Quietism in philosophy is an approach to the subject that sees the role of philosophy as broadly therapeutic or remedial. Quietist philosophers believe that philosophy has no positive thesis to contribute, but rather that its value is in defusing confusions in the linguistic and conceptual frameworks of other subjects, including non-quietist philosophy. By re-formulating supposed problems in a way that makes the misguided reasoning from which they arise apparent, the quietist hopes to put an end to humanity's confusion, help return to a state of intellectual quietude. By its nature, quietism is not a philosophical school as understood in the traditional sense of a body of doctrines, but still it can be identified both by its methodology, which focuses on language and the use of words, by its objective, to show that most philosophical problems are only pseudo-problems. Pyrrhonism represents the earliest example of an identifiably quietist position in the West. Sextus Empiricus regarded Pyrrhonism not as a nihilistic attack but rather as a form of philosophical therapy: The causal principle of scepticism we say is the hope of becoming tranquil.
Men of talent, troubled by the anomaly in things and puzzled as to which of them they should rather assent to, came to investigate what in things is true and what false, thinking that by deciding these issues they would become tranquil. The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is opposed. Contemporary discussion of quietism can be traced back to Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose work influenced the ordinary language philosophers. One of the early'ordinary language' works, Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, attempted to demonstrate that dualism arises from a failure to appreciate that mental vocabulary and physical vocabulary are different ways of describing one and the same thing, namely human behaviour. J. L. Austin's Sense and Sensibilia took a similar approach to the problems of skepticism and the reliability of sense perception, arguing that they arise only by misconstruing ordinary language, not because there is anything genuinely wrong with empirical evidence.
Norman Malcolm, a friend of Wittgenstein's, took a quietist approach to skeptical problems in the philosophy of mind. More the philosophers John McDowell and Richard Rorty have taken explicitly quietist positions. Philosophical hermeneutics Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. 3rd Rev Edn, Blackwell, 2002. ISBN 0-631-23127-7 Ryle, Gilbert; the Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949. ISBN 0-14-012482-9 Austin, J L. Sense and Sensibilia. OUP, 1962. ISBN 0-19-881083-0 Macarthur, David. “Pragmatism, Metaphysical Quietism and the Problem of Normativity,” Philosophical Topics. Vol.36 No.1, 2009. Malcolm, Norman. Dreaming. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959. ISBN 0-7100-3836-4 McDowell and Evans, Gareth. Truth and Meaning. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. ISBN 0-19-824517-3 McDowell, John. Mind and World. New Ed, Harvard, 1996. ISBN 0-674-57610-1
Emotivism is a meta-ethical view that claims that ethical sentences do not express propositions but emotional attitudes. Hence, it is colloquially known as the hurrah/boo theory. Influenced by the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism in the 20th century, the theory was stated vividly by A. J. Ayer in his 1936 book Language and Logic, but its development owes more to C. L. Stevenson. Emotivism can be considered a form of expressivism, it stands in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism, as well as to all forms of cognitivism. In the 1950s, emotivism appeared in a modified form in the universal prescriptivism of R. M. Hare. Emotivism reached prominence in the early 20th century. In 1710, George Berkeley wrote that language in general serves to inspire feelings as well as communicate ideas. Decades David Hume espoused ideas similar to Stevenson's ones. In his 1751 book An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume considered morality not to be related to fact but "determined by sentiment": In moral deliberations we must be acquainted beforehand with all the objects, all their relations to each other.
… While we are ignorant whether a man were aggressor or not, how can we determine whether the person who killed him be criminal or innocent? But after every circumstance, every relation is known, the understanding has no further room to operate, nor any object on which it could employ itself; the approbation or blame which ensues, cannot be the work of the judgement, but of the heart. G. E. Moore published his Principia Ethica in 1903 and argued that the attempts of ethical naturalists to translate ethical terms into non-ethical ones committed the "naturalistic fallacy". Moore was a cognitivist, but his case against ethical naturalism steered other philosophers toward noncognitivism emotivism; the emergence of logical positivism and its verifiability criterion of meaning early in the 20th century led some philosophers to conclude that ethical statements, being incapable of empirical verification, were cognitively meaningless. This criterion was fundamental to A. J. Ayer's defense of positivism in Language and Logic, which contains his statement of emotivism.
However, positivism is not essential to emotivism itself not in Ayer's form, some positivists in the Vienna Circle, which had great influence on Ayer, held non-emotivist views. R. M. Hare unfolded his ethical theory of universal prescriptivism in 1952's The Language of Morals, intending to defend the importance of rational moral argumentation against the "propaganda" he saw encouraged by Stevenson, who thought moral argumentation was sometimes psychological and not rational, but Hare's disagreement was not universal, the similarities between his noncognitive theory and the emotive one — his claim, Stevenson's, that moral judgments contain commands and are thus not purely descriptive — caused some to regard him as an emotivist, a classification he denied: I did, do, follow the emotivists in their rejection of descriptivism. But I was never an emotivist, though I have been called one, but unlike most of their opponents I saw that it was their irrationalism, not their non-descriptivism, mistaken.
So my main task was to find a rationalist kind of non-descriptivism, this led me to establish that imperatives, the simplest kinds of prescriptions, could be subject to logical constraints while not descriptive. Influential statements of emotivism were made by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in their 1923 book on language, The Meaning of Meaning, by W. H. F. Barnes and A. Duncan-Jones in independent works on ethics in 1934. However, it is the works of Ayer and Stevenson that are the most developed and discussed defenses of the theory. A. J. Ayer's version of emotivism is given in chapter six, "Critique of Ethics and Theology", of Language and Logic. In that chapter, Ayer divides "the ordinary system of ethics" into four classes: "Propositions that express definitions of ethical terms, or judgements about the legitimacy or possibility of certain definitions" "Propositions describing the phenomena of moral experience, their causes" "Exhortations to moral virtue" "Actual ethical judgments"He focuses on propositions of the first class—moral judgments—saying that those of the second class belong to science, those of the third are mere commands, those of the fourth are too concrete for ethical philosophy.
While class three statements were irrelevant to Ayer's brand of emotivism, they would play a significant role in Stevenson's. Ayer argues that moral judgments cannot be translated into non-ethical, empirical terms and thus cannot be verified, but he differs from intuitionists by discarding appeals to intuition as "worthless" for determining moral truths, since the intuition of one person contradicts that of another. Instead, Ayer concludes that ethical concepts are "mere pseudo-concepts": The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content, thus if I say to someone, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not stating anything more than if I had said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am evincing my moral disapproval of it, it is as if I had said, "You sto
A metaphor is a figure of speech that, for rhetorical effect, directly refers to one thing by mentioning another. It may identify hidden similarities between two ideas. Antithesis, hyperbole and simile are all types of metaphor. One of the most cited examples of a metaphor in English literature is the "All the world's a stage" monologue from As You Like It: This quotation expresses a metaphor because the world is not a stage. By asserting that the world is a stage, Shakespeare uses points of comparison between the world and a stage to convey an understanding about the mechanics of the world and the behavior of the people within it; the Philosophy of Rhetoric by rhetorician I. A. Richards describes a metaphor as having two parts: the tenor and the vehicle; the tenor is the subject. The vehicle is the object. In the previous example, "the world" is compared to a stage, describing it with the attributes of "the stage". Other writers employ the general terms figure to denote the tenor and the vehicle.
Cognitive linguistics uses source, respectively. Psychologist Julian Jaynes contributed the terms metaphrand, metaphier and paraphier to the understanding of how metaphors evoke meaning thereby adding two additional terms to the common set of two basic terms. Metaphrand is equivalent to metaphor theory terms tenor and ground. Metaphier is equivalent to metaphor theory terms vehicle and source. Paraphier is any attribute, characteristics, or aspect of a metaphier, whereas any paraphrand is a selected paraphier which has conceptually become attached to a metaphrand through understanding or comprehending of a metaphor. For example, if a reader encounters this metaphor: "Pat is a tornado," the metaphrand is "Pat," the metaphier is "tornado." The paraphiers, or characteristics, of the metaphier "tornado" would include: storm, wind, danger, destruction, etc. However, the metaphoric use of those attributes or characteristics of a tornado is not one-for-one; the English metaphor derived from the 16th-century Old French word métaphore, which comes from the Latin metaphora, "carrying over", in turn from the Greek μεταφορά, "transfer", from μεταφέρω, "to carry over", "to transfer" and that from μετά, "after, across" + φέρω, "to bear", "to carry".
Metaphors are most compared with similes. It is said, for instance, that a metaphor is'a condensed analogy' or'analogical fusion' or that they'operate in a similar fashion' or are'based on the same mental process' or yet that'the basic processes of analogy are at work in metaphor', it is pointed out that'a border between metaphor and analogy is fuzzy' and'the difference between them might be described as the distance between things being compared'. A simile is a specific type of metaphor. A metaphor asserts the objects in the comparison are identical on the point of comparison, while a simile asserts a similarity. For this reason a common-type metaphor is considered more forceful than a simile; the metaphor category contains these specialized types: Allegory: An extended metaphor wherein a story illustrates an important attribute of the subject. Antithesis: A rhetorical contrast of ideas by means of parallel arrangements of words, clauses, or sentences. Catachresis: A mixed metaphor, sometimes by accident.
Hyperbole: Excessive exaggeration to illustrate a point. Metonymy: A figure of speech using the name of one thing in reference to a different thing to which the first is associated. In the phrase "lands belonging to the crown", the word "crown" is metonymy for monarch. Parable: An extended metaphor told as an anecdote to illustrate or teach a moral or spiritual lesson, such as in Aesop's fables or Jesus' teaching method as told in the Bible. Pun: Similar to a metaphor, a pun alludes to another term. However, the main difference is that a pun is a frivolous allusion between two different things whereas a metaphor is a purposeful allusion between two different things. Metaphor, like other types of analogy, can be distinguished from metonymy as one of two fundamental modes of thought. Metaphor and analogy work by bringing together concepts from different conceptual domains, while metonymy uses one element from a given domain to refer to another related element. A metaphor creates new links between otherwise distinct conceptual domains, while a metonymy relies on the existing links within them.
A dead metaphor is a metaphor. The phrases "to grasp a concept" and "to gather what you've understood" use physical action as a metaphor for understanding; the audience does not need to visualize the action. Some distinguish between a dead metaphor and a cliché. Others use "dead metaphor" to denote both. A mixed metaphor is a metaphor that leaps from one identification to a second inconsistent with the first, e.g.: I smell a rat but I'll nip him in the bud"-Irish politician Boyle Roche This form is used as a parody of metaphor itself: If we can hit that bull's-eye the rest of the dominoes will fall like a house of cards... Checkmate. An extended metaphor, or conceit, sets up a principal subject wit
Media studies is a discipline and field of study that deals with the content and effects of various media. Media studies may draw on traditions from both the social sciences and the humanities, but from its core disciplines of mass communication, communication sciences, communication studies. Researchers may develop and employ theories and methods from disciplines including cultural studies, philosophy, literary theory, political science, political economy, sociology, social theory, art history and criticism, film theory, feminist theory, information theory. For a history of the field, see History of media studies; the first Media Studies M. A. program in the U. S. was introduced by John Culkin at The New School in 1975, which has since graduated more than 2,000 students. Culkin was responsible for bringing Marshall McLuhan to Fordham in 1968 and subsequently founded the Center for Understanding Media, which became the New School program. Media is studied as a broad subject in most states in Australia, with the state of Victoria being world leaders in curriculum development.
Media studies in Australia was first developed as an area of study in Victorian universities in the early 1960s, in secondary schools in the mid 1960s. Today all Australian universities teach media studies. According to the Government of Australia's "Excellence in Research for Australia" report, the leading universities in the country for media studies are Monash University, QUT, RMIT, University of Melbourne, University of Queensland and UTS. In secondary schools, an early film studies course first began being taught as part of the Victorian junior secondary curriculum during the mid 1960s. And, by the early 1970s, an expanded media studies course was being taught; the course became part of the senior secondary curriculum in the 1980s. It has since become, continues to be, a strong component of the VCE. Notable figures in the development of the Victorian secondary school curriculum were the long time Rusden College media teacher Peter Greenaway, Trevor Barr and John Murray. Today, Australian states and territories that teach media studies at a secondary level are Australian Capital Territory, Northern Territory, South Australia and Western Australia.
Media studies does not appear to be taught in the state of New South Wales at a secondary level. In Victoria, the VCE media studies course is structured as: Unit 1 - Representation, Technologies of Representation, New Media. Media studies form a major part of the primary and junior secondary curriculum, includes areas such as photography, print media and television. Victoria hosts the peak media teaching body known as ATOM which publishes Metro and Screen Education magazines. In Canada, media studies and communication studies are incorporated in the same departments and cover a wide range of approaches. Over time, research developed to employ theories and methods from cultural studies, political economy, gender and race theory, rhetoric, film theory and anthropology. Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan are famous Canadian scholars for their contributions to the fields of media ecology and political economy in the 20th century, they were both important members of the Toronto School of Communication at the time.
More the School of Montreal and its founder James R. Taylor contributed to the field of organizational communication by focusing on the ontological processes of organizations. Carleton University and the University of Western Ontario, 1945 and 1946 prospectively, created Journalism specific programs or schools. A Journalism specific program was created at Ryerson in 1950; the first communication programs in Canada were started at Concordia Universities. The Radio and Television Arts program at Ryerson were started in the 1950s, while the Film, Media Studies/Media Arts, Photography programs originated from programs started in the 1950s; the Communication studies department at Concordia was created in the late 1960s. Ryerson's Radio and Television, Film and Photography programs were renowned by the mid 1970s, its programs were being copied by other colleges and universities nationally and Internationally. Today, most universities offer undergraduate degrees in Media and Communication Studies, many Canadian scholars contribute to the field, among which: Brian Massumi, Kim Sawchuk, Carrie Rentschler, François Cooren.
In his book “Understanding Media, The Extensions of Man”, media theorist Marshall McLuhan suggested that "the medium is the message", that all human artefacts and technologies are media. His book introduced the usage of terms such as “media” into our language along with other precepts, among them “global village” and “Age of Information”. A medium is anything that mediates our interaction with other humans. Given this perspective, media study is not restricted to just media of communications bu
Analytic philosophy is a style of philosophy that became dominant in the Western world at the beginning of the 20th century. The term can refer to one of several things: As a philosophical practice, it is characterized by an emphasis on argumentative clarity and precision making use of formal logic, conceptual analysis, and, to a lesser degree and the natural sciences; as a historical development, analytic philosophy refers to certain developments in early 20th-century philosophy that were the historical antecedents of the current practice. Central figures in this historical development are Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. Moore, Gottlob Frege, the logical positivists. In this more specific sense, analytic philosophy is identified with specific philosophical traits, such as: The logical-positivist principle that there are not any philosophical facts and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts; this may be contrasted with the traditional foundationalism, which considers philosophy to be a special science that investigates the fundamental reasons and principles of everything.
Many analytic philosophers have considered their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences. This is an attitude that begins with John Locke, who described his work as that of an "underlabourer" to the achievements of natural scientists such as Newton. During the 20th century, the most influential advocate of the continuity of philosophy with science was Willard Van Orman Quine; the principle that the logical clarification of thoughts can be achieved only by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions. The logical form of a proposition is a way of representing it, to reduce it to simpler components if necessary, to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type. However, analytic philosophers disagree about the correct logical form of ordinary language; the neglect of generalized philosophical systems in favour of more restricted inquiries stated rigorously, or ordinary language. According to a characteristic paragraph by Russell: Modern analytical empiricism differs from that of Locke and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique.
It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, in comparison with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe, its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. In the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, New Zealand and Scandinavia, the majority of university philosophy departments today identify themselves as "analytic" departments. Analytic philosophy is understood in contrast to other philosophical traditions, most notably continental philosophies such as existentialism and phenomenology, Thomism and Marxism. British idealism, as taught by philosophers such as F. H. Bradley and Thomas Hill Green, dominated English philosophy in the late 19th century. With reference to this intellectual basis the initiators of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, articulated early analytic philosophy.
Since its beginning, a basic goal of analytic philosophy has been conceptual clarity, in the name of which Moore and Russell rejected Hegelianism for being obscure—see for example Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense" and Russell's critique of the doctrine of internal relations. Inspired by developments in modern logic, the early Russell claimed that the problems of philosophy can be solved by showing the simple constituents of complex notions. An important aspect of British idealism was logical holism—the opinion that there are aspects of the world that can be known only by knowing the whole world; this is related to the opinion that relations between items are internal relations, that is, properties of the nature of those items. Russell, along with Wittgenstein, in response promulgated logical atomism and the doctrine of external relations—the belief that the world consists of independent facts. Russell, during his early career, along with his collaborator Alfred North Whitehead, was much influenced by Gottlob Frege, who developed predicate logic, which allowed a much greater range of sentences to be parsed into logical form than was possible using the ancient Aristotelian logic.
Frege was influential as a philosopher of mathematics in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. In contrast to Edmund Husserl's 1891 book Philosophie der Arithmetik, which argued that the concept of the cardinal number derived from psychical acts of grouping objects and counting them, Frege argued that mathematics and logic have their own validity, independent of the judgments or mental states of individual mathematicians and logicians. Frege further developed his philosophy of logic and mathematics in The Foundations of Arithmetic and The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, where he provided an alternative to psychologistic accounts of the concept of number. Like Frege, Russell argued that mathematics is reducible to logical fundamentals in The Principles of Mathematics, his book written with Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, encouraged many philosophers to renew their interest in the
Computer science is the study of processes that interact with data and that can be represented as data in the form of programs. It enables the use of algorithms to manipulate and communicate digital information. A computer scientist studies the theory of computation and the practice of designing software systems, its fields can be divided into practical disciplines. Computational complexity theory is abstract, while computer graphics emphasizes real-world applications. Programming language theory considers approaches to the description of computational processes, while computer programming itself involves the use of programming languages and complex systems. Human–computer interaction considers the challenges in making computers useful and accessible; the earliest foundations of what would become computer science predate the invention of the modern digital computer. Machines for calculating fixed numerical tasks such as the abacus have existed since antiquity, aiding in computations such as multiplication and division.
Algorithms for performing computations have existed since antiquity before the development of sophisticated computing equipment. Wilhelm Schickard designed and constructed the first working mechanical calculator in 1623. In 1673, Gottfried Leibniz demonstrated a digital mechanical calculator, called the Stepped Reckoner, he may be considered the first computer scientist and information theorist, among other reasons, documenting the binary number system. In 1820, Thomas de Colmar launched the mechanical calculator industry when he released his simplified arithmometer, the first calculating machine strong enough and reliable enough to be used daily in an office environment. Charles Babbage started the design of the first automatic mechanical calculator, his Difference Engine, in 1822, which gave him the idea of the first programmable mechanical calculator, his Analytical Engine, he started developing this machine in 1834, "in less than two years, he had sketched out many of the salient features of the modern computer".
"A crucial step was the adoption of a punched card system derived from the Jacquard loom" making it infinitely programmable. In 1843, during the translation of a French article on the Analytical Engine, Ada Lovelace wrote, in one of the many notes she included, an algorithm to compute the Bernoulli numbers, considered to be the first computer program. Around 1885, Herman Hollerith invented the tabulator, which used punched cards to process statistical information. In 1937, one hundred years after Babbage's impossible dream, Howard Aiken convinced IBM, making all kinds of punched card equipment and was in the calculator business to develop his giant programmable calculator, the ASCC/Harvard Mark I, based on Babbage's Analytical Engine, which itself used cards and a central computing unit; when the machine was finished, some hailed it as "Babbage's dream come true". During the 1940s, as new and more powerful computing machines were developed, the term computer came to refer to the machines rather than their human predecessors.
As it became clear that computers could be used for more than just mathematical calculations, the field of computer science broadened to study computation in general. In 1945, IBM founded the Watson Scientific Computing Laboratory at Columbia University in New York City; the renovated fraternity house on Manhattan's West Side was IBM's first laboratory devoted to pure science. The lab is the forerunner of IBM's Research Division, which today operates research facilities around the world; the close relationship between IBM and the university was instrumental in the emergence of a new scientific discipline, with Columbia offering one of the first academic-credit courses in computer science in 1946. Computer science began to be established as a distinct academic discipline in the 1950s and early 1960s; the world's first computer science degree program, the Cambridge Diploma in Computer Science, began at the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory in 1953. The first computer science degree program in the United States was formed at Purdue University in 1962.
Since practical computers became available, many applications of computing have become distinct areas of study in their own rights. Although many believed it was impossible that computers themselves could be a scientific field of study, in the late fifties it became accepted among the greater academic population, it is the now well-known IBM brand that formed part of the computer science revolution during this time. IBM released the IBM 704 and the IBM 709 computers, which were used during the exploration period of such devices. "Still, working with the IBM was frustrating if you had misplaced as much as one letter in one instruction, the program would crash, you would have to start the whole process over again". During the late 1950s, the computer science discipline was much in its developmental stages, such issues were commonplace. Time has seen significant improvements in the effectiveness of computing technology. Modern society has seen a significant shift in the users of computer technology, from usage only by experts and professionals, to a near-ubiquitous user base.
Computers were quite costly, some degree of humanitarian aid was needed for efficient use—in part from professional computer operators. As computer adoption became more widespread and affordable, less human assistance was needed for common usage. Despite its short history as a formal academic discipline, computer science has made a number of fundamental contributions to science and society—in fact, along with electronics, it is
Philosophy of science
Philosophy of science is a sub-field of philosophy concerned with the foundations and implications of science. The central questions of this study concern what qualifies as science, the reliability of scientific theories, the ultimate purpose of science; this discipline overlaps with metaphysics and epistemology, for example, when it explores the relationship between science and truth. There is no consensus among philosophers about many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science, including whether science can reveal the truth about unobservable things and whether scientific reasoning can be justified at all. In addition to these general questions about science as a whole, philosophers of science consider problems that apply to particular sciences; some philosophers of science use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about philosophy itself. While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of Aristotle, philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century in the wake of the logical positivism movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them.
Thomas Kuhn's 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was formative, challenging the view of scientific progress as steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead arguing that any progress is relative to a "paradigm," the set of questions and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period. Karl Popper and Charles Sanders Peirce moved on from positivism to establish a modern set of standards for scientific methodology. Subsequently, the coherentist approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to W. V. Quine and others; some thinkers such as Stephen Jay Gould seek to ground science in axiomatic assumptions, such as the uniformity of nature. A vocal minority of philosophers, Paul Feyerabend in particular, argue that there is no such thing as the "scientific method", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly supernatural ones.
Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how knowledge is created from a sociological perspective, an approach represented by scholars like David Bloor and Barry Barnes. A tradition in continental philosophy approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience. Philosophies of the particular sciences range from questions about the nature of time raised by Einstein's general relativity, to the implications of economics for public policy. A central theme is; that is, can chemistry be reduced to physics, or can sociology be reduced to individual psychology? The general questions of philosophy of science arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. For instance, the question of the validity of scientific reasoning is seen in a different guise in the foundations of statistics; the question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in the philosophy of medicine. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, of psychology, of the social sciences explore whether the scientific studies of human nature can achieve objectivity or are shaped by values and by social relations.
Distinguishing between science and non-science is referred to as the demarcation problem. For example, should psychoanalysis be considered science? How about so-called creation science, the inflationary multiverse hypothesis, or macroeconomics? Karl Popper called this the central question in the philosophy of science. However, no unified account of the problem has won acceptance among philosophers, some regard the problem as unsolvable or uninteresting. Martin Gardner has argued for the use of a Potter Stewart standard for recognizing pseudoscience. Early attempts by the logical positivists grounded science in observation while non-science was non-observational and hence meaningless. Popper argued; that is, every genuinely scientific claim is capable of being proven false, at least in principle. An area of study or speculation that masquerades as science in an attempt to claim a legitimacy that it would not otherwise be able to achieve is referred to as pseudoscience, fringe science, or junk science.
Physicist Richard Feynman coined the term "cargo cult science" for cases in which researchers believe they are doing science because their activities have the outward appearance of it but lack the "kind of utter honesty" that allows their results to be rigorously evaluated. A related question is what counts as a good scientific explanation. In addition to providing predictions about future events, society takes scientific theories to provide explanations for events that occur or have occurred. Philosophers have investigated the criteria by which a scientific theory can be said to have explained a phenomenon, as well as what it means to say a scientific theory has explanatory power. One early and influential theory of scientific explanation is the deductive-nomological model, it says that a successful scientific explanation must deduce the occurrence of the phenomena in question from a scientific law. This view has been subjected to substantial criticism, resulting in several acknowledged counterexamples to the theory.
It is challenging to characterize what is meant by an explanation when the thing to be explained cannot be deduc