Mind–body dualism, or mind–body duality, is a view in the philosophy of mind that mental phenomena are, in some respects, non-physical, or that the mind and body are distinct and separable. Thus, it encompasses a set of views about the relationship between mind and matter, between subject and object, is contrasted with other positions, such as physicalism and enactivism, in the mind–body problem. Aristotle shared Plato's view of multiple souls and further elaborated a hierarchical arrangement, corresponding to the distinctive functions of plants and people: a nutritive soul of growth and metabolism that all three share. In this view, a soul is the hylomorphic form of a viable organism, wherein each level of the hierarchy formally supervenes upon the substance of the preceding level. Thus, for Aristotle, all three souls perish. For Plato however, the soul was not dependent on the physical body. Dualism is associated with the thought of René Descartes, which holds that the mind is a nonphysical—and therefore, non-spatial—substance.
Descartes identified the mind with consciousness and self-awareness and distinguished this from the brain as the seat of intelligence. Hence, he was the first to formulate the mind -- body problem in the form. Dualism is contrasted with various kinds of monism. Substance dualism is contrasted with all forms of materialism, but property dualism may be considered a form of emergent materialism or non-reductive physicalism in some sense. Ontological dualism makes dual commitments about the nature of existence as it relates to mind and matter, can be divided into three different types: Substance dualism asserts that mind and matter are fundamentally distinct kinds of foundations. Property dualism suggests that the ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter. Predicate dualism claims the irreducibility of mental predicates to physical predicates. Substance dualism is a type of dualism most famously defended by René Descartes, which states that there are two kinds of foundation: mental and body.
This philosophy states that the mental can exist outside of the body, the body cannot think. Substance dualism is important for having given rise to much thought regarding the famous mind–body problem. Substance dualism is a philosophical position compatible with most theologies which claim that immortal souls occupy an independent realm of existence distinct from that of the physical world. Property dualism asserts that an ontological distinction lies in the differences between properties of mind and matter, that consciousness is ontologically irreducible to neurobiology and physics, it asserts. Hence, it is a sub-branch of emergent materialism. What views properly fall under the property dualism rubric is itself a matter of dispute. There are different versions of property dualism. Non-reductive physicalism is a form of property dualism in which it is asserted that all mental states are causally reducible to physical states. One argument for this has been made in the form of anomalous monism expressed by Donald Davidson, where it is argued that mental events are identical to physical events, there can be strict law-governed causal relationships.
Another argument for this has been expressed by John Searle, the advocate of a distinctive form of physicalism he calls biological naturalism. His view is that although mental states are ontologically irreducible to physical states, they are causally reducible, he has acknowledged that "to many people" his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike. But he thinks. Epiphenomenalism is a form of property dualism, in which it is asserted that one or more mental states do not have any influence on physical states, it asserts that while material causes give rise to sensations, ideas, etc. such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further: they are causal dead-ends. This can be contrasted to interactionism, on the other hand, in which mental causes can produce material effects, vice versa. Predicate dualism is a view espoused by nonreductive physicalists such as Donald Davidson and Jerry Fodor, who maintain that while there is only one ontological category of substances and properties of substances, the predicates that we use to describe mental events cannot be redescribed in terms of physical predicates of natural languages.
If we characterize predicate monism as the view subscribed to by eliminative materialists, who maintain that such intentional predicates as believe, think, etc. will be eliminated from both the language of science and from ordinary language because the entities to which they refer do not exist predicate dualism is most defined as the negation of this position. Predicate dualists believe that so-called "folk psychology", with all of its propositional attitude ascriptions, is an ineliminable part of the enterprise of describing and understanding human mental states and behavior. Davidson, for example, subscribes to Anomalous Monism, according to which there can be no strict psychophysical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as mental and physical events. However, all mental events have
The mind–body problem is a philosophical problem concerning the relationship between thought and consciousness in the human mind, the brain as part of the physical body. It is distinct from the question of how mind and body function chemically and physiologically since that question presupposes an interactionist account of mind-body relations; this question arises when mind and body are considered as distinct, based on the premise that the mind and the body are fundamentally different in nature. The problem was addressed by René Descartes in the 17th century, resulting in Cartesian dualism, by pre-Aristotelian philosophers, in Avicennian philosophy, in earlier Asian traditions. A variety of approaches have been proposed. Most are either monist. Dualism maintains a rigid distinction between the realms of matter. Monism maintains that there is only one unifying reality, substance or essence in terms of which everything can be explained; each of these categories contain numerous variants. The two main forms of dualism are substance dualism, which holds that the mind is formed of a distinct type of substance not governed by the laws of physics, property dualism, which holds that mental properties involving conscious experience are fundamental properties, alongside the fundamental properties identified by a completed physics.
The three main forms of monism are physicalism, which holds that the mind consists of matter organized in a particular way. Psychophysical parallelism is a third possible alternative regarding the relation between mind and body, between interaction and one-sided action. Several philosophical perspectives have been developed; the historical materialism of Karl Marx and subsequent writers, itself a form of physicalism, held that consciousness was engendered by the material contingencies of one's environment. An explicit rejection of the dichotomy is found in French structuralism, is a position that characterized post-war Continental philosophy; the absence of an empirically identifiable meeting point between the non-physical mind and its physical extension has proven problematic to dualism, many modern philosophers of mind maintain that the mind is not something separate from the body. These approaches have been influential in the sciences in the fields of sociobiology, computer science, evolutionary psychology, the neurosciences.
An ancient model of the mind known as the Five-Aggregate Model, described in the Buddhist teachings, explains the mind as continuously changing sense impressions and mental phenomena. Considering this model, it is possible to understand that it is the changing sense impressions and mental phenomena that experiences/analyzes all external phenomena in the world as well as all internal phenomena including the body anatomy, the nervous system as well as the organ brain; this conceptualization leads to two levels of analyses: analyses conducted from a third-person perspective on how the brain works, analyzing the moment-to-moment manifestation of an individual’s mind-stream. Considering the latter, the manifestation of the mind-stream is described as happening in every person all the time in a scientist who analyses various phenomena in the world, including analyzing and hypothesizing about the organ brain. Philosophers David L. Robb and John F. Heil introduce mental causation in terms of the mind–body problem of interaction: Mind–body interaction has a central place in our pretheoretic conception of agency.
Indeed, mental causation figures explicitly in formulations of the mind–body problem. Some philosophers insist that the notion of psychological explanation turns on the intelligibility of mental causation. If your mind and its states, such as your beliefs and desires, were causally isolated from your bodily behavior what goes on in your mind could not explain what you do. If psychological explanation goes, so do the related notions of agency and moral responsibility. A good deal rides on a satisfactory solution to the problem of mental causation there is more than one way in which puzzles about the mind's "causal relevance" to behavior can arise. Set the agenda for subsequent discussions of the mind–body relation. According to Descartes and bodies are distinct kinds of "substance". Bodies, he held, are spatially extended substances, incapable of thought. If minds and bodies are radically different kinds of substance, however, it is not easy to see how they "could" causally interact. Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia puts it forcefully to him in a 1643 letter: how the human soul can determine the movement of the animal spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts—being as it is a conscious substance.
For the determination of movement seems always to come about from the moving body's being propelled—to depend on the kind of impulse it gets from what sets it in motion, or again, on the nature and shape of this latter thing's surface. Now the first two conditions involve contact, the third involves that the impelling thing has extension. Elizabeth is expressing the prevailing mechanistic view as to how causation of bodies
Mental rotation is the ability to rotate mental representations of two-dimensional and three-dimensional objects as it is related to the visual representation of such rotation within the human mind. Mental rotation, as a function of visual representation in the human brain, has been associated with the right cerebral hemisphere. There is a relationship between similar areas of the brain associated with perception and mental rotation. There could be a relationship between the cognitive rate of spatial processing, general intelligence and mental rotation. Mental rotation can be described as the brain moving objects in order to help understand what they are and where they belong. Mental rotation has been studied to try to figure out how the mind recognizes objects in their environment. Researchers call such objects stimuli. Mental rotation is one cognitive function for the person to figure out. Mental rotation can be separated into the following cognitive stages: Create a mental image of an object from all directions Rotate the object mentally until a comparison can be made Make the comparison Decide if the objects are the same or not Report the decision In a mental rotation test, the participant compares two 3D objects rotated in some axis, states if they are the same image or if they are mirror images.
The test will have pairs of images each rotated a specific number of degrees. A set number of pairs will be split between being the same image rotated; the researcher judges the participant on how and they can distinguish between the mirrored and non-mirrored pairs. Roger Shepard and Jacqueline Metzler were some of the first to research the phenomenon, their experiment tested mental rotation on three-dimensional objects. Each subject was presented with multiple pairs of three-dimensional, asymmetrical lined or cubed objects; the experiment was designed to measure how long it would take each subject to determine whether the pair of objects were indeed the same object or two different objects. Their research showed that the reaction time for participants to decide if the pair of items matched or not was linearly proportional to the angle of rotation from the original position; that is, the more an object has been rotated from the original, the longer it takes an individual to determine if the two images are of the same object or enantiomorphs.
In 1978, Steven G. Vandenberg and Allan R. Kuse developed a test to assess mental rotation abilities, based on Shepard and Metzler's original study; the Mental Rotations Test was constructed using India ink drawings. Each stimulus was a two-dimensional image of a three-dimensional object drawn by a computer; the image was displayed on an oscilloscope. Each image was shown at different orientations rotated around the vertical axis. Following the basic ideas of Shepard and Metzler's experiment, this study found a significant difference in the mental rotation scores between men and women, with men performing better. Correlations with other measures showed strong association with tests of spatial visualization and no association with verbal ability. In 1999, a study was conducted to find out which part of the brain is activated during mental rotation. Seven volunteers between the ages of twenty-nine to sixty-six participated in this experiment. For the study, the subjects were shown eight characters 4 times each and the subjects had to decide if the character was in its normal configuration or if it was the mirror image.
During this task, a PET scan was performed and revealed activation in the right posterior parietal lobe. Functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of brain activation during mental rotation reveal consistent increased activation of the parietal lobe the inter-parietal sulcus, dependent on the difficulty of the task. In general, the larger the angle of rotation, the more brain activity associated with the task; this increased brain activation is accompanied by longer times to complete the rotation task and higher error rates. Researchers have argued that the increased brain activation, increased time, increased error rates indicate that task difficulty is proportional to the angle of rotation. Physical objects that people imagine rotating in everyday life have many properties, such as textures and colors. A study at the University of California Santa Barbara was conducted to test the extent to which visual information, such as color, is represented during mental rotation; this study used several methods such as reaction time studies, verbal protocol analysis, eye tracking.
In the initial reaction time experiments, those with poor rotational ability were affected by the colors of the image, whereas those with good rotational ability were not. Overall, those with poor ability were faster and more accurate identifying images that were colored; the verbal protocol analysis showed that the subjects with low spatial ability mentioned color in their mental rotation tasks more than participants with high spatial ability. One thing that can be shown through this experiment is that those with higher rotational ability will be less to represent color in their mental rotation. Poor rotators will be more to represent color in their mental rotation using piecemeal strategies. Research on how athleticism and artistic ability affect mental rotation has been done. Pietsch, S. & Jansen, P. (
Eliminative materialism is the claim that people's common-sense understanding of the mind is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. It is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind; some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that psychological concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions. Eliminativism about a class of entities is the view. For example, materialism tends to be eliminativist about the soul. Eliminative materialism is the new idea that certain classes of mental entities that common sense takes for granted, such as beliefs and the subjective sensation of pain, do not exist; the most common versions are eliminativism about propositional attitudes, as expressed by Paul and Patricia Churchland, eliminativism about qualia, as expressed by Daniel Dennett and Georges Rey.
These philosophers appeal to an introspection illusion. In the context of materialist understandings of psychology, eliminativism stands in opposition to reductive materialism which argues that mental states as conventionally understood do exist, that they directly correspond to the physical state of the nervous system. An intermediate position is revisionary materialism, which will argue that the mental state in question will prove to be somewhat reducible to physical phenomena—with some changes needed to the common sense concept. Since eliminative materialism claims that future research will fail to find a neuronal basis for various mental phenomena, it must wait for science to progress further. One might question the position on these grounds, but other philosophers like Churchland argue that eliminativism is necessary in order to open the minds of thinkers to new evidence and better explanations. Various arguments have been put forth both for and against eliminative materialism over the last forty years.
Most of the arguments in favor of the view are based on the assumption that people's commonsense view of the mind is an implicit theory. It is to be compared and contrasted with other scientific theories in its explanatory success and ability to allow people to make correct predictions about the future. Eliminativists argue that, based on these and other criteria, commonsense "folk" psychology has failed and will need to be replaced with explanations derived from the neurosciences; these philosophers therefore tend to emphasize the importance of neuroscientific research as well as developments in artificial intelligence to sustain their thesis. Philosophers who argue against eliminativism may take several approaches. Simulation theorists, like Robert Gordon and Alvin Goldman argue that folk psychology is not a theory, but rather depends on internal simulation of others, therefore is not subject to falsification in the same way that theories are. Jerry Fodor, among others, argues. Another view is that eliminativism assumes the existence of the beliefs and other entities it seeks to "eliminate" and is thus self-refuting.
Eliminativism maintains that the common-sense understanding of the mind is mistaken, that the neurosciences will one day reveal that the mental states that are talked about in everyday discourse, using words such as "intend", "believe", "desire", "love", do not refer to anything real. Because of the inadequacy of natural languages, people mistakenly think that they have such beliefs and desires; some eliminativists, such as Frank Jackson, claim that consciousness does not exist except as an epiphenomenon of brain function. Consciousness and folk psychology are separate issues and it is possible to take an eliminative stance on one but not the other; the roots of eliminativism go back to the writings of Wilfred Sellars, W. V. Quine, Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty; the term "eliminative materialism" was first introduced by James Cornman in 1968 while describing a version of physicalism endorsed by Rorty. The Ludwig Wittgenstein was an important inspiration for eliminativism with his attack on "private objects" as "grammatical fictions".
Early eliminativists such as Rorty and Feyerabend confused two different notions of the sort of elimination that the term "eliminative materialism" entailed. On the one hand, they claimed, the cognitive sciences that will give people a correct account of the workings of the mind will not employ terms that refer to common-sense mental states like beliefs and desires, but critics countered that this view was indistinguishable from the identity theory of mind. Quine himself wondered what was so eliminative about eliminative materialism after all: On the other hand, the same philosophers claimed that common-sense mental states do not exist, but critics pointed out that eliminativists could not have it both ways: either mental states exist and will be explained in terms of lower-level neurophysiological processes or they do not. Modern el
Mental operations are operations that affect mental contents. Operations of reasoning have been the object of logic alone. Pierre Janet was one of the first to use the concept in psychology. Mental operations have been investigated at a developmental level by Jean Piaget, from a psychometric perspective by J. P. Guilford. There is a cognitive approach to the subject, as well as a systems view of it. Since Antiquity, mental operations, more formal operations of reasoning have been the object of logic. In 1903, Pierre Janet described two types of mental operations: reality operations - mental operations under the control of logic. Jean Piaget differentiated a preoperational stage, operational stages of cognitive development, on the basis of presence of mental operations as an adaptation tool. J. P. Guilford's Structure of Intellect model described up to 180 different intellectual abilities organized along three dimensions—Operations and Products. According to most logicians, the three primary mental operations are apprehension and inference.
Apprehension is the mental operation. If you were to think of a sunset or a baseball, the action of forming that picture in your mind is apprehension; the verbal expression of apprehension is called a term. Judgment is the mental operation. Were you to think, "That sunset is beautiful" or "Baseball is the all-American sport" is to make a judgment; the verbal expression of judgment is the statement. Inference is the mental operation. If you were to think, "I like to look at that sunset, because I enjoy beautiful things, that sunset is beautiful" you would be reasoning; the verbal expression of reasoning is the logical argument. Jean Piaget identifies several mental operations of the concrete operational stage of cognitive development: Seriation—the ability to sort objects in an order according to size, shape, or any other characteristic. For example, if given different-shaded objects they may make a color gradient. Transitivity—The ability to recognize logical relationships among elements in a serial order, perform'transitive inferences'.
Classification—the ability to name and identify sets of objects according to appearance, size or other characteristic, including the idea that one set of objects can include another. Decentering—where the child takes into account multiple aspects of a problem to solve it. For example, the child will no longer perceive an exceptionally wide but short cup to contain less than a normally-wide, taller cup. Reversibility—the child understands that numbers or objects can be changed returned to their original state. For this reason, a child will be able to determine that if 4+4 equals t, t−4 will equal 4, the original quantity. Conservation—understanding that quantity, length or number of items is unrelated to the arrangement or appearance of the object or items. Piaget describes a formal operational stage, with formal operations of abstract thinking: hypothesizing, hypothesis testing, deduction. According to J. P. Guilford's Structure of Intellect theory, an individual's performance on intelligence tests can be traced back to the underlying mental abilities or factors of intelligence.
SI theory comprises multiple intellectual abilities organized along three dimensions—Operations and Products. Operations dimensionSI includes six operations or general intellectual processes: Cognition—The ability to understand, comprehend and become aware of information. Memory recording—The ability to encode information. Memory retention—The ability to recall information. Divergent production—The ability to generate multiple solutions to a problem. Convergent production—The ability to deduce a single solution to a problem. Evaluation—The ability to judge whether or not information is accurate, consistent, or valid. Content dimensionSI includes five broad areas of information to which the human intellect applies the six operations: Visual—Information perceived through seeing. Auditory—Information perceived through hearing. Kinesthetic -through actions Symbolic—Information perceived as symbols or signs that have no meaning by themselves. Semantic—Information perceived in words or sentences, whether oral, written, or silently in one's mind.
Behavioral—Information perceived as acts of people. Product dimensionAs the name suggests, this dimension contains results of applying particular operations to specific contents; the SI model includes six products, in increasing complexity: Units—Single items of knowledge. Classes—Sets of units sharing common attributes. Relations—Units linked as opposites or in associations, sequences, or analogies. Systems—Multiple relations interrelated to comprise structures or networks. Transformations—Changes, conversions, or mutations to knowledge. Implications—Predictions, consequences, or anticipations of knowledge. Therefore, according to Guilford there are 6 x 5 x 6 = 180 intellectual factors; each ability stands for a particular operation in a particular content area and results in a specific product, such as Comprehension of Figural Units or Evaluation of Semantic Implications. Following on the footsteps of Silvio Ceccato, Giulio Benedetti describes several types of mental operations: attentional focalization - focusing attention on something.
The Chinese room argument holds that a program cannot give a computer a "mind", "understanding" or "consciousness", regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program may make the computer behave. The argument was first presented by philosopher John Searle in his paper, "Minds and Programs", published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 1980, it has been discussed in the years since. The centerpiece of the argument is a thought experiment known as the Chinese room; the argument is directed against the philosophical positions of functionalism and computationalism, which hold that the mind may be viewed as an information-processing system operating on formal symbols. The argument is intended to refute a position Searle calls Strong AI: The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in the same sense human beings have minds. Although it was presented in reaction to the statements of artificial intelligence researchers, it is not an argument against the goals of AI research, because it does not limit the amount of intelligence a machine can display.
The argument applies only to digital computers running programs and does not apply to machines in general. Searle's thought experiment begins with this hypothetical premise: suppose that artificial intelligence research has succeeded in constructing a computer that behaves as if it understands Chinese, it takes Chinese characters as input and, by following the instructions of a computer program, produces other Chinese characters, which it presents as output. Suppose, says Searle, that this computer performs its task so convincingly that it comfortably passes the Turing test: it convinces a human Chinese speaker that the program is itself a live Chinese speaker. To all of the questions that the person asks, it makes appropriate responses, such that any Chinese speaker would be convinced that they are talking to another Chinese-speaking human being; the question Searle wants to answer is this: does the machine "understand" Chinese? Or is it simulating the ability to understand Chinese? Searle calls the first position "strong AI" and the latter "weak AI".
Searle supposes that he is in a closed room and has a book with an English version of the computer program, along with sufficient papers, pencils and filing cabinets. Searle could receive Chinese characters through a slot in the door, process them according to the program's instructions, produce Chinese characters as output. If the computer had passed the Turing test this way, it follows, says Searle, that he would do so as well by running the program manually. Searle asserts that there is no essential difference between the roles of the computer and himself in the experiment; each follows a program, step-by-step, producing a behavior, interpreted by the user as demonstrating intelligent conversation. However, Searle himself would not be able to understand the conversation. Therefore, he argues, it follows that the computer would not be able to understand the conversation either. Searle argues that, without "understanding", we cannot describe what the machine is doing as "thinking" and, since it does not think, it does not have a "mind" in anything like the normal sense of the word.
Therefore, he concludes. Gottfried Leibniz made a similar argument in 1714 against mechanism. Leibniz used the thought experiment of expanding the brain. Leibniz found it difficult to imagine that a "mind" capable of "perception" could be constructed using only mechanical processes. In the 1961 short story "The Game" by Anatoly Dneprov, a stadium of people act as switches and memory cells implementing a program to translate a sentence of Portuguese, a language that none of them knows. In 1974, Lawrence Davis imagined duplicating the brain using telephone lines and offices staffed by people, in 1978 Ned Block envisioned the entire population of China involved in such a brain simulation; this thought experiment is called the China brain the "Chinese Nation" or the "Chinese Gym". The Chinese Room Argument was introduced in Searle's 1980 paper "Minds and Programs", published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, it became the journal's "most influential target article", generating an enormous number of commentaries and responses in the ensuing decades, Searle has continued to defend and refine the argument in many papers, popular articles and books.
David Cole writes that "the Chinese Room argument has been the most discussed philosophical argument in cognitive science to appear in the past 25 years". Most of the discussion consists of attempts to refute it. "The overwhelming majority", notes BBS editor Stevan Harnad, "still think that the Chinese Room Argument is dead wrong". The sheer volume of the literature that has grown up around it inspired Pat Hayes to comment that the field of cognitive science ought to be redefined as "the ongoing research program of showing Searle's Chinese Room Argument to be false". Searle's argument has become "something of a classic in cognitive science", according to Harnad. Varol Akman agrees, has described the original paper as "an exemplar of philosophical clarity and purity". Although the Chinese Room argument was presented in reaction to the statements of AI researchers, philosophers have come to view it as an important part of the philosophy of mind, it is a challenge to functionalism and the computational theory of mind, is related to such questions as the mind–body problem, the problem of other minds, the symbol-grounding problem, the hard problem of consciou