Pleasure is a broad class of mental states that humans and other animals experience as positive, enjoyable, or worth seeking. It includes more specific mental states such as happiness, enjoyment and euphoria; the early psychological concept of pleasure, the pleasure principle, describes it as a positive feedback mechanism that motivates the organism to recreate the situation it has just found pleasurable, to avoid past situations that caused pain. The experience of pleasure is subjective and different individuals experience different kinds and amounts of pleasure in the same situation. Many pleasurable experiences are associated with satisfying basic biological drives, such as eating, hygiene and sex; the appreciation of cultural artifacts and activities such as art, music and literature is pleasurable. Based upon the incentive salience model of reward – the attractive and motivational property of a stimulus that induces approach behavior and consummatory behavior – an intrinsic reward has two components: a "wanting" or desire component, reflected in approach behavior, a "liking" or pleasure component, reflected in consummatory behavior.
While all pleasurable stimuli are rewards, some rewards do not evoke pleasure. Pleasure is a component of reward. Stimuli that are pleasurable, therefore attractive, are known as intrinsic rewards, whereas stimuli that are attractive and motivate approach behavior, but are not inherently pleasurable, are termed extrinsic rewards. Extrinsic rewards are rewarding as a result of a learned association with an intrinsic reward. In other words, extrinsic rewards function as motivational magnets that elicit "wanting", but not "liking" reactions once they have been acquired; the reward system contains pleasure centers or hedonic hotspots – i.e. brain structures that mediate pleasure or "liking" reactions from intrinsic rewards. As of October 2017, hedonic hotspots have been identified in subcompartments within the nucleus accumbens shell, ventral pallidum, parabrachial nucleus, orbitofrontal cortex, insular cortex; the hotspot within the nucleus accumbens shell is located in the rostrodorsal quadrant of the medial shell, while the hedonic coldspot is located in a more posterior region.
The posterior ventral pallidum contains a hedonic hotspot, while the anterior ventral pallidum contains a hedonic coldspot. Microinjections of opioids and orexin are capable of enhancing liking in these hotspots; the hedonic hotspots located in the anterior OFC and posterior insula have been demonstrated to respond to orexin and opioids, as has the overlapping hedonic coldspot in the anterior insula and posterior OFC. On the other hand, the parabrachial nucleus hotspot has only been demonstrated to respond to benzodiazepine receptor agonists. Hedonic hotspots are functionally linked, in that activation of one hotspot results in the recruitment of the others, as indexed by the induced expression of c-Fos, an immediate early gene. Furthermore, inhibition of one hotspot results in the blunting of the effects of activating another hotspot. Therefore, the simultaneous activation of every hedonic hotspot within the reward system is believed to be necessary for generating the sensation of an intense euphoria.
Pleasure is considered one of the core dimensions of emotion. It can be described as the positive evaluation that forms the basis for several more elaborate evaluations such as "agreeable" or "nice"; as such, pleasure is an affect and not an emotion, as it forms one component of several different emotions. Pleasure is sometimes subdivided into fundamental pleasures that are related to survival and higher-order pleasures; the clinical condition of being unable to experience pleasure from enjoyable activities is called anhedonia. An active aversion to obtaining pleasure is called hedonophobia. Pleasure is regarded as a bipolar construct, meaning that the two ends of the spectrum from pleasant to unpleasant are mutually exclusive; this view is e.g. inherent in the circumplex model of affect. Yet, some lines of research suggest that people do experience pleasant and unpleasant feelings at the same time, giving rise to so-called mixed feelings; the degree to which something or someone is experienced as pleasurable not only depends on its objective attributes, but on beliefs about its history, about the circumstances of its creation, about its rarity, fame, or price, on other non-intrinsic attributes, such as the social status or identity it conveys.
For example, a sweater, worn by a celebrity is more desired than an otherwise identical sweater that has not, though less so if it has been washed. Another example was when Grammy-winning, internationally acclaimed violinist Joshua Bell played in the Washington D. C. subway for 43 minutes, attracting little attention from the 1,097 people who passed by, earning about $59 in tips. Paul Bloom describes these phenomena as arising from a form of essentialism. Epicurus and his followers defined the highest pleasure as the absence of suffering and pleasure itself as "freedom from pain in the body and freedom from turmoil in the soul". According to Cicero Epicurus believed that pleasure was the chief good and pain the chief evil. In the 12th century Razi's "Treatise of the Self and the Spirit" analyzed different types of pleasure and intellectual, explained their relations with one another, he concludes that human needs and desires are endless, "their
Ethical naturalism is the meta-ethical view which claims that: Ethical sentences express propositions. Some such propositions are true; those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of human opinion. These moral features of the world are reducible to some set of non-moral features It is important to distinguish the versions of ethical naturalism which have received the most sustained philosophical interest, for example, Cornell realism, from the position that "the way things are is always the way they ought to be", which few ethical naturalists hold. Ethical naturalism does, reject the fact-value distinction: it suggests that inquiry into the natural world can increase our moral knowledge in just the same way it increases our scientific knowledge. Indeed, proponents of ethical naturalism have argued that humanity needs to invest in the science of morality, a broad and loosely defined field that uses evidence from biology, anthropology, psychology and other areas to classify and describe moral behavior.
Ethical naturalism encompasses any reduction of ethical properties, such as'goodness', to non-ethical properties. Hedonism, for example, is the view that goodness is just pleasure. Altruism Consequentialism Consequentialist libertarianism Cornell realism Ethical egoism Evolutionary ethics Hedonism Humanistic ethics Moral skepticism Natural-rights libertarianism Objectivism Utilitarianism Virtue ethics Ethical naturalism has been criticized most prominently by ethical non-naturalist G. E. Moore, who formulated the open-question argument. Garner and Rosen say that a common definition of "natural property" is one "which can be discovered by sense observation or experience, experiment, or through any of the available means of science." They say that a good definition of "natural property" is problematic but that "it is only in criticism of naturalism, or in an attempt to distinguish between naturalistic and nonnaturalistic definist theories, that such a concept is needed." R. M. Hare criticised ethical naturalism because of its fallacious definition of the terms'good' or'right' explaining how value-terms being part of our prescriptive moral language are not reducible to descriptive terms: "Value-terms have a special function in language, that of commending.
When it comes to the moral questions that we might ask, it can be difficult to argue that there is not some level of meta-ethical relativism – and failure to address this matter is criticized as ethnocentrism. As a broad example of relativism, we would no doubt see different moral systems in an alien race that can only survive by ingesting one another; as a narrow example, there would be further specific moral opinions for each individual of that species. Some forms of moral realism are compatible with some degree of meta-ethical relativism; this argument rests on the assumption. For example, a moral universalist might argue that, just as one can discuss what is'good and evil' at an individual's level, so too can one make certain "moral" propositions with truth values relative at the level of the species. In other words, the moral relativist need not deem all moral propositions as subjective; the answer to "is free speech good for human societies?" is relative in a sense, but the moral realist would argue that an individual can be incorrect in this matter.
This may be the philosophical equivalent of the more pragmatic arguments made by some scientists. Moral nihilists maintain that any talk of an objective morality is incoherent and better off using other terms. Proponents of moral science like Ronald A. Lindsay have counter-argued that their way of understanding "morality" as a practical enterprise is the way we ought to have understood it in the first place, he holds the position that the alternative seems to be the elaborate philosophical reduction of the word "moral" into a vacuous, useless term. Lindsay adds that it is important to reclaim the specific word "Morality" because of the connotations it holds with many individuals. Author Sam Harris has argued that we overestimate the relevance of many arguments against the science of morality, arguments he believes scientists and rightly disregard in other domains of science like physics. For example, scientists may find themselves attempting to argue against philosophical skeptics, when Harris says they should be asking – as they would in any other domain – "why would we listen to a solipsist in the first place?"
This, Harris contends, is part of. Physicist Sean Carroll believes that conceiving of morality as a science could be a case of scientific imperialism and insists that what is "good for conscious creatures" is not an adequate working definition of "moral". In opposition, Vice President at the Center for Inquiry, John Shook, claims that this working definition is more than adequate for science at present, that disagreement should not immobilize the scientific study of ethics. In the collective The End of Christianity, Richard Carrier's chapter "Moral Facts Naturally Exist" sets out to propose a form of moral realism centered on human satisfaction.. In modern times, m
In mathematics and philosophy, a property is a characteristic of an object. The property may be considered a form of object in its own right. A property, differs from individual objects in that it may be instantiated, in more than one thing, it differs from the logical/mathematical concept of class by not having any concept of extensionality, from the philosophical concept of class in that a property is considered to be distinct from the objects which possess it. Understanding how different individual entities can in some sense have some of the same properties is the basis of the problem of universals; the terms attribute and quality have similar meanings. In modern analytic philosophy there are several debates about the fundamental nature of properties; these center around questions such as: Are properties real? Are they categorical or dispositional? Are properties physical or mental? A realist about properties asserts. One way to spell this out is in terms of exact, instantiations known universals.
The other realist position asserts that properties are particulars, which are unique instantiations in individual objects that resemble one another to various degrees. The anti-realist position referred to as nominalism claims that properties are names we attach to particulars; the properties themselves have no existence. According to the categoricalist, dispositions reduce to causal bases; the fragility of a wine glass, for example, is not a property. Rather it can be explained by the categorical property of the glass's micro-structural composition. Dispositionalism, in turn, asserts that a property is nothing more that a set of causal powers. Fragility, according to this view, identifies a real property of the glass. Several intermediary positions exist; the Identity view that states that properties are both categorical and dispositional, they are just two ways of viewing the same property. One hybrid view claims that some properties are categorical and some are dispositional. A second hybrid view claims that properties have both a categorical and dispositional part, but that these are distinct ontological parts.
Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is constituted of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties inhere in some physical substances; this stands in contrast to idealism. Physicalism claims that all properties, include mental properties reduce to, or supervene on, physical properties. Metaphysical Idealism, by contrast, claims that "something mental is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or exhaustive of reality." In classical Aristotelian terminology, a property is one of the predicables. It is a non-essential quality of a species, but a quality, characteristically present in members of that species. For example, "ability to laugh" may be considered a special characteristic of human beings. However, "laughter" is not an essential quality of the species human, whose Aristotelian definition of "rational animal" does not require laughter.
Therefore, in the classical framework, properties are characteristic qualities that are not required for the continued existence of an entity but are possessed by the entity. A property may be classified as either determinable. A determinable property is one. For example, color is a determinable property because it can be restricted to redness, etc. A determinate property is one; this distinction may be useful in dealing with issues of identity. Daniel Dennett distinguishes between lovely properties, although they require an observer to be recognised, exist latently in perceivable objects. However, taking any grammatical predicate whatsoever to be a property, or to have a corresponding property, leads to certain difficulties, such as Russell's paradox and the Grelling–Nelson paradox. Moreover, a real property can imply a host of true predicates: for instance, if X has the property of weighing more than 2 kilos the predicates "..weighs more than 1.9 kilos", "..weighs more than 1.8 kilos", etc. are all true of it.
Other predicates, such as "is an individual", or "has some properties" are uninformative or vacuous. There is some resistance to regarding such so-called "Cambridge properties" as legitimate. An intrinsic property is a property that an object or a thing has of itself, independently of other things, including its context. An extrinsic property is a property; the latter is sometimes called an attribute, since the value of that property is given to the object via its relation with another object. For example, mass is a physical intrinsic property of any physical object, whereas weight is an extrinsic property that varies depending on the strength of the gravitational field in which the res
In monotheistic thought, God is conceived of as the supreme being, creator deity, principal object of faith. The conceptions of God, as described by theologians include the attributes of omniscience, omnipresence, as having an eternal and necessary existence. Depending on one's kind of theism, these attributes are used either in way of analogy, or in a literal sense as distinct properties. God is most held to be incorporeal. Incorporeality and corporeality of God are related to conceptions of transcendence and immanence of God, with positions of synthesis such as the "immanent transcendence". Psychoanalyst Carl Jung equated religious ideas of God with transcendental aspects of consciousness in his interpretation; some religions describe God without reference to gender, while others or their translations use sex-specific terminology. Judaism attributes only a grammatical gender to God, using terms such as "Him" or "Father" for convenience. God has been conceived as either impersonal. In theism, God is the creator and sustainer of the universe, while in deism, God is the creator, but not the sustainer, of the universe.
In pantheism, God is the universe itself. In atheism, there is an absence of belief in God. In agnosticism, the existence of God is deemed unknowable. God has been conceived as the source of all moral obligation, the "greatest conceivable existent". Many notable philosophers have developed arguments against the existence of God. Monotheists refer to their gods using names prescribed by their respective religions, with some of these names referring to certain cultural ideas about their god's identity and attributes. In the ancient Egyptian era of Atenism the earliest recorded monotheistic religion, this deity was called Aten, premised on being the one "true" Supreme Being and creator of the universe. In the Hebrew Bible and Judaism, Adonai, YHWH and other names are used as the names of God. Yahweh and Jehovah, possible vocalizations of YHWH, are used in Christianity. In the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, coexisting in three "persons", is called the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. In Islam, the name Allah is used, while Muslims have a multitude of titular names for God.
In Hinduism, Brahman is considered a monistic concept of God. In Chinese religion, Shangdi is conceived as the progenitor of the universe, intrinsic to it and bringing order to it. Other religions have names for the concept, for instance, Baha in the Bahá'í Faith, Waheguru in Sikhism, Sang Hyang Widhi Wasa in Balinese Hinduism, Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrianism; the many different conceptions of God, competing claims as to God's characteristics and actions, have led to the development of ideas of omnitheism, pandeism, or a perennial philosophy, which postulates that there is one underlying theological truth, of which all religions express a partial understanding, as to which "the devout in the various great world religions are in fact worshipping that one God, but through different, overlapping concepts". The earliest written form of the Germanic word God comes from the 6th-century Christian Codex Argenteus; the English word itself is derived from the Proto-Germanic * ǥuđan. The reconstructed Proto-Indo-European form * ǵhu-tó-m was based on the root * ǵhau-, which meant either "to call" or "to invoke".
The Germanic words for God were neuter—applying to both genders—but during the process of the Christianization of the Germanic peoples from their indigenous Germanic paganism, the words became a masculine syntactic form. In the English language, capitalization is used for names by which a god is known, including'God'; the capitalized form of god is not used for multiple gods or when used to refer to the generic idea of a deity. The English word God and its counterparts in other languages are used for any and all conceptions and, in spite of significant differences between religions, the term remains an English translation common to all; the same holds for Hebrew El, but in Judaism, God is given a proper name, the tetragrammaton YHWH, in origin the name of an Edomite or Midianite deity, Yahweh. In many translations of the Bible, when the word LORD is in all capitals, it signifies that the word represents the tetragrammaton. Allāh is the Arabic term with no plural used by Muslims and Arabic speaking Christians and Jews meaning "The God", while "ʾilāh" is the term used for a deity or a god in general.
God may be given a proper name in monotheistic currents of Hinduism which emphasize the personal nature of God, with early references to his name as Krishna-Vasudeva in Bhagavata or Vishnu and Hari. Ahura Mazda is the name for God used in Zoroastrianism. "Mazda", or rather the Avestan stem-form Mazdā-, nominative Mazdå, reflects Proto-Iranian *Mazdāh. It is taken to be the proper name of the spirit, like its Sanskrit cognate medhā, means "intelligence" or "wisdom". Both the Avestan and Sanskrit words reflect Proto-Indo-Iranian *mazdhā-, from Proto-Indo-European mn̩sdʰeh1 meaning "placing one's mind", hence "wise". Waheguru is a term most used in Sikhism to refer to God, it means "Wonderful Teacher" in the Punjabi language. Vāhi means "wonderful" and guru is a term denoting "teacher". Waheguru is described by some as an experience of ecstasy, beyond all descriptions; the most common usage of the word "Waheguru" is in the greeting Sikhs use with each other: Baha, the "greates
Intuition is the ability to acquire knowledge without proof, evidence, or conscious reasoning, or without understanding how the knowledge was acquired. Different writers give the word "intuition" a great variety of different meanings, ranging from direct access to unconscious knowledge, unconscious cognition, inner sensing, inner insight to unconscious pattern-recognition and the ability to understand something instinctively, without the need for conscious reasoning; the word intuition comes from the Latin verb intueri translated as "consider" or from the late middle English word intuit, "to contemplate". Both Eastern and Western philosophers have studied the concept in great detail. Philosophy of mind deals with the concept of intuition. In the East intuition is intertwined with religion and spirituality, various meanings exist from different religious texts. In Hinduism various attempts have been made to interpret other esoteric texts. For Sri Aurobindo intuition comes under the realms of knowledge by identity.
The second nature being the action when it seeks to be aware of itself, resulting in humans being aware of their existence or aware of being angry & aware of other emotions. He terms this second nature as knowledge by identity, he finds that at present as the result of evolution the mind has accustomed itself to depend upon certain physiological functioning and their reactions as its normal means of entering into relations with the outer material world. As a result, when we seek to know about the external world the dominant habit is through arriving at truths about things via what our senses convey to us. However, knowledge by identity, which we only give the awareness of human beings' existence, can be extended further to outside of ourselves resulting in intuitive knowledge, he finds this intuitive knowledge was common to older humans and was taken over by reason which organises our perception and actions resulting from Vedic to metaphysical philosophy and to experimental science. He finds that this process, which seems to be decent, is a circle of progress, as a lower faculty is being pushed to take up as much from a higher way of working.
He finds when self-awareness in the mind is applied to one's self and the outer -self, results in luminous self-manifesting identity. Osho believed consciousness of human beings to be in increasing order from basic animal instincts to intelligence and intuition, humans being living in that conscious state moving between these states depending on their affinity, he suggests living in the state of intuition is one of the ultimate aims of humanity. Advaita vedanta takes intuition to be an experience through which one can come in contact with an experience Brahman. Buddhism finds intuition to be a faculty in the mind of immediate knowledge and puts the term intuition beyond the mental process of conscious thinking, as the conscious thought cannot access subconscious information, or render such information into a communicable form. In Zen Buddhism various techniques have been developed to help develop one's intuitive capability, such as koans – the resolving of which leads to states of minor enlightenment.
In parts of Zen Buddhism intuition is deemed a mental state between the Universal mind and one's individual, discriminating mind. In Islam there are various scholars with varied interpretations of intuition, sometimes relating the ability of having intuitive knowledge to prophethood. Siháb al Din-al Suhrawadi, in his book Philosophy Of Illumination, finds that intuition is a knowledge acquired through illumination and is mystical in nature and suggests mystical contemplation on this to bring about correct judgments. While Ibn Sīnā finds the ability of having intuition as a "prophetic capacity" and terms it as a knowledge obtained without intentionally acquiring it, he finds that regular knowledge is based on imitation while intuitive knowledge is based on intellectual certitude. In the West, intuition does not appear as a separate field of study, early mentions and definitions can be traced back to Plato. In his book Republic he tries to define intuition as a fundamental capacity of human reason to comprehend the true nature of reality.
In his works Meno and Phaedo, he describes intuition as a pre-existing knowledge residing in the "soul of eternity", a phenomenon by which one becomes conscious of pre-existing knowledge. He provides an example of mathematical truths, posits that they are not arrived at by reason, he argues that these truths are accessed using a knowledge present in a dormant form and accessible to our intuitive capacity. This concept by Plato is sometimes referred to as anamnesis; the study was continued by his followers. In his book Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes refers to an intuition as a pre-existing knowledge gained through rational reasoning or discovering truth through contemplation; this definition is referred to as rational intuition. Philosophers, such as Hume, have more ambiguous interpretations of intuition. Hume claims intuition is a recognition of relationships while he states that "the resemblance" "will strike the eye" but goes on to stat
The concept of the supernatural encompasses anything, inexplicable by scientific understanding of the laws of nature but argued by believers to exist. Examples include immaterial beings such as angels and spirits, claimed human abilities like magic and extrasensory perception. Supernatural entities have been invoked to explain phenomena as diverse as lightning and the human senses. Naturalists maintain that nothing beyond the physical world exists and hence maintain skeptical attitudes towards supernatural concepts; the supernatural is featured in paranormal and religious contexts, but can feature as an explanation in more secular contexts. Occurring as both an adjective and a noun, descendants of the modern English compound supernatural enters the language from two sources: via Middle French and directly from the Middle French's term's ancestor, post-Classical Latin. Post-classical Latin supernaturalis first occurs in the 6th century, composed of the Latin prefix super- and nātūrālis; the earliest known appearance of the word in the English language occurs in a Middle English translation of Catherine of Siena's Dialogue.
The semantic value of the term has shifted over the history of its use. The term referred to Christian understandings of the world. For example, as an adjective, the term can mean'belonging to a realm or system that transcends nature, as that of divine, magical, or ghostly beings. Obsolete uses include'of, relating to, or dealing with metaphysics'; as a noun, the term can mean'a supernatural being', with a strong history of employment in relation to entities from the mythologies of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The metaphysical considerations of the existence of the supernatural can be difficult to approach as an exercise in philosophy or theology because any dependencies on its antithesis, the natural, will have to be inverted or rejected. One complicating factor is that there is disagreement about the definition of "natural" and the limits of naturalism. Concepts in the supernatural domain are related to concepts in religious spirituality and occultism or spiritualism. For sometimes we use the word nature for that Author of nature whom the schoolmen, harshly enough, call natura naturans, as when it is said that nature hath made man corporeal and immaterial.
Sometimes we mean by the nature of a thing the essence, or that which the schoolmen scruple not to call the quiddity of a thing, the attribute or attributes on whose score it is what it is, whether the thing be corporeal or not, as when we attempt to define the nature of an angle, or of a triangle, or of a fluid body, as such. Sometimes we take nature for an internal principle of motion, as when we say that a stone let fall in the air is by nature carried towards the centre of the earth, and, on the contrary, that fire or flame does move upwards toward firmament. Sometimes we understand by nature the established course of things, as when we say that nature makes the night succeed the day, nature hath made respiration necessary to the life of men. Sometimes we take nature for an aggregate of powers belonging to a body a living one, as when physicians say that nature is strong or weak or spent, or that in such or such diseases nature left to herself will do the cure. Sometimes we take nature for the universe, or system of the corporeal works of God, as when it is said of a phoenix, or a chimera, that there is no such thing in nature, i.e. in the world.
And sometimes too, that most we would express by nature a semi-deity or other strange kind of being, such as this discourse examines the notion of. And besides these more absolute acceptions, if I may so call them, of the word nature, it has divers others, as nature is wont to be set or in opposition or contradistinction to other things, as when we say of a stone when it falls downwards that it does it by a natural motion, but that if it be thrown upwards its motion that way is violent. So chemists distinguish vitriol into natural and fictitious, or made by art, i.e. by the intervention of human power or skill. We say that wicked men are still in the state of nature, but the regenerate in a state of grace; the term "supernatural" is used interchangeably with paranormal or preternatural — the latter limited to an adjective for describing abilities which appear to exceed what is possible within the boundaries of the laws of physics. Epistemologically, the relationship between the supernatural and the natural is indistinct in terms of natural phenomena that, ex hypothesi, violate the laws of nature, in so far as such laws are realistically accountable.
Parapsychologists use the term psi to refer to an assumed unitary force underlying the phenomena they study. Psi is defined in the Journal of Parapsychology as "personal factors or processes in nature which transcend accepted laws" and "which are non-physical in nature", it is used to cover both extrasensory perception, an "awareness of or response to an external event or influence not apprehended by sens