1.
Ontology
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Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence or reality as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. Although ontology as an enterprise is highly hypothetical, it also has practical application in information science and technology. Some philosophers, notably of the Platonic school, contend that all refer to existent entities. Other philosophers contend that nouns do not always name entities, between these poles of realism and nominalism, stand a variety of other positions. An ontology may give an account of which refer to entities, which do not, why. Principal questions of ontology include, What can be said to exist, into what categories, if any, can we sort existing things. What are the meanings of being, what are the various modes of being of entities. Various philosophers have provided different answers to these questions, one common approach involves dividing the extant subjects and predicates into groups called categories. Such an understanding of ontological categories, however, is merely taxonomic, what does it mean for a being to be. Is existence a genus or general class that is divided up by specific differences. Which entities, if any, are fundamental, how do the properties of an object relate to the object itself. What features are the essential, as opposed to merely accidental attributes of a given object, how many levels of existence or ontological levels are there. Can one give an account of what it means to say that an object exists. Can one give an account of what it means to say that an entity exists. What constitutes the identity of an object, when does an object go out of existence, as opposed to merely changing. Do beings exist other than in the modes of objectivity and subjectivity, i. e. is the subject/object split of modern philosophy inevitable. e. Being, that which is, which is the present participle of the verb εἰμί, eimí, i. e. to be, I am, and -λογία, -logia, i. e. logical discourse. The first occurrence in English of ontology as recorded by the OED came in a work by Gideon Harvey, Archelogia philosophica nova, or, New principles of Philosophy
2.
Supervenience
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In philosophy, supervenience is an ontological relation that is used to describe cases where the upper-level properties of a system are determined by its lower level properties. Some philosophers hold that the world is structured into a kind of hierarchy of properties and that is, the chemical properties of the world determine a distribution of biological properties, those biological properties determine a distribution of psychological properties, and so forth. So, for example, mind-body supervenience holds that every mental phenomenon must be grounded in, or anchored to and this means that mental states can occur only in systems that can have physical properties, namely physical systems. It is useful to both when supervenience does and does not apply. The paper alone does not determine the value of the money, some philosophical problems can be stated in terms of questions about supervenience. For example, do mental properties supervene on neural properties, do the aesthetic properties of an art object supervene on physical properties of that object. Though it is clear what supervenience is, formally specifying what it means involves a complex technical apparatus. Most definitions involve comparisons of objects for indiscernibility, the intuitive idea is that if you could make a physical copy of a person, youd also be making a psychological copy of that person. The reverse does not hold, two people could be in the mental state, but that mental state could be supported by different brain states. The properties in B are called the base properties, and the properties in A are called the supervenient properties, Supervenience has traditionally been used to describe relationships between sets of properties in a manner which does not imply a strong reductive relationship. For example, many hold that economic properties supervene on physical properties, however, this does not entail that economics can be reduced in any straightforward way to physics. Its systematic use in philosophy is considered to have begun in early 20th-century meta-ethics, as G. E. Moore wrote in 1922, If a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then. Anything exactly like it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree, the usage also carried over into the work R. M. Hare. For discussion of the emergentist roots of supervenience see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in the 1970s Donald Davidson was the first to use the term to describe a broadly physicalist approach to the philosophy of mind. In subsequent years Terry Horgan, David Lewis, and especially Jaegwon Kim formalized the concept and this raised numerous questions about how various formulations relate to one another, how adequate the formulation is to various philosophical tasks, and whether it avoids or entails reductionism. In the contemporary literature, there are two formulations of supervenience. A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if all things that are B-indiscernible are A-indiscernible, formally, ∀ x ∀ y A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if anything that has an A-property has some B-property such that anything that has that B-property also has that A-property. Some points of clarification, first, the definitions above involve quantification over properties, second, in, expressions of the form capture the concept of sharing all properties, or being indiscernible with respect to a set of properties
3.
Monism
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Monism is the view that attributes oneness or singleness to a concept. Substance monism is the view that a variety of existing things can be explained in terms of a single reality or substance. Another definition states that all existing things go back to a source that is distinct from them and this is often termed priority monism, and is the view that only one thing is ontologically basic or prior to everything else. Another distinction is the difference between substance and existence monism, or stuff monism and thing monism, substance monism posits that only one kind of stuff exists, although many things may be made out of this stuff. Existence monism posits that, strictly speaking, there only a single thing. The restricted definition, this not only unity of origin. Although the term monism is derived from Western philosophy to typify positions in the mind–body problem, in modern Hinduism, the term absolute monism is being used for Advaita Vedanta. The mind–body problem in philosophy examines the relationship between mind and matter, and in particular the relationship between consciousness and the brain and it was later also applied to the theory of absolute identity set forth by Hegel and Schelling. Thereafter the term was more used, for any theory postulating a unifying principle. The opponent thesis of dualism also was broadened, to include pluralism, according to Urmson, as a result of this extended use, the term is systematically ambiguous. According to Jonathan Schaffer, monism lost popularity due to the emergence of Analytic philosophy in the twentieth century. Carnap and Ayer, who were proponents of positivism, ridiculed the whole question as incoherent mysticism. Monism is also relevant to the philosophy of mind, where various positions are defended. g. Metaphysical nihilism, negates any of the above categories, eliminative Materialism, according to which everything is physical and mental things do not exist b. Moreover, they do not define the meaning of real, while the lack of information makes it difficult in some cases to be sure of the details, the following pre-Socratic philosophers thought in monistic terms, Thales, Water. Reality is some, one thing, but we know what. Parmenides argued that Being or Reality is a perfect sphere, unchanging. Neopythagorians such as Apollonius of Tyana centered their cosmologies on the Monad or One, Stoics taught that there is only one substance, identified as God
4.
Substance theory
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Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is an ontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance is distinct from its properties. A thing-in-itself is a property-bearer that must be distinguished from the properties it bears, according to monistic views, there is only one substance. Stoicism and Spinoza, for example, hold monistic views, that pneuma or God and these modes of thinking are sometimes associated with the idea of immanence. Dualism sees the world as being composed of two substances, for example, the Cartesian substance dualism of mind and matter. Pluralist philosophies include Platos Theory of Forms and Aristotles hylomorphic categories, Aristotle used the term substance theory in a secondary sense for genera and species understood as hylomorphic forms. A substance—that which is called a substance most strictly, primarily, the species in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, in chapter 6 of book I the Physics Aristotle argues that any change must be analysed in reference to the property of an invariant subject, as it was before the change and thereafter. Thus, in his account of change, matter serves as a relative substratum of transformation. Examples of such a substantial change include not only conception and dying, an example of this sort of accidental change is a change of color or size, a tomato becomes red, or a juvenile horse grows. Neither the bare particulars nor property bundles of modern theory have their antecedent in Aristotle, according to whom, all matter exists in some form. However, according to Aristotles theology, a form of invariant form exists without matter, beyond the cosmos, powerless and oblivious, in the eternal substance of the unmoved movers. In contrast to Aristotle, Plato and later Neoplatonism spoke of the reality of a thing or its inner reality. The Stoics rejected the idea that incorporeal beings inhere in matter and they believed that all being is corporeal infused with a creative fire called pneuma. Thus they developed a scheme of categories different from Aristotles based on the ideas of Anaxagoras, Descartes means by a substance an entity which exists in such a way that it needs no other entity in order to exist. Therefore, only God is a substance in this strict sense, however, he extends the term to created things, which need only the concurrence of God to exist. Of these there are two and only two, mind and matter, each being distinct from the other in their attributes and therefore in their essence, Spinoza denied Descartes real distinction between mind and matter. Substance, according to Spinoza, is one and indivisible, but has multiple attributes and he regards an attribute, though, as what we conceive as constituting the essence of substance. The single essence of one substance can be conceived of as material and also, consistently, what is ordinarily called the natural world, together with all the individuals in it, is immanent in God, hence his famous phrase deus sive natura
5.
Materialism
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Materialism is closely related to physicalism, the view that all that exists is ultimately physical. Thus the term physicalism is preferred over materialism by some, while others use the terms as if they are synonymous, philosophies contradictory to materialism or physicalism include idealism, pluralism, dualism, and other forms of monism. Materialism belongs to the class of monist ontology, as such, it is different from ontological theories based on dualism or pluralism. For singular explanations of the reality, materialism would be in contrast to idealism, neutral monism. To idealists, spirit or mind or the objects of mind are primary, to materialists, matter is primary, and mind or spirit or ideas are secondary, the product of matter acting upon matter. The materialist view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically, famously by René Descartes, however, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice, it is assimilated to one variety of physicalism or another. Jerry Fodor influentially argues this view, according to which empirical laws, a lot of vigorous literature has grown up around the relation between these views. Modern philosophical materialists extend the definition of other scientifically observable entities such as energy, forces, however philosophers such as Mary Midgley suggest that the concept of matter is elusive and poorly defined. Materialism typically contrasts with dualism, phenomenalism, idealism, vitalism and its materiality can, in some ways, be linked to the concept of determinism, as espoused by Enlightenment thinkers. Later Marxists, such as Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky developed the notion of dialectical materialism which characterized later Marxist philosophy, Materialism developed, possibly independently, in several geographically separated regions of Eurasia during what Karl Jaspers termed the Axial Age. In Ancient Indian philosophy, materialism developed around 600 BC with the works of Ajita Kesakambali, Payasi, Kanada, Kanada became one of the early proponents of atomism. The Nyaya–Vaisesika school developed one of the earliest forms of atomism, though their proofs of God, buddhist atomism and the Jaina school continued the atomic tradition. Xunzi developed a Confucian doctrine centered on realism and materialism in Ancient China, Ancient Greek philosophers like Thales, Anaxagoras, Epicurus and Democritus prefigure later materialists. The Latin poem De Rerum Natura by Lucretius reflects the philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus. According to this view, all that exists is matter and void, De Rerum Natura provides mechanistic explanations for phenomena such as erosion, evaporation, wind, and sound. Famous principles like nothing can touch body but body first appeared in the works of Lucretius, chinese thinkers of the early common era said to be materialists include Yang Xiong and Wang Chong. Later Indian materialist Jayaraashi Bhatta in his work Tattvopaplavasimha refuted the Nyaya Sutra epistemology, the materialistic Cārvāka philosophy appears to have died out some time after 1400
6.
Otto Neurath
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Otto Neurath was an Austrian philosopher of science, sociologist, and political economist. Before he fled his country in 1934, Neurath was one of the leading figures of the Vienna Circle. Neurath was born in Vienna, the son of Wilhelm Neurath and he studied mathematics in Vienna and gained his Ph. D. in the department of Political Science and Statistics at the University of Berlin. He married Anna Schapire in 1907 and she died as a result of childbirth in 1911, and he married a close friend, the mathematician and philosopher Olga Hahn. Neurath taught political economy at the Neue Wiener Handelsakademie until war broke out, subsequently, he directed the Department of War Economy in the War Ministry. In 1917 or 1918, he director of the Deutsches Kriegswirtschaftsmuseum at Leipzig. Here he worked with Wolfgang Schumann, known from the Dürerbund for which Neurath had written many articles, during the political crisis which led to the armistice, Schumann urged him to work out a plan for socialization in Saxony. Along with Schumann and Hermann Kranold developed the Programm Kranold-Neurath-Schumann, Neurath then joined the German Social Democratic Party in 1918-19 and ran an office for central economic planning in Munich. When the Bavarian Soviet Republic was defeated, Neurath was imprisoned but returned to Austria after intervention from the Austrian government, while in prison he wrote Anti-Spengler, a critical attack on Oswald Spenglers Decline of the West. In 1923, he founded a new museum for housing and city planning called Siedlungsmuseum, julius Tandler, city councillor for welfare and health, served at the first board of the museum together with other prominent social democratic politicians. The museum was provided with rooms at buildings of the city administration. To make the museum understandable for everybody, Neurath worked on graphic design, in the late 1920s, graphic designer and communications theorist Rudolf Modley served as an assistant to Neurath, contributing to a new means of communication, a visual language. With the illustrator Gerd Arntz and with Marie Reidemeister, Neurath created Isotype, at international conventions of city planners, Neurath presented and promoted his communication tools. During the 1920s, Neurath also became an ardent logical positivist and he was the driving force behind the Unity of Science movement and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. During the Austrian Civil War of 1934, Neurath had been working in Moscow, anticipating problems, he had asked to get a coded message in case it would be dangerous for him to return to Austria. He was joined by Arntz after affairs in Vienna had been sorted out as best they could and his wife also fled to the Netherlands where she died in 1937. After the Luftwaffe had bombed Rotterdam he and Marie Reidemeister fled to England and he and Reidemeister married in 1941, after a period interned on the Isle of Man. Neurath died, suddenly and unexpectedly, in December 1945, most work by and about Neurath is still available only in German
7.
Rudolf Carnap
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Rudolf Carnap was a German-born philosopher who was active in Europe before 1935 and in the United States thereafter. He was a member of the Vienna Circle and an advocate of logical positivism. He is considered one of the giants among twentieth-century philosophers, Carnaps father had risen from the status of a poor ribbon-weaver to become the owner of a ribbon-making factory. His mother came from stock, her father was an educational reformer and her oldest brother was the archaeologist Wilhelm Dörpfeld. As a ten-year-old, Carnap accompanied his uncle on an expedition to Greece, Carnap was raised in a religious family, but later became an atheist. He began his education at the Barmen Gymnasium. From 1910 to 1914, he attended the University of Jena, but he also studied carefully Kants Critique of Pure Reason during a course taught by Bruno Bauch, and was one of very few students to attend Gottlob Freges courses in mathematical logic. While Carnap held moral and political opposition to World War I, after three years of service, he was given permission to study physics at the University of Berlin, 1917–18, where Albert Einstein was a newly appointed professor. Carnap then attended the University of Jena, where he wrote a thesis defining a theory of space. The physics department said it was too philosophical, and Bruno Bauch of the department said it was pure physics. Carnap then wrote another thesis in 1921, with Bauchs supervision, on the theory of space in a more orthodox Kantian style, in it he makes the clear distinction between formal, physical and perceptual spaces. Freges course exposed him to Bertrand Russells work on logic and philosophy and he accepted the effort to surpass traditional philosophy with logical innovations that inform the sciences. In 1924 and 1925, he attended seminars led by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, Carnap discovered a kindred spirit when he met Hans Reichenbach at a 1923 conference. Reichenbach introduced Carnap to Moritz Schlick, a professor at the University of Vienna who offered Carnap a position in his department, when Wittgenstein visited Vienna, Carnap would meet with him. He wrote the 1929 manifesto of the Circle, and initiated the philosophy journal Erkenntnis, the formal system of the Aufbau was grounded in a single primitive dyadic predicate, which is satisfied if two individuals resemble each other. The Aufbau was greatly influenced by Principia Mathematica, and warrants comparison with the mereotopological metaphysics A. N. Whitehead developed over 1916–29 and it appears, however, that Carnap soon became somewhat disenchanted with this book. In particular, he did not authorize an English translation until 1967, pseudoproblems in Philosophy asserted that many philosophical questions were meaningless, i. e. the way they were posed amounted to an abuse of language. An operational implication of this opinion was taken to be the elimination of metaphysics from responsible human discourse and this is the statement for which Carnap was best known for many years
8.
Karl Popper
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Sir Karl Raimund Popper CH FBA FRS was an Austrian-British philosopher and professor. He is generally regarded as one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century, in political discourse, he is known for his vigorous defence of liberal democracy and the principles of social criticism that he came to believe made a flourishing open society possible. Karl Popper was born in Vienna in 1902, to upper middle-class parents, karls father Simon Siegmund Carl Popper was a lawyer from Bohemia and a doctor of law at the Vienna University, and mother Jenny Schiff was of Silesian and Hungarian descent. Karl Poppers uncle was the Austrian philosopher Josef Popper-Lynkeus and his father was a bibliophile who had 12, 000–14,000 volumes in his personal library and took an interest in philosophy, the classics, and social and political issues. Popper inherited both the library and the disposition from him, later, he would describe the atmosphere of his upbringing as having been decidedly bookish. Popper left school at the age of 16 and attended lectures in mathematics, physics, philosophy, psychology, in 1919, Popper became attracted by Marxism and subsequently joined the Association of Socialist School Students. He also became a member of the Social Democratic Workers Party of Austria and he worked in street construction for a short amount of time, but was unable to cope with the heavy labour. Continuing to attend university as a guest student, he started an apprenticeship as cabinetmaker and he was dreaming at that time of starting a daycare facility for children, for which he assumed the ability to make furniture might be useful. After that he did service in one of psychoanalyst Alfred Adlers clinics for children. In 1922, he did his matura by way of a second chance education and he completed his examination as an elementary teacher in 1924 and started working at an after-school care club for socially endangered children. In 1925, he went to the newly founded Pädagogisches Institut and continued studying philosophy, around that time he started courting Josefine Anna Henninger, who later became his wife. In 1928, he earned a doctorate in psychology, under the supervision of Karl Bühler and his dissertation was entitled Die Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie. In 1929, he obtained the authorisation to teach mathematics and physics in secondary school and he married his colleague Josefine Anna Henninger in 1930. Fearing the rise of Nazism and the threat of the Anschluss, he started to use the evenings and he needed to publish one to get some academic position in a country that was safe for people of Jewish descent. However, he ended up not publishing the work, but a condensed version of it with some new material, Logik der Forschung. Here, he criticised psychologism, naturalism, inductionism, and logical positivism, in 1935 and 1936, he took unpaid leave to go to the United Kingdom for a study visit. It was here that he wrote his influential work The Open Society, in Dunedin he met the Professor of Physiology John Carew Eccles and formed a lifelong friendship with him. In 1946, after the Second World War, he moved to the United Kingdom to become reader in logic and scientific method at the London School of Economics, Three years later, in 1949, he was appointed professor of logic and scientific method at the University of London
9.
Type physicalism
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Type physicalism is a physicalist theory, in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, for example, one type of mental event, such as mental pains will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event. Type physicalism is contrasted by token identity physicalism, which argues that mental events are unlikely to have steady or categorical biological correlates and these positions make use of the philosophical type–token distinction. Type physicalism can now be understood to argue that there is identicalness between types, whereas token identity physicalism says one can describe a particular, unique. There are other ways a physicalist might criticize type physicalism, eliminative materialism, in the same way talk of demonic possession was questioned with scientific advance, categorisations like pain may need to be revised. Boring, in a book entitled The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness wrote that, two events that always occur together at the same time in the same place, without any temporal or spatial differentiation at all, are not two events but the same event. The mind-body correlations as formulated at present, do not admit of spatial correlation, the need for identification is no less urgent in this case. The dominant epistemology of the logical positivists at that time was phenomenalism, the revival of interest in the work of Gottlob Frege and his ideas of sense and reference on the part of Herbert Feigl and J. J. C. Smart, along with the discrediting of phenomenalism through the influence of the later Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin, led to a more tolerant climate toward physicalistic, however, all of the versions share the central idea that the mind is identical to something physical. Places notion of the relation of identity was derived from Bertrand Russells distinction among types of is statements, the is of identity, the is of equality. Places version of the relation of identity is more accurately described as a relation of composition, for Place, higher-level mental events are composed out of lower-level physical events and will eventually be analytically reduced to these. Nevertheless, lightning is a discharge is true since the one is composed of the other. Moreover, sensations are brain processes is a contingent, not a necessary, one of the most influential and common objections to the type identity theory is the argument from multiple realizability. The multiple realizability thesis asserts that states can be realized in multiple kinds of systems, not just brains. Since the identity theory identifies mental events with certain brain states and this is in effect an argument that the identity theory is too narrow because it does not allow for organisms without brains to have mental states. However, token identity and functionalism both account for multiple realizability, as Smart states, The functionalist second order state is a state of having some first order state or other which causes or is caused by the behavior to which the functionalist alludes. In this way we have an order type theory. The fundamental point is that it is difficult to determine where, on the continuum of first order processes, type identity ends
10.
Multiple realizability
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Multiple realizability, in the philosophy of mind, is the thesis that the same mental property, state, or event can be implemented by different physical properties, states or events. In short, a theory of mind that includes multiple realizability allows for the existence of strong AI, the original targets of these arguments were the type-identity theory and eliminative materialism. The same arguments from multiple realizability were also used to defend many versions of functionalism, in recent years, however, multiple realizability has been used as a weapon to attack the very theory that it was originally designed to defend. Functionalism has consequently fallen out of vogue as a dominant theory in the philosophy of mind, the dominant theory in modern philosophy of mind is a sort of generic non-reductive physicalism and one of its central pillars is the hypothesis of multiple realizability. In addition, Restrepo noted in 2009 that the multiple realizability of the mental is a thesis Turing held at least ten years before the attributed authors described it. In 1950 Turing expressed the multiple realizability of the mental in this way, The storage was to be mechanical, using wheels. The fact that Babbages Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will help us rid ourselves of a superstition, importance is often attached to the fact that modern digital computers are electrical, and the nervous system is also electrical. Since Babbages machine was not electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense equivalent, if we wish to find such similarities we should look rather for mathematical analogies of function. A classic example of the thesis of multiple realizability is to be found in papers published by Hilary Putnam in the late 1960s. In these papers, he argued that, contrary to the claim of type-identity theory. Putnam cited numerous examples from all over the kingdom to illustrate his thesis. Is it likely that the structures of all mammals, reptiles, birds, amphibians and molluscs realize pain, or other mental states. Do they even have the brain structures. Clearly not, if we are to believe the evidence furnished by comparative neuroanatomy, how is it possible then that they can share the same mental states and properties. The answer had to be that these mental kinds were realized by different physical states in different species, Putnam then took his argument a step further, asking about such things as the nervous systems of alien beings, artificially-intelligent robots and silicon-based life forms. Should such hypothetical entities be considered a priori incapable of experiencing pain just because they did not possess the same neurochemistry as humans and this is sometimes referred to as the likelihood argument. Putnam also formulated an argument based on, what he called. He defined the concept in terms, Two systems are functionally isomorphic if there is a correspondence between the states of one and the states of the other that preserves functional relations
11.
Carl Gustav Hempel
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Carl Gustav Peter Hempel was a German writer and philosopher. He was a figure in logical empiricism, a 20th-century movement in the philosophy of science. He is also known for the raven paradox, Hempel studied mathematics, physics and philosophy at the University of Göttingen and subsequently at the University of Berlin and the Heidelberg University. In Göttingen, he encountered David Hilbert and was impressed by his program attempting to base all mathematics on solid logical foundations derived from a number of axioms. In 1934, he received his degree from the University of Berlin with a dissertation on probability theory. Within a year of completing his doctorate, the increasingly repressive, in this, he was aided by the scientist Paul Oppenheim, with whom he co-authored the book Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logik on typology and logic in 1936. In 1937, Hempel emigrated to the United States, where he accepted a position as Carnaps assistant at the University of Chicago. He later held positions at the City College of New York, Yale University and Princeton University, Hempel never embraced the term logical positivism as an accurate description of the Vienna Circle and Berlin Group, preferring to describe those philosophers – and himself – as logical empiricists. He believed that the term positivism, with its roots in Auguste Comte, to Hempel, metaphysics involved claims to know things which were not knowable, that is, metaphysical hypotheses were incapable of confirmation or disconfirmation by evidence. In 2005, the City of Oranienburg, Hempels birthplace, renamed one of its streets Carl-Gustav-Hempel-Straße in his memory, the Philosophy of Carl G. Hempel, Studies in Science, Explanation, and Rationality, ISBN 0-19-512136-8. ″On the Nature of Mathematical Truth″ and ″Geometry and Empirical Science″, American Mathematical Monthly, articles in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars. Hempels dilemma Raven paradox, also known as Hempels paradox, Carl Gustav Hempel at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning by Carl G. Hempel Obituary by the Princeton University Office of Communications, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01 at the Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh. Obituary in the New York Times
12.
Panpsychism
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In philosophy, panpsychism is the view that consciousness, mind or soul is a universal and primordial feature of all things. Panpsychists see themselves as minds in a world of mind, Panpsychism is one of the oldest philosophical theories, and has been ascribed to philosophers like Thales, Parmenides, Plato, Averroes, Spinoza, Leibniz and William James. Panpsychism can also be seen in ancient philosophies such as Stoicism, Taoism, Vedanta, during the 19th century, panpsychism was the default theory in philosophy of mind, but it saw a decline during the middle years of the 20th century with the rise of logical positivism. The recent interest in the problem of consciousness has revived interest in panpsychism. The term panpsychism has its origins with the Greek term pan and psyche as the center of the mental life of us humans. Psyche comes from the Greek word ψύχω and can mean life, soul, mind, spirit, heart, early forms of panpsychism can be found in pre-modern animistic beliefs in religions such as Shinto, Taoism, Paganism and shamanism. Panpsychist views are also a theme in pre-Socratic Greek philosophy. According to Aristotle, Thales the first Greek philosopher, posited a theory which held that everything is full of gods, Thales believed that this was demonstrated by magnets. This has been interpreted as a panpsychist doctrine, other Greek thinkers that have been associated with Panpsychism include Anaxagoras, Anaximenes and Heraclitus. Plato argues for Panpsychism in his Sophist, in which he writes that all things participate in the form of Being, in the Philebus and Timaeus, Plato argues for the idea of a world soul or anima mundi. According to Plato, This world is indeed a living being endowed with a soul, a single visible living entity containing all other living entities, which by their nature are all related. Stoicism developed a cosmology which held that the world was infused with a divine fiery essence called Pneuma. The relationship of the individual Logos of beings with the universal Logos was a concern of the Roman Stoic Marcus Aurelius. The Metaphysics of Stoicism was based on Hellenistic philosophies such as Neoplatonism and Gnosticism also made use of the Platonic idea of the Anima mundi, after the closing of Platos Academy by the Emperor Justinian in 529 CE, Neoplatonism declined. Though there were mediaeval Christian thinkers who ventured what might be called panpsychist ideas, cardano argued for the view that soul or anima was a fundamental part of the world and Patrizi introduced the actual term panpsychism into the philosophical vocabulary. According to Giordano Bruno, There is nothing that does not possess a soul, platonist ideas like the anima mundi also resurfaced in the work of esoteric thinkers like Paracelsus, Robert Fludd and Cornelius Agrippa. In the 17th century, two rationalists can be said to be panpsychists, Baruch Spinoza and Gottfried Leibniz, in Spinozas monism, the one single infinite and eternal substance was God, or Nature which has the aspects of mind and matter. Leibniz view is there are an infinite number of absolutely simple mental substances called monads which make up the fundamental structure of the universe
13.
Neutral monism
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This view denies that the mental and the physical are two fundamentally different things. Rather, neutral monism claims the universe consists of one kind of stuff. Neutral monism about the relationship is described by C. D. Broad in one of his works, The Mind and Its Place in Nature. Broads list of possible views about the problem, which became known simply as Broads famous list of 1925. There are few self-proclaimed neutral monists, most of the philosophers who are seen to have this view were classified after their deaths, some examples of this are Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Ernst Mach, Richard Avenarius, Kenneth Sayre and Joseph Petzoldt and Jonathan Westphal. Earlier, William James had propounded the notion in his essay Does Consciousness Exist. in 1904, whately Carington in his book Matter, Mind, and Meaning advocated a form of neutral monism. He held that mind and matter both consist of the kind of components known as cognita or sense data. According to Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield, neutral monism has not been a view in philosophy as it is difficult to develop or understand the nature of the neutral elements. In 1921, Bertrand Russell adopted a position to that of William James. Russell quotes from Jamess essay Does consciousness exist, the relation itself is a part of pure experience, one of its terms becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, the other becomes the object known. Russell observes that the view of consciousness is set forth in Jamess succeeding essay. In addition to the role of James, Russell observes the role of two American Realists, the American realists, professor R. B. Perry of Harvard and Mr. Edwin B. Holt. have derived a strong impulsion from James, but have more interest than he had in logic and mathematics and they speak of neutral entities as the stuff out of which both mind and matter are constructed. Perhaps the least dangerous name is neutral-stuff, although rocks may have experiences associated with them. Personally, I am much more confident of naturalistic dualism than I am of panpsychism, the latter issue seems to be very much open. In his 2002 Consciousness and its Place in Nature, Chalmers carefully considers neutral monism and panpsychism and he admits that, The type-F view is admittedly speculative and it can sound strange at first hearing. Many find it extremely counterintuitive to suppose that fundamental physical systems have phenomenal properties, dialectical monism Double aspect theory Monadology Panpsychism Philosophy of mind Monism
14.
Truth
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Truth is most often used to mean being in accord with fact or reality, or fidelity to an original or standard. Truth may also often be used in modern contexts to refer to an idea of truth to self, the commonly understood opposite of truth is falsehood, which, correspondingly, can also take on a logical, factual, or ethical meaning. The concept of truth is discussed and debated in several contexts, including philosophy, art, Some philosophers view the concept of truth as basic, and unable to be explained in any terms that are more easily understood than the concept of truth itself. Commonly, truth is viewed as the correspondence of language or thought to an independent reality, other philosophers take this common meaning to be secondary and derivative. On this view, the conception of truth as correctness is a derivation from the concepts original essence. Various theories and views of truth continue to be debated among scholars, philosophers, language and words are a means by which humans convey information to one another and the method used to determine what is a truth is termed a criterion of truth. The English word truth is derived from Old English tríewþ, tréowþ, trýwþ, Middle English trewþe, cognate to Old High German triuwida, like troth, it is a -th nominalisation of the adjective true. Old Norse trú, faith, word of honour, religious faith, thus, truth involves both the quality of faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty, sincerity, veracity, and that of agreement with fact or reality, in Anglo-Saxon expressed by sōþ. All Germanic languages besides English have introduced a distinction between truth fidelity and truth factuality. To express factuality, North Germanic opted for nouns derived from sanna to assert, affirm, while continental West Germanic opted for continuations of wâra faith, trust, pact. Romance languages use terms following the Latin veritas, while the Greek aletheia, Russian pravda, each presents perspectives that are widely shared by published scholars. However, the theories are not universally accepted. More recently developed deflationary or minimalist theories of truth have emerged as competitors to the substantive theories. Minimalist reasoning centres around the notion that the application of a term like true to a statement does not assert anything significant about it, for instance, anything about its nature. Minimalist reasoning realises truth as a label utilised in general discourse to express agreement, to stress claims, correspondence theories emphasise that true beliefs and true statements correspond to the actual state of affairs. This type of theory stresses a relationship between thoughts or statements on one hand, and things or objects on the other and it is a traditional model tracing its origins to ancient Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. This class of theories holds that the truth or the falsity of a representation is determined in principle entirely by how it relates to things, Aquinas also restated the theory as, A judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality. Many modern theorists have stated that this ideal cannot be achieved without analysing additional factors, for example, language plays a role in that all languages have words to represent concepts that are virtually undefined in other languages
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Saul Kripke
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Saul Aaron Kripke is an American philosopher and logician. He is a Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York and emeritus professor at Princeton University. Since the 1960s Kripke has been a figure in a number of fields related to mathematical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology. Much of his work remains unpublished or exists only as tape recordings, Kripke was the recipient of the 2001 Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy. Kripke has made influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic and he has also contributed an original reading of Wittgenstein, referred to as Kripkenstein. His most famous work is Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke is the oldest of three children born to Dorothy K. Kripke and Rabbi Myer S. Kripke. His father was the leader of Beth El Synagogue, the only Conservative congregation in Omaha, Nebraska, Saul and his two sisters, Madeline and Netta, attended Dundee Grade School and Omaha Central High School. He wrote his first completeness theorem in logic at the age of 17. After graduating from school in 1958, Kripke attended Harvard University. During his sophomore year at Harvard, Kripke taught a graduate-level logic course at nearby MIT, upon graduation he received a Fulbright Fellowship, and in 1963 was appointed to the Society of Fellows. After teaching briefly at Harvard, he moved to Rockefeller University in New York City in 1967, in 1988 he received the universitys Behrman Award for distinguished achievement in the humanities. In 2002 Kripke began teaching at the CUNY Graduate Center in midtown Manhattan and he was married to philosopher Margaret Gilbert. He has received degrees from the University of Nebraska, Omaha, Johns Hopkins University, University of Haifa, Israel. He is a member of the American Philosophical Society, an elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and he won the Schock Prize in Logic and Philosophy in 2001. He is the cousin once removed of television writer, director. The Saul Kripke Center at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York is dedicated to preserving and promoting Kripkes work, the Saul Kripke Center is directed by Gary Ostertag. Kripkes contributions to philosophy include, Kripke semantics for modal and related logics and his 1970 Princeton lectures Naming and Necessity, that significantly restructured philosophy of language. The most familiar logics in the family are constructed from a weak logic called K
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David Chalmers
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David John Chalmers is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Centre for Consciousness at the Australian National University and he is also a University Professor, Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science, and a Director of the Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness at New York University. In 2013, he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, since 2004, Chalmers has been Professor of Philosophy, Director of the Centre for Consciousness, and an ARC Federation Fellow at the Australian National University. Chalmers received his degree in pure mathematics from the University of Adelaide in Australia and continued his studies at the University of Oxford. Chalmers received his PhD in philosophy and cognitive science from Indiana University Bloomington under Douglas Hofstadter, after appearing as a plenary speaker at the first meeting, Chalmers has subsequently taken the role of co-organizer, alongside Stuart Hameroff, of this conference. Chalmers 1996 book, The Conscious Mind, was described by The Sunday Times as one of the best science books of the year. In the book, Chalmers argues that all forms of physicalism that have dominated modern philosophy and he proposes an alternative dualistic view he calls naturalistic dualism. He is the singer of the Zombie Blues band which performed at the Qualia Fest in 2012 in New York. Chalmers is an editor on topics in the philosophy of mind for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, on 14 June 2016 David Chalmers visited Moscow to hold a lecture at Moscow State University focused on solving the Hard problem of consciousness. He also gave an interview about before holding a lecture at the Moscow State University, Chalmers is best known for his formulation of the notion of a hard problem of consciousness in both his 1996 book and in the 1995 paper Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. The essential difference between the easy problems and the problem is that the former are at least theoretically answerable via the standard strategy in philosophy of mind. Chalmers argues for a gap from the objective to the subjective. In support of this, Chalmers is famous for his commitment to the possibility of philosophical zombies. These zombies, unlike the zombie of popular fiction, are complete physical duplicates of human beings, Chalmers argues that since such zombies are conceivable to us, they must therefore be logically possible. Since they are possible, then qualia and sentience are not fully explained by physical properties alone. He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats, Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his contemporaries. After the publication of Chalmerss landmark paper, more than twenty papers in response were published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies and these papers were collected and published in the book Explaining Consciousness, The Hard Problem. John Searle critiqued Chalmerss views in The New York Review of Books, with Andy Clark, Chalmers has written The Extended Mind, an article about the borders of the mind
17.
God
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In monotheism, God is conceived of as the Supreme Being and principal object of faith. The concept of God as described by most theologians includes the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, divine simplicity, many theologians also describe God as being omnibenevolent and all loving. Furthermore, some religions attribute only a purely grammatical gender to God, incorporeity and corporeity of God are related to conceptions of transcendence and immanence of God, with positions of synthesis such as the immanent transcendence of Chinese theology. God has been conceived as personal or impersonal. In theism, God is the creator and sustainer of the universe, while in deism, God is the creator, in pantheism, God is the universe itself. In atheism, God is not believed to exist, while God is deemed unknown or unknowable within the context of agnosticism, God has also been conceived as the source of all moral obligation, and the greatest conceivable existent. Many notable philosophers have developed arguments for and against the existence of God, there are many names for God, and different names are attached to different cultural ideas about Gods identity and attributes. In the ancient Egyptian era of Atenism, possibly the earliest recorded monotheistic religion, this deity was called Aten, premised on being the one true Supreme Being and creator of the universe. In the Hebrew Bible and Judaism, He Who Is, I Am that I Am, in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, God, consubstantial in three persons, is called the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. In Judaism, it is common to refer to God by the titular names Elohim or Adonai, in Islam, the name Allah is used, while Muslims also have a multitude of titular names for God. In Hinduism, Brahman is often considered a concept of God. In Chinese religion, God is conceived as the progenitor of the universe, intrinsic to it, other religions have names for God, for instance, Baha in the Baháí Faith, Waheguru in Sikhism, and Ahura Mazda in Zoroastrianism. The earliest written form of the Germanic word God comes from the 6th-century Christian Codex Argenteus, the English word itself is derived from the Proto-Germanic * ǥuđan. The reconstructed Proto-Indo-European form * ǵhu-tó-m was likely based on the root * ǵhau-, in the English language, the capitalized form of God continues to represent a distinction between monotheistic God and gods in polytheism. The same holds for Hebrew El, but in Judaism, God is also given a proper name, in many translations of the Bible, when the word LORD is in all capitals, it signifies that the word represents the tetragrammaton. Allāh is the Arabic term with no plural used by Muslims and Arabic speaking Christians and Jews meaning The God, Ahura Mazda is the name for God used in Zoroastrianism. Mazda, or rather the Avestan stem-form Mazdā-, nominative Mazdå and it is generally taken to be the proper name of the spirit, and like its Sanskrit cognate medhā, means intelligence or wisdom. Both the Avestan and Sanskrit words reflect Proto-Indo-Iranian *mazdhā-, from Proto-Indo-European mn̩sdʰeh1, literally meaning placing ones mind, Waheguru is a term most often used in Sikhism to refer to God
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Necessity and sufficiency
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In logic, necessity and sufficiency are implicational relationships between statements. The assertion that one statement is a necessary and sufficient condition of another means that the statement is true if. That is, the two statements must be simultaneously true or simultaneously false. In ordinary English, necessary and sufficient indicate relations between conditions or states of affairs, not statements, being a male sibling is a necessary and sufficient condition for being a brother. Freds being a male sibling is necessary and sufficient for the truth of the statement that Fred is a brother, in the conditional statement, if S then N, the expression represented by S is called the antecedent and the expression represented by N is called the consequent. This conditional statement may be written in many equivalent ways, for instance, in the above situation, we also say that N is a necessary condition for S. In common language this is saying that if the statement is a true statement. Phrased differently, the antecedent S can not be true without N being true, for example, in order for someone to be called Socrates, it is necessary for that someone to be Named. We also say that S is a sufficient condition for N, if the conditional statement is true, then if S is true, N must be true. In common terms, S guarantees N, continuing the example, knowing that someone is called Socrates is sufficient to know that that someone has a Name. A necessary and sufficient condition requires that both of the implications S ⇒ N and N ⇒ S hold, from the first of these we see that S is a sufficient condition for N, and from the second that S is a necessary condition for N. This is expressed as S is necessary and sufficient for N, S if and only if N, the assertion that Q is necessary for P is colloquially equivalent to P cannot be true unless Q is true or if Q is false, then P is false. By contraposition, this is the thing as whenever P is true. The logical relation between them is expressed as if P, then Q and denoted P ⇒ Q and it may also be expressed as any of P only if Q, Q, if P, Q whenever P, and Q when P. One often finds, in prose for instance, several necessary conditions that, taken together, constitute a sufficient condition. Example 2 For the whole numbers greater than two, being odd is necessary to being prime, since two is the whole number that is both even and prime. Example 3 Consider thunder, the caused by lightning. We say that thunder is necessary for lightning, since lightning never occurs without thunder, the thunder does not cause the lightning, but because lightning always comes with thunder, we say that thunder is necessary for lightning
19.
Anomalous monism
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Anomalous monism is a philosophical thesis about the mind–body relationship. It was first proposed by Donald Davidson in his 1970 paper Mental Events, hence, Davidson proposes an identity theory of mind without the reductive bridge laws associated with the type-identity theory. Davidson put forth his theory of anomalous monism as a solution to the mind–body problem. There is just one event that can be characterized both in terms and in physical terms. If mental events are events, they can at least in principle be explained and predicted, like all physical events. Davidson makes an argument for his version of non-reductive physicalism, the argument relies on the following three principles, The principle of causal interaction, there exist both mental-to-physical as well as physical-to-mental causal interactions. The principle of the character of causality, all events are causally related through strict laws. The principle of the anomalism of the mental, there are no laws which relate the mental. The first principle follows from Davidsons view of the ontology of events, Davidson subscribes to an ontology of events where events are the fundamental, irreducible entities of the mental and physical universe. His original position, as expressed in Actions and Events, was that event-individuation must be done on the basis of causal powers, according to this view, all events are caused by and cause other events and this is the chief, defining characteristic of what an event is. Another relevant aspect of Davidsons ontology of events for anomalous monism is that an event has an number of properties or aspects. An event such as the turning on of the light-switch is not fully described in the words of that particular phrase, rather, the turning on of the light-switch also involves the illumination of the room, the alerting of the burglar in the kitchen, etc. Davidson says that the event, in such a case, is the particular reason that caused the action to occur. It was because I wanted to see better that I turned on the light-switch, the latter is just a sort of side effect. So, for Davidson, reasons are causes and this explains the causal efficacy of the mental, the principle of the nomological character of causality requires that events be covered by so-called strict laws. Davidson originally assumed the validity of this principle but, in recent years. The cause-law principle was intended by Davidson to take in both laws of succession as well as bridge laws. However, mental predicates may be allowed in what are called hedged laws which are just strict laws qualified by ceteris paribus clauses
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Property dualism
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In other words, it is the view that non-physical, mental properties inhere in some physical substances. Substance dualism thus has a harder time with the mind-body problem. Both substance and property dualism are opposed to physicalism, Emergentism is the idea that increasingly complex structures in the world give rise to the emergence of new properties that are something over and above their more basic constituents. The concept of emergence dates back to the late 19th century, John Stuart Mill notably argued for an emergentist conception of science in his 1843 System of Logic. Non-reductive physicalism is the predominant contemporary form of property according to which mental properties are mapped to neurobiological properties. Non-reductive physicalism asserts that mind is not ontologically reducible to matter and it asserts that while mental states are physical in that they are caused by physical states, they are not ontologically reducible to physical states. No mental state is the one thing as some physical state, nor is any mental state composed merely from physical states. Most contemporary non-reductive physicalists subscribe to a position called anomalous monism, unlike epiphenomenalism, which renders mental properties causally redundant, anomalous monists believe that mental properties make a causal difference to the world. The position was put forward by Donald Davidson in his 1970 paper Mental Events. Another argument for non-reductive physicalism has been expressed by John Searle and his view is that although mental states are not ontologically reducible to physical states, they are causally reducible. He believes the mental will ultimately be explained through neuroscience and this world view does not necessarily fall under property dualism, and therefore does not necessarily make him a property dualist. He has acknowledged that to many people his views and those of property dualists look a lot alike, but he thinks the comparison is misleading. Such mental phenomena themselves cause nothing further - they are dead ends. The position is credited to English biologist Thomas Huxley, who analogised mental properties to the whistle on a steam locomotive, the position found favour amongst scientific behaviourists over the next few decades, until behaviourism itself fell to the cognitive revolution in the 1960s. Recently, epiphenomenalism has gained popularity with those struggling to reconcile non-reductive physicalism, in the paper Epiphenomenal Qualia and later What Mary Didnt Know Frank Jackson made the so-called knowledge argument against physicalism. Superficially, it seems to be a form of property dualism, so long as the reduction of non-mental properties to mental ones is in place, panpsychism is not strictly a form of property dualism, otherwise it is. Thomas Nagel posed the question What is it like to be a bat, daniel Dennett, a critic of Nagels argument, nevertheless called this paper the most widely cited and influential thought experiment about consciousness. Kripke has an argument for some kind of property dualism
21.
Logical conjunction
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In logic and mathematics, and is the truth-functional operator of logical conjunction, the and of a set of operands is true if and only if all of its operands are true. The logical connective that represents this operator is written as ∧ or ⋅. A and B is true only if A is true and B is true, an operand of a conjunction is a conjunct. Related concepts in other fields are, In natural language, the coordinating conjunction, in programming languages, the short-circuit and control structure. And is usually denoted by an operator, in mathematics and logic, ∧ or ×, in electronics, ⋅. In Jan Łukasiewiczs prefix notation for logic, the operator is K, logical conjunction is an operation on two logical values, typically the values of two propositions, that produces a value of true if and only if both of its operands are true. The conjunctive identity is 1, which is to say that AND-ing an expression with 1 will never change the value of the expression. In keeping with the concept of truth, when conjunction is defined as an operator or function of arbitrary arity. The truth table of A ∧ B, As a rule of inference, conjunction introduction is a classically valid, the argument form has two premises, A and B. Intuitively, it permits the inference of their conjunction, therefore, A and B. or in logical operator notation, A, B ⊢ A ∧ B Here is an example of an argument that fits the form conjunction introduction, Bob likes apples. Therefore, Bob likes apples and oranges, Conjunction elimination is another classically valid, simple argument form. Intuitively, it permits the inference from any conjunction of either element of that conjunction, therefore, A. or alternately, A and B. In logical operator notation, A ∧ B ⊢ A. falsehood-preserving, yes When all inputs are false, walsh spectrum, Nonlinearity,1 If using binary values for true and false, then logical conjunction works exactly like normal arithmetic multiplication. Many languages also provide short-circuit control structures corresponding to logical conjunction. Logical conjunction is used for bitwise operations, where 0 corresponds to false and 1 to true,0 AND0 =0,0 AND1 =0,1 AND0 =0,1 AND1 =1. The operation can also be applied to two binary words viewed as bitstrings of length, by taking the bitwise AND of each pair of bits at corresponding positions. For example,11000110 AND10100011 =10000010 and this can be used to select part of a bitstring using a bit mask. For example,10011101 AND00001000 =00001000 extracts the fifth bit of an 8-bit bitstring
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Material conditional
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The material conditional is a logical connective that is often symbolized by a forward arrow →. The material conditional is used to form statements of the form
23.
Concept
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A concept is an abstract idea representing the fundamental characteristics of what it represents. Concepts arise as abstractions or generalisations from experience or the result of a transformation of existing ideas, the concept is instantiated by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other ideas. Concepts are treated in many if not most disciplines both explicitly, such as in linguistics, psychology, philosophy, etc. and implicitly, such as in mathematics, physics, etc. In informal use the word concept often just means any idea and these concepts are then stored in long term memory In metaphysics, and especially ontology, a concept is a fundamental category of existence. It would go furniture, chair, and easy chair, the term concept is traced back to 1554–60, but what is today termed the classical theory of concepts is the theory of Aristotle on the definition of terms. The meaning of concept is explored in mainstream science, cognitive science, metaphysics. In computer and information science contexts, especially, the concept is often used in unclear or inconsistent ways. In a platonist theory of mind, concepts are construed as abstract objects and this debate concerns the ontological status of concepts – what they are really like. There is debate as to the relationship between concepts and natural language, concepts that can be equated to a single word are called lexical concepts. Study of concepts and conceptual structure falls into the disciplines of linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. In the simplest terms, a concept is a name or label that regards or treats an abstraction as if it had concrete or material existence, such as a person, a place, or a thing. It may represent an object that exists in the real world like a tree, an animal. It may also name an object like a chair, computer, house. Abstract ideas and knowledge domains such as freedom, equality, science, happiness and it is important to realize that a concept is merely a symbol, a representation of the abstraction. The word is not to be mistaken for the thing, for example, the word moon is not the large, bright, shape-changing object up in the sky, but only represents that celestial object. Concepts are created to describe, explain and capture reality as it is known, Kant declared that human minds possess pure or a priori concepts. Instead of being abstracted from individual perceptions, like empirical concepts and he called these concepts categories, in the sense of the word that means predicate, attribute, characteristic, or quality. But these pure categories are predicates of things in general, not of a particular thing, according to Kant, there are 12 categories that constitute the understanding of phenomenal objects
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Contradiction
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In classical logic, a contradiction consists of a logical incompatibility between two or more propositions. It occurs when the propositions, taken together, yield two conclusions which form the logical, usually opposite inversions of each other. Illustrating a general tendency in applied logic, Aristotles law of noncontradiction states that One cannot say of something that it is, by extension, outside of classical logic, one can speak of contradictions between actions when one presumes that their motives contradict each other. By creation of a paradox, Platos Euthydemus dialogue demonstrates the need for the notion of contradiction, in the ensuing dialogue Dionysodorus denies the existence of contradiction, all the while that Socrates is contradicting him. I in my astonishment said, What do you mean Dionysodorus, the dictum is that there is no such thing as a falsehood, a man must either say what is true or say nothing. Indeed, Dionysodorus agrees that there is no such thing as false opinion, there is no such thing as ignorance and demands of Socrates to Refute me. Socrates responds But how can I refute you, if, as you say, note, The symbol ⊥ represents an arbitrary contradiction, with the dual tee symbol ⊤ used to denote an arbitrary tautology. Contradiction is sometimes symbolized by Opq, and tautology by Vpq, the turnstile symbol, ⊢ is often read as yields or proves. In classical logic, particularly in propositional and first-order logic, a proposition φ is a contradiction if, since for contradictory φ it is true that ⊢ φ → ψ for all ψ, one may prove any proposition from a set of axioms which contains contradictions. This is called the principle of explosion or ex falso quodlibet, in a complete logic, a formula is contradictory if and only if it is unsatisfiable. Therefore, a proof that ¬ φ ⊢ ⊥ also proves that φ is true, the use of this fact constitutes the technique of the proof by contradiction, which mathematicians use extensively. This applies only in a logic using the excluded middle A ∨ ¬ A as an axiom, in mathematics, the symbol used to represent a contradiction within a proof varies. A consistency proof requires an axiomatic system a demonstration that it is not the case both the formula p and its negation ~p can be derived in the system. Posts solution to the problem is described in the demonstration An Example of a Successful Absolute Proof of Consistency offered by Ernest Nagel and they too observe a problem with respect to the notion of contradiction with its usual truth values of truth and falsity. They observe that, The property of being a tautology has been defined in notions of truth, yet these notions obviously involve a reference to something outside the formula calculus. Therefore, the mentioned in the text in effect offers an interpretation of the calculus. This being so, the authors have not done what they promised, namely, proofs of consistency which are based on models, and which argue from the truth of axioms to their consistency, merely shift the problem. Given some primitive formulas such as PMs primitives S1 V S2, so what will be the definition of tautologous
25.
Eliminative materialism
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Eliminative materialism is the claim that peoples common-sense understanding of the mind is false and that certain classes of mental states that most people believe in do not exist. It is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind, some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. Rather, they argue that concepts of behaviour and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. Other versions entail the non-existence of conscious mental states such as pain, eliminativism about a class of entities is the view that that class of entities does not exist. The most common versions are eliminativism about propositional attitudes, as expressed by Paul and Patricia Churchland and these philosophers often appeal to an introspection illusion. Since eliminative materialism claims that research will fail to find a neuronal basis for various mental phenomena. Various arguments have been put forth both for and against eliminative materialism over the last forty years, most of the arguments in favor of the view are based on the assumption that peoples commonsense view of the mind is actually an implicit theory. It is to be compared and contrasted with scientific theories in its explanatory success, accuracy. Eliminativists argue that, based on these and other criteria, commonsense folk psychology has failed and these philosophers therefore tend to emphasize the importance of neuroscientific research as well as developments in artificial intelligence to sustain their thesis. Philosophers who argue against eliminativism may take several approaches, jerry Fodor, among others, argues that folk psychology is, in fact, a successful theory. Another view is that eliminativism assumes the existence of the beliefs, because of the inadequacy of natural languages, people mistakenly think that they have such beliefs and desires. Consciousness and folk psychology are separate issues and it is possible to take a stance on one. The roots of eliminativism go back to the writings of Wilfred Sellars, quine, Paul Feyerabend, and Richard Rorty. The term eliminative materialism was first introduced by James Cornman in 1968 while describing a version of physicalism endorsed by Rorty, the later Ludwig Wittgenstein was also an important inspiration for eliminativism, particularly with his attack on private objects as grammatical fictions. Early eliminativists such as Rorty and Feyerabend often confused two different notions of the sort of elimination that the term eliminative materialism entailed, but critics immediately countered that this view was indistinguishable from the identity theory of mind. While it was a minority view in the 1960s, eliminative materialism gained prominence and acceptance during the 1980s, in these cases, science has not produced more detailed versions or reductions of these theories, but rejected them altogether as obsolete. Radical behaviorists, such as Skinner, argued that psychology is already obsolete. Patricia and Paul Churchland argued that folk psychology will be replaced as neuroscience matures
26.
International Standard Serial Number
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An International Standard Serial Number is an eight-digit serial number used to uniquely identify a serial publication. The ISSN is especially helpful in distinguishing between serials with the same title, ISSN are used in ordering, cataloging, interlibrary loans, and other practices in connection with serial literature. The ISSN system was first drafted as an International Organization for Standardization international standard in 1971, ISO subcommittee TC 46/SC9 is responsible for maintaining the standard. When a serial with the content is published in more than one media type. For example, many serials are published both in print and electronic media, the ISSN system refers to these types as print ISSN and electronic ISSN, respectively. The format of the ISSN is an eight digit code, divided by a hyphen into two four-digit numbers, as an integer number, it can be represented by the first seven digits. The last code digit, which may be 0-9 or an X, is a check digit. Formally, the form of the ISSN code can be expressed as follows, NNNN-NNNC where N is in the set, a digit character. The ISSN of the journal Hearing Research, for example, is 0378-5955, where the final 5 is the check digit, for calculations, an upper case X in the check digit position indicates a check digit of 10. To confirm the check digit, calculate the sum of all eight digits of the ISSN multiplied by its position in the number, the modulus 11 of the sum must be 0. There is an online ISSN checker that can validate an ISSN, ISSN codes are assigned by a network of ISSN National Centres, usually located at national libraries and coordinated by the ISSN International Centre based in Paris. The International Centre is an organization created in 1974 through an agreement between UNESCO and the French government. The International Centre maintains a database of all ISSNs assigned worldwide, at the end of 2016, the ISSN Register contained records for 1,943,572 items. ISSN and ISBN codes are similar in concept, where ISBNs are assigned to individual books, an ISBN might be assigned for particular issues of a serial, in addition to the ISSN code for the serial as a whole. An ISSN, unlike the ISBN code, is an identifier associated with a serial title. For this reason a new ISSN is assigned to a serial each time it undergoes a major title change, separate ISSNs are needed for serials in different media. Thus, the print and electronic versions of a serial need separate ISSNs. Also, a CD-ROM version and a web version of a serial require different ISSNs since two different media are involved, however, the same ISSN can be used for different file formats of the same online serial
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International Standard Book Number
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The International Standard Book Number is a unique numeric commercial book identifier. An ISBN is assigned to each edition and variation of a book, for example, an e-book, a paperback and a hardcover edition of the same book would each have a different ISBN. The ISBN is 13 digits long if assigned on or after 1 January 2007, the method of assigning an ISBN is nation-based and varies from country to country, often depending on how large the publishing industry is within a country. The initial ISBN configuration of recognition was generated in 1967 based upon the 9-digit Standard Book Numbering created in 1966, the 10-digit ISBN format was developed by the International Organization for Standardization and was published in 1970 as international standard ISO2108. Occasionally, a book may appear without a printed ISBN if it is printed privately or the author does not follow the usual ISBN procedure, however, this can be rectified later. Another identifier, the International Standard Serial Number, identifies periodical publications such as magazines, the ISBN configuration of recognition was generated in 1967 in the United Kingdom by David Whitaker and in 1968 in the US by Emery Koltay. The 10-digit ISBN format was developed by the International Organization for Standardization and was published in 1970 as international standard ISO2108, the United Kingdom continued to use the 9-digit SBN code until 1974. The ISO on-line facility only refers back to 1978, an SBN may be converted to an ISBN by prefixing the digit 0. For example, the edition of Mr. J. G. Reeder Returns, published by Hodder in 1965, has SBN340013818 -340 indicating the publisher,01381 their serial number. This can be converted to ISBN 0-340-01381-8, the check digit does not need to be re-calculated, since 1 January 2007, ISBNs have contained 13 digits, a format that is compatible with Bookland European Article Number EAN-13s. An ISBN is assigned to each edition and variation of a book, for example, an ebook, a paperback, and a hardcover edition of the same book would each have a different ISBN. The ISBN is 13 digits long if assigned on or after 1 January 2007, a 13-digit ISBN can be separated into its parts, and when this is done it is customary to separate the parts with hyphens or spaces. Separating the parts of a 10-digit ISBN is also done with either hyphens or spaces, figuring out how to correctly separate a given ISBN number is complicated, because most of the parts do not use a fixed number of digits. ISBN issuance is country-specific, in that ISBNs are issued by the ISBN registration agency that is responsible for country or territory regardless of the publication language. Some ISBN registration agencies are based in national libraries or within ministries of culture, in other cases, the ISBN registration service is provided by organisations such as bibliographic data providers that are not government funded. In Canada, ISBNs are issued at no cost with the purpose of encouraging Canadian culture. In the United Kingdom, United States, and some countries, where the service is provided by non-government-funded organisations. Australia, ISBNs are issued by the library services agency Thorpe-Bowker
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Parmenides
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Parmenides of Elea was a pre-Socratic Greek philosopher from Elea in Magna Graecia. He was the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, the single known work of Parmenides is a poem, On Nature, which has survived only in fragmentary form. In this poem, Parmenides describes two views of reality, in the way of truth, he explains how reality is one, change is impossible, and existence is timeless, uniform, necessary, and unchanging. In the way of opinion, he explains the world of appearances, in which ones sensory faculties lead to conceptions which are false, Parmenides was born in the Greek colony of Elea, which, according to Herodotus, had been founded shortly before 535 BC. He was descended from a wealthy and illustrious family,450 BC, which, if true, suggests a year of birth of c.515 BC. He was said to have been a pupil of Xenophanes, and regardless of whether they knew each other. Diogenes Laërtius also describes Parmenides as a disciple of Ameinias, son of Diochaites, the Pythagorean, the first hero cult of a philosopher we know of was Parmenides dedication of a heroon to his teacher Ameinias in Elea. Parmenides was the founder of the School of Elea, which also included Zeno of Elea, of his life in Elea, it was said that he had written the laws of the city. His most important pupil was Zeno, who according to Plato was 25 years his junior, Parmenides had a large influence on Plato, who not only named a dialogue, Parmenides, after him, but always spoke of him with veneration. William Smith also wrote in Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology, Reason is our guide, on the latter the eye that does not catch the object and re-echoing hearing. Thought and that which is thought of coinciding, the passages of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, and others. Parmenides is one of the most significant of the pre-Socratic philosophers and his single known work, a poem conventionally titled On Nature, has survived only in fragments. Approximately 160 verses remain today from a total that was probably near 800. The poem was divided into three parts, A proem, which introduced the entire work, A section known as The Way of Truth. The proem is a sequence in which the narrator travels beyond the beaten paths of mortal men to receive a revelation from an unnamed goddess on the nature of reality. Aletheia, an estimated 90% of which has survived, and doxa, in the proem, Parmenides describes the journey of the poet, escorted by maidens, from the ordinary daytime world to a strange destination, outside our human paths. Carried in a chariot, and attended by the daughters of Helios the Sun. The goddess resides in a well-known mythological space, where Night and its essential character is that here all opposites are undivided, or one
. doi:10.1215/00318108-110-3-315.
