Henryk Zygalski was a Polish mathematician and cryptologist who worked at breaking German Enigma ciphers before and during World War II. Zygalski was born on 15 July 1908 in Posen, German Empire, he was, from September 1932, a civilian cryptologist with the Polish General Staff's Biuro Szyfrów, housed in the Saxon Palace in Warsaw. He worked there with fellow Poznań University alumni and Cipher Bureau cryptology-course graduates Marian Rejewski and Jerzy Różycki. Together they developed methods and equipment for breaking Enigma messages. In late 1938, in response to growing complexities in German encryption procedures, Zygalski designed the "perforated sheets," known as "Zygalski sheets," a manual device for finding Enigma settings; this scheme, like the earlier "card catalog," was independent of the number of connections being used in the Enigma's plugboard, or commutator. After the war he remained in exile in the United Kingdom and worked, until his retirement, as a lecturer in mathematical statistics at the University of Surrey.
During this period he was prevented by the Official Secrets Act from speaking of his achievements in cryptology. He died on 30 August 1978 in Liss, was cremated and his ashes taken to London. Shortly before his death, he was honored by the Polish University in Exile with an honorary doctorate for his role in breaking Enigma. Cryptanalysis of the Enigma List of cryptographers Zygalski sheets Marian Rejewski List of Polish mathematicians Władysław Kozaczuk, Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, How It Was Read by the Allies in World War II, edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek, Frederick, MD, University Publications of America, 1984, ISBN 0-89093-547-5
The Saxon Palace was one of the most distinctive buildings in prewar Warsaw, Poland. There are plans to reconstruct the building; the Saxon Palace had been preceded by a manor house belonging to Tobiasz Morsztyn. After 1661 his brother and heir Jan Andrzej Morsztyn had replaced the manor house with a baroque palace with four towers. In 1713 the Morsztyn Palace was purchased by the first of Poland's two Saxon kings, Augustus II, who began enlarging it. In 1748 the palace's rebuilding was completed by his son, King Augustus III. In the early 19th century, the Saxon Palace housed the Warsaw Lyceum in which Frédéric Chopin's father Nicolas Chopin taught French, living with his family on the palace grounds; the Palace was remodeled in 1842. After World War I, the Saxon Palace was the seat of the Polish General Staff. In 1925, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was established within the colonnade-topped arcade that joined the Palace's two symmetric wings; the Palace continued to be sandwiched between the Saxon Garden, to its rear, the Saxon Square in front.
In this building the German Enigma machine cipher was first broken in December 1932 and read for several years before the General Staff Cipher Bureau German section's 1937 move to new, specially designed quarters near Pyry in the Kabaty Woods south of Warsaw. During World War II, after the German suppression of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, the Saxon Palace was blown up by the Germans as part of their planned destruction of Warsaw. Only parts of the central arcade remained, housing the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, which escaped destruction. There are plans to reconstruct the Saxon Palace; the palace cellars were excavated in 2006. The palaces' reconstruction was scheduled for completion by 2010; the reconstructed building was planned to house Warsaw's city hall, but due to Warsaw's budget problems caused by the recent global financial crisis, subsequent cuts, the reconstruction has been on hold. On 11 November 2018, in celebration of the 100th anniversary of Poland's post-World War I independence, President Andrzej Duda reaffirmed the intent to rebuild the palace.
Saxon Axis Brühl Palace Planned destruction of Warsaw Władysław Kozaczuk, Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, How It Was Read by the Allies in World War II, edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek, Maryland, University Publications of America, 1984, ISBN 0-89093-547-5. Warsaw before 1939 Picture gallery of Saxon Square History of the Saxon Palace and the Saxon Axis
The Biuro Szyfrów was the interwar Polish General Staff's Second Department's unit charged with SIGINT and both cryptography and cryptanalysis. The precursor of the agency that would become the Cipher Bureau was created in May 1919, during the Polish-Soviet War, played a vital role in securing Poland's survival and victory in that war. In mid-1931, the Cipher Bureau was formed by the merger of pre-existing agencies. In December 1932, the Bureau began breaking Germany's Enigma ciphers. Over the next seven years, Polish cryptologists overcame the growing structural and operating complexities of the plugboard-equipped Enigma; the Bureau broke Soviet cryptography. Five weeks before the outbreak of World War II, on 25 July 1939, in Warsaw, the Polish Cipher Bureau revealed its Enigma-decryption techniques and equipment to representatives of French and British military intelligence, unable to make any headway against Enigma; this Polish intelligence-and-technology transfer would give the Allies an unprecedented advantage in their victorious prosecution of World War II.
On 8 May 1919 Lt. Józef Serafin Stanslicki established a Polish Army "Cipher Section", precursor to the "Cipher Bureau"; the Cipher Section reported to the Polish General Staff and contributed to Poland's defense by Józef Piłsudski's forces during the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–21, thereby helping preserve Poland's independence regained in the wake of World War I. The Cipher Section's purview included both codes. In Polish the term "cipher" loosely refers to both these two principal categories of cryptography. During the Polish–Soviet War, some one hundred Russian ciphers were broken by a sizable cadre of Polish cryptologists who included army Lieutenant Jan Kowalewski and three world-famous professors of mathematics — Stefan Mazurkiewicz, Wacław Sierpiński and Stanisław Leśniewski. Russian army staffs were still following the same disastrously ill-disciplined signals-security procedures as had Tsarist army staffs during World War I, to the decisive advantage of their German enemy; as a result, during the Polish-Soviet War the Polish military were kept informed by Russian signals stations about the movements of Russian armies and their intentions and operational orders.
The Soviet staffs, according to Polish Colonel Mieczysław Ścieżyński, "had not the slightest hesitation about sending any and all messages of an operational nature by means of radiotelegraphy. The same held for the chitchat of personnel at radiotelegraphic stations, where discipline was disastrously lax." In the crucial month of August 1920 alone, Polish cryptologists decrypted 410 signals: from Soviet General Mikhail Tukhachevsky, commander of the northern front from Leon Trotsky, Soviet commissar of war from commanders of armies, for example: the commander of the RKKA IV Army, Yevgenii Nikolaievich Sergeev the commander of the 1st Cavalry Army, Semyon Budionny the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, Gai from the staffs of the XII, XV and XVI Armies from the staffs of: the Mozyr Group the Zolochiv Group the Yakir Group from the 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 24, 27, 41, 44, 45, 53, 54, 58 and 60 Infantry Divisions from the 8 Cavalry Divisionetc. The intercepts were as a rule decrypted the same day, or at latest the next day, were sent to the Polish General Staff's Section II and operational section.
The more important signals were read in their entirety by the Chief of the General Staff, by the Commander in Chief, Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Interception and reading of the signals provided Polish intelligence with entire Russian operational orders; the Poles were able to follow the whole operation of Budionny's Cavalry Army in the second half of August 1920 with incredible precision, just by monitoring his radiotelegraphic correspondence with Tukhachevsky, including the famous and historic conflict between the two Russian commanders. The intercepts included an order from Trotsky to the revolutionary council of war of the Western Front, confirming Tukhachevsky's operational orders, thus giving them the authority of the supreme chief of the Soviet armed forces. An entire operational order from Tukhachevsky to Budionny was intercepted on 19 August and read on 20 August, stating the tasks of all of Tukhachevsky's armies, of which only the essence had been known.Ścieżyński surmises that the Soviets must have intercepted Polish operational signals.
Polish cryptologists enjoyed generous support under the command of Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel, chief of the Polish General Staff's Section II, they worked at Warsaw's radio station WAR, on
Stefan Mazurkiewicz was a Polish mathematician who worked in mathematical analysis and probability. He was a member of the Polish Academy of Learning, his students included Karol Borsuk, Bronisław Knaster, Kazimierz Kuratowski, Stanisław Saks, Antoni Zygmund. For a time Mazurkiewicz was a professor at the University of Paris; the Hahn–Mazurkiewicz theorem, a basic result on curves prompted by the phenomenon of space-filling curves, is named for Mazurkiewicz and Hans Hahn. His 1935 paper Sur l'existence des continus indécomposables is considered the most elegant piece of work in point-set topology. During the Polish–Soviet War, Mazurkiewicz as early as 1919 broke the most common Russian cipher for the Polish General Staff's cryptological agency. Thanks to this, orders issued by Soviet commander Mikhail Tukhachevsky's staff were known to Polish Army leaders; this contributed perhaps decisively, to Polish victory at the critical Battle of Warsaw and to Poland's survival as an independent country.
Biuro Szyfrów Stefan Mazurkiewicz at the Mathematics Genealogy Project O'Connor, John J..
Polish Enigma double
A Polish Enigma "double" was a machine produced by the Polish Cipher Bureau that replicated the German Enigma rotor cipher machine. The Enigma double was one result of Marian Rejewski's remarkable achievement of determining the wiring of the Enigma's rotors and reflectors; the Polish Cipher Bureau recognized. The Germans had mistakenly shipped a cipher machine to Poland; the Bureau purchased a commercial Enigma machine, it attempted but failed to break the cipher. In December 1932, the Polish Cipher Bureau tasked Marian Rejewski with breaking the Enigma cipher machine. A French spy had obtained some material about the Enigma, the French had provided the material to the Polish Cipher Bureau. By that time, the commercial Enigma had been extended to use a plugboard. Rejewski was able to determine the wiring of the military Enigma; the Bureau modified its commercial Enigma rotors and internal wiring to match the military Enigma. The commercial Enigma did not have a plugboard, but the plugboard could be simulated by relabeling the keys and the lamps.
The result was the first Enigma double. In February 1933, the Polish Cipher Bureau ordered fifteen "doubles" of the military Enigma machine from the AVA Radio Manufacturing Company, in Warsaw. About seventy such functional replicas were produced. In August 1939, following the tripartite meeting of the French and Polish cryptanalysts held near Warsaw on 25 and 26 July, two Enigma replicas were passed to Poland's allies, one being sent to Paris and one to London; until German military Enigma traffic had defeated the British and French, they had faced the disturbing prospect that German communications would remain "black" to them for the duration of the coming war. After Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel had been evacuated to France, the Cipher Bureau resumed its interrupted work at PC Bruno, outside Paris; the Poles had only three replica Enigma machines to work with, these were wearing out from round-the-clock use. French Army intelligence officer Gustave Bertrand ordered parts for forty machines from a French precision-mechanics firm.
Manufacture proceeded sluggishly, it was only after the fall of France and the opening of underground work in southern France's Free Zone in October 1940 that four machines were assembled. Saxon Palace, in Warsaw, where German Enigma ciphers were first broken in December 1932 Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "The Unknown Victors". Marian Rejewski, 1905-1980: Living with the Enigma Secret. Bydgoszcz: Bydgoszcz City Council. Pp. 15–18. ISBN 83-7208-117-4. OCLC 62701914. Kozaczuk, Władysław. Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two. Foreign intelligence book series. Edited and translated by Christopher Kasparek. Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America. ISBN 0-89093-547-5. OCLC 9826775. Woytak, Richard A.. Transcribed and translated by Christopher Kasparek. "A Conversation with Marian Rejewski". Cryptologia. 6: 50–60. Doi:10.1080/0161-118291856830. Slawo Wesolkowski, "The Invention of Enigma and How the Polish Broke It Before the Start of WWII" http://www.cryptomuseum.com/crypto/enigma/hist.htm has picture of Enigma double http://www.codesandciphers.org.uk/virtualbp/poles/poles.htm has picture of Enigma double
The bomba, or bomba kryptologiczna, was a special-purpose machine designed about October 1938 by Polish Cipher Bureau cryptologist Marian Rejewski to break German Enigma-machine ciphers. How the machine came to be called a "bomb" has been an object of speculation. One theory, most apocryphal, originated with Polish engineer and army officer Tadeusz Lisicki, he claimed. This story seems implausible. Rejewski himself stated that the device had been dubbed a "bomb" "for lack of a better idea"; the most credible explanation is given by a Cipher Bureau technician, Czesław Betlewski: workers at B. S.-4, the Cipher Bureau's German section, christened the machine a "bomb" because of the characteristic muffled noise that it produced when operating. According to a top-secret U. S. Army report dated 15 June 1945, A machine called; the first machine was a hand operated multiple enigma machine. When a possible solution was reached a part would fall off the machine onto the floor with a loud noise. Hence the name "bombe".
The German Enigma used a combination key to control the operation of the machine: rotor order, which rotors to install, which ring setting for each rotor, which initial setting for each rotor, the settings of the stecker plugboard. The rotor settings were trigrams to indicate the way. German Enigma operators were issued lists of one key for each day. For added security, each individual message was encrypted using an additional key modification; the operator randomly selected a trigram rotor setting for each message. This message key would be typed using the daily key. At this point each operator would reset his machine to the message key, which would be used for the rest of the message; because the configuration of the Enigma's rotor set changed with each depression of a key, the repetition would not be obvious in the ciphertext since the same plaintext letters would encrypt to different ciphertext letters. This procedure, which seemed reasonably secure to the Germans, was nonetheless a cryptographic malpractice, since the first insights into Enigma encryption could be inferred from seeing how the same character string was encrypted differently two times in a row.
Using the knowledge that the first three letters of a message were the same as the second three, Polish mathematician–cryptologist Marian Rejewski was able to determine the internal wirings of the Enigma machine and thus to reconstruct the logical structure of the device. Only general traits of the machine were suspected, from the example of the commercial Enigma variant, which the Germans were known to have been using for diplomatic communications; the military versions were sufficiently different to present an new problem. Having done that much, it was still necessary to check each of the potential daily keys to break an encrypted message. With many thousands of such possible keys, with the growing complexity of the Enigma machine and its keying procedures, this was becoming an daunting task. In order to mechanize and speed up the process, Rejewski, a civilian mathematician working at the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau in Warsaw, invented the "bomba kryptologiczna" in October 1938; each bomb constituted an electrically powered aggregate of six Enigmas and took the place of some one hundred workers.
The bomb method was based, like the Poles' earlier "grill" method, on the fact that the plug connections in the commutator did not change all the letters. But while the grill method required unchanged pairs of letters, the bomb method required only unchanged letters. Hence it could be applied though the number of plug connections in this period was between five and eight. In mid-November 1938, the bombs were ready, the reconstructing of daily keys now took about two hours. Up to July 25, 1939, the Poles had been breaking Enigma messages for over six and a half years without telling their French and British allies. On December 15, 1938, two new rotors, IV and V, were introduced; as Rejewski wrote in a 1979 critique of appendix 1, volume 1, of the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War, "we found the within the, but introduction raised the number of possible sequences of drums from 6 to 60 and hence raised tenfold the work of finding the keys. Thus the change was not qualitative but quantitative.
We would have had to markedly increase the personnel to operate the bombs, to produce the perforated sheets and to manipulate the sheets."Harry Hinsley suggested in British Intelligence... that the Poles decided to share their Enigma-breaking techniques and equipment with the French and British in July 1939 because they had encountered insuperable technical difficulties. Rejewski rejected this: "No
A military staff is a group of officers and civilian personnel that are responsible for the administrative and logistical needs of its unit. It provides bi-directional flow of information between a commanding officer and subordinate military units. A staff provides an executive function where it filters information needed by the commander or shunts unnecessary information. One of the key purposes of a military staff is to provide accurate, timely information on which command decisions are based. A goal is being able to suggest approaches or help produce well-informed decisions that will manage and conserve unit resources. In addition to generating information, the staff manages the flow of communication within the unit and around it. While controlled information flow toward the commander is a priority, those useful or contingent in nature are communicated to lower-level units and/or through their respective staffs. If the information is not pertinent to the unit, it is redirected to the command level which can best utilize the condition or information.
Staffs are the first to know of issues that affect its group. Issues that require major decisions affecting the unit's operational capability are communicated to the commanding officer. However, not all issues will be handled by the commander. Smaller matters that arise are given to a more appropriate tasker within the unit to be handled and resolved, which would otherwise be an unnecessary distraction for the Commanding Officer who makes numerous decisions every day. In addition, a staff aims to craft any useful situations and utilize that information. In a generic command staff, more seasoned and senior officers oversee staff sections of groups organized by the needs of the unit. Senior Enlisted Personnel task personnel in the maintenance of tactical equipment and vehicles. Senior Analysts are tasked with the finalizing of reports, their enlisted personnel participate in the acquisition of information from subordinate staffs and units; this hierarchy places decision making and reporting under the auspices of the most experienced personnel and maximizes information flow of pertinent information sent out of the command overall, clarifying matters overall.
This frees up the most senior members of the command at each level for decision making and issuing direction for further research or information gathering. Operations staff officers are tasked with battle planning both for offensive and defensive conditions, issuing contingency plans for handling situations anticipated during the foreseeable future. Prior to the late 18th century, there was no organizational support for staff functions such as military intelligence, planning or personnel. Unit commanders handled such functions for their units, with informal help from subordinates who were not trained for or assigned to a specific task. A great deal of mythology surrounds the origin of the modern staff system as a tool of army management, it was perfected by the Prussians, but despite the claims of many American and British authors, it did not originate in France not with Napoleon and General Louis Alexandre Berthier. The claims made about Pierre-Joseph Bourcet and his staff college at Grenoble are myths.
In a great irony of history, it was the French attaché to the Austrian court, whose memorandum was used by Count Leopold Joseph von Daun in January 1758 in a letter to the Empress Maria Theresa to press for a more important role for the Generalquartiermeister. The failures in the army at the Battle of Leuthen made it clear that Austria had no "great brain" and the command needed to spread the workload to allow the Commander-in-chief the time to consider the strategic picture; the 1757 regulations had created the Grosse Feldgeneralstab and Kleine Generalstab and after changes in 1769, a permanent staff of 30 officers was established under the Director, Franz Moritz von Lacy, which would be expanded in wartime with junior officers. The Grosse staff was divided into three: First, the Intrinsecum, which handled internal administration and directing operations. Alongside the General Staff was the General Adjutant, who led a group of Adjutant staff selected by the army commanders to handle the details of internal administration and collating intelligence, answered to the Commander-in-chief.
The Chief of Staff became the chief adviser to the Commander-in-chief and, in a fundamental move away from the previous administrative role, the Chief of Staff now undertook operational planning, while delegating the routine work to his senior staff officers. Staff officers were drawn from line units and would return to them, the intention being that they would prove themselves as leaders during their time with the staff. In a battle or when the army had detached corps, a small number of staff would be allocated to the column commander as a smaller version of headquarters; the senior man a Major, would be the chief of the column staff and his principal task would be to help the commander to understand what was intended. When Karl Mack von Leiberich became chief of staff of the army under Prince Josias of Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeld in the Netherlands, he issued the Instruktionspunkte für gesammte Herren Generals, the last of 19 points setting out the roles of staff officers, dealing with offensive and defensive operations, while helping the Commander-