John Bordley Rawls was an American moral and political philosopher in the liberal tradition. Rawls received both the Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy and the National Humanities Medal in 1999, the latter presented by President Bill Clinton, in recognition of how Rawls's work "helped a whole generation of learned Americans revive their faith in democracy itself."In his 1990 introduction to the field, Will Kymlicka wrote that "it is accepted that the recent rebirth of normative political philosophy began with the publication of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice in 1971." Rawls has been described as the most important political philosopher of the 20th century. He has the unusual distinction among contemporary political philosophers of being cited by the courts of law in the United States and Canada and referred to by practising politicians in the United States and the United Kingdom. Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" recommends equal basic rights, equality of opportunity, promoting the interests of the least advantaged members of society.
Rawls's argument for these principles of social justice uses a thought experiment called the "original position", in which people select what kind of society they would choose to live under if they did not know which social position they would occupy. In his work Political Liberalism, Rawls turned to the question of how political power could be made legitimate given reasonable disagreement about the nature of the good life. Rawls was born in Baltimore, the second of five sons of William Lee Rawls, "one of the most prominent attorneys in Baltimore", Anna Abell Stump Rawls. Tragedy struck Rawls at a young age: Two of his brothers died in childhood because they had contracted fatal illnesses from him.... In 1928, the seven-year-old Rawls contracted diphtheria, his brother Bobby, younger by 20 months, was fatally infected. The next winter, Rawls contracted pneumonia. Another younger brother, caught the illness from him and died. Rawls's biographer Thomas Pogge calls the loss of the brothers the "most important events in John's childhood".
Rawls attended the Calvert School in Baltimore for six years, before transferring to the Kent School, an Episcopalian preparatory school in Connecticut. Upon graduation in 1939, Rawls attended Princeton University where he graduated summa cum laude and was accepted into The Ivy Club and the American Whig-Cliosophic Society. During his last two years at Princeton, he "became concerned with theology and its doctrines." He considered attending a seminary to study for the Episcopal priesthood and wrote an "intensely religious senior thesis." At Princeton, Rawls was influenced by Wittgenstein's student. He completed his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1943, enlisted in the Army in February of that year. During World War II, Rawls served as an infantryman in the Pacific, where he toured New Guinea and was awarded a Bronze Star. There, he lost his Christian faith. Following the surrender of Japan, Rawls became part of General MacArthur's occupying army and was promoted to sergeant, but he became disillusioned with the military when he saw the aftermath of the atomic blast in Hiroshima.
Rawls disobeyed an order to discipline a fellow soldier, believing no punishment was justified, was demoted back to private. Disenchanted, he left the military in January 1946. After his military service, Rawls became an atheist. In early 1946, Rawls returned to Princeton to pursue a doctorate in moral philosophy, he married Margaret Warfield Fox, a Brown University graduate, in 1949. They had four children, Anne Warfield, Robert Lee, Alexander Emory, Elizabeth Fox. After earning his PhD from Princeton in 1950, Rawls taught there until 1952 when he received a Fulbright Fellowship to Oxford University, where he was influenced by the liberal political theorist and historian Isaiah Berlin and the legal theorist H. L. A. Hart. After returning to the United States he served first as an assistant and associate professor at Cornell University. In 1962 he became a full professor of philosophy at Cornell, soon achieved a tenured position at MIT; that same year he moved to Harvard University, where he taught for forty years and where he trained some of the leading contemporary figures in moral and political philosophy, including Thomas Nagel, Allan Gibbard, Onora O'Neill, Adrian Piper, Elizabeth S. Anderson, Christine Korsgaard, Susan Neiman, Claudia Card, Thomas Pogge, T. M. Scanlon, Barbara Herman, Joshua Cohen, Thomas E. Hill Jr. Gurcharan Das, Andreas Teuber, Samuel Freeman and Paul Weithman.
He held the James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard. Rawls gave interviews and, having both a stutter and a "bat-like horror of the limelight", did not become a public intellectual despite his fame, he instead remained committed to his academic and family life. In 1995 he suffered the first of several strokes impeding his ability to continue to work, he was able to complete a book titled The Law of Peoples, the most complete statement of his views on international justice, shortly before his death in November 2002 published Justice As Fairness: A Restatement, a response to criticisms of A Theory of Justice. Rawls is buried at the Mount Auburn Cemetery in Massachusetts, he was survived by his wife, their four children, four grandchildren. Rawls published
Symmetry in everyday language refers to a sense of harmonious and beautiful proportion and balance. In mathematics, "symmetry" has a more precise definition, that an object is invariant to any of various transformations. Although these two meanings of "symmetry" can sometimes be told apart, they are related, so in this article they are discussed together. Mathematical symmetry may be observed with respect to the passage of time; this article describes symmetry from three perspectives: in mathematics, including geometry, the most familiar type of symmetry for many people. The opposite of symmetry is asymmetry. A geometric shape or object is symmetric if it can be divided into two or more identical pieces that are arranged in an organized fashion; this means that an object is symmetric if there is a transformation that moves individual pieces of the object but doesn't change the overall shape. The type of symmetry is determined by the way the pieces are organized, or by the type of transformation: An object has reflectional symmetry if there is a line going through it which divides it into two pieces which are mirror images of each other.
An object has rotational symmetry if the object can be rotated about a fixed point without changing the overall shape. An object has translational symmetry. An object has helical symmetry if it can be translated and rotated in three-dimensional space along a line known as a screw axis. An object contracted. Fractals exhibit a form of scale symmetry, where small portions of the fractal are similar in shape to large portions. Other symmetries include glide reflection rotoreflection symmetry. A dyadic relation R is only if, whenever it's true that Rab, it's true that Rba. Thus, "is the same age as" is symmetrical, for if Paul is the same age as Mary Mary is the same age as Paul. Symmetric binary logical connectives are and, or, nand and nor. Generalizing from geometrical symmetry in the previous section, we say that a mathematical object is symmetric with respect to a given mathematical operation, if, when applied to the object, this operation preserves some property of the object; the set of operations that preserve a given property of the object form a group.
In general, every kind of structure in mathematics will have its own kind of symmetry. Examples include and odd functions in calculus. In statistics, it appears as symmetric probability distributions, as skewness, asymmetry of distributions. Symmetry in physics has been generalized to mean invariance—that is, lack of change—under any kind of transformation, for example arbitrary coordinate transformations; this concept has become one of the most powerful tools of theoretical physics, as it has become evident that all laws of nature originate in symmetries. In fact, this role inspired the Nobel laureate PW Anderson to write in his read 1972 article More is Different that "it is only overstating the case to say that physics is the study of symmetry." See Noether's theorem. Important symmetries in physics include discrete symmetries of spacetime. In biology, the notion of symmetry is used explicitly to describe body shapes. Bilateral animals, including humans, are more or less symmetric with respect to the sagittal plane which divides the body into left and right halves.
Animals that move in one direction have upper and lower sides and tail ends, therefore a left and a right. The head becomes specialized with a mouth and sense organs, the body becomes bilaterally symmetric for the purpose of movement, with symmetrical pairs of muscles and skeletal elements, though internal organs remain asymmetric. Plants and sessile animals such as sea anemones have radial or rotational symmetry, which suits them because food or threats may arrive from any direction. Fivefold symmetry is found in the echinoderms, the group that includes starfish, sea urchins, sea lilies. In biology, the notion of symmetry is used as in physics, to say to describe the properties of the objects studied, including their interactions. A remarkable property of biological evolution is the changes of symmetry corresponding to the appearance of new parts and dynamics. Symmetry is important to chemistry because it undergirds all specific interactions between molecules in nature; the control of the symmetry of molecules produced in modern chemical synthesis contributes to the ability of scientists to offer the
Justice, in its broadest context, includes both the attainment of that, just and the philosophical discussion of that, just. The concept of justice is based on numerous fields, many differing viewpoints and perspectives including the concepts of moral correctness based on ethics, law, religion and fairness; the general discussion of justice is divided into the realm of social justice as found in philosophy and religion, procedural justice as found in the study and application of the law. The concept of justice differs in every culture. Early theories of justice were set out by the Ancient Greek philosophers Plato in his work The Republic, Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics. Throughout history various theories have been established. Advocates of divine command theory argue that justice issues from God. In the 1600s, theorists like John Locke argued for the theory of natural law. Thinkers in the social contract tradition argued that justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone concerned.
In the 1800s, utilitarian thinkers including John Stuart Mill argued that justice is what has the best consequences. Theories of distributive justice concern what is distributed, between whom they are to be distributed, what is the proper distribution. Egalitarians argued. John Rawls used a social contract argument to show that justice, distributive justice, is a form of fairness. Property rights theorists take a consequentialist view of distributive justice and argue that property rights-based justice maximizes the overall wealth of an economic system. Theories of retributive justice are concerned with punishment for wrongdoing. Restorative justice is an approach to justice that focuses on the needs of offenders. In his dialogue Republic, Plato uses Socrates to argue for justice that covers both the just person and the just City State. Justice is a harmonious relationship between the warring parts of the person or city. Hence, Plato's definition of justice is. A just man is a man in just the right place, doing his best and giving the precise equivalent of what he has received.
This applies both at the universal level. A person's soul has three parts – reason and desire. A city has three parts – Socrates uses the parable of the chariot to illustrate his point: a chariot works as a whole because the two horses' power is directed by the charioteer. Lovers of wisdom – philosophers, in one sense of the term – should rule because only they understand what is good. If one is ill, one goes to a medic rather than a farmer, because the medic is expert in the subject of health. One should trust one's city to an expert in the subject of the good, not to a mere politician who tries to gain power by giving people what they want, rather than what's good for them. Socrates uses the parable of the ship to illustrate this point: the unjust city is like a ship in open ocean, crewed by a powerful but drunken captain, a group of untrustworthy advisors who try to manipulate the captain into giving them power over the ship's course, a navigator, the only one who knows how to get the ship to port.
For Socrates, the only way the ship will reach its destination – the good – is if the navigator takes charge. Advocates of divine command theory argue that justice, indeed the whole of morality, is the authoritative command of God. Murder must be punished, for instance, because God says it so; some versions of the theory assert that God must be obeyed because of the nature of his relationship with humanity, others assert that God must be obeyed because he is goodness itself, thus doing what he says would be best for everyone. A meditation on the Divine command theory by Plato can be found in Euthyphro. Called the Euthyphro dilemma, it goes as follows: "Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God?" The implication is that if the latter is true justice is arbitrary. A response, popularized in two contexts by Immanuel Kant and C. S. Lewis, is that it is deductively valid to argue that the existence of an objective morality implies the existence of God and vice versa.
For advocates of the theory that justice is part of natural law, it involves the system of consequences that derives from any action or choice. In this, it is similar to the laws of physics: in the same way as the Third of Newton's laws of Motion requires that for every action there must be an equal and opposite reaction, justice requires according individuals or groups what they deserve, merit, or are entitled to. Justice, on this account, is a universal and absolute concept: laws, religions, etc. are attempts to codify that concept, sometimes with results that contradict the true nature of justice. In Republic by Plato, the character Thrasymachus argues that justice is the interest of the strong – a name for what the powerful or cunning ruler has imposed on the people. Advocates of the social contract agree that justice is derived from the mutual agreement of everyone concerned; this account is considered further below, under'Justice as fairness'. The absence of bias refers to an equal ground for all people
Alvin E. Roth
Alvin Elliot Roth is an American academic. He is the Craig and Susan McCaw professor of economics at Stanford University and the Gund professor of economics and business administration emeritus at Harvard University, he was President of the American Economics Association in 2017. Roth has made significant contributions to the fields of game theory, market design and experimental economics, is known for his emphasis on applying economic theory to solutions for "real-world" problems. In 2012, he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design". Alvin Roth graduated from Columbia University's School of Engineering and Applied Science in 1971 with a bachelor's degree in Operations Research, he moved to Stanford University, receiving both his Master's and PhD in Operations Research there in 1973 and 1974 respectively. After leaving Stanford, Roth went on to teach at the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign which he left in 1982 to become the Andrew W. Mellon professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh.
While at Pitt, he served as a fellow in the university's Center for Philosophy of Science and as a professor in the Katz Graduate School of Business. In 1998, Roth left to join the faculty at Harvard where he remained until deciding to return to Stanford in 2012. In 2013 he took emeritus status at Harvard. Roth is an Alfred P. Sloan fellow, a Guggenheim fellow, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he is a member of the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Econometric Society. In 2013, Roth and David Gale won a Golden Goose Award for their work on market design. A collection of Roth's papers is housed at the Rubenstein Library at Duke University. Roth has worked in the fields of game theory, market design, experimental economics. In particular, he helped redesign mechanisms for selecting medical residents, New York City high schools and Boston primary schools. Describing the dynamism of market design, Roth suggests that'As the conditions of the market change, the behavior of people change and that causes old rules to be discarded and new rules to be created'.
Roth's 1984 paper on the National Resident Matching Program highlighted the system designed by John Stalknaker and F. J. Mullen in 1952; the system was built on theoretical foundations independently introduced by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley in 1962. Roth proved that the NRMP was both stable and strategy-proof for unmarried residents but deferred to future study the question of how to match married couples efficiently. In 1999 Roth redesigned the matching program to ensure stable matches with married couples. Roth helped design the market to match New York City public school students to high schools as incoming freshmen; the school district had students mail in a list of their five preferred schools in rank order mailed a photocopy of that list to each of the five schools. As a result, schools could tell; this meant that some students had a choice of one school, rather than five. It meant that students had an incentive to hide their true preferences. Roth and his colleagues Atila Abdulkadiroğlu and Parag Pathak proposed David Gale and Lloyd Shapley's incentive-compatible student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm to the school board in 2003.
The school board accepted the measure as the method of selection for New York City public school students. Working with Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sonmez, Roth presented a similar measure to Boston's public school system in 2003. Here the Boston system gave so much preference to an applicant's first choice that were a student to not receive her first or second choice it was that she would not be matched with any school on her list and be administratively assigned to schools which had vacancies; some Boston parents had informally recognized this feature of the system and developed detailed lists in order to avoid having their children administratively assigned. Boston held public hearings on the school selection system and in 2005 settled on David Gale and Lloyd Shapley's incentive-compatible student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Roth is a founder of the New England Program for Kidney Exchange along with Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver, a registry and matching program that pairs compatible kidney donors and recipients.
The program was designed to operate through the use of two pairs of incompatible donors. Each donor was incompatible with her partner but could be compatible with another donor, incompatible with his partner. Francis Delmonico, a transplant surgeon at Harvard Medical School, describes a typical situation, Kidney exchange enables transplantation where it otherwise could not be accomplished, it overcomes the frustration of a biological obstacle to transplantation. For instance, a wife may need a kidney and her husband may want to donate, but they have a blood type incompatibility that makes donation impossible. Now they can do an exchange, and we've done them. Now we are working on a three-way exchange; because the National Organ Transplant Act forbids the creation of binding contracts for organ transplant, steps in the procedure had to be performed simultaneously. Two pairs of patients means four operating rooms and four surgical teams acting in concert with each other. Hospitals and professionals in the transplant community felt that the practical burden of three pairwise exchanges would be too large.
While the original theoretical work discovered that an "efficient frontier" would be reached with exchanges between three pair
Kenneth George "Ken" Binmore, is a British mathematician and game theorist. He is a Professor Emeritus of Economics at University College London and a Visiting Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Bristol, he is one of the founders of the modern economic theory of bargaining, has made important contributions to the foundations of game theory, experimental economics, evolutionary game theory, as well as to analytical philosophy. Binmore took up economics after a career in mathematics, during which he held the Chair of Mathematics at the London School of Economics. Since his switch to economics he has been at the forefront of developments in game theory, his other research interests include political and moral philosophy, decision theory, statistics. He is the author of 14 books, he studied mathematics at Imperial College London where he was awarded 1st class honours BSc with Governor's Prize, subsequently PhD. Binmore's major research contributions are to the theory of bargaining and its testing in the laboratory.
He is a pioneer of experimental economics. He began his experimental work in the 1980s when most economists thought that game theory would not work in the laboratory. Binmore and his collaborators established that game theory can predict the behaviour of experienced players well in laboratory settings in the case of human bargaining behaviour, a challenging case for game theory; this has brought him into conflict with some proponents of behavioural economics who emphasise the importance of other-regarding or social preferences, argue that their findings threaten traditional game theory. Binmore's work in political and moral philosophy began in the 1980s when he first applied bargaining theory to John Rawls' original position, his search for the philosophical foundations of the original position took him first to Kant's works, to Hume. Hume inspired Binmore to contribute to a naturalistic science of morals that seeks foundations for Rawlsian ideas about fairness norms in biological and social evolution.
The result was his two-volume Game Theory and the Social Contract, an ambitious attempt to lay the foundations for a genuine science of morals using the theory of games. In Game Theory and the Social Contract Binmore proposes a naturalistic reinterpretation of John Rawls' original position that reconciles his egalitarian theory of justice with John Harsanyi's utilitarian theory, his recent Natural Justice provides a nontechnical synthesis of this work. In 1995 Binmore became one of the founding directors of the Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, an interdisciplinary research centre involving economists, psychologists and mathematicians based at University College London. Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, ELSE pursues fundamental research on evolutionary and learning approaches to games and society, it applies its theoretical findings to practical problems in government and business. While the Director of ELSE, Binmore became known as the ‘poker-playing economic theorist’ who netted the British government £22 billion when he led the team that designed the third generation telecommunications auction in 2000.
He went on to design and implement 3G spectrum auctions in Belgium, Greece and Hong Kong. Binmore is Emeritus Professor of Economics at University College London, Visiting Emeritus Professor of Economics at the University of Bristol and Visiting Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics, he has held corresponding positions at the London School of Economics, the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Michigan. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, he was appointed a CBE in the New Year's Honours List 2001 for contributions to game theory and for his role in designing the UK's 3G telecommunications auctions. He was elected a Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2002. In 2007 he was appointed an Honorary Research Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Bristol and an Honorary Fellow of the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics.. Mathematical Analysis: A Straightforward Approach.
New York: Cambridge University Press.. Foundations of Analysis: Book 1: Logic and Numbers. Cambridge University Press.. Foundations of Analysis: Book 2: Topological Ideas. Cambridge University Press.. Economic Organizations As Games. Basil Blackwell.. The Economics of Bargaining. Basil Blackwell. A collection including many of Binmore's classic early papers on Nash bargaining theory.. Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory. Basil Blackwell. A collection which includes Binmore's seminal papers “Modeling Rational Players I and II” from Economics and Philosophy, 1987.. Fun and Games: A Text on Game Theory. D. C. Heath and Company. Game Theory and the Social Contract:. Volume 1: Playing Fair. Cambridge: MIT Press.. Volume 2: Just Playing. Cambridge: MIT Press.. Calculus: Concepts and Methods. Cambridge University Press.. Natural Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.. Playing for Real – A Text on Game Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.. Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge. MIT Press. A collection of Binmore's influential papers on bargaining experiments, with a newly written commentary addressing the challenges to game theory posed by the behavioural school of economics..
Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford
An extensive-form game is a specification of a game in game theory, allowing for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as "moves by nature"; some authors in introductory textbooks define the extensive-form game as being just a game tree with payoffs, add the other elements in subsequent chapters as refinements. Whereas the rest of this article follows this gentle approach with motivating examples, we present upfront the finite extensive-form games as constructed here; this general definition was introduced by Harold W. Kuhn in 1953, who extended an earlier definition of von Neumann from 1928. Following the presentation from Hart, an n-player extensive-form game thus consists of the following: A finite set of n players A rooted tree, called the game tree Each terminal node of the game tree has an n-tuple of payoffs, meaning there is one payoff for each player at the end of every possible play A partition of the non-terminal nodes of the game tree in n+1 subsets, one for each player, with a special subset for a fictitious player called Chance.
Each player's subset of nodes is referred to as the "nodes of the player". Each node of the Chance player has a probability distribution over its outgoing edges; each set of nodes of a rational player is further partitioned in information sets, which make certain choices indistinguishable for the player when making a move, in the sense that: there is a one-to-one correspondence between outgoing edges of any two nodes of the same information set—thus the set of all outgoing edges of an information set is partitioned in equivalence classes, each class representing a possible choice for a player's move at some point—, every path in the tree from the root to a terminal node can cross each information set at most once the complete description of the game specified by the above parameters is common knowledge among the playersA play is thus a path through the tree from the root to a terminal node. At any given non-terminal node belonging to Chance, an outgoing branch is chosen according to the probability distribution.
At any rational player's node, the player must choose one of the equivalence classes for the edges, which determines one outgoing edge except the player doesn't know which one is being followed. A pure strategy for a player thus consists of a selection—choosing one class of outgoing edges for every information set. In a game of perfect information, the information sets are singletons. It's less evident, it is assumed that each player has a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function defined for every game outcome. The above presentation, while defining the mathematical structure over which the game is played, elides however the more technical discussion of formalizing statements about how the game is played like "a player cannot distinguish between nodes in the same information set when making a decision"; these can be made precise using epistemic modal logic. A perfect information two-player game over a game tree can be represented as an extensive form game with outcomes. Examples of such games include tic-tac-toe and infinite chess.
A game over an expectminimax tree, like that of backgammon, has no imperfect information but has moves of chance. For example, poker has both moves of imperfect information. A complete extensive-form representation specifies: the players of a game for every player every opportunity they have to move what each player can do at each of their moves what each player knows for every move the payoffs received by every player for every possible combination of moves The game on the right has two players: 1 and 2; the numbers by every non-terminal node indicate. The numbers by every terminal node represent the payoffs to the players; the labels by every edge of the graph are the name of the action. The initial node belongs to player 1. Play according to the tree is as follows: player 1 chooses between U and D; the payoffs are as specified in the tree. There are four outcomes represented by the four terminal nodes of the tree:, and; the payoffs associated with each outcome are as follows, and. If player 1 plays D, player 2 will play U' to maximise their payoff and so player 1 will only receive 1.
However, if player 1 plays U, player 2 maximises their payoff by playing D' and player 1 receives 2. Player 1 prefers 2 to 1 and s
Focal point (game theory)
In game theory, a focal point is a solution that people will tend to use in the absence of communication, because it seems natural, special, or relevant to them. The concept was introduced by the Nobel Memorial Prize-winning American economist Thomas Schelling in his book The Strategy of Conflict. In this book, Schelling describes "focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do"; this type of focal point was named after Schelling. He further explains that such points are useful in negotiations, because we cannot trust our negotiating partners' words. In a simple example, two people unable to communicate with each other are each shown a panel of four squares and asked to select one. Three of the squares are blue and one is red. Assuming they each know nothing about the other player, but that they each do want to win the prize they will, both choose the red square; the red square is not in a sense a better square. The red square is the "right" square to select only if a player can be sure that the other player has selected it.
However, it is the most salient and notable square, so—lacking any other one—most people will choose it, this will in fact work. Schelling illustrated this concept with the following problem: "Tomorrow you have to meet a stranger in NYC. Where and when do you meet them?" This is a coordination game, where any time in the city could be an equilibrium solution. Schelling asked a group of students this question, found the most common answer was "noon at Grand Central Terminal". There is nothing that makes Grand Central Terminal a location with a higher payoff, but its tradition as a meeting place raises its salience and therefore makes it a natural "focal point". Focal points can have real-life applications. For example, imagine two bicycles headed towards each other and in danger of crashing. Avoiding collision becomes a coordination game where each player's winning choice depends on the other player's choice; each player in this case swerve to the left or swerve to the right. Both players want to avoid crashing.
In this case, the decision to swerve right can serve as a focal point which leads to the winning right-right outcome. It seems a natural focal point in places using right-hand traffic; this idea of anti-coordination game is apparent in the game of chicken, which involves two cars racing toward each other on a collision course and in which the driver who first decides to swerve is seen as a coward, while no driver swerving results in a fatal collision for both. After Schelling wrote about it, a number of experimental investigations have been performed on the efficacy of focal point in coordination situations and research has validated it. A review by Isoni et al. looked at studies that used the Battle of the Sexes game that showed players' preferences to more salient options. However, some studies have demonstrated that the power of focal point can be weakened by asymmetric payoff. In Crawford et al.'s 2008 study, subjects played coordination games in symmetric payoff and asymmetric payoff conditions.
While 90% of subjects in the symmetry condition were able to coordinate on the focal point, only 60% chose the more salient option in the slight asymmetry condition. This effect would become more profound as the asymmetry in payoffs become more exaggerated. Keynesian beauty contest Game theory Rare Entries Contests and Common Entries Contests, games of avoiding and seeking out focal points TED community experiment on focal / Schelling points