Eric Stark Maskin is an American economist and 2007 Nobel laureate recognized with Leonid Hurwicz and Roger Myerson "for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory". He is the Adams University Professor at Harvard University; until 2011, he was the Albert O. Hirschman Professor of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, a visiting lecturer with the rank of professor at Princeton University. Maskin was born in New York City on December 12, 1950, into a Jewish family, spent his youth in Alpine, New Jersey, he graduated from Tenafly High School in Tenafly, New Jersey, in 1968, attended Harvard University, where he earned A. B.. He continued to earn a Ph. D. in applied mathematics at the same institution. In 1975-76, he was a visiting student at Cambridge University. In 1976, after earning his doctorate, Maskin became a research fellow at Jesus College, Cambridge University. In the following year, he joined the faculty at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 1985 he returned to Harvard as the Louis Berkman Professor of Economics, where he remained until 2000.
That year, he moved to the Institute for Advanced Study in New Jersey. In addition to his position at the Princeton Institute, Maskin is the director of the Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory at The Institute for Advanced Studies at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 2010, he was conferred an Honorary Doctoral Degree in Economics from The University of Cambodia. In 2011, Maskin has returned to Harvard again. Maskin has worked in diverse areas of economic theory, such as game theory, the economics of incentives, contract theory, he is well known for his papers on mechanism design/implementation theory and dynamic games. His current research projects include comparing different electoral rules, examining the causes of inequality, studying coalition formation, he is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Econometric Society, the European Economic Association, a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He was president of the Econometric Society in 2003. In September 2017, Maskin received the title of HEC Paris Honoris Causa Professor.
Maskin suggested. Software and computer industries have been innovative despite weak patent protection, he argued. Innovation in those industries has been sequential and complementary, so competition can increase firms' future profits. In such a dynamic industry, "patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare". A natural experiment occurred in the 1980s when patent protection was extended to software", wrote Maskin with co-author James Bessen. "Standard arguments would predict that R&D intensity and productivity should have increased among patenting firms. Consistent with our model, these increases did not occur". Other evidence supporting this model includes a distinctive pattern of cross-licensing and a positive relationship between rates of innovation and firm entry. List of economists Mechanism design Maskin Nobel Prize lecture Profile in The Daily Princetonian Tabarrok, Alex. "What is Mechanism Design? Explaining the research that won the 2007 Nobel Prize in Economics".
Reason Magazine. Retrieved 2007-12-11. Videos of Eric Maskin speaking in plain English Maskin, Eric Stark. "Prize Lecture by Eric S. Maskin." Nobel Media AB. Nobel Prize, 2007. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. <http://www.nobelprize.org/mediaplayer/index.php?id=789>. Eric S. Maskin delivered his Prize Lecture on 8 December 2007 at Stockholm University, he was introduced by Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee. Credits: Ladda Productions AB. Copyright © Nobel Web AB 2007 Maskin, Eric Stark. "Eric Maskin - An Introduction to Mechanism Design - Warwick Economics Summit 2014." Warwick Economics Summit on YouTube. Warwick Economics Summit, 1 June 2014. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSVoeETsEcU>. Professor Eric Maskin giving the keynote address on'How to Make the Right Decisions without knowing People's Preferences: An Introduction to Mechanism Design' at the Warwick Economics Summit 2014. Maskin, Eric Stark. "Eric Maskin - Introductory Lecture." The Institute for Advanced Studies of Jerusalem on YouTube.
The Institute for Advanced Studies of Jerusalem, 24 June 2014. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBZGBk3N2Ok>. Eric Maskin - Introductory Lecture Maskin, Eric Stark. "Eric Maskin: Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals." UCI Media Services on YouTube. UCI Media Services, 22 Aug. 2014. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. <https://youtu.be/AtRmnTeIPio>. Eric Maskin, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University “Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals” Serious Science. "Mechanism Design Theory - Eric Maskin." Serious Science on YouTube. Http://serious-science.org, 23 Dec. 2013. Web. 27 Dec. 2015. <https://youtu.be/Y645BrYSi74>
In game theory, a simultaneous game is a game where each player chooses his action without knowledge of the actions chosen by other players. Simultaneous games contrast with sequential games, which are played by the players taking turns. Normal form representations are used for simultaneous games. Rock-paper-scissors, a played hand game, is an example of a simultaneous game. Both players make a decision without knowledge of the opponent's decision, reveal their hands at the same time. There are two players in this game and each of them has three different strategies to make their decision. We will display Player 1's strategies as Player 2's strategies as columns. In the table, the numbers in red represent the payoff to Player 1, the numbers in blue represent the payoff to Player 2. Hence, the pay off for a 2 player game in rock-paper-scissors will look like this: The prisoner's dilemma is an example of a simultaneous game; some variants of chess that belong to this class of games include Synchronous chess and Parity chess.
Sequential game Simultaneous action selection Bibliography Pritchard, D. B.. Beasley, John, ed; the Classified Encyclopedia of Chess Variants. John Beasley. ISBN 978-0-9555168-0-1
Michele Boldrin is an Italian-born economist, expert in economic growth, business cycles, technological progress and intellectual property. He is the Joseph Gibson Hoyt Distinguished Professor in Arts & Sciences at Washington University in St. Louis. Along with his colleague and coauthor David Levine, he was part of the group of 200 economists publicly opposing the 2009 Stimulus bill, he publicly defended his position on the issue in various international media, including a public debate with Brad DeLong. Boldrin was born and raised in Padua and moved to Venice, he did his undergraduate studies at the University of Venice. He received his M. S. and Ph. D. in economics from the University of Rochester in New York, under the supervision of Lionel McKenzie. Before moving to St. Louis in the Fall of 2006, he worked at University of Chicago, UCLA, Kellogg School of Management, Charles III University of Madrid, University of Minnesota, he is a research fellow at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis since 2006.
He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a past Associate Editor of Econometrica and Editor and Associate Editor of the Review of Economic Dynamics, among other academic journals. He wrote four books and was a visiting professor in Barcelona, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, a number of other places, he is affiliated with CEPR and director of FEDEA. He is one of the founding editors of the blog noiseFromAmerika and he contributes to Against Monopoly and Nada es Gratis, which are in English and Spanish, his two most recent books are Against Intellectual Monopoly, coauthored with David K. Levine and Tremonti, istruzioni per il disuso, coauthored with Alberto Bisin, Sandro Brusco, Andrea Moro and Giulio Zanella, in Italian. Boldrin is a member of the Board of Trustees and the Scientific Council of Foundation IMDEA Social Sciences. Michele Boldrin conducts ongoing research in dynamic general equilibrium theory, focusing on the sources of business fluctuations and development, technological innovation, intellectual property.
Collaborating with David K. Levine, Boldrin examines the role played by competitive versus monopolistic markets in growth and innovation, they posit that little evidence exists for the presence of increasing returns at the aggregate level, thus argue that there is no reason to believe that increasing returns play an important role in actual economic growth. This implies that, in theory as in practice, competitive markets favor and promote continued growth and innovation, whereas monopoly power is not necessary and harmful to technological change and economic development, their theory concludes that existing claims for the necessity of intellectual property in the process of growth and innovation are exaggerated. Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, Against Intellectual Monopoly, Cambridge University Press, 2008. Official website Michele Boldrin's biography Publications, from the Open Library. Blog on il Fatto Quotidiano NoiseFromAmerika Roberts, Russ. "Boldrin on Intellectual Property". EconTalk.
Library of Economics and Liberty
In economics and other social sciences, preference is the ordering of alternatives based on their relative utility, a process which results in an optimal "choice". The character of the individual preferences is determined purely by taste factors, independent of considerations of prices, income, or availability of goods. With the help of the scientific method many practical decisions of life can be modelled, resulting in testable predictions about human behavior. Although economists are not interested in the underlying causes of the preferences in themselves, they are interested in the theory of choice because it serves as a background for empirical demand analysis. In 1926 Ragnar Frisch developed for the first time a mathematical model of preferences in the context of economic demand and utility functions. Up to economists had developed an elaborated theory of demand that omitted primitive characteristics of people; this omission ceased when, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, logical positivism predicated the need of theoretical concepts to be related with observables.
Whereas economists in the 18th and 19th centuries felt comfortable theorizing about utility, with the advent of logical positivism in the 20th century, they felt that it needed more of an empirical structure. Because binary choices are directly observable, it appealed to economists; the search for observables in microeconomics is taken further by revealed preference theory. Since the pioneer efforts of Frisch in the 1920s, one of the major issues which has pervaded the theory of preferences is the representability of a preference structure with a real-valued function; this has been achieved by mapping it to the mathematical index called utility. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944 book "Games and Economic Behaviour" treated preferences as a formal relation whose properties can be stated axiomatically; these type of axiomatic handling of preferences soon began to influence other economists: Marschak adopted it by 1950, Houthakker employed it in a 1950 paper, Kenneth Arrow perfected it in his 1951 book "Social Choice and Individual Values".
Gérard Debreu, influenced by the ideas of the Bourbaki group, championed the axiomatization of consumer theory in the 1950s, the tools he borrowed from the mathematical field of binary relations have become mainstream since then. Though the economics of choice can be examined either at the level of utility functions or at the level of preferences, to move from one to the other can be useful. For example, shifting the conceptual basis from an abstract preference relation to an abstract utility scale results in a new mathematical framework, allowing new kinds of conditions on the structure of preference to be formulated and investigated. Another historical turnpoint can be traced back to 1895, when Georg Cantor proved in a theorem that if a binary relation is linearly ordered it is isomorphically embeddable in the ordered real numbers; this notion would become influential for the theory of preferences in economics: by the 1940s prominent authors such as Paul Samuelson, would theorize about people having weakly ordered preferences.
Suppose the set of all states of the world is X and an agent has a preference relation on X. It is common to mark the weak preference relation by ⪯, so that x ⪯ y means "the agent wants y at least as much as x" or "the agent weakly prefers y to x"; the symbol ∼ is used as a shorthand to the indifference relation: x ∼ y ⟺, which reads "the agent is indifferent between y and x". The symbol ≺ is used as a shorthand to the strong preference relation: x ≺ y ⟺, which reads "the agent prefers y to x". In everyday speech, the statement "x is preferred to y" is understood to mean that someone chooses x over y. However, decision theory rests on more precise definitions of preferences given that there are many experimental conditions influencing people's choices in many directions. Suppose a person is confronted with a mental experiment that she must solve with the aid of introspection, she is offered apples and oranges, is asked to verbally choose one of the two. A decision scientist observing this single event would be inclined to say that whichever is chosen is the preferred alternative.
Under several repetitions of this experiment, if the scientist observes that apples are chosen 51% of the time it would mean that x ≻ y. If half of the time oranges are chosen x ∼ y. If 51% of the time she chooses oranges it means that y ≻ x. Preference is here being identified with a greater frequency of choice; this experiment implicitly assumes. Otherwise, out of 100 repetitions, some of them will give as a result that neither apples, oranges or ties are chosen; these few cases of uncertainty will ruin any preference information resulting from the frequency attributes of the other valid cases. However, this example was used
An extensive-form game is a specification of a game in game theory, allowing for the explicit representation of a number of key aspects, like the sequencing of players' possible moves, their choices at every decision point, the information each player has about the other player's moves when they make a decision, their payoffs for all possible game outcomes. Extensive-form games allow for the representation of incomplete information in the form of chance events modeled as "moves by nature"; some authors in introductory textbooks define the extensive-form game as being just a game tree with payoffs, add the other elements in subsequent chapters as refinements. Whereas the rest of this article follows this gentle approach with motivating examples, we present upfront the finite extensive-form games as constructed here; this general definition was introduced by Harold W. Kuhn in 1953, who extended an earlier definition of von Neumann from 1928. Following the presentation from Hart, an n-player extensive-form game thus consists of the following: A finite set of n players A rooted tree, called the game tree Each terminal node of the game tree has an n-tuple of payoffs, meaning there is one payoff for each player at the end of every possible play A partition of the non-terminal nodes of the game tree in n+1 subsets, one for each player, with a special subset for a fictitious player called Chance.
Each player's subset of nodes is referred to as the "nodes of the player". Each node of the Chance player has a probability distribution over its outgoing edges; each set of nodes of a rational player is further partitioned in information sets, which make certain choices indistinguishable for the player when making a move, in the sense that: there is a one-to-one correspondence between outgoing edges of any two nodes of the same information set—thus the set of all outgoing edges of an information set is partitioned in equivalence classes, each class representing a possible choice for a player's move at some point—, every path in the tree from the root to a terminal node can cross each information set at most once the complete description of the game specified by the above parameters is common knowledge among the playersA play is thus a path through the tree from the root to a terminal node. At any given non-terminal node belonging to Chance, an outgoing branch is chosen according to the probability distribution.
At any rational player's node, the player must choose one of the equivalence classes for the edges, which determines one outgoing edge except the player doesn't know which one is being followed. A pure strategy for a player thus consists of a selection—choosing one class of outgoing edges for every information set. In a game of perfect information, the information sets are singletons. It's less evident, it is assumed that each player has a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function defined for every game outcome. The above presentation, while defining the mathematical structure over which the game is played, elides however the more technical discussion of formalizing statements about how the game is played like "a player cannot distinguish between nodes in the same information set when making a decision"; these can be made precise using epistemic modal logic. A perfect information two-player game over a game tree can be represented as an extensive form game with outcomes. Examples of such games include tic-tac-toe and infinite chess.
A game over an expectminimax tree, like that of backgammon, has no imperfect information but has moves of chance. For example, poker has both moves of imperfect information. A complete extensive-form representation specifies: the players of a game for every player every opportunity they have to move what each player can do at each of their moves what each player knows for every move the payoffs received by every player for every possible combination of moves The game on the right has two players: 1 and 2; the numbers by every non-terminal node indicate. The numbers by every terminal node represent the payoffs to the players; the labels by every edge of the graph are the name of the action. The initial node belongs to player 1. Play according to the tree is as follows: player 1 chooses between U and D; the payoffs are as specified in the tree. There are four outcomes represented by the four terminal nodes of the tree:, and; the payoffs associated with each outcome are as follows, and. If player 1 plays D, player 2 will play U' to maximise their payoff and so player 1 will only receive 1.
However, if player 1 plays U, player 2 maximises their payoff by playing D' and player 1 receives 2. Player 1 prefers 2 to 1 and s
Armen Albert Alchian was an American economist and professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles. Alchian was born in California into a family with Armenian background, he attended California State University, Fresno for two years before transferring to Stanford University in 1934, where he earned both a B. A. and a Ph. D.. He served as a statistician with the USA Army Air Corps, from 1942 to 1946. In 1946, he joined the Economics Department at UCLA. For many years, he was affiliated with the Rand Corporation. Alchian was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1978. In 1996, he became a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association and in 2010 he received an honorary doctorate degree from Universidad Francisco Marroquín, he is told to have been a member of Mont Pelerin Society. Alchian was married to Pauline Alchian for 73 years, he had six grandchildren and three great-grandchildren. Alchian is the founder of the "UCLA tradition" in economics, a member of the Chicago school of economics, one of the more prominent price theorists of the second half of the 20th century.
He is the author of pathbreaking articles on information and uncertainty, the theory of the firm. Through his writings on property rights and transaction costs, he is a founder of the new institutional economics. Alchian's writings have touched on topics conventionally viewed as macroeconomic: money, inflation and the theory of business investment, his writings are characterized by a minimum of mathematical formalism. Alchian is the coauthor with William R. Allen of the influential introductory economics text Exchange and Production, its content and organization differ radically from those of other American university economics texts written during the second half of the 20th century. This was the first American introductory text to discuss information, transaction costs, property rights, a market economy as a discovery process, it contains the classic statement of what has come to be known as the Alchian–Allen theorem. This proposition, colloquially known as "ship the good apples out," states that when output varies in quality, the lower quality output is consumed nearby while the higher quality output is shipped long distances.
The reason is simple: transportation costs vary with the weight and bulk, but not the quality of that, transported. The added per-unit amount decreases the relative price of the higher-grade product. Alchian, Armen, "Uncertainty and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy 58: 211–21. Alchian, Armen, "Costs and outputs", in Abramovitz, Moses; the allocation of economic resources: essays in honor of Bernard Francis Haley, California: Stanford University Press, OCLC 490147128. ISBN 9780804705684. Alchian, Armen, "Information Costs and Resource Unemployment," Economic Inquiry 7: 109–28. Alchian, Armen. Alchian, Armen. Alchian, Economic Forces at Work. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. A number of Alchian's better known articles are reprinted here. Alchian, Armen and Production. Wadsworth Publishing. A revision of part of University Economics, first published in 1964. "Alchian's generalization" states that when an equal amount of payment is added to two competitive goods, the price of the dearer one will fall relative to the cheaper one.
Therefore, there will be a tendency for consumers to substitute the dearer one for the cheaper one. Uncertainty and Economic Theory Alchian's profile at UCLA. Article on Alchian from the UCLA student newspaper, the Daily Bruin. Video collection from NewMedia Universidad Francisco Marroquín Armen Alchian publications indexed by Google Scholar