Copyright Act of 1790
The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first federal copyright act to be instituted in the United States, though most of the states had passed various legislation securing copyrights in the years following the Revolutionary War. The stated object of the act was the "encouragement of learning," and it achieved this by securing authors the "sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting and vending" the copies of their "maps and books" for a term of 14 years, with the right to renew for one additional 14-year term should the copyright holder still be alive; the 1710 British Statute of Anne did not apply to the American colonies. The colonies' economy was agrarian, hence copyright law was not a priority, resulting in only three private copyright acts being passed in America prior to 1783. Two of the acts were limited to seven years, the other was limited to a term of five years. In 1783 a committee of the Continental Congress concluded "that nothing is more properly a man's own an the fruit of his study, that the protection and security of literary property would tends to encourage genius and to promote useful discoveries."
But under the Articles of Confederation, the Continental Congress had no authority to issue copyright. Three states had enacted copyright statutes in 1783 prior to the Continental Congress resolution, in the subsequent three years all of the remaining states except Delaware passed a copyright statute. Seven of the States followed the Statute of Anne and the Continental Congress' resolution by providing two fourteen-year terms; the five remaining States granted copyright for single terms of fourteen and twenty-one years, with no right of renewal. At the Constitutional Convention 1787 both James Madison of Virginia and Charles C. Pinckney of South Carolina submitted proposals that would allow Congress the power to grant copyright for a limited time; these proposals are the origin of the Copyright Clause in the United States Constitution, which allows the granting of copyright and patents for a limited time to serve a utilitarian function, namely "to promote the progress of science and useful arts".
During the first session of the 1st United States Congress in 1789, the House of Representative considered enacting a copyright law. The historian Davit Ramsay petitioned congress seeking to restrict the publication of his History of the American Revolution on April 15. Congressmen Thomas Tudor Tucker, Alexander White, Benjamin Huntington examined his claims and a copyright committee consisting of Huntington, Lambert Cadwalader, Benjamin Contee began drafting the legislation on April 20. Jedidiah Morse, Nicholas Pike, Hannah Adams each petitioned Congress with their interests in restricting the printing of texts, their bill moved to the Committee of the Whole House in June, but the matter was postponed in anticipation of the first recess, to be taken up again when the House reconvened. Both houses of Congress pursued a copyright law more pointedly during 1790's second session, they responded to President George Washington's 1790 State of the Union Address, in which he urged Congress to pass legislation designed for "the promotion of Science and Literature" so as to better educate the public.
This led to the Patent Act of 1790 and, shortly thereafter, the Copyright Act of 1790. The scope of what works would be covered by the law's exclusivity was contended in the House; when he reintroduced the matter, Aedanus Burke wanted to establish a first law about copyright regarding "literary property," but Alexander White called for the expansion of copyright beyond writings on the behalf of Jedidiah Morse, who wrote to Congress in fear that unauthorized copying of his American Geography would hurt his business. The need to re-raise the copyright issue, among other items left unresolved at the end of the first session, required the House to clarify some order of business problems over whether or not they could reopen unfinished business from a previous session; that settled, the House established a drafting committee for the law on February 1, chaired by Abraham Baldwin. The House passed a copyright bill and passed it to the Senate; the Senate deliberated on Copyright after the President's speech.
On May 14, the Senate passed an amended version of the bill sent to them by the House. The House accepted their amendment on the bill passed to the President; the bill was signed into law on May 31, 1790 by George Washington and published in its entirety throughout the country shortly after. The Act granted copyright for a term of "fourteen years from the time of recording the title thereof", with a right of renewal for another fourteen years if the author survived to the end of the first term, it restricted books and charts. Although musical composition were not mentioned in the text of the act, would not be expressly covered by copyright until the Copyright Act of 1831, they were registered under the 1790 Act as "books"; the Act did not mention paintings or drawings, which were not covered until the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1870. The Act was copied verbatim from the 1709 British Statute of Anne; the first sentences of the two laws are identical. Both require registration in order for a work to receive copyright protection.
Concurrent use registration
A concurrent use registration, in United States trademark law, is a federal trademark registration of the same trademark to two or more unrelated parties, with each party having a registration limited to a distinct geographic area. Such a registration is achieved by filing a concurrent use application and prevailing in a concurrent use proceeding before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, a judicial body within the United States Patent and Trademark Office. A concurrent use application may be filed with respect to a trademark, registered or otherwise in use by another party, but may be allowed to go forward based on the assertion that the existing use can co-exist with the new registration without causing consumer confusion; the authority for this type of registration is set forth in the Lanham Act, which permits concurrent use registration where the concurrent use applicant made a good-faith adoption of the mark prior to the registrant filing an application for registration. Such registrations are most achieved by agreement of the parties involved, although the USPTO must still determine that no confusion will be caused.
The authority of the USPTO to issue a concurrent use registration is set forth in the Lanham Act, section 2, enacted in 1947 and coded at 15 U. S. C. § 1052, which states in relevant part: Provided: That if the Director determines that confusion, mistake, or deception is not to result from the continued use by more than one person of the same or similar marks under conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the marks or the goods on or in connection with which such marks are used, concurrent registrations may be issued to such persons when they have become entitled to use such marks as a result of their concurrent lawful use in commerce prior to the earliest of the filing dates of the applications pending or of any registration issued under this Act. Use prior to the filing date of any pending application or a registration shall not be required when the owner of such application or registration consents to the grant of a concurrent registration to the applicant. Concurrent registrations may be issued by the Director when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that more than one person is entitled to use the same or similar marks in commerce.
In issuing concurrent registrations, the Director shall prescribe conditions and limitations as to the mode or place of use of the mark or the goods on or in connection with which such mark is registered to the respective persons. Through these provisions, the Act places three requirements on marks for which a applicant seeks a concurrent use registration: 1) the applicant must have used the mark in commerce prior to the time that the earlier registrant filed its application for registration, unless the senior registrant consents to the junior user's registration; the statute codifies the Tea Rose-Rectanus doctrine, established by the United States Supreme Court in two cases decided in 1916 and 1918. The Court had established in those cases that a junior user of a mark, geographically remote from the senior user of the mark may establish priority over a senior user's claim to the mark in the junior user's area. Any party may voluntarily limit the geographic scope of its application while conceding the rights of another party to a different geographic territory.
A concurrent use application may not be filed based on a party's intent to use a mark, but must rely on actual use in commerce. The concurrent use application must identify all other parties who are entitled to use the mark, provide the names and addresses of the parties identified. Instead of making the usual assertion that no other party has the right to use the mark, the applicant must assert that no other party "except as specified in the application" has such a right. Where two or more geographically unrestricted applications are pending at the same time, no registration has yet been issued, the USPTO will proceed with the earliest application, put all applications on hold pending a determination on the earliest. By the terms of the Act, the critical dates with respect to concurrent registration are the date of the applicant's first use and the earliest filing date of any other registrant. In other words, as the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Manual of Procedure states, "an application seeking concurrent registration through a concurrent use proceeding must assert a date of first use in commerce prior to the earliest application filing date of the application... involved in the proceeding."The Lanham Act requires that an Applicant's use in commerce must have been lawful.
The TTAB has read this to mean that the applicant's use must not have infringed another party's use at the time that applicant adopted its mark. Therefore, one potential pitfall facing applicant is that "enerally, concurrent rights arise when a party, in good faith, without knowledge of a prior party's use in another geographic area and uses the same or similar mark for the same or similar goods or services within its own geographic area."The mere fact that an applicant's use was geographically remote from
Archive.today is an archive site which stores snapshots of web pages. It retrieves one page at a time similar to WebCite, smaller than 50MB each, but with support for modern sites such as Google Maps and Twitter. Archive.is uses headless browsing to record what embedded resources need to be captured to provide a high-quality memento, creates a PNG image to provide a static and non-interactive visualization of the representation. Archive.today can capture individual pages in response to explicit user requests. Since July 2013, archive.is supports the Memento Project application programming interface. Archive.today was founded in 2012. The site branded itself as archive.today, but in May 2015 changed the primary mirror to archive.is. In January 2019, it began to deprecate the archive.is domain in favor of the archive.today mirror. In March 2019 the site was blocked by several Australian internet providers in the aftermath of the Christchurch mosque shootings in an attempt to limit distribution of the footage of the attack.
According to GreatFire.org, archive.is has been blocked in China since March 2016, archive.li since September 2017, archive.fo since July 2018. On July 21, 2015, the operators blocked access to the service from all Finnish IP addresses, stating on Twitter that they did this in order to avoid escalating a dispute they had with the Finnish government. In Russia, only HTTP access is possible. CloudFlare's 220.127.116.11 does not resolve archive.is domains. Archive.is records only text and images, excluding video, xml and other non-static content. It keeps track of the history of snapshots saved, returning to the user a request for confirmation before adding a new snapshot of an saved Internet address; the research toolbar enables advanced keywords operators. A couple of quotation marks address the search to an exact sequence of keywords present in the title or in the body of the webpage, whereas the insite operator restricts it to a specific Internet domain. Once a web page is archived, it cannot be deleted directly by any Internet user.
Nevertherless, archive.is controls or deletes web pages saved some days before, without any policy or right of discussion and appeal. While saving a dynamic list, archive.is searchbox shows only a result that links the previous and the following section of the list. The other web pages saved are filtered, sometimes may be found by one of their occurrences. Digital preservation Internet Archive Link rot Perma.cc Wayback Machine Web archiving WebCite WP:Link rot Official website "Offline blog"
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U. S. 417 known as the “Betamax case”, is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States which ruled that the making of individual copies of complete television shows for purposes of time shifting does not constitute copyright infringement, but is fair use. The Court ruled that the manufacturers of home video recording devices, such as Betamax or other VCRs, cannot be liable for infringement; the case was a boon to the home video market. The broader legal consequence of the Court's decision was its establishment of a general test for determining whether a device with copying or recording capabilities ran afoul of copyright law; this test has created some interpretative challenges to courts in applying the case to more recent file sharing technologies available for use on home computers and over the Internet. In the 1970s, Sony developed the Betamax video tape recording format. Universal Studios and the Walt Disney Company were among the film industry members who were wary of this development, but were aware the U.
S. Congress was in the final stages of a major revision of copyright law and would be hesitant to undertake any new protections for the film industry; the companies therefore opted to sue Sony and its distributors in California District Court in 1976, alleging that because Sony was manufacturing a device that could be used for copyright infringement, they were thus liable for any infringement committed by its purchasers. The complaint additionally included an unfair competition claim under the Lanham Act, but this was dismissed early in the course of the lawsuit. Two years the District Court ruled for Sony, on the basis that noncommercial home use recording was considered fair use, that access to free public information is a First Amendment public interest served by this use. However, this ruling was reversed in part by the Ninth Circuit Court, which held Sony liable for contributory infringement; the court held Betamax was not a staple article because its main purpose was copying. It went on to suggest damages, injunctive relief, compulsory licenses in lieu of other relief.
After hearing oral arguments in the case, the Supreme Court was conflicted as to the outcome. The papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall, released nearly a decade reveal that a majority of justices were inclined to affirm the Ninth Circuit. Justice Harry Blackmun was assigned to write a majority opinion to that effect, while Justice John Paul Stevens drafted a dissenting opinion. Sensing that some members of the Court might be persuaded to change their votes, Stevens wrote a dissent that read like a majority opinion, could be changed to one with the substitution of a few words. Stevens, in his initial draft, expressed great concern with the possibility that an individual might be liable for copyright infringement for copying a single program in his own home, for his own use. At the same time, Justice Brennan was wavering on affirming based on the presence of non-infringing uses of the technology—but Brennan was not prepared to say that making home copies for repeated personal use did not constitute an infringement.
Justice White, noting Brennan's position, suggested that Stevens shift the basis of his opinion away from arguments about whether home-use was, in fact, an infringement. White pointed out that the issue need not be resolved, because the suit was not against home-users, but against the producers of the technology that enabled them. Justice O'Connor initially inclined to affirm the Ninth Circuit, had concerns about the potential to shift the burden of proving harm away from the plaintiff; the District Court had found. Stevens therefore adjusted his draft to accommodate the positions taken by O'Connor. In so doing, he shifted the vote of the Court from a 6-3 majority for affirming the Ninth Circuit to a 5-4 majority for reversing the Ninth Circuit; the Court's 5-4 ruling to reverse the Ninth Circuit in favor of Sony hinged on the possibility that the technology in question had significant non-infringing uses, that the plaintiffs were unable to prove otherwise. On the question of whether Sony could be described as "contributing" to copyright infringement, the Court stated: a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective - not symbolic - protection of the statutory monopoly, the rights of others to engage in unrelated areas of commerce.
Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need be capable of substantial noninfringing uses; the question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses... one potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home. It does so both because respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, because the District Court's factual findings reveal that the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents' programs is legitimate fair use…. If there are millions of owners of VTR's who make copies of televised sports events, religious broadcasts, educational programs... and if the proprietors of those programs welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that makes such copying feasible should not be stifled becau
In patent, industrial design rights and trademark laws, a priority right or right of priority is a time-limited right, triggered by the first filing of an application for a patent, an industrial design or a trademark respectively. The priority right allows the claimant to file a subsequent application in another country for the same invention, design, or trademark effective as of the date of filing the first application; when filing the subsequent application, the applicant must claim the priority of the first application in order to make use of the right of priority. The right of priority belongs to his successor in title; the period of priority, i.e. the period during which the priority right exists, is 6 months for industrial designs and trademarks and 12 months for patents and utility models. The period of priority is referred to as the priority year for patents and utility models. In patent law, when a priority is validly claimed, the date of filing of the first application, called the priority date, is considered to be the effective date of filing for the examination of novelty and inventive step or non-obviousness for the subsequent application claiming the priority of the first application.
In other words, the prior art, taken into account for examining the novelty and inventive step or non-obviousness of the invention claimed in the subsequent application would not be everything made available to the public before the filing date but everything made available to the public before the priority date, i.e. the date of filing of the first application. The "basic purpose is to safeguard, for a limited period, the interests of a patent applicant in his endeavour to obtain international protection for his invention, thereby alleviating the negative consequences of the principle of territoriality in patent law." The "Paris Convention priority right" called "Convention priority right" or "Union priority right", is a "priority right" under a multilateral arrangement, defined by Article 4 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883. The Convention priority right is the most known priority right, it is defined by its Article 4 A.: Article 4 B. of the Paris Convention describes the effects of the priority right: Article 2 paragraph 1 of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights in conjunction with the Paris Convention provides a "derived" Convention priority right.
That is, while WTO members need not ratify the Paris Convention, they should however comply with Articles 1 through 12, Article 19, of the Paris Convention.. Some priority rights are defined by a multilateral convention such as the European Patent Convention or the Patent Cooperation Treaty; the Paris Convention does not cover priorities claimed in a European patent application or in an international application, as the EPC and the PCT have their own legal provisions regarding priority. Article 87 EPC defines the priority right system under the EPC or more recognise priority rights for first filings in or for States party to the Paris Convention or any Member of the World Trade Organization: Article 89 EPC describes the effect of the priority right: As explained by the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office in its decision G 3/93 of August 16, 1994: Regarding the critical question "What is'the same invention'?" in Article 87 EPC, opinion G 2/98 prescribes a photographic approach to the assessment of priority.
According to Enlarged Board of Appeal opinion G 2/98, the requirement for claiming priority of "the same invention" means that priority of a previous application in respect of a claim in a European patent application is to be acknowledged only if the skilled person can derive the subject-matter of the claim directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, from the previous application as a whole. The Patent Cooperation Treaty, in its Article 8, provides the possibility of claiming a right of priority for the filing of an international application: Rule 4.10 PCT goes on to mention that: However, Rule 4.10 as amended with effect from January 1, 2000 does not apply to all designated Offices. For instance, for the European Patent Office as designated Office, the old Rule 4.10 still applied until December 12, 2007, that is, rights of priority of first applications made in a WTO member not party to the Paris Convention were not recognised. Now and more for European patent applications filed on or after December 13, 2007, the rights of priority of first applications made in a WTO member are recognized under the European Patent Convention.
Some priority rights, called "internal priority rights", are defined by some national laws. Such internal priority right allows an applicant who filed a first application in a given country to claim the priority of the first application when filing a subsequent application in the same country; the Paris Convention does not cover internal priority rights. See, e.g. provisional application in the US. Some priority rights exist on the basis of bilateral agreements. A bilateral agreement between a first and a second country may allow an applicant who filed an application in the first country to claim the priority of the first application when filing a second application in the second country; these kinds of bilateral agreements involve at least one country not party to the Paris
Supreme Court of the United States
The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the federal judiciary of the United States. Established pursuant to Article III of the U. S. Constitution in 1789, it has original jurisdiction over a narrow range of cases, including suits between two or more states and those involving ambassadors, it has ultimate appellate jurisdiction over all federal court and state court cases that involve a point of federal constitutional or statutory law. The Court has the power of judicial review, the ability to invalidate a statute for violating a provision of the Constitution or an executive act for being unlawful. However, it may act only within the context of a case in an area of law over which it has jurisdiction; the court may decide cases having political overtones, but it has ruled that it does not have power to decide nonjusticiable political questions. Each year it agrees to hear about one hundred to one hundred fifty of the more than seven thousand cases that it is asked to review.
According to federal statute, the court consists of the Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices, all of whom are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Once appointed, justices have lifetime tenure unless they resign, retire, or are removed from office; each justice has a single vote in deciding. When the chief justice is in the majority, he decides. In modern discourse, justices are categorized as having conservative, moderate, or liberal philosophies of law and of judicial interpretation. While a far greater number of cases in recent history have been decided unanimously, decisions in cases of the highest profile have come down to just one single vote, exemplifying the justices' alignment according to these categories; the Court meets in the Supreme Court Building in Washington, D. C, its law enforcement arm is the Supreme Court of the United States Police. It was while debating the division of powers between the legislative and executive departments that delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention established the parameters for the national judiciary.
Creating a "third branch" of government was a novel idea. Early on, some delegates argued that national laws could be enforced by state courts, while others, including James Madison, advocated for a national judicial authority consisting of various tribunals chosen by the national legislature, it was proposed that the judiciary should have a role in checking the executive power to veto or revise laws. In the end, the Framers compromised by sketching only a general outline of the judiciary, vesting federal judicial power in "one supreme Court, in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish", they delineated neither the exact powers and prerogatives of the Supreme Court nor the organization of the Template:Judicial branch as a whole. The 1st United States Congress provided the detailed organization of a federal judiciary through the Judiciary Act of 1789; the Supreme Court, the country's highest judicial tribunal, was to sit in the nation's Capital and would be composed of a chief justice and five associate justices.
The act divided the country into judicial districts, which were in turn organized into circuits. Justices were required to "ride circuit" and hold circuit court twice a year in their assigned judicial district. After signing the act into law, President George Washington nominated the following people to serve on the court: John Jay for chief justice and John Rutledge, William Cushing, Robert H. Harrison, James Wilson, John Blair Jr. as associate justices. All six were confirmed by the Senate on September 26, 1789. Harrison, declined to serve. In his place, Washington nominated James Iredell; the Supreme Court held its inaugural session from February 2 through February 10, 1790, at the Royal Exchange in New York City the U. S. capital. A second session was held there in August 1790; the earliest sessions of the court were devoted to organizational proceedings, as the first cases did not reach it until 1791. When the national capital moved to Philadelphia in 1790, the Supreme Court did so as well.
After meeting at Independence Hall, the Court established its chambers at City Hall. Under Chief Justices Jay and Ellsworth, the Court heard few cases; as the Court had only six members, every decision that it made by a majority was made by two-thirds. However, Congress has always allowed less than the court's full membership to make decisions, starting with a quorum of four justices in 1789; the court lacked a home of its own and had little prestige, a situation not helped by the era's highest-profile case, Chisholm v. Georgia, reversed within two years by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment; the court's power and prestige grew during the Marshall Court. Under Marshall, the court established the power of judicial review over acts of Congress, including specifying itself as the supreme expositor of the Constitution and making several important constitutional rulings that gave shape and substance to the balance of power between the federal government and states; the Marshall Court ended the practice of each justice issuin