Bargaining or haggling is a type of negotiation in which the buyer and seller of a good or service debate the price and exact nature of a transaction. If the bargaining produces agreement on terms, the transaction takes place. Bargaining is an alternative pricing strategy to fixed prices. Optimally, if it costs the retailer nothing to engage and allow bargaining, s/he can divine the buyer's willingness to spend, it allows for capturing more consumer surplus as it allows price discrimination, a process whereby a seller can charge a higher price to one buyer, more eager. Haggling has disappeared in parts of the world where the cost to haggle exceeds the gain to retailers for most common retail items. However, for expensive goods sold to uninformed buyers such as automobiles, bargaining can remain commonplace. Dickering refers to the same process, albeit with a slight negative connotation. Bargaining is the name chosen for the third stage of the Kübler-Ross model though it has nothing to do with price negotiations.
Not all transactions are open to bargaining. Both religious beliefs and regional custom may determine whether or not the seller is willing to bargain. In North America and Europe bargaining is restricted to expensive or one-of-a-kind items and informal sales settings such as flea markets and garage sales. In other regions of the world, bargaining may be the norm for small commercial transactions. In Indonesia and elsewhere in Asia, locals haggle for goods and services everywhere from street markets to hotels. Children learn to haggle from a young age. Participating in that tradition can make foreigners feel accepted. On the other hand, in Thailand, haggling seems to be softer than the other countries due to Thai culture, in which people tend to be humble and avoiding argument. However, haggling for food items is discouraged in Southeast Asia and is considered an insult, because food is seen as a common necessity, not to be treated as a tradable good. In all large complex business negotiations, a certain amount of bargaining takes place.
One simplified'western' way to decide when it's time to bargain is to break negotiation into two stages: creating value and claiming value. Claiming value is another phrase for bargaining. Many cultures take offence; this offence is as a result of their wanting to first create value for longer before they bargain together. The Chinese culture by contrast places a much higher value on taking time to build a business relationship before starting to create value or bargain. Not understanding when to start bargaining has ruined many an otherwise positive business negotiation. In areas where bargaining at the retail level is common, the option to bargain depends on the presence of the store's owner. A chain store managed by clerks is more to use fixed pricing than an independent store managed by an owner or one of owner's trusted employees; the store's ambiance may be used to signal whether or not bargaining is appropriate. For instance, a comfortable and air-conditioned store with posted prices does not allow bargaining, but a stall in a bazaar or marketplace may.
Supermarkets and other chain stores never allow bargaining. However, the importance of ambiance may depend on the cultural commitment to bargaining. In Israel, prices on day-to-day items may be negotiable in a Western style store manned by a clerk; the personality theory in bargaining emphasizes that the type of personalities determine the bargaining process and its outcome. A popular behavioral theory deals with a distinction between soft-liners. Various research papers refer to hard-liners as warriors, it varies from region to region. Bargaining may take place more in semi-urban areas than in a metro city. Bargaining games refer to situations where two or more players must reach agreement regarding how to distribute an object or monetary amount; each player prefers to reach an agreement in these games, rather than abstain from doing so. However, each prefers. Examples of such situations include the bargaining involved in a labour union and the directors of a company negotiating wage increases, the dispute between two communities about the distribution of a common territory, or the conditions under which two countries agree on nuclear disarmament.
Analyzing these kinds of problems looks for a solution that specifies which component in dispute corresponds to each party involved. Players in a bargaining problem can bargain for the objective as a whole at a precise moment in time; the problem can be divided so that parts of the whole objective become subject to bargaining during different stages. In a classical bargaining problem the result is an agreement reached between all interested parties, or the status quo of the problem, it is clear that studying how individual parties make their decisions is insufficient for predicting what agreement will be reached. However, classical bargaining theory assumes that each participant in a bargaining process will choose between possible agreements, following the conduct predicted by the rational choice model, it is assumed that each player's preferences regarding the possible agreements can be represented by a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem function. Nash defines a classical bargaining problem as being a set of joint allocations of utility, some of which correspond to what the players would obtain if they reach an agreement, another that represents what
Geopolitics is the study of the effects of Earth's geography on politics and international relations. While geopolitics refers to countries and relations between them, it may focus on two other kinds of states: de facto independent states with limited international recognition and. At the level of international relations, geopolitics is a method of studying foreign policy to understand and predict international political behavior through geographical variables; these include area studies, topography, natural resources, applied science of the region being evaluated. Geopolitics focuses on political power linked to geographic space. In particular, territorial waters and land territory in correlation with diplomatic history. Topics of geopolitics include relations between the interests of international political actors and interests focused within an area, a space, or a geographical element. "Critical geopolitics" deconstructs classical geopolitical theories, by showing their political/ideological functions for great powers.
According to Christopher Gogwilt and other researchers, the term is being used to describe a broad spectrum of concepts, in a general sense used as "a synonym for international political relations", but more "to imply the global structure of such relations", which builds on "early-twentieth-century term for a pseudoscience of political geography" and other pseudoscientific theories of historical and geographic determinism. Oil and international competition over oil and gas resources was one of the main foci of the geopolitics literature from World War and onward. From about 2010, a new branch of the literature emerged, focusing on international power relations related to renewable energy. Alfred Thayer Mahan, a frequent commentator on world naval strategic and diplomatic affairs, believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea—and with its commercial use in peace and its control in war. Mahan's theoretical framework came from Antoine-Henri Jomini, emphasized that strategic locations, as well as quantifiable levels of fighting power in a fleet, were conducive to control over the sea.
He proposed six conditions required for a nation to have sea power: Advantageous geographical position. Mahan distinguished a key region of the world in the Eurasian context, the Central Zone of Asia lying between 30° and 40° north and stretching from Asia Minor to Japan. In this zone independent countries still survived – Turkey, Afghanistan and Japan. Mahan regarded those countries, located between Britain and Russia, as if between "Scylla and Charybdis". Of the two monsters – Britain and Russia – it was the latter that Mahan considered more threatening to the fate of Central Asia. Mahan was impressed by Russia's transcontinental size and strategically favorable position for southward expansion. Therefore, he found it necessary for the Anglo-Saxon "sea power". Homer Lea in The Day of the Saxon described that the entire Anglo-Saxon race faced a threat from German and Japanese expansionism: The "fatal" relationship of Russia and Germany "has now assumed through the urgency of natural forces a coalition directed against the survival of Saxon supremacy."
It is "a dreadful Dreibund". Lea believed that while Japan moved against Far East and Russia against India, the Germans would strike at England, the center of the British Empire, he thought. Two famous Security Advisers from the Cold War period, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued to continue the United States geopolitical focus on Eurasia and on Russia, despite the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. Both continued their influence on geopolitics after the end of the Cold War, writing books on the subject in the 1990s—Diplomacy and The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives; the Anglo-American classical geopolitical theories were revived. Kissinger argued against the approach that with the dissolution of the USSR hostile intentions had disappeared and traditional foreign policy considerations no longer applied. "They would argue … that Russia, regardless of who govern it, sits astride the territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland, is the heir to one of the most potent imperial traditions."
Therefore the United States must "maintain the global balance of power vis-à-vis the country with a long history of expansionism."After Russia, the second geopolitical threat remained Germany and, as Mackinder had feared ninety years ago, its partnership with Russia. During the Cold War, Kissinger argues, both sides of the Atlantic recognized that, "unless America is organically involved in Europe, it would be obliged to involve itself under circumstances far less favorable to both sides of the Atlantic; that is more true today. Germany has become so strong that existing European institutions cannot by themselves strike a balance between Germany and its European partners. Nor can Europe with Germany, manage by itself Russia." Thus Kissinger belied it is
In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state, not a superpower nor a great power, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. The concept of the "middle power" dates back to the origins of the European state system. In the late 16th century, Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero divided the world into three types of states – grandissime and piccioli. According to Botero, a mezano or middle power "...has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others." No agreed standard method defines which states are middle powers, aside from the broad idea that middle powers are states that have a'moderate' ability to influence the behaviour of other states, in contrast to small power, which have'little' ability to influence. Some researchers use Gross National Product statistics to draw lists of middle powers around the world. Economically, middle powers are those that are not considered too "big" or too "small," however, defined.
However, economics is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but did not dominate in any one area. However, this usage is not universal, some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers. According to academics at the University of Leicester and University of Nottingham: middle power status is identified in one of two ways; the traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Because countries' capabilities differ, they are categorized as superpowers, middle powers or small powers. More it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes; this posits that middle powers can be distinguished from superpowers and smaller powers because of their foreign policy behaviour – middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interest.
In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability. According to Eduard Jordaan of Singapore Management University: All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order through multilateral and cooperative initiatives; however and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.
Another definition, by the Middle Power Initiative: "Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that give them significant international credibility." Under this definition however, nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, every state participant of the NATO nuclear sharing, would not be middle powers. According to Laura Neak of the International Studies Association: Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most by their international behavior–called'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, the tendency to embrace notions of'good international citizenship' to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace.
Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power; the imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War. According to international relations scholar Annette Baker Fox, relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than has been assumed. According to Soeya Yoshihide, "Middle Power does not just mean a state's size or military or economic power. Rather,'middle power diplomacy' is defined by the issue area where a state invests its resources and knowledge.
Middle Power States avoid a direct confrontation with great powers, but they see themselves as'moral actors' and seek their own role in particular issue areas, such as human rights and arms regulations. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building."Characteristics of middle
The bourgeoisie is a polysemous French term that can mean: a sociologically defined class in contemporary times, referring to people with a certain cultural and financial capital belonging to the middle or upper middle class: the upper and petty bourgeoisie. Originally and "those who live in the borough", to say, the people of the city, as opposed to those of rural areas. A defined class of the Middle Ages to the end of the Ancien Régime in France, that of inhabitants having the rights of citizenship and political rights in a city; the "bourgeoisie" in its original sense is intimately linked to the existence of cities recognized as such by their urban charters, so there was no bourgeoisie "outside the walls of the city" beyond which the people were "peasants" submitted to the stately courts and manorialism. In Marxist philosophy, the bourgeoisie is the social class that came to own the means of production during modern industrialization and whose societal concerns are the value of property and the preservation of capital to ensure the perpetuation of their economic supremacy in society.
Joseph Schumpeter saw the incorporation of new elements into an expanding bourgeoisie entrepreneurs who took risks to bring innovation to industries and the economy through the process of creative destruction, as the driving force behind the capitalist engine. The Modern French word bourgeois derived from the Old French burgeis, which derived from bourg, from the Old Frankish burg. In its literal sense, bourgeois in Old French means "town dweller". In English, the word "bourgeoisie" identified a social class oriented to economic materialism and hedonism, to upholding the extreme political and economic interests of the capitalist ruling-class. In the 18th century, before the French Revolution, in the French feudal order, the masculine and feminine terms bourgeois and bourgeoise identified the rich men and women who were members of the urban and rural Third Estate – the common people of the French realm, who violently deposed the absolute monarchy of the Bourbon King Louis XVI, his clergy, his aristocrats in the French Revolution of 1789-1799.
Hence, since the 19th century, the term "bourgeoisie" is politically and sociologically synonymous with the ruling upper-class of a capitalist society. The medieval French word bourgeois denoted the inhabitants of the bourgs, the craftsmen, artisans and others, who constituted "the bourgeoisie", they were the socio-economic class between the peasants and the landlords, between the workers and the owners of the means of production; as the economic managers of the materials, the goods, the services, thus the capital produced by the feudal economy, the term "bourgeoisie" evolved to denote the middle class – the businessmen and businesswomen who accumulated and controlled the capital that made possible the development of the bourgs into cities. Contemporarily, the terms "bourgeoisie" and "bourgeois" identify the ruling class in capitalist societies, as a social stratum; the 18th century saw a partial rehabilitation of bourgeois values in genres such as the drame bourgeois and "bourgeois tragedy".
The bourgeoisie emerged as a historical and political phenomenon in the 11th century when the bourgs of Central and Western Europe developed into cities dedicated to commerce. This urban expansion was possible thanks to economic concentration due to the appearance of protective self-organisation into guilds. Guilds arose when individual businessmen conflicted with their rent-seeking feudal landlords who demanded greater rents than agreed. In the event, by the end of the Middle Ages, under régimes of the early national monarchies of Western Europe, the bourgeoisie acted in self-interest, politically supported the king or queen against legal and financial disorder caused by the greed of the feudal lords. In the late-16th and early 17th centuries, the bourgeoisies of England and the Netherlands had become the financial – thus political – forces that deposed the feudal order. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the bourgeoisie were the politically progressive social class who
Information is the resolution of uncertainty. Information is associated with data and knowledge, as data is meaningful information and represents the values attributed to parameters, knowledge signifies understanding of an abstract or concrete concept; the existence of information can be uncoupled from an observer, which refers to that which accesses information to discern that which it specifies. In the case of knowledge, the information itself requires a cognitive observer to be accessed. In terms of communication, information is expressed either as the content of a message or through direct or indirect observation. That, perceived can be construed as a message in its own right, in that sense, information is always conveyed as the content of a message. Information can be encoded into various forms for interpretation, it can be encrypted for safe storage and communication. Information reduces uncertainty; the uncertainty of an event is measured by its probability of occurrence and is inversely proportional to that.
The more uncertain an event, the more information is required to resolve uncertainty of that event. The bit is a typical unit of information. For example, the information encoded in one "fair" coin flip is log2 = 1 bit, in two fair coin flips is log2 = 2 bits; the concept of information has different meanings in different contexts. Thus the concept becomes related to notions of constraint, control, form, knowledge, understanding, mental stimuli, perception and entropy; the English word derives from the Latin stem of the nominative: this noun derives from the verb informare in the sense of "to give form to the mind", "to discipline", "instruct", "teach". Inform itself comes from the Latin verb informare, which means to form an idea of. Furthermore, Latin itself contained the word informatio meaning concept or idea, but the extent to which this may have influenced the development of the word information in English is not clear; the ancient Greek word for form was μορφή and εἶδος "kind, shape, set", the latter word was famously used in a technical philosophical sense by Plato to denote the ideal identity or essence of something.'Eidos' can be associated with thought, proposition, or concept.
The ancient Greek word for information is πληροφορία, which transliterates from πλήρης "fully" and φέρω frequentative of to carry through. It means "bears fully" or "conveys fully". In modern Greek the word Πληροφορία is still in daily use and has the same meaning as the word information in English. In addition to its primary meaning, the word Πληροφορία as a symbol has deep roots in Aristotle's semiotic triangle. In this regard it can be interpreted to communicate information to the one decoding that specific type of sign; this is something that occurs with the etymology of many words in ancient and modern Greek where there is a strong denotative relationship between the signifier, e.g. the word symbol that conveys a specific encoded interpretation, the signified, e.g. a concept whose meaning the interpreter attempts to decode. In English, “information” is an uncountable mass noun. In information theory, information is taken as an ordered sequence of symbols from an alphabet, say an input alphabet χ, an output alphabet ϒ.
Information processing consists of an input-output function that maps any input sequence from χ into an output sequence from ϒ. The mapping may be deterministic, it may be memoryless. Information can be viewed as a type of input to an organism or system. Inputs are of two kinds. In his book Sensory Ecology Dusenbery called these causal inputs. Other inputs are important only because they are associated with causal inputs and can be used to predict the occurrence of a causal input at a time; some information is important because of association with other information but there must be a connection to a causal input. In practice, information is carried by weak stimuli that must be detected by specialized sensory systems and amplified by energy inputs before they can be functional to the organism or system. For example, light is a causal input to plants but for animals it only provides information; the colored light reflected from a flower is too weak to do much photosynthetic work but the visual system of the bee detects it and the bee's nervous system uses the information to guide the bee to the flower, where the bee finds nectar or pollen, which are causal inputs, serving a nutritional function.
The cognitive scientist and applied mathematician Ronaldo Vigo argues that information is a concept that requires at least two related entities to make quantitative sense. These are, any dimensionally defined category of objects S, any of its subsets R. R, in essence, is a representation of S, or, in other words, conveys representational information about S. Vigo defines the amount of information that R conveys a
The Asian Century is the projected 21st-century dominance of Asian politics and culture, assuming certain demographic and economic trends persist. The concept of Asian Century parallels the characterization of the 19th century as Britain's Imperial Century, the 20th century as the American Century. A 2011 study by the Asian Development Bank found that an additional 3 billion Asians could enjoy living standards similar to those in Europe today, the region could account for over half of global output by the middle of this century, it warned, that the Asian Century is not preordained. The growing importance and emphasis of unity in Asia, as well as maturing and progressive relationships among countries in the region further solidify the creation of the 21st Asian Century. In 1924, Karl Haushofer used the term "Pacific age," envisaging the growth of Japan and India: "A giant space is expanding before our eyes with forces pouring into it which... await the dawn of the Pacific age, the successor of the Atlantic age, the over-age Mediterranean and European era."
The phrase Asian Century arose in the mid to late 1980s, is attributed to a 1988 meeting with People's Republic of China leader Deng Xiaoping and Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in which Deng said that'n recent years people have been saying that the next century will be the century of Asia and the Pacific, as if that were sure to be the case. I disagree with this view.' Prior to this, it made an appearance in a 1985 US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearing. It has been subsequently reaffirmed by Asian political leaders, is now a popularly used term in the media. Asia's robust economic performance over the three decades preceding 2010, compared to that in the rest of the world, made the strongest case yet for the possibility of an Asian Century. Although this difference in economic performance had been recognized for some time, specific individual setbacks tended to hide the broad sweep and general tendency. By the early 21st century, however, a strong case could be made that this stronger Asian performance was not just sustainable but held a force and magnitude that could alter the distribution of power on the planet.
Coming in its wake, global leadership in a range of significant areas—international diplomacy, military strength and soft power—might as a consequence, be assumed by one or more of Asia's nation states. Among many scholars have provided factors that have contributed to the significant Asian development, Kishore Mahbubani provides seven pillars that rendered the Asian countries to excel and provided themselves with the possibility to become compatible with the Western counterparts; the seven pillars include: free-market economics and technology, pragmatism, culture of peace, rule of law and education. Population growth in Asia is expected to continue through at least the first half of the 21st century, though it has slowed since the late 20th century. At four billion people in the beginning of the 21st century, the Asian population is predicted to grow to more than five billion by 2050. While its percent of the world population is not expected to change, North American and European shares of the global population are expected to decline.
The major driver is continued productivity growth in Asia in China and India, as living standards rise. Without converging with European or North American living standards, Asia's might produce half of global GDP by 2050; this is a large shift compared to the immediate post-cold war, when North America and Europe combined produced half of global GDP. A 2011 study by the Asian Development Bank stated that: "By nearly doubling its share of global gross domestic product to 52 percent by 2050, Asia would regain the dominant economic position it held some 300 years ago, before the industrial revolution; the notion of the Asian Century assumes that Asian economies can maintain their momentum for another 40 years, adapt to shifting global economic and technological environment, continually recreate comparative advantages. In this scenario, according to 2011 modelling by the Asian Development Bank Asia's GDP would increase from $17 trillion in 2010 to $174 trillion in 2050, or half of global GDP. In the same study, the Asian Development Bank estimates that seven economies would lead Asia's powerhouse growth.
Since China's economic reforms in the late 1970s and early 1990s, the Chinese economy has enjoyed three decades of economic growth rates between 8 and 10%. The Indian economy began a similar albeit slower ascent at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, has averaged around 4% during this period, though growing over 8% in 2005, hitting 9.2% in 2006 before slowing to 6% in 2009 reaching 8.9% in 2010. A Goldman Sachs report suggests that the Indian economy could surpass the US economy by 2043, but India "will remain a low-income country for several decades, with per capita incomes well below its other BRIC peers. If India fulfills its growth potential, it can become a motor for the world economy, a key contributor to generating spending growth". Both of these developments involved policy of a degree of managed liberalisation of the economy as well as a turning outwards of the economy towards globalization; the magnitude of this liberalisation and globalisation is still subject to debate. They were part of conscious decisions by key political leaders in India and the PRC.
The populations of the two countries offer a potential market of over two and a q
The proletariat is the class of wage-earners in an economic society whose only possession of significant material value is their labour-power. A member of such a class is a proletarian. In Marxist theory, a dictatorship of the proletariat is for the proletariat, of the proletariat, by the proletariat. On the Marxist view, this will endow the proletarian with the power to abolish the conditions that make a person a proletarian and, build communism; the proletarii constituted a social class of Roman citizens owning no property. The origin of the name is linked with the census, which Roman authorities conducted every five years to produce a register of citizens and their property from which their military duties and voting privileges could be determined. For citizens with property valued 11,000 assēs or less, below the lowest census for military service, their children—proles —were listed instead of their property; the only contribution of a proletarius to the Roman society was seen in his ability to raise children, the future Roman citizens who can colonize new territories conquered by the Roman Republic and by the Roman Empire.
The citizens who had no property of significance were called capite censi because they were "persons registered not as to their property...but as to their existence as living individuals as heads of a family." Although included in one of the five support centuriae of the Comitia Centuriata, proletarii were deprived of their voting rights due to their low social status caused by their lack of "even the minimum property required for the lowest class" and a class-based hierarchy of the Comitia Centuriata. The late Roman historians, such as Livy, not without some uncertainty, understood the Comitia Centuriata to be one of three forms of popular assembly of early Rome composed of centuriae, the voting units whose members represented a class of citizens according to the value of their property; this assembly, which met on the Campus Martius to discuss public policy issues, was used as a means of designating military duties demanded of Roman citizens. One of reconstructions of the Comitia Centuriata features 18 centuriae of cavalry, 170 centuriae of infantry divided into five classes by wealth, plus 5 centuriae of support personnel called adsidui.
The top infantry class assembled with full arms and armor. In voting, the cavalry and top infantry class were enough to decide an issue. In the last centuries of the Roman Republic, the Comitia Centuriata became impotent as a political body, which further eroded minuscule political power the proletarii might have had in the Roman society. Following a series of wars the Roman Republic engaged since the closing of the Second Punic War, such as the Jugurthine War and conflicts in Macedonia and Asia, the significant reduction in the number of Roman family farmers had resulted in the shortage of people whose property qualified them to perform the citizenry's military duty to Rome; as a result of the Marian reforms initiated in 107 BC by the Roman general Gaius Marius, the proletarii became the backbone of the Roman army. In the era of early 19th century, many Western European liberal scholars - who dealt with social sciences and economics - pointed out the socio-economic similarieties of the modern growing industrial worker class and the classic ancient proletarians.
One of the earliest analogies can be found in the 1807 paper of French philosopher and political scientist Hugues Felicité Robert de Lamennais. It was translated to English with the title: "Modern Slavery". Swiss liberal economist and historian Jean Charles Léonard de Sismondi, was the first who applied the proletariat term to the working class created under capitalism, whose writings were cited by Marx. Marx most encountered the Proletariat term while studying the works of Sismondi. Karl Marx, who studied Roman law at the Friedrich Wilhelm University of Berlin, used the term proletariat in his socio-political theory of Marxism to describe a working class unadulterated by private property and capable of a revolutionary action to topple capitalism in order to create classless society. In Marxist theory, the proletariat is the social class that does not have ownership of the means of production and whose only means of subsistence is to sell their labor power for a wage or salary. Proletarians are wage-workers.
For Marx, wage labor may involve getting a salary rather than a wage per se. Marxism sees the proletariat and bourgeoisie as occupying conflicting positions, since workers automatically wish their wages to be as high as possible, while owners and their proxies wish for wages to be as low as possible. In Marxist theory, the borders between the proletariat and some layers of the petite bourgeoisie, who rely but not on self-employment at an income no different from an ordinary wage or below it – and the lumpenproletariat, who are not in legal employment – are not well defined. Intermediate positions are possible, where some wage-labor for an employer combines with self-employment. Marx makes a clear distinction between proletariat as salaried workers, which he sees as a progressive class, Lumpenproletariat, "rag-proletariat", the poorest and outcasts of the society