A contract is a legally-binding agreement which recognises and governs the rights and duties of the parties to the agreement. A contract is enforceable because it meets the requirements and approval of the law. An agreement involves the exchange of goods, money, or promises of any of those. In the event of breach of contract, the law awards the injured party access to legal remedies such as damages and cancellation. In the Anglo-American common law, formation of a contract requires an offer, consideration, a mutual intent to be bound; each party must have capacity to enter the contract. Although most oral contracts are binding, some types of contracts may require formalities such as being in writing or by deed. In the civil law tradition, contract law is a branch of the law of obligations. At common law, the elements of a contract are offer, intention to create legal relations and legality of both form and content. Not all agreements are contractual, as the parties must be deemed to have an intention to be bound.
A so-called gentlemen's agreement is one, not intended to be enforceable, "binding in honour only". In order for a contract to be formed, the parties must reach mutual assent; this is reached through offer and an acceptance which does not vary the offer's terms, known as the "mirror image rule". An offer is a definite statement of the offeror's willingness to be bound should certain conditions be met. If a purported acceptance does vary the terms of an offer, it is not an acceptance but a counteroffer and, therefore a rejection of the original offer; the Uniform Commercial Code disposes of the mirror image rule in §2-207, although the UCC only governs transactions in goods in the USA. As a court cannot read minds, the intent of the parties is interpreted objectively from the perspective of a reasonable person, as determined in the early English case of Smith v Hughes, it is important to note that where an offer specifies a particular mode of acceptance, only an acceptance communicated via that method will be valid.
Contracts may be unilateral. A bilateral contract is an agreement in which each of the parties to the contract makes a promise or set of promises to each other. For example, in a contract for the sale of a home, the buyer promises to pay the seller $200,000 in exchange for the seller's promise to deliver title to the property; these common contracts take place in the daily flow of commerce transactions, in cases with sophisticated or expensive precedent requirements, which are requirements that must be met for the contract to be fulfilled. Less common are unilateral contracts in which one party makes a promise, but the other side does not promise anything. In these cases, those accepting the offer are not required to communicate their acceptance to the offeror. In a reward contract, for example, a person who has lost a dog could promise a reward if the dog is found, through publication or orally; the payment could be additionally conditioned on the dog being returned alive. Those who learn of the reward are not required to search for the dog, but if someone finds the dog and delivers it, the promisor is required to pay.
In the similar case of advertisements of deals or bargains, a general rule is that these are not contractual offers but an "invitation to treat", but the applicability of this rule is disputed and contains various exceptions. The High Court of Australia stated that the term unilateral contract is "unscientific and misleading". In certain circumstances, an implied contract may be created. A contract is implied in fact if the circumstances imply that parties have reached an agreement though they have not done so expressly. For example, John Smith, a former lawyer may implicitly enter a contract by visiting a doctor and being examined. A contract, implied in law is called a quasi-contract, because it is not in fact a contract. Quantum meruit claims are an example. Where something is advertised in a newspaper or on a poster, the advertisement will not constitute an offer but will instead be an invitation to treat, an indication that one or both parties are prepared to negotiate a deal. An exception arises if the advertisement makes a unilateral promise, such as the offer of a reward, as in the famous case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, decided in nineteenth-century England.
The company, a pharmaceutical manufacturer, advertised a smoke ball that would, if sniffed "three times daily for two weeks", prevent users from catching the'flu. If the smoke ball failed to prevent'flu, the company promised that they would pay the user £100, adding that they had "deposited £1,000 in the Alliance Bank to show our sincerity in the matter"; when Mrs Carlill sued for the money, the company argued the advert should not be taken as a serious binding offer. Although an invitation to treat cannot be accepted, it should not be ignored, for it may affect the offer. For instance, where an offer is made in response to an invitation to treat, the offer may incorporate the terms of the invitation to treat. If, as in the Boots case, the offer is made by an action without any
Nationality is a legal relationship between an individual person and a state. Nationality affords the state jurisdiction over the person and affords the person the protection of the state. What these rights and duties are varies from state to state. By custom and international conventions, it is the right of each state to determine who its nationals are; such determinations are part of nationality law. In some cases, determinations of nationality are governed by public international law—for example, by treaties on statelessness and the European Convention on Nationality. Nationality differs technically and from citizenship, a different legal relationship between a person and a country; the noun national can include both non-citizens. The most common distinguishing feature of citizenship is that citizens have the right to participate in the political life of the state, such as by voting or standing for election. However, in most modern countries all nationals are citizens of the state, full citizens are always nationals of the state.
In older texts, the word nationality rather than ethnicity used to refer to an ethnic group. This older meaning of nationality is not defined by political borders or passport ownership and includes nations that lack an independent state. Individuals may be considered nationals of groups with autonomous status that have ceded some power to a larger government. Nationality is the status that allows a nation to grant rights to the subject and to impose obligations upon the subject. In most cases, no rights or obligations are automatically attached to this status, although the status is a necessary precondition for any rights and obligations created by the state. In European law, nationality is the status or relationship that gives a nation the right to protect a person from other nations. Diplomatic and consular protection are dependent upon this relationship between the person and the state. A person's status as being the national of a country is used to resolve the conflict of laws. Within the broad limits imposed by few treaties and international law, states may define who are and are not their nationals.
However, since the Nottebohm case, other states are only required to respect claim by a state to protect an alleged national if the nationality is based on a true social bond. In the case of dual nationality, states may determine the most effective nationality for a person, to determine which state's laws are most relevant. There are limits on removing a person's status as a national. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "Everyone has the right to a nationality," and "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality." Nationals have the right to enter or return to the country they belong to. Passports are issued to nationals of a state, rather than only to citizens, because the passport is the travel document used to enter the country. However, nationals may not have the right of abode in the countries passports. Conceptually, citizenship is focused on the internal political life of the state and nationality is a matter of international dealings.
In the modern era, the concept of full citizenship encompasses not only active political rights, but full civil rights and social rights. Nationality is a necessary but not sufficient condition to exercise full political rights within a state or other polity. Nationality is required for full citizenship, some people have no nationality in international law. A person, denied full citizenship or nationality is called a stateless person; the most significant difference between a national and a citizen is that the citizen has the right to vote for elected officials, to be elected. This distinction between full citizenship and other, lesser relationships goes back to antiquity; until the 19th and 20th centuries, it was typical for only a small percentage of people who belonged to a city or state to be full citizens. In the past, most people were excluded from citizenship on the basis of gender, socioeconomic class, ethnicity and other factors. However, they held a legal relationship with their government akin to the modern concept of nationality.
United States nationality law defines some persons born in U. S. outlying possessions as U. S. not citizens. British nationality law defines six classes of British national, among which "British citizen" is one class. In the Republic of China known as Taiwan, the status of national without household registration applies to people who have Republic of China nationality, but do not have an automatic entitlement to enter or reside in the Taiwan Area, do not qualify for civic rights and duties there. Under the nationality laws of Mexico and some other Latin American countries, nationals do not become citizens until they turn 18. Nationality is sometimes used as an alternative word for ethnicity or national origin, just as some people assume that citizenship and nationality are identical. In some countries, the cognate word for nationality in local language may be understood as a synonym of ethnicity or as an identifier of cultural and family-based self-determination, rather than on relations with a state or current government.
For example, some Kurds say that they have Kurdish nationality
Hague Conference on Private International Law
The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an intergovernmental organisation in the area of private international law, that administers several international conventions and soft law instruments. The Hague Conference was first convened by Tobias Asser in 1893 in The Hague. In 1911, Asser received the Nobel Prize for Peace for his work in the field of private international law, in particular for his achievements with respect to the HCCH. After World War II, the Hague Conference was established as an international organisation. On the initiative of Tobias Asser, the First Diplomatic Session of the HCCH was convoked in 1893, its aim was, remains, to "work for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law", including by creating, assisting in the implementation of, multilateral conventions that promote the harmonisation of the rules and principles of private international law. The First to Fourth Diplomatic Session of the HCCH took place in 1893, 1894, 1900 and 1904 respectively.
They resulted in a number of multilateral treaties, the Hague Conventions, that unified the rules of private international law in the areas of Marriage, Guardianship, Civil Procedure, Effects of Marriage, Deprivation of Civil Rights. After World War I, the Fifth and Sixth Diplomatic Sessions took place in 1928 respectively; the result of those Diplomatic Sessions was the Protocol to recognize the competence of the Permanent Court of International Justice to interpret the Hague Conventions on Private International Law. After World War II, steps were taken to establish the HCCH as an intergovernmental organisation, governed by its Member States and administered by a secretariat, the Permanent Bureau; the treaty establishing the HCCH, the "Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law", was adopted during the Seventh Diplomatic Session of the HCCH in 1951, entered into force on 15 July 1955. The acronym "HCCH" is derived from using the respective capitals of the phrases "Hague Conference" and "Conférence de La Haye".
It represents the bilingual nature of the HCCH, which has both English and French as its working languages. As of November 2017, the Membership of the HCCH comprises 82 Member States. In addition, since 2007, the Membership comprises one Regional Economic Integration Organisation: the European Union; the Member States contribute to the expenses of the HCCH through their assessed contributions, which are due annually. The EU contributes on the basis of contributions that are agreed; the "Regulations on Financial Matters and Budgetary Practices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law provide the details in this regard. Membership in the HCCH is not a precondition for signing, ratifying or acceding to one or more Hague Conventions, a total of 68 non member states are parties to one or more convention. HCCH identifies them as "connected states"; the HCCH acts through a number of governing bodies. The Council on General Affairs and Policy is composed of all Members, it is in charge of the operation of the HCCH and its meetings are held annually.
Through the HCCH's secretariat, the Permanent Bureau, the Council on General Affairs and Policy ensures such operation, including by establishing the HCCH's work programme. The Council of Diplomatic Representatives, composed of all Member States, is the supreme financial and budgetary authority of the Conference and exercises oversight of the financial administration of the Conference. Other bodies include the Netherlands Standing Government Committee, the Special Commissions, the Diplomatic Sessions; the secretariat of the HCCH, the Permanent Bureau, is established by the Statute of the HCCH. Under the direction of the HCCH's highest governing body, the Council on General Affairs and Policy, the Permanent Bureau is charged with the preparation and organisation of the Sessions of the Hague Conference and the meetings of the Council and of any Special Commissions; the Permanent Bureau operates three offices, including the organisation's headquarters in The Hague, as well as its regional offices in Buenos Aires and Hong Kong SAR.
Since 1955, the HCCH developed 38 international conventions and protocols that establish rules on jurisdiction, applicable law, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, on legal and judicial cooperation. They are open for adoption, accession or ratification by any State, including States that are not members of HCCH. In 2015, the HCCH adopted its first soft-law instrument, the Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts; the HCCH's instruments cover subject matters in the area of family law and child protection, international civil procedure and legal cooperation, as well as cross-border commercial and finance law. These areas are referred to as the "three pillars" of the HCCH; the following HCCH conventions are the most ratified: The abolition of legalisation Service of process Taking of evidence abroad International child abduction Intercountry adoption Maintenance obligations Choice of Court Agreements Securities held with intermediaries The law applicable to trusts The HCCH has developed several tools in order to aid in the application of its Conventions.
INCADAT is a legal database on international child abduction law containing case summaries and legal analysis of the application of the 1980 Child Abduction Convention. The website provides additional material relev
In law, common law is that body of law derived from judicial decisions of courts and similar tribunals. The defining characteristic of "common law" is. In cases where the parties disagree on what the law is, a common law court looks to past precedential decisions of relevant courts, synthesizes the principles of those past cases as applicable to the current facts. If a similar dispute has been resolved in the past, the court is bound to follow the reasoning used in the prior decision. If, the court finds that the current dispute is fundamentally distinct from all previous cases, legislative statutes are either silent or ambiguous on the question, judges have the authority and duty to resolve the issue; the court states an opinion that gives reasons for the decision, those reasons agglomerate with past decisions as precedent to bind future judges and litigants. Common law, as the body of law made by judges, stands in contrast to and on equal footing with statutes which are adopted through the legislative process, regulations which are promulgated by the executive branch.
Stare decisis, the principle that cases should be decided according to consistent principled rules so that similar facts will yield similar results, lies at the heart of all common law systems. The common law—so named because it was "common" to all the king's courts across England—originated in the practices of the courts of the English kings in the centuries following the Norman Conquest in 1066; the British Empire spread the English legal system to its historical colonies, many of which retain the common law system today. These "common law systems" are legal systems that give great precedential weight to common law, to the style of reasoning inherited from the English legal system. Today, one-third of the world's population lives in common law jurisdictions or in systems mixed with civil law, including Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Cameroon, Cyprus, Fiji, Grenada, Hong Kong, Ireland, Jamaica, Liberia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Namibia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Tobago, the United Kingdom, the United States, Zimbabwe.
Some of these countries have variants on common law systems. The term common law has many connotations; the first three set out here are the most-common usages within the legal community. Other connotations from past centuries are sometimes seen and are sometimes heard in everyday speech; the first definition of "common law" given in Black's Law Dictionary, 10th edition, 2014, is "The body of law derived from judicial decisions, rather than from statutes or constitutions. This usage is given as the first definition in modern legal dictionaries, is characterized as the “most common” usage among legal professionals, is the usage seen in decisions of courts. In this connotation, "common law" distinguishes the authority. For example, the law in most Anglo-American jurisdictions includes "statutory law" enacted by a legislature, "regulatory law" or “delegated legislation” promulgated by executive branch agencies pursuant to delegation of rule-making authority from the legislature, common law or "case law", i.e. decisions issued by courts.
This first connotation can be further differentiated into pure common law arising from the traditional and inherent authority of courts to define what the law is in the absence of an underlying statute or regulation. Examples include most criminal law and procedural law before the 20th century, today, most contract law and the law of torts. Interstitial common law court decisions that analyze and determine the fine boundaries and distinctions in law promulgated by other bodies; this body of common law, sometimes called "interstitial common law", includes judicial interpretation of the Constitution, of legislative statutes, of agency regulations, the application of law to specific facts. Publication of decisions, indexing, is essential to the development of common law, thus governments and private publishers publish law reports. While all decisions in common law jurisdictions are precedent, some become "leading cases" or "landmark decisions" that are cited often. Black's Law Dictionary 10th Ed. definition 2, differentiates "common law" jurisdictions and legal systems from "civil law" or "code" jurisdictions.
Common law systems place great weight on court decisions, which are considered "law" with the same force of law as statutes—for nearly a millennium, common law courts have had the authority to make law where no legislative statute exists, statutes mean what courts interpret them to mean. By contrast, in civil law jurisdictions, courts lack authority to act. Civil law judges tend to give less weight to judicial precedent, which means that a
American Law Institute
The American Law Institute was established in 1923 to promote the clarification and simplification of United States common law and its adaptation to changing social needs. Members of ALI include law professors, attorneys and other professionals in the legal industry. ALI writes documents known as "treatises", which are summaries of state common law Many courts and legislatures look to ALI's treatises as authoritative reference material concerning many legal issues. However, some legal experts and the late Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia have voiced concern about ALI rewriting the law as they want it to be instead of as it is; the ALI drafts and publishes Restatements of the Law, Principles of the Law, model codes, other proposals for law reform. The ALI is headquartered in Pennsylvania. At any time, ALI is engaged in up to 20 projects examining the law; some current projects have been watched by the media the revision of the Model Penal Code Sexual Assault provisions. The American Law Institute was founded in 1923 on the initiative of William Draper Lewis, Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, following a study by a group of prominent American judges and teachers who sought to address the uncertain and complex nature of early 20th century American law.
According to the "Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law," part of the law's uncertainty stemmed from the lack of agreement on fundamental principles of the common-law system, while the law's complexity was attributed to the numerous variations within different jurisdictions. The Committee recommended that a perpetual society be formed to improve the law and the administration of justice in a scholarly and scientific manner; the organization was incorporated on February 23, 1923, at a meeting called by the Committee in the auditorium of Memorial Continental Hall in Washington, D. C. According to ALI's Certificate of Incorporation, its purpose is "to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, to encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work". Membership in the American Law Institute is limited to 3,000 elected members who are judges and legal scholars from a wide range of practice areas, from all areas of the United States and from many foreign countries.
The total membership of more than 4,200 includes ex officio members and life members who, after 25 years as an elected member, are no longer required to pay dues. New members must be proposed by an existing member, who writes a letter of recommendation, seconded by two others. Proposals are evaluated by a Membership Committee that selects members based on several factors, including professional achievement, personal character, demonstrated interest in improving the law. ALI members support the work of the Institute, including attending Annual Meetings and other project conferences, joining Members Consultative Groups for Institute projects, submitting comments on project drafts. Members are asked to write and vote on the basis of their own personal and professional convictions, without regard to client interests, so as to maintain ALI's respected reputation for thoughtful and impartial analysis; the Institute is governed by its Council, a volunteer board of directors that oversees the management of ALI's business and projects.
Having no fewer than 42 and no more than 65 members, the Council consists of lawyers and academics, reflects a broad range of specialties and experiences. George W. Wickersham George Wharton Pepper Harrison Tweed Norris Darrell R. Ammi Cutter Roswell B. Perkins Charles Alan Wright Michael Traynor Roberta Cooper Ramo David F. Levi William Draper Lewis Herbert Funk Goodrich Herbert Wechsler Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. Lance Liebman Richard Revesz Restatements are codifications of case law, common law judge-made doctrines that develop over time because of the principle of stare decisis. Although Restatements are not binding authority in and of themselves, they are persuasive because they are formulated over several years with extensive input from law professors, practicing attorneys, judges, they are meant to reflect the consensus of the American legal community as to. All told, the Restatement of the Law is one of the most respected and well-used sources of secondary authority, covering nearly every area of common law.
Restatements are addressed to courts and aim at clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements, reflect the law as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a court. Although Restatements aspire toward the precision of statutory language, they are intended to reflect the flexibility and capacity for development and growth of the common law; that is why they are phrased in the descriptive terms of a judge announcing the law to be applied in a given case rather than in the mandatory terms of a statute. ALI completed the Fourth Restatement of U. S. Foreign Relations Law and the Principles of Election Administration. Beginning with the Principles of Corporate Governance, the American Law Institute has more undertaken intensive studies of areas of law thought to need reform; this type of analysis results in a publication that recommends changes in the law. Principles of the Law issued so far include volumes on Aggrega
Sovereignty is the full right and power of a governing body over itself, without any interference from outside sources or bodies. In political theory, sovereignty is a substantive term designating supreme authority over some polity; the term arises from the unattested Vulgar Latin's *superanus, meaning "chief", "ruler". Its spelling, which varied from the word's first appearance in English in the fourteenth century, was influenced by the English "reign"; the concepts of sovereignty have been discussed throughout history, are still debated. Its definition and application has changed throughout during the Age of Enlightenment; the current notion of state sovereignty contains four aspects consisting of territory, population and recognition. According to Stephen D. Krasner, the term could be understood in four different ways: domestic sovereignty – actual control over a state exercised by an authority organized within this state, interdependence sovereignty – actual control of movement across state's borders, assuming the borders exist, international legal sovereignty – formal recognition by other sovereign states, Westphalian sovereignty – lack of other authority over state other than the domestic authority.
These four aspects all appear together, but this is not the case – they are not affected by one another, there are historical examples of states that were non-sovereign in one aspect while at the same time being sovereign in another of these aspects. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, another fundamental feature of sovereignty is that it is a claim that must be recognised by others if it is to have any meaning: The Roman jurist Ulpian observed that: The people transferred all their imperium and power to the Emperor. Cum lege regia, quae de imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem conferat The emperor is not bound by the laws. Princeps legibus. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem. Ulpian was expressing the idea that the Emperor exercised a rather absolute form of sovereignty, that originated in the people, although he did not use the term expressly. Ulpian's statements were known in medieval Europe, but sovereignty was an important concept in medieval times.
Medieval monarchs were not sovereign, at least not so, because they were constrained by, shared power with, their feudal aristocracy. Furthermore, both were constrained by custom. Sovereignty existed during the Medieval period as the de jure rights of nobility and royalty, in the de facto capability of individuals to make their own choices in life. Around c. 1380–1400, the issue of feminine sovereignty was addressed in Geoffrey Chaucer's Middle English collection of Canterbury Tales in The Wife of Bath's Tale. A English Arthurian romance, The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnell, uses many of the same elements of the Wife of Bath's tale, yet changes the setting to the court of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table; the story revolves around the knight Sir Gawain granting to Dame Ragnell, his new bride, what is purported to be wanted most by women: sovereignty. We desire most From men both lund and poor, To have sovereignty without lies. For where we have sovereignty, all is ours, Though a knight be so fierce, And win mastery.
It is our desire to have master Over such a sir. Such is our purpose. Sovereignty reemerged as a concept in the late 16th century, a time when civil wars had created a craving for stronger central authority, when monarchs had begun to gather power onto their own hands at the expense of the nobility, the modern nation state was emerging. Jean Bodin in reaction to the chaos of the French wars of religion, presented theories of sovereignty calling for strong central authority in the form of absolute monarchy. In his 1576 treatise Les Six Livres de la République Bodin argued that it is inherent in the nature of the state that sovereignty must be: Absolute: On this point he said that the sovereign must be hedged in with obligations and conditions, must be able to legislate without his subjects' consent, must not be bound by the laws of his predecessors, could not, because it is illogical, be bound by his own laws. Perpetual: Not temporarily delegated as to a strong leader in an emergency or to a state employee such as a magistrate.
He held that sovereignty must be perpetual because anyone with the power to enforce a time limit on the governing power must be above the governing power, which would be impossible if the governing power is absolute. Bodin rejected the notion of transference of sovereignty from people to the ruler, and the sovereign is not above natural law. He is above only positive law, he emphasized that a sovereign is bound to observe certain basic rules derived from the divine law, the law of nature or reason, the law, common to all nations, as well as the fundamental laws of the state that determine, the sovereign, who succeeds to sovereignty, what limits the sovereign power. Thus, Bodin’s sovereign was restricted by the constitutional law of the state and by the higher law, considered as binding upon every human being; the fact that the sovereign must obey divine and natural law imposes ethical constraints on him. Bodin held that the lois royales, the fun
Forum selection clause
A forum selection clause in a contract with a conflict of laws element allows the parties to agree that any disputes relating to that contract will be resolved in a specific forum. They operate in conjunction with a choice of law clause which determines the proper law of the relevant contract. There are three principal types of clause: that all disputes must be litigated in a particular court in a jurisdiction agreed upon by the parties. A simple forum selection clause covering both the proper law of the contract and the forum for resolving disputes might read: “This contract is governed by the laws of England and any dispute shall be resolved by the English courts.”Where the clause chooses a particular jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes, it may do so either as an exclusive jurisdiction clause or a non-exclusive jurisdiction clause. An exclusive jurisdiction clause mandates that all disputes must be resolved by a particular court, whereas a non-exclusive clause confirms that a particular court may be used by the relevant parties, but does not preclude a party from commencing proceedings in another court if they wish to do so.
In many cross-border contracts, the forum for resolving disputes may not be the same as the country whose law governs the contract. And the contract may provide for a staged procedure for resolving disputes. For example: “1; this agreement shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of England. 2. The parties shall endeavour to settle any dispute that arises by direct negotiation between their managing directors or similar senior executives but if direct negotiation does not result in a resolution of the dispute, either Party may require that it be referred to mediation in accordance with the CEDR Mediation Rules at present in force. 3. Any dispute, not settled by direct negotiation or by mediation shall be settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators appointed in accordance with the said Rules.” The choice of law stage in a conflict case requires the forum court to decide which of several competing laws should be applied to resolve the dispute.
In this, there is an important distinction to be made between a forum selection clause and a choice of law clause. As an application of the public policy of freedom of contract, the parties are free to nominate the proper law under which all relevant disputes will be resolved. If there is an express selection, this choice will be respected so long as it is made bona fide, i.e. the subjective intention prevails unless the purpose is to: evade the operation of some mandatory provisions of a relevant law, there was an element of fraud or duress or undue influence involved in the signing of the contract, or there was some other evidence of mala fides. But, if the parties do no more than nominate a forum, this is no more than an indication that they intend that forum's law to apply. There are many reasons why parties may select a forum: the forum has established significant expertise in the relevant areas of law, e.g. shipping, carriage by air, etc.. If the parties have selected a jurisdiction as the place for the resolution of a dispute, the implication is that the courts may apply their lex fori which includes their general choice of law principles.
Thus, in the ordinary course of legal events, the forum court may identify and apply a foreign law as the proper law. The majority of professionally drafted contracts will address both issues, contain clauses specifying both the forum and the law to be applied therein; the fact that the particular contract only specifies the forum therefore becomes revealing as implying that the parties intended to leave the choice of law issue to the forum nominated. Forum selection clauses have been criticised by a minority of courts as improper attempts to divest them of personal jurisdiction over the parties; because of this, some jurisdictions refuse to give effect to these clauses, declaring them to be void as against public policy. However, most jurisdictions now recognise and enforce forum selection clauses, so long as the parties were acting in good faith. Although most contractual clauses are enforced by way of either an award of damages for breach or by an injunction to restrain breach, the operation of jurisdiction clauses tends to operate at the interlocutory stage of a dispute.
The existence of a jurisdiction clause in an agreement will operate to enable a court to take jurisdiction in a particular matter, or may provide strong grounds for another court to decline jurisdiction. Such clauses are sometimes enforced against proceedings in foreign courts by use of an anti-suit injunction. Although it is theoretically possible to sue for damages for bringing proceedings in breach of a jurisdiction clause, examples are rare. In