In economics general equilibrium theory, a perfect market known as an atomistic market, is defined by several idealizing conditions, collectively called perfect competition, or atomistic competition. In theoretical models where conditions of perfect competition hold, it has been theoretically demonstrated that a market will reach an equilibrium in which the quantity supplied for every product or service, including labor, equals the quantity demanded at the current price; this equilibrium would be a Pareto optimum. Perfect competition provides both allocative efficiency and productive efficiency: Such markets are allocatively efficient, as output will always occur where marginal cost is equal to average revenue i.e. price. In perfect competition, any profit-maximizing producer faces a market price equal to its marginal cost; this implies. It allows for derivation of the supply curve; this is the reason why "a monopoly does not have a supply curve". The abandonment of price taking creates considerable difficulties for the demonstration of a general equilibrium except under other specific conditions such as that of monopolistic competition.
In the short-run competitive markets are not productively efficient as output will not always occur where marginal cost is equal to average cost. However, in the long-run, productive efficiency occurs. Competition reduces cost to the minimum of the long run average costs. At this point, price equals both the average total cost for each good; the theory of perfect competition has its roots in late-19th century economic thought. Léon Walras gave the first rigorous definition of perfect competition and derived some of its main results. In the 1950s, the theory was further formalized by Gérard Debreu. Real markets are never perfect; those economists who believe in perfect competition as a useful approximation to real markets may classify those as ranging from close-to-perfect to imperfect. Share and foreign exchange markets are said to be the most similar to the perfect market; the real estate market is an example of a imperfect market. In such markets, the theory of the second best proves that if one optimality condition in an economic model cannot be satisfied, it is possible that the next-best solution involves changing other variables away from the values that would otherwise be optimal.
There is a set of market conditions which are assumed to prevail in the discussion of what perfect competition might be if it were theoretically possible to obtain such perfect market conditions. These conditions include: A large number of buyers and sellers – A large number of consumers with the willingness and ability to buy the product at a certain price, a large number of producers with the willingness and ability to supply the product at a certain price. Perfect information – All consumers and producers know all prices of products and utilities they would get from owning each product. Homogeneous products – The products are perfect substitutes for each other. Well defined property rights – These determine what may be sold, as well as what rights are conferred on the buyer. No barriers to entry or exit Every participant is a price taker – No participant with market power to set prices Perfect factor mobility – In the long run factors of production are mobile, allowing free long term adjustments to changing market conditions.
Profit maximization of sellers – Firms sell where the most profit is generated, where marginal costs meet marginal revenue. Rational buyers: Buyers make all trades that increase their economic utility and make no trades that do not increase their utility. No externalities – Costs or benefits of an activity do not affect third parties; this criteria excludes any government intervention. Zero transaction costs – Buyers and sellers do not incur costs in making an exchange of goods in a competitive market. Non-increasing returns to scale and no network effects – The lack of economies of scale or network effects ensures that there will always be a sufficient number of firms in the industry. Anti-competitive regulation - It is assumed that a market of perfect competition shall provide the regulations and protections implicit in the control of and elimination of anti-competitive activity in the market place. In a perfect market the sellers operate at zero economic surplus: sellers make a level of return on investment known as normal profits.
Normal profit is not a component of business profit at all. It represents the opportunity cost, as the time that the owner spends running the firm could be spent on running a different firm; the enterprise component of normal profit is thus the profit that a business owner considers necessary to make running the business worth her or his while i.e. it is comparable to the next best amount the entrepreneur could earn doing another job. If enterprise is not included as a factor of production, it can be viewed a return to capital for investors including the entrepreneur, equivalent to the return the capital owner could have expected, plus compensation for risk. In other words, the cost of normal profit varies both across industries. Only normal profits arise in circumstances of perfect competition when long run economic equilibrium is reached.
Shyam Sundar Goswami is a classical vocalist, trained in Kirana Gharana. Goswami was born to Pravupada Dwijendranath Goswami, a spiritual teacher and a Sanskrit scholar. Shyam received his first training from his mother, Maya Goswami, after which he was trained by Jadunath Chakraborty and Madan Mohan Thakur, he studied Indian classical music at Rabindra Bharati University, from where he got an Honours degree. He did his M. A. degree in khyal from the same university. He sings khyals and bhajans For continuing his research in music he got a scholarship from the French Government and worked at La Cite Internationale Das Arts in Paris with other musicians. Goswami has performed in India and in Europe and South Africa; the first CD album of Goswami, named "Peace and Harmony" was released on 24 April 2006
Marianne Weems is the artistic director of the New York-based Obie Award-winning performance and media company The Builders Association, founded in 1994. She is a professor at UC Santa Cruz. Weems grew up in Seattle, she attended Reed College before graduating from Barnard College. In 1986–87 she attended Whitney Museum of American Art's Independent Study Program where she founded the performance and study group The V-Girls along with Martha Baer, Erin Cramer, Jessica Chalmers and Andrea Fraser. From 1988 to 1993 she was dramaturg and assistant director with The Wooster Group and during that time worked with Susan Sontag, Ron Vawter, Richard Foreman and many others. From 1986 to 1989 she was program director for the independent arts foundation Art Matters, where she remains a member of the Board. In 1994 Weems founded the performance and media ensemble The Builders Association with Dan Dobson, David Pence, John Cleater, Jennifer Tipton, Jeff Webster; the Builders Association's first production was an adaptation of Ibsen's The Master Builder, set in a full-scale three story house constructed inside a New York City warehouse.
Since company has been recognized internationally as a leader in theatrical innovation for their interdisciplinary stage performances and use of digital technology. Collaborating with architects and video artists, software designers, performers and The Builders Association combine video, text and architecture to explore the interface between media and live performance in a culture that is, as Weems puts it, "irrevocably mediatised." The company's last four productions have received their New York premieres at the Brooklyn Academy of Music. Weems has been an adjunct and visiting artist at Princeton University’s Lewis Center for the Arts, Columbia University, New York University, UC Berkeley, Ohio State University in Columbus, the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, many other institutions. From 2008 to 2014 she was the head of graduate directing at Carnegie Mellon University’s School of Drama and is now professor in the Theater Arts program at UC Santa Cruz, she is the co-author of Art Matters: How The Culture Wars Changed America and co-wrote a book with Professor Shannon Jackson The Builders Association: Performance and Media in Contemporary Theater,She divides her time between Santa Cruz, CA and New York City with her daughter Sunita.
Master Builder The White Album Imperial Motel Jump-Cut Jet Lag Xtravaganza Alladeen Avanti Supervision Invisible Cities Continuous City Jet Lag 2010 House/Divided Sontag:Reborn Émilie ‘’Elements of Oz" ‘’Strange Window: Turn of the Screw" Giannachi, Nick Kaye. Performing presence: Between the live and the simulated. New York: Manchester. Giesekam, Greg. Staging the Screen. New York: Palgrave. Neri, Louise; the Builders Association. Interview Magazine.. Schechner, Richard. "Building the Builders Association" The Drama Review. 56.3.. Svich, Caridad, ed. Trans-global Readings. New York: Manchester.. Weems, Julie Ault, Brian Wallis, Philip Yenawine. Art Matters:. New York: NYU.. The Builders Association website Marianne Weems Staging the Screen: The Use of Film and Video in Theatre. By Greg Giesekam. Palgrave Macmillan Press. 2007