Category:Legal history of Colorado
Pages in category "Legal history of Colorado"
The following 13 pages are in this category, out of 13 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).
The following 13 pages are in this category, out of 13 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).
1. Brinkman v. Long – Brinkman v. Long and its companion case, McDaniel-Miccio v. Hickenlooper, are the lead state court cases on same-sex marriage in Colorado. S. Brinkman and McDaniel-Miccio have been appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court, after being denied a marriage license, a lesbian couple filed a lawsuit on October 30,2013 in the Seventeenth Judicial District. The case, Brinkman v. Long, seeks to overturn the constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. The couple was joined on February 18,2014, by nine other same-sex couples who filed a lawsuit, McDaniel-Miccio v. Hickenlooper, also in state district court, four of the couples are raising children, and five of the couples have married in other states. The suit named Governor John Hickenlooper and Denver City Clerk Debra Johnson as defendants, Hickenlooper responded by noting Colorados support for civil unions. Johnson said she supported marriage rights for same-sex couples but was obligated to follow the law by denying marriage licenses. Colorado Attorney General John Suthers, a Republican, announced he would defend the states ban, Brinkman and McDaniel-Miccio were combined for argument in state district court. Written motions for summary judgment were submitted by May 2,2014, a court hearing was held on June 16,2014 in Adams County before state District Judge C. Scott Crabtree, who was reported to be skeptical about the states position. The judge stayed his ruling pending the outcome of appeals, Colorado District Judge Andrew Hartmans decision in Colorado ex rel. Suthers v. Hall provided legal cover for the Boulder County clerk to issue marriage licenses as a form of civil disobedience. After Hartmans decision was handed down, the Denver County and Pueblo County clerks began issuing licenses to couples regardless of gender as well, when asked to enjoin the Denver County clerk from issuing licenses to same-sex couples, Judge Crabtree refused to take action. On July 14,2014, Colorado Attorney General Suthers appealed Judge Crabtrees inaction to the Colorado Supreme Court. In a separate filing, and seeking a reversal of Judge Hartmans ruling, in a July 18,2014 unanimous order issued en banc, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the attorney generals request for an emergency injunction—one which would have statewide effect. That rule grants the high power to issue a stay where the trial court … has failed to afford the relief which the applicant requested, Brinkman v. Colorado. On October 7, the Colorado Supreme Court lifted its injunction, LGBT rights in Colorado Recognition of same-sex unions in Colorado Same-sex marriage in Colorado Same-sex marriage in the United States
2. Colorado v. Bannister – Colorado v. Bannister,449 U. S.1, is a U. S. Supreme Court case concerning the automobile exception to constitutional protections against searches and seizures. In the early morning hours of October 15,1979, a Colorado Springs Police Officer observed a blue 1967 Pontiac GTO automobile moving along a road at a speed above the legal limit, the vehicle disappeared from the Officers sight before he could stop the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the officer heard a radio dispatch reporting that a theft of motor vehicle parts had occurred in the area he was patrolling in his car. The radio dispatch announced that a number of chrome lug nuts were among the items stolen, a few minutes later, the officer spotted the same automobile still speeding. He saw the car enter a station, and followed it there for the purpose of issuing a traffic citation to its driver. Upon approach of the car, both of its occupants exited, the officer observed chrome lug nuts in an open glove compartment located between the vehicles front bucket seats, as well as two lug wrenches on the floorboard of the back seat. These items were in view, illuminated by the lights of the service station. Because the respondent and his companion fit the description of those suspected of stealing motor vehicle parts and he then seized the lug nuts and wrenches from their automobile. Prior to trial, Bannister moved to suppress the contraband seized by the arresting officer, the trial court granted the motion, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed. The State subsequently filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, first, the stop of the Defendants was justified because the officer observed the occupants of the vehicle breaking the traffic laws. Finally, the seizure of the items was lawful because they were in plain view
3. Colorado v. Connelly – Francis Connelly approached a Denver police officer and expressed interest in talking about a murder that he committed. After being read his rights, Connelly continued to want to confess to the murder, the detective repeated Connellys rights again, but Connelly remained willing to discuss the murder. Connelly then waived his right to counsel, and described the details of the murder, soon afterwards, the court determined that Connelly was not of sound enough mind to stand trial, and was given six months of therapy. After the six months was completed, Connelly stood trial, during the trial, the psychiatrist that evaluated Connelly testified that he believed that God told him to confess to the murder, or commit suicide. The lower court ruled that Connellys waiver of his Miranda rights was made when he was incompetent due to his mental illness, the case then went to the Colorado Supreme Court, where the local courts decision was upheld. The evidence of Connellys confession was suppressed under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Courts decision to suppress the evidence, stating that there was no violation of the due process clause. Before Connelly the test was whether the confession was voluntary considering the totality of the circumstances, voluntary carried its everyday meaning, the confession had to be a product of the exercise of the defendants free will rather than police coercion. After Connelly the totality of circumstances test is not even triggered unless the defendant can show coercive police conduct, G. Colorado v. Connelly, Is Free Will No Longer a Criteria for the Voluntariness of an Accuseds Waiver and Confession Under Miranda. A review and update on the practice of evaluating Miranda comprehension
4. Hill v. Colorado – Hill v. Colorado,530 U. S.703, was a United States Supreme Court decision. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the majority of the court and its interest is to protect citizens entering or exiting a medical facility from unwanted communication. This law does not prevent patients from being communicated with entirely, however, it does allow them to better avoid situations in which they wish to not listen to the message of speakers. Even though speakers have a right to persuade, this cannot extend to unwilling listeners because people also have a right “to be let alone. ”As was explained in Ward v. Rock Against Racism and this is specifically important in time, place and manner legislation. It is content neutral because it does not regulate speech, just one arena for speech, no matter what message a person is trying to convey, this statute would apply. This legislation is not viewpoint based simply because it was enacted in response to issues being raised by a certain viewpoint and this legislation is narrowly tailored to meet the Ward requirements. This statute does not completely prevent demonstrators from getting their points heard, citizens may still yell, hold signs and convince from eight feet away. The only thing that is seriously impeded is their ability to distribute literature, however, demonstrators can still hand out leaflets to willing recipients. Protecting the well being of patients entering or exiting healthcare facilities is specifically targeted by this legislation because they are likely to be emotionally and physically vulnerable. “Prior restraint” arguments claiming that Colorado is putting a prior restraint on constitutionally protected speech are wrong, prior restraint is only an issue in government censorship cases where in this case individuals can choose to deny or permit communication. Justices David Souter, Sandra Day O’Connor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer, concurring, This legislation seeks to prevent unwanted approaching, not speech. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissenting, This law is not content neutral as it is only being applied to abortion clinics. Protecting citizens from unwanted speech is not a state interest. The amount of actually being covered by this statute is very large if one considers the extensive amount of healthcare facilities there are. So, speech is being restricted very significantly and this law removes one of the few outlets in which peaceful and civil pro-life citizens could get their point across to women considering abortion, now only inappropriate bullying groups will be heard. This opinion of the court is in conflict with other First Amendment restriction cases, the only reason the Court is changing now is because the messages are not content neutral – it is about abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy dissenting, This legislation is definitely content based and is in violation of the First Amendment. Hecklers veto McCullen v. Coakley,573 U. S. ___ Hill v. Colorado,530 U. S.703,735, text of Hill v. Colorado,530 U. S.703 is available from, Findlaw Justia
5. Londoner v. City and County of Denver – Londoner v. City and County of Denver,210 U. S.373, is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that Due Process rights under the U. S. Constitution attach to administrative agency hearings that involve adjudication, but not to those that involve legislation, Due Process protections attach to government agency activities that are adjudicative in nature, but not to activities that are legislative in nature. The provisions of the Denver city charter confer upon the city the power to make local improvements, londoner was provided with notice of the assessment, but there was no opportunity for a hearing, the notice only fixed a deadline for the filing of complaints and objection. Londoner brought suit against the city challenging the assessment of a tax for the cost of paving the street abutting his property on the grounds that he was denied due process of law. Where a tax is to be assessed upon property owners, do those affected by the tax have the right to argue their side, the Due Process protections of the 14th Amendment of the U. S. Constitution require a hearing and opportunity to be heard whenever the government wishes to violate a citizens life, liberty, Due Process rights attach to governmental activities that are adjudicative in nature, but not to activities that are legislative in nature. In the context of taxation, a body has the power to tax without affording citizens due process protections. These due process protections do not require a trial. Due process in this context requires at least an opportunity to be heard in person, therefore, the action violated Due Process, and the liens were void. This case is one of the earliest to establish when an agency rulemaking process must submit to adjudication, while administrative agencies have wide discretion within the rulemaking context, there are many instances in which adjudication is required. Where complaints are particularized and specific facts are at issue, adjudication is preferable since it is within a judges expertise to matters involving personal rights. Here, the law of Colorado denied landowners post-deprivation hearings, the right to be heard after an assessment of taxes had been made