traditions and has clashed with the militant Sufi group Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a; the group has been suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram. It attracted some members from western countries, including Samantha Lewthwaite and Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki. In August 2014, the Somali government-led Operation Indian Ocean was launched to clean up the remaining insurgent-held pockets in the countryside. On 1 September 2014, a US drone strike carried out as part of the broader mission killed al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair.
U. S. authorities hailed the raid as a major symbolic and operational loss for al-Shabaab, the Somali government offered a 45-day amnesty to all moderate members of the militant group. The group remains nonetheless strong and active, has been responsible for exceptionally deadly terrorist attacks such as the Westgate shopping mall attack and the 14 October Mogadishu bombings. Al-Shabaab is known as Ash-Shabaab, Hizbul Shabaab, Popular Resistance Movement in the Land of the Two Migrations. For short, the organization is referred to as HSM, which stands for "Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen"; the term Shabaab means "youth" in Arabic, the group should not be confused with named groups. Al-Shabaab's composition is multiethnic, with its leadership positions occupied by Afghanistan- and Iraq-trained ethnic Somalis and foreigners. According to the National Counterterrorism Center, the group's rank-and-file members hail from disparate local groups, sometimes recruited by force. Unlike most of the organization's top leaders, its foot soldiers are concerned with nationalist and clan-related affairs as opposed to the global jihad.
They are prone to infighting and shifting alliances. According to the Jamestown Foundation, al-Shabaab seeks to exploit these vulnerabilities by manipulating clan networks in order to retain power; the group itself is not immune to local politics. More Muslim converts from neighbouring countries have been conscripted to do undesirable or difficult work. Although al-Shabaab's leadership falls upon al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, the internal leadership is not clear, with foreign fighters trickling out of the country, its structure is decentralized. Ahmed Abdi Godane was publicly named as emir of al-Shabaab in December 2007. In August 2011, Godane was criticized by al-Shabaab cofounder Hassan Dahir Aweys and others for not letting aid into the hunger-stricken parts of southern Somalia. Although not formally announced, Shabaab was split up into a "foreign legion," led by Godane, a coalition of factions forming a "national legion" under Aweys; the latter group refused to take orders from Godane and the two groups hardly talked to each other.
In February 2012, Godane made an oath of allegiance, to al-Qaeda. With it, he hoped to reclaim and extend his authority and to encourage foreign fighters to stay; this move will further complicate the cooperation with the "national legion" of al-Shabaab. Godane was killed in a U. S. drone strike in Somalia on September 1, 2014. Ahmad Umar was named Godane's successor on 6 September 2014, he is believed to have played a role in al-Shabaab's internal secret service known as Amniya. Ahmad Umar Moktar Ali Zubeyr "Godane" – Somali sub-clan of northern Isaaq clan Other leaders: Mukhtar Robow "Abu Mansoor" – Second Deputy Leader and regional commander in charge of Bay and Bakool. Fuad Mohammed Khalaf "Shangole" – third-most important leader after "Abu Mansoor". In charge of public affairs. Hassan Dahir Aweys – spiritual leader Hussein Ali Fidow – political chief and Wasiir Ali Mohamud Raghe "Dheere" a.k.a. Shei
Hagar is a biblical person in the Book of Genesis. She was an Egyptian handmaid of Sarai; the product of the union was Abraham's firstborn, the progenitor of the Ishmaelites. Various commentators have connected her to the Hagrites as their eponymous ancestor; the name Hagar originates from the Book of Genesis. Hagar is alluded to in the Quran, Islam considers her Abraham's second wife; this is a summary of the account of Hagar from Genesis 16 and 21. Hagar was the Egyptian slave of Abraham's wife. Sarah had been barren for a long time and sought a way to fulfill God's promise to Abraham that Abraham would be father of many nations since they were getting older, so she offered Hagar to Abraham as a second wife. Hagar became pregnant, tension arose between the two women. Sarah complained to Abraham, treated Hagar harshly, Hagar ran away. Hagar fled into the desert on her way to Shur. At a spring en route, an angel appeared to Hagar, who instructed her to return to Sarah, so that she may bear a child who "shall be a wild ass of a man: his hand shall be against every man, every man's hand against him.
She was told to call her son Ishmael. Afterward, Hagar referred to God as "El Roi", she returned to Abraham and Sarah, soon gave birth to a son, whom she named as the angel had instructed. Sarah gave birth to Isaac, the tension between the women returned. At a celebration after Isaac was weaned, Sarah found the teenage Ishmael mocking her son, she was so upset by it that she demanded that Abraham send her son away. She declared. Abraham was distressed but God told Abraham to do as his wife commanded because God's promise would be carried out through both Isaac and Ishmael. Early the next morning, Abraham brought Ishmael out together. Abraham gave Hagar bread and water sent them into the wilderness of Beersheba, she and her son wandered aimlessly until their water was consumed. In a moment of despair, she burst into tears. God came to rescue them; the angel opened Hagar's eyes and she saw a well of water. He told Hagar that God would "make a great nation" of Ishmael. Hagar found her son a wife from Egypt and they settled in the Desert of Paran.
According to the Baha'i Faith, the Báb was a descendant of Abraham and Hagar, God made a promise to spread Abraham's seed. The Baha'i Publishing House released a text on the wives and concubines of Abraham and traces their lineage to five different religions. In the New Testament, Paul the Apostle made Hagar's experience an allegory of the difference between law and grace in his Epistle to the Galatians chapter 4. Paul links the laws of the Torah, given on Mount Sinai, to the bondage of the Israelite people, implying that it was signified by Hagar's condition as a bondswoman, while the "free" heavenly Jerusalem is signified by Sarah and her child; the Biblical Mount Sinai has been referred to as "Agar" named after Hagar. Augustine of Hippo referred to Hagar as symbolizing an "earthly city", or sinful condition of humanity: "In the earthly city... we find two things, its own obvious presence and the symbolic presence of the heavenly city. New citizens are begotten to the earthly city by nature vitiated by sin but to the heavenly city by grace freeing nature from sin."
This view was expounded on by medieval theologians such as John Wycliffe. The latter compared the children of Sarah to the redeemed, those of Hagar to the unredeemed, who are "carnal by nature and mere exiles"; the story of Hagar demonstrates that survival is possible under harshest conditions. Hājar or Haajar, is the Arabic name used to identify the mother of Ismā ` īl. Although not mentioned by name in the Qur'an, she is referenced and alluded to via the story of her husband, she is a revered woman in the Islamic faith. According to Muslim belief, she was the Egyptian handmaiden of Ibrāhīm's first wife Sara, she settled in the Desert of Paran with her son Ismā'īl. Hājar is honoured as an important matriarch of monotheism, as it was through Ismā'īl that Muhammad would come. Neither Sara nor Hājar are mentioned by name in the Qur'an, but the story is traditionally understood to be referred to in a line from Ibrāhīm's prayer in Sura Ibrahim: "I have settled some of my family in a barren valley near your Sacred House."
While Hājar is not named, the reader lives Hājar's predicament indirectly through the eyes of Ibrāhīm. She is frequently mentioned in the books of hadiths. According to the Qisas Al-Anbiya, a collection of tales about the prophets, Hājar was the daughter of the King of Maghreb, a descendant of Salih, her father was killed by Pharaoh Dhu l-'arsh and she was captured and taken as a slave. Because of her royal blood, she was made mistress of the female slaves and given access to all of Pharaoh's wealth. Upon conversion to Ibrāhīm's faith, the Pharaoh gave Hājar to Sara. In this account, the name "Hājar" comes from Ha ajruka, Arabic for "here is your recompense". According to another tradition, Hājar was the daughter of the Egyptian king, who gave her to Ibrāhīm as a wife, thinking Sara was his sister. According to Ibn Abbas, Ismā'īl's birth to Hājar caused strife between her and Sara, still barren. Ibrāhīm brought Hājar and their son to a land called Paran-aram or