SUMMARY / RELATED TOPICS

Michael Lazarus

Michael Lazarus is an American painter. He has been working since the early 1990s, his first solo exhibition was in 1998 at Inc.. Lazarus was represented by Feature until 2011, exhibiting alongside artists including B. Wurtz, Dike Blair, Jim Isermann, Tom Friedman, Lisa Beck, Takashi Murakami, Lily van der Stokker. In 2000, he was one of the first'alternative' artists to have a solo show in the "Gallery 2" program at Andrea Rosen Gallery. Lazarus has had solo exhibitions in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Montreal and Amsterdam. In 2006 Lazarus' works were exhibited in conversation with Emory Douglas and Corita Kent in "That was then... This is now" at MoMA PS1. Lazarus has worked as a collaborator in the group Assume Vivid Astro Focus, on two separate projects. Lazarus' work is included in several public and private collections, including The Frances Young Tang Teaching Museum and Art Gallery, The Portland Art Museum, The Progressive Corporation, JPMorgan Chase, his work is featured in Paste: 21st-Century Collage.

Wagle, Kate. Curator and Critic Tours, Connective Conversations: Inside Oregon Art 2011-2014, The Ford Family Foundation and University of Oregon. GHP, Connecticut. Pp. 172–173. ISBN 9780871141828. Zevitas, Steven. "Pacific Coast". New American Paintings. 121: 86–89. Roberts, Richard Brereton with Caroline. Cut & paste: 21st-century collage. London: Laurence King Publishing. Pp. 104–109. ISBN 978-1856697170. Cotter, Holland. "New Sparkle for an Abstract Ensemble". The New York Times. Johnson, Ken. "The Allure of the Homespun in the Maw of the Digital Age". The New York Times. Cotter, Holland. "Art in Review: The Perpetual Dialogue". The New York Times. Ebgi, Anat. "Reviews". Flash Art. Pagel, David. "Into a void of inhuman beauty". The Los Angeles Times. Wei, Lilly. "Reviews". Art News. Nobue, Isono. Nyūyōku no atorie: nyūyōku āto to kuriētātachi no sugao. Tōkyō: Gyappujapan. Pp. 96–99. ISBN 4883572226. Melissa, Feldman. "Michael Lazarus at San Francisco Art Institute and Feature". Art in America. Mondt, Zoey. "Reviews". Art Issues.

Cotter, Holland. "Review: Michael Lazarus". The New York Times. Cash, Stephanie. "The Hotel as Art". Art in America. Pagel, David. "Review". The Los Angeles Times. Cotter, Holland. "Home Is Where the Art Is". The New York Times

Zombie bank

A zombie bank is a financial institution that has an economic net worth less than zero but continues to operate because its ability to repay its debts is shored up by implicit or explicit government credit support. The term was first used by Edward Kane in 1987 to explain the dangers of tolerating a large number of insolvent savings and loan associations and applied to the emerging Japanese crisis in 1993. A zombie can continue to operate and to grow as long as creditors remain confident in the relevant government's ability to extract the funds needed to back up its promises from current or future taxpayers, but when this ability seems doubtful, zombie institutions face runs by uninsured depositors and margin calls from counterparties in derivatives transactions. In an article published in the Mar/Apr 1992 issue of Society entitled "The Savings and Loan Insurance Mess," Edward Kane expanded on the source of the analogy. "Although the Savings and Loan debacle is complex," Kane wrote, "simple-minded cartoons and horror movies can illustrate how the S&L insurance fund turned into such a mess....

In movies such as George Romero's Night of the Living Dead and Dawn of the Dead, corpses climb out of their graves and walk around hunting for food. They are hungry for only one thing—human flesh; as soon as these living-dead "zombies" feed on another human, the human dies and becomes a zombie too. Many S&Ls have, for some time, been zombie institutions; these institutions were insolvent in the sense that their assets had fallen below the level at which they could cover their deposit debt. These zombie S&Ls were able to survive only because they could feed off taxpayers through the device of government-guaranteed federal deposit insurance."Tyler Cowen, a professor of economics at George Mason University, wrote for the New York Times in April 2011 that "If enough depositors fear frozen accounts, the banks will be emptied out, they will require additional government bailouts, on top of the bailouts for the bad real estate loans. The banks come to resemble empty shells, conduits for public aid but shrinking and unprofitable as businesses — and, to a large extent, the case in Ireland.

Portugal is moving toward being a land inhabited by zombie banks. It’s the zombie banks that doom the current European bailout plans." In 1990, Japan suffered a collapse in real estate and stock market prices that pushed major banks into insolvency. Rather than follow America's tough recommendation and close or recapitalise these banks Japan kept banks marginally functional through explicit or implicit guarantees and piecemeal government bailouts; the resulting "zombie banks" neither alive nor dead could not support economic growth. After the financial crisis in 2008, banks in Europe have been described as zombies; this keeps these banks fostering growth. On July 26, 2012 the ECB’s president Mario Draghi launched the Outright Monetary Transactions Program, which led to a significant increase in the value of sovereign bonds issued by European periphery countries; the regained stability of the European banking sector has not transferred into economic growth. The slow recovery is explained by bad credit allocations by zombie banks.

New restrictions imposed on European banks by the European Union, which took effect from January 2016, are meant to protect taxpayers from picking up the bill for rescuing banks as happened during the financial crisis. After the 2008 crisis rigorous stress test forced some banks to recapitalize; this may have avoided banks becoming zombies, but there is a possibility that zombie companies exist. What causes the existence of zombie banks are bad loans. In slow economies, businesses who borrowed from banks become unable to pay the loans back; the capital infusions received from the government, but from central bank loans, form zombie banks. This phenomenon is referred to as regulatory forbearance, it is giving the lender leverage to enable the banks to postpone the recognition of their losses. The government is giving zombie banks leeway in hopes that they will be able to make profits over time to cover and reverse their losses and revitalize. Rather than pressing businesses for repayment, zombie banks extend their loans with the money received from the government, which in turn causes the existence of zombie companies.

The rescuing of failing financial institutions, or zombie banks creates moral hazard: investors take risks without considering the negative consequences, since they believe the government will help them out in case investments fail. Investors do not have incentive to be concerned about the risk-reward ratio, essential for healthy economy. Other effects of zombie banking include unpredictability of future earnings due to their non-performing assets on their balance sheet. Since zombie banks employ higher interest rates to attract investors, healthy banks suffer from competition and lose customers. Zombie banks can be reluctant to lend money to the private sector. Zombie Banks: How Broken Banks and Debtor Nations are Crippling the Global Economy by Yalman Onaran Bad bank Bridge bank Zombie company