Cardinal voting refers to any electoral system which allows the voter to give each candidate an independent rating or grade. These are referred to as "rated", "evaluative", "graded", or "absolute" voting systems. Cardinal methods and ordinal methods are two main categories of modern voting systems, along with plurality voting. There are several voting systems. For example: Approval voting is the simplest possible method, which allows only the two grades: "approved" or "unapproved". Evaluative voting or combined approval voting uses 3 grades: "against", "abstain", or "for". Score voting or range voting, in which ratings are numerical and the candidate with the highest average rating wins. Score voting uses a discrete integer scale from 0 to 5 or 0 to 9. Range voting uses a continuous scale from 0 to 1. STAR voting, in which scores are from 0 to 5, the most-preferred of the top-two highest-scoring candidates wins. Majority Judgment, in which ratings are verbal grades with numerical values, one of the candidates with the highest median grade wins.
Majority Approval Voting, a scored variant of Bucklin voting using letter grades. 3-2-1 voting, in which voters rate each candidate "Good", "OK", or "Bad", there are 3 automatic rounds to tally them. Additionally, several cardinal systems have variants for multi-winner elections meant to produce proportional representation, such as: Proportional approval voting Sequential proportional approval voting Satisfaction approval voting Re-weighted range voting Ratings ballots can be converted to ranked/preferential ballots. For example: This requires the voting system to accommodate a voter's indifference between two candidates; the opposite is not true: Rankings cannot be converted to ratings, since ratings carry more information about strength of preference, destroyed when converting to rankings. By avoiding ranking cardinal voting methods may solve a difficult problem: A foundational result in social choice theory is Arrow's impossibility theorem, which states that no method can comply with all of a simple set of desirable criteria.
However, since one of these criteria implicitly requires that a method be ordinal, not cardinal, Arrow's theorem does not apply to cardinal methods. Others, argue that ratings are fundamentally invalid, because meaningful interpersonal comparisons of utility are impossible; this was Arrow's original justification for only considering ranked systems, but in life he stated that cardinal methods are "probably the best". In any case, cardinal methods do fall under Gibbard's theorem, therefore any such method must be subject to strategic voting in some instances. Psychological research has shown that cardinal ratings are more valid and convey more information than ordinal rankings in measuring human opinion
Single transferable vote
The single transferable vote is a voting system designed to achieve proportional representation through ranked voting in multi-seat organizations or constituencies. Under STV, an elector has a single vote, allocated to their most preferred candidate. Votes are totalled and a quota derived. If their candidate achieves quota, he/she is elected and in some STV systems any surplus vote is transferred to other candidates in proportion to the voters' stated preferences. If more candidates than seats remain, the bottom candidate is eliminated with his/her votes being transferred to other candidates as determined by the voters' stated preferences; these elections and eliminations, vote transfers if applicable, continue until there are only as many candidates as there are unfilled seats. The specific method of transferring votes varies in different systems; the system provides proportional representation in non-partisan elections, that minority factions have some representation. STV is the system of choice of groups such as the Proportional Representation Society of Australia, the Electoral Reform Society in the United Kingdom and FairVote in the USA.
Its critics contend that some voters find the mechanisms behind STV difficult to understand, but this does not make it more difficult for voters to rank the list of candidates in order of preference on an STV ballot paper. STV has had its widest adoption in the English-speaking world; as of 2018, in government elections, STV is used for: In British Columbia, Canada, a type of STV called BC-STV was recommended for provincial elections by the British Columbia Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform in 2004. In a 2005 provincial referendum, it received 57.69% support and passed in 77 of 79 electoral districts. It was not adopted, because it fell short of the 60% threshold requirement the BC Liberal government had set for the referendum to be binding. In a second referendum, on 12 May 2009, BC-STV was defeated 60.91% to 39.09% STV has been used in several other jurisdictions in provincial elections in the cities of Edmonton and Calgary in Alberta. Less well known is STV use at the municipal level in western Canada – Calgary used STV for more than 50 years before it was changed to first past the post.
For a more complete list, see History and use of the single transferable vote. When STV is used for single-winner elections, it is equivalent to the instant-runoff voting method. STV used for multi-winner elections is sometimes called "proportional representation through the single transferable vote", or PR-STV. "STV" refers to the multi-winner version, as it does in this article. In the United States, it is sometimes called choice voting, preferential voting or preference voting. Hare-Clark is the name given to PR-STV elections in the Australian Capital Territory. In STV, each voter ranks the list of candidates in order of preference, marking a'1' beside their most preferred candidate, a'2' beside their second most preferred, so on as shown in the sample ballot on the right; as noted, this is a simplified example. In practice, the ballot would be organized in columns so that voters are informed of each candidate's party affiliations or whether they are standing as independents; the most straightforward way to count a ranked ballot vote is to sequentially identify the candidate with the least support, eliminate that candidate, transfer those votes to the next-named candidate on each ballot.
This process is repeated. This method was used for a period of time in several local elections in South Australia. In effect, it is identical to instant-runoff voting, used in leadership contests, except that the transfer process is terminated when there are still several candidates remaining, if all the seats have been filled. However, preferences for elected candidates are not transferred at any value penalising those who vote for a popular candidate. In most STV elections, an additional step is taken that ensures that all elected candidates are elected with equal numbers of votes, it can be shown. A number of different quotas can be used. For example, at most 3 people can have 25% + 1 in 3-winner elections, 9 can have 10% + 1 in 9-winner elections, so on. If
The Wright system is a refinement of rules associated with proportional representation by means of the single transferable vote electoral system. Developed and written by Anthony van der Craats, System Analyst and Life member of the Proportional Representation Society of Australia, It was first published as part of a submission and review of Victoria and Australia's electoral system, it is named after Jack Wright, former President of the Proportional Representation Society of Australia) The aim of the system is to provide an alternative to various methods of segmentation and distribution of preferences associated with the exclusion of a candidate from the count. The Wright System fulfills the first of the two principles identified by Brian Meek: Principle 1. If a candidate is excluded from the count, all ballots are treated as if that candidate had never stood. Principle 2. If a candidate has achieved the quota, they retain a fixed proportion of the value of every vote received, transfers the remainder to the next non-excluded continuing candidate, the value of the retained total equalling the quota.
As regards the second principle it differs in not transferring surpluses to already-elected candidates, a procedure criticised by Meek, but which does make hand-counting more practicable. The system uses the optional Droop quota and the Gregory method of weighted surplus transfer value of the vote in calculating a candidate's surplus transfer value, multiplied by the value of each vote received by the candidates whose votes are to be redistributed, as is the case in the Western Australian upper-house elections. Unlike the Western Australian upper-house electoral system, the Wright System uses a reiterative counting process that differs from the Meek's method as an alternative to the method of segmentation and distribution of excluded candidates' votes. On every exclusion of a candidate from the count, the counting of the ballot is reset and all valid votes are redistributed to candidates remaining in the count at full value. In each iteration of the count, votes are first distributed according to the voter's first available preference, with each vote assigned a value of one and the total number of votes tabulated for each candidate and the quota calculated on the value of the total number of valid votes using the Droop quota method.
Any candidate that has a total value equal or greater than the quota is provisionally declared elected and their surplus value distributed according to the voter's nominated subsequent preference. If the number of vacancies are filled on the first distribution the results of the election are declared with all provisionally declared candidates being declared the winner of the election. If the number of candidates provisionally declared elected is less than the number of vacancies and all candidates' surplus votes have been distributed the candidate with the lowest value of votes is excluded from the count; the ballot is reset and the process of redistribution restarted with ballot papers being redistributed again according to the voters next available preference allocated to any continuing candidate. This process repeats itself until all vacancies are filled in a single count without the need for any further exclusions; the Wright System takes into account optional preferential voting in that any votes that do not express a valid preference for a continuing candidate are set aside without-value and the quota is recalculated on each iteration of the count following the distribution of the first available preference.
Votes that exhaust as a result of a candidate's surplus transfer are set aside with the value associated with the transfer in which they exhausted. The main advantage of the Wright System is that it limits the distortion and bias in the vote that arises from the adopted methods of segmentation and distribution of preferences of excluded candidates; each vote is treated in the same manner as every other vote. Under the current system used in the Australian Senate a voter whose first preference is for a minor candidate and their subsequent second preference for a major candidate, declared elected earlier in the count is denied the opportunity to have their second preference vote allocated to the candidate of their choice. With the reiterative counting system the voter's second preference forms part of the voter's alternative chosen candidate's surplus and is redistributed according to the voters nominated preference allocation. Continuing Candidate means a candidate that has not been excluded from or declared not-elected in the process of the count Total Vote is the total number of ballot papers that express a valid preference allocated to candidates remaining in the count Quota Droop quota means the number determined by dividing the Total Vote by 1 more than the number of candidates required to be elected and by increasing the quotient or Alternatively a Full Proportional Quota means the number determined by dividing the Total Vote by the number of candidates required to be elected Value of the Vote means the value allocated to each ballot paper as it progresses though the count.
Candidate’s Total Value of votes means the aggregated sum of the value of each ballot paper allocated to the candidate. Surplus Value means the value calculated by subtracting the Quota from the Candidates Total Value’ of votes Surplus Transfer Value means the value calculated by the Surplus value divided by the Candidate’s Total Value of votes and multiplied by the Value of vote allocated to each b
STAR voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections. The name stands for "Score Automatic Runoff", referring to the fact that this system is a combination of score voting, to pick two frontrunners with the highest total scores, followed by a "virtual runoff" in which the frontrunner, preferred on more ballots wins, it is a type of cardinal voting electoral system. In STAR, voters are given a ratings ballot, on which each voter rates every candidate with a number from 0 to 5, where 0 means "strong disapproval" and 5 means "strong approval"; the scores for each candidate are summed, the two highest-rated candidates are selected as finalists. In the instant-runoff round, the finalist, given a higher rating on a greater number of ballots is selected as the winner; the concept was first proposed in October 2014 by Mark Frohnmayer, was called score plus top two or score runoff voting. The runoff step was introduced in order to reduce strategic incentives in ordinary score voting, such as bullet voting and tactical maximization.
Thus, STAR is intended to be a hybrid between instant runoff voting. The movement to implement STAR voting was centered in Oregon, in July 2018, supporters submitted over 16000 signatures for a ballot initiative in Lane County, OR, putting Measure 20-290 on the November 2018 ballot; this ballot measured failed, with 48% of voters supporting it. Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital; the population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities and that everyone wants to live as near to the capital as possible; the candidates for the capital are: Memphis, the state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other cities Nashville, with 26% of the voters, near the center of the state Knoxville, with 17% of the voters Chattanooga, with 15% of the votersThe preferences of the voters would be divided like this: Suppose that 100 voters each decided to grant from 0 to 5 stars to each city such that their most liked choice got 5 stars, least liked choice got 0 stars, with the intermediate choices getting an amount proportional to their relative distance.
The top-two frontrunners are Chattanooga. Of the two, Nashville is preferred by 68% to 32% of voters, so Nashville, the capital in real life wins in the example. For comparison, note that traditional first-past-the-post would elect Memphis though most citizens consider it the worst choice, because 42% is larger than any other single city. Instant-runoff voting could elect the 2nd-worst choice, because the central candidates would be eliminated early. Under Score voting, Nashville would have won. In approval voting, with each voter selecting their top two cities, Nashville would win because of the significant boost from Memphis residents. A two-round system could have a runoff between Nashville, where Nashville would win. In this particular case, there is no way for any single city of voters to get a better outcome through tactical voting; however and Knoxville voters combined could vote strategically to make Chattanooga win. Unlike ranked voting systems, STAR voting allows voters to express preferences of varying strengths.
STAR voting satisfies the monotonicity criterion, i.e. raising your vote's score for a candidate can never hurt their chances of winning, lowering it can never help their chances. It satisfies the resolvability criterion, it does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion, although with all-strategic voters and perfect information, the Condorcet winner is a strong Nash equilibrium. It does, satisfy the Condorcet loser criterion and the majority loser criterion. There are a number of other voting system criteria; these include the majority criterion, since the highest-rated candidates that proceed to the runoff may not be the first preference of a majority. It does not satisfy the mutual majority criterion, although the more candidates there are in the mutual majority set, the greater the chances that at least one of them is among the two finalists in the runoff, in which case one of them will win, it does not always satisfy reversal symmetry. It violates independence of clones and consistency, it does not satisfy the later-no-harm criterion, meaning that giving a positive rating to a less-preferred candidate can cause a more-preferred candidate to lose.
These criteria are not considered paramount by STAR advocates, as some are mutually exclusive, no voting system can meet all such criteria simultaneously. Advocates claim that STAR strikes a balance between such competing criteria, performs better than other systems in voter satisfaction simulations. List of democracy and elections-related topics Consensus decision-making Decision making Democracy Relative Utilitarianism Majority judgment — similar voting method, based on medians instead of averages Unified Primary — alternate voting method for nonpartisan blanket primary that uses approval voting-based method in runoff election STAR voting The Equal Vote Coalition, an advocacy organization for STAR voting and other reforms. ★.✓ An online platform for carrying ou
The contingent vote is an electoral system used to elect a single winner. It is a variation of instant-runoff voting, in which the voter ranks the candidates in order of preference. If no candidate receives an absolute majority of first preference votes all but the two leading candidates are eliminated and there is a second count. In the second count, the votes of those who supported eliminated candidates are distributed among the two remaining candidates, so that one candidate achieves an absolute majority; the contingent vote differs from the alternative vote which allows for many rounds of counting, eliminating only one weakest candidate each round. The contingent vote can be considered a compressed form of the two round system, in which both'rounds' occur without the need for voters to go to the polls twice. Today, a special variant of the contingent vote is used to elect the President of Sri Lanka. Another variant, called the supplementary vote, is used to elect mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners in England.
In the past the ordinary form of the contingent vote was used to elect the Legislative Assembly of Queensland from 1892 to 1942. To date, this has been the longest continuous use of the system anywhere in the world, it was used in the US state of Alabama in the 1920s. In an election held using the contingent vote the voters rank the list of candidates in order of preference. Under the most common ballot layout, they place a'1' beside their most preferred candidate, a'2' beside their second most preferred, so on. In this respect the contingent vote is the same as instant-runoff voting. There are a maximum of two rounds of counting. In the first round only first preferences are counted. If a candidate has received an absolute majority of first preferences he or she is declared the winner. However, if no candidate has an absolute majority all but the two candidates with the most first preferences are eliminated, there is a second round. In the second round the votes of the voters whose first preference had been eliminated are transferred to whichever of the two remaining candidates were ranked the highest.
The votes are counted and whichever candidate has an absolute majority is declared elected. Like Instant runoff voting, the two round system, the goal of the contingent vote is to enable a majority of voters to confirm the winner of an election; the majority requirement encourages candidates to seek support beyond their core base of supporters in order to secure the lower preferences of the supporters of other candidates. This is said to create a more conciliatory campaigning style among candidates with similar policy platforms; however this effect will be diminished by the fact that lower preferences are less important under the contingent vote than under IRV. The contingent vote does aid the chances of'third party' candidates to some extent. Unlike plurality voters do not need to be afraid a vote for a third party will spoil the election for a stronger party candidate, as long as their second preference candidate can make the top-two requirement; the Supplementary Vote and Sri Lankan contingent vote are two implemented variation in which voters, differently from the ordinary form of the contingent vote, cannot rank all of the candidates, but rather are only permitted to express two and three ranks of preferences, respectively.
This means that if a voter does not use any of his or her preferences to support one of the candidates who survives to the second round it will be impossible to transfer that vote, therefore'wasted' or'exhausted'. In Sri Lanka a variant of the contingent vote electoral system is used to elect the President; as under the conventional contingent vote, in an election held using the Sri Lankan form of the contingent vote each voter ranks the candidates in order of preference, if no candidate receives an overall majority of first preference votes on the first count all but the two leading candidates are eliminated and their votes redistributed to help determine a winner in a second and final round. However, whereas under the ordinary form of the contingent vote voters can rank all of the candidates in order of preference, under Sri Lankan CV the voter only expresses his or her top three preferences. Sri Lankan CV has been used for presidential elections there since 1982. Under the two-round system voters vote for only a single candidate, rather than ranking candidates in order of preference.
As under the contingent vote, if no candidate has an absolute majority in the first round, all but the top two are eliminated and there is a second round. However, in the two round system, voters are asked to vote a second time; because of the similarities between them, the contingent vote and the two-round system can be expected to elect the same winner. However, in the two-round system, the voter is permitted to change one's mind from one round to another if the favourite candidate in the first round has not been eliminated; the nonpartisan blanket primary is a variation of the two-round system except the first round does not pick a winner, but instead picks the two highest candidates who will compete in the general election. Because the first round does not pick a winner, there will tend to be higher voter turnout in the second election; the contingent vote will pick the same winner as a blanket primary, except fewer voters in the primary round may lead to a different top-two candidates than if the whole electorate voted in both rounds.
As noted above, the Instant-runoff voting (or alt
Tideman alternative method
Tideman's Alternative Methods, including Alternative Smith and Alternative Schwartz, are two electoral systems developed by Nicolaus Tideman which select a single winner using votes that express preferences. These methods can create a sorted list of winners; these methods are Smith- and Schwartz-efficient and thus are Condorcet methods. Tideman's Alternative procedure is as follows: Identify the Smith or Schwartz set. If the set consists of one candidate, elect that candidate. Eliminate all candidates outside the set and redistribute ballots. Eliminate the plurality loser. Repeat the procedure. To create a sorted list of preferred candidates, select a winner, remove that winner from the list of candidates, repeat. Tideman's Alternative Methods are easier to understand than other methods, such as Ranked Pairs and Schulze, owing to the simplicity of explaining both the Smith set and Instant run-off voting; this increases the likelihood of voter acceptance. This method resists both tactical voting and tactical nomination, reducing the amount of political manipulation possible or favorable in large elections.
They inherit this resistance from instant run-off voting, as both methods resolve a Condorcet winner from the Smith set by eliminating non-Smith candidates and performing instant run-off voting on the result. Although IRV itself faces criticism for theoretical and historical failures, all Smith- and Schwartz-efficient voting methods attempt to resolve a candidate from these respective sets. Unlike IRV, these methods invariably elect a Condorcet winner. Ranked Pairs elects the winner with the strongest overall ranking, while the Schulze method attempts to elect a winner without the worst pairwise loss. Tideman's Alternative Method elects a candidate in a manner resisting tactical nomination and voting. Tideman's Alternative Methods fail independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, the methods adhere to a less strict property, sometimes called independence of Smith-dominated alternatives, it says that if one candidate wins an election, a new alternative is added, X will win the election if Y is not in the Smith set.
ISDA implies the Condorcet criterion. The following table compares Tideman's Alternative Methods with other preferential single-winner election methods: Green-Armytage, James. Four Condorcet-Hare Hybrid Methods for Single-Winner Elections
Proportional representation characterizes electoral systems in which divisions in an electorate are reflected proportionately in the elected body. If n% of the electorate support a particular political party roughly n% of seats will be won by that party; the essence of such systems is that all votes contribute to the result - not just a plurality, or a bare majority. The most prevalent forms of proportional representation all require the use of multiple-member voting districts, as it is not possible to fill a single seat in a proportional manner. In fact, the implementations of PR that achieve the highest levels of proportionality tend to include districts with large numbers of seats; the most used families of PR electoral systems are party list PR, the single transferable vote, mixed member proportional representation. With party list PR, political parties define candidate voters vote for a list; the relative vote for each list determines how many candidates from each list are elected. Lists can be "closed" or "open".
Voting districts can be as large as a province or an entire nation. The single transferable vote uses small multiple-member districts, with voters ranking individual candidates in order of preference. During the count, as candidates are elected or eliminated, surplus or discarded votes that would otherwise be wasted are transferred to other candidates according to the preferences. STV enables voters to elect independent candidates. Mixed member proportional representation called the additional member system, is a two-tier mixed electoral system combining a non-proportional plurality/majoritarian election and a compensatory regional or national party list PR election. Voters have two votes, one for their single-member district and one for the party list, the party list vote determining the balance of the parties in the elected body. According to the ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, some form of proportional representation is used for national lower house elections in 94 countries. Party list PR, being used in 85 countries, is the most used.
MMP is used in seven lower houses. STV, despite long being advocated by political scientists, is used in only two: Ireland, since independence in 1922, Malta, since 1921; as with all electoral systems, both accepted and opposing claims are made about the advantages and disadvantages of PR. The case for proportional representation was made by John Stuart Mill in his 1861 essay Considerations on Representative Government: In a representative body deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled, but does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all?... Is it necessary that the minority should not be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives.
Man for man, they would be as represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government... There is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from them, contrary to all just government, above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its root and foundation. Many academic political theorists agree with Mill, that in a representative democracy the representatives should represent all segments of society. PR tries to resolve the unfairness of majoritarian and plurality voting systems where the largest parties receive an "unfair" "seat bonus" and smaller parties are disadvantaged and have difficulty winning any representation at all; the established parties in UK elections can win formal control of the parliament with as little as 35% of votes. In certain Canadian elections, majority governments have been formed by parties with the support of under 40% of votes cast. If turnout levels in the electorate are less than 60%, such outcomes allow a party to form a majority government by convincing as few as one quarter of the electorate to vote for it.
In the 2005 UK election, for example, the Labour Party under Tony Blair won a comfortable parliamentary majority with the votes of only 21.6% of the total electorate. Such misrepresentation has been criticized as "no longer a question of'fairness' but of elementary rights of citizens". Note intermediate PR systems with a high electoral threshold, or other features that reduce proportionality, are not much fairer: in the Turkish general election, 2002, using an open list system with a 10% threshold, 46% of votes were wasted. Plurality/majoritarian systems can disproportionately benefit regional parties that can win districts where they have a strong following, while other parties with national support but no strongholds, like the Greens, win few or no seats. An example is the Bloc Québécois in Canada that won 52 seats in the 1993 federal election, all in Quebec, on 13.5% of the national vote, while the Progressive Conservatives collapsed to two seats on 16% spread nationally. In the 2015 UK General Election, the Scottish National Party gained 56 seats, all in Sc