Bofors 40 mm gun
The Bofors 40 mm gun referred to as the Bofors gun, is an anti-aircraft autocannon designed in the 1930s by the Swedish arms manufacturer AB Bofors. It was one of the most popular medium-weight anti-aircraft systems during World War II, used by most of the western Allies as well some captured systems being used by the Axis powers. A small number of these weapons remain in service to this day, saw action as late as the Persian Gulf War. In the post-war era, the original design was not suitable for action against jet-powered aircraft, so Bofors introduced a new model of more power, the 40 mm L/70. In spite of sharing nothing with the original design other than the calibre and the distinctive conical flash hider, this weapon is widely known as "the Bofors". Although not as popular as the original L/60 model, the L/70 remains in service as a multi-purpose weapon for light armoured vehicles, as on the CV 90. Bofors has been part of BAE Systems AB since March 2005; the Swedish Navy purchased a number of 2-pounder Pom-Poms from Vickers as anti-aircraft guns in 1922.
The Navy approached Bofors about the development of a more capable replacement. Bofors signed a contract in late 1928. Bofors produced a gun, a smaller version of a 57 mm semi-automatic gun developed as an anti-torpedo boat weapon in the late 19th century by Finspång, their first test gun was a re-barreled Nordenfelt version of the Finspong gun, to, added a semi-automatic loading mechanism. Testing of this gun in 1929 demonstrated that a problem existed feeding the weapon in order to maintain a reasonable rate of fire. A mechanism, strong enough to handle the stresses of moving the large round was too heavy to move enough to fire rapidly. One attempt to solve this problem used zinc shell cases; this proved to leave heavy zinc deposits in the barrel, had to be abandoned. In the summer of 1930 experiments were made with a new test gun that did away with controlled feed and instead flicked the spent casing out the rear whereafter a second mechanism reloaded the gun by "throwing" a fresh round from the magazine into the open breech.
This seemed to be the solution they needed, improving firing rates to an acceptable level, the work on a prototype commenced soon after. During this period Krupp purchased a one-third share of Bofors. Krupp engineers started the process of updating the Bofors factories to use modern equipment and metallurgy, but the 40 mm project was kept secret; the prototype was completed and fired in November 1931, by the middle of the month it was firing strings of two and three rounds. Changes to the feed mechanism were all that remained, by the end of the year it was operating at 130 rounds per minute. Continued development was needed to turn it into a weapon suitable for production, completed in October 1933. Since acceptance trials had been passed the year before, this became known as the "40 mm akan M/32". Most forces referred to it as the "Bofors 40 mm L/60", although the barrel was 56.25 calibres in length, not the 60 calibres that the name implies. The gun fired a 900 g high explosive 40 × 311R shell at 2,960 ft/s.
The rate of fire was about 120 rounds per minute, which improved when the barrels were closer to the horizontal as gravity assisted the feeding from the top-mounted magazine. In practice firing rates were closer to 80–100 rpm, as the rounds were fed into the breech from four round clips which had to be replaced by hand; the maximum attainable ceiling was 7,200 m. The gun was provided with an advanced sighting system; the trainer and layer were both provided with reflector sights for aiming, while a third crew-member standing behind them "adjusted" for lead using a simple mechanical computer. Power for the sights was supplied from a 6V battery. In spite of the successful development, the Swedish Navy changed its mind and decided it needed a smaller hand-traversed weapon of 13 mm-25 mm size, tested various designs from foreign suppliers. With the 40 mm well along in development, Bofors offered a 25 mm version in 1932, selected as the Bofors 25 mm M/32; the first version of the 40 mm the Navy ordered was intended for use on submarines, where the larger calibre allowed the gun to be used for both AA and against smaller ships.
The barrel was shorter at 42 calibers long, with the effect of reducing the muzzle velocity to about 700 m/s. When not in use, the gun retracted into a watertight cylinder; the only known submarines that used this arrangement was the Sjölejonet-class boats. The guns were removed as the subs were modified with streamlined conning towers; the first order for the "real" L/60 was made by the Dutch Navy, who ordered five twin-gun mounts for the cruiser De Ruyter in August 1934. These guns were stabilized using the Hazemeyer mount, in which one set of layers aimed the gun, while a second manually stabilized the platform the gun sat on. All five mounts were operated by one fire control system. Bofors developed a towable carriage which they displayed in April 1935 at a show in Belgium; this mount allowed the gun to be fired from the carriage with no setup required, although with limited accuracy. If time was available for setup, the gunners used the tow-bar and muzzle lock as levers, raising the wheels off the ground and thereby lowering the gun onto supporting pads.
Two additional legs folded out to the sides, the platform was leveled with hand cranks. The entire setup process could be completed in under a minute. Orders for the land based versions were immediate, starting with
A naval mine is a self-contained explosive device placed in water to damage or destroy surface ships or submarines. Unlike depth charges, mines are deposited and left to wait until they are triggered by the approach of, or contact with, any vessel. Naval mines can be used offensively, to hamper enemy shipping movements or lock vessels into a harbour. Mines can be laid in many ways: by purpose-built minelayers, refitted ships, submarines, or aircraft—and by dropping them into a harbour by hand, they can be inexpensive: some variants can cost as little as US$2000, though more sophisticated mines can cost millions of dollars, be equipped with several kinds of sensors, deliver a warhead by rocket or torpedo. Their flexibility and cost-effectiveness make mines attractive to the less powerful belligerent in asymmetric warfare; the cost of producing and laying a mine is between 0.5% and 10% of the cost of removing it, it can take up to 200 times as long to clear a minefield as to lay it. Parts of some World War II naval minefields still exist because they are too extensive and expensive to clear.
It is possible for some of these 1940s-era mines to remain dangerous for many years to come. Mines have been employed as offensive or defensive weapons in rivers, estuaries and oceans, but they can be used as tools of psychological warfare. Offensive mines are placed in enemy waters, outside harbours and across important shipping routes with the aim of sinking both merchant and military vessels. Defensive minefields safeguard key stretches of coast from enemy ships and submarines, forcing them into more defended areas, or keeping them away from sensitive ones. Minefields designed for psychological effect are placed on trade routes and are used to stop shipping from reaching an enemy nation, they are spread thinly, to create an impression of minefields existing across large areas. A single mine inserted strategically on a shipping route can stop maritime movements for days while the entire area is swept. International law requires nations to declare when they mine an area, to make it easier for civil shipping to avoid the mines.
The warnings do not have to be specific. Precursors to naval mines were first invented by Chinese innovators of Imperial China and were described in thorough detail by the early Ming dynasty artillery officer Jiao Yu, in his 14th century military treatise known as the Huolongjing. Chinese records tell of naval explosives in the 16th century, used to fight against Japanese pirates; this kind of naval mine was loaded in a wooden box, sealed with putty. General Qi Jiguang made several timed, to harass Japanese pirate ships; the Tiangong Kaiwu treatise, written by Song Yingxing in 1637 AD, describes naval mines with a rip cord pulled by hidden ambushers located on the nearby shore who rotated a steel wheellock flint mechanism to produce sparks and ignite the fuse of the naval mine. Although this is the rotating steel wheellock's first use in naval mines, Jiao Yu had described their use for land mines back in the 14th century; the first plan for a sea mine in the West was by Ralph Rabbards, who presented his design to Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1574.
The Dutch inventor Cornelius Drebbel was employed in the Office of Ordnance by King Charles I of England to make weapons, including a "floating petard" which proved a failure. Weapons of this type were tried by the English at the Siege of La Rochelle in 1627. American David Bushnell developed the first American naval mine for use against the British in the American War of Independence, it was a watertight keg filled with gunpowder, floated toward the enemy, detonated by a sparking mechanism if it struck a ship. It was used on the Delaware River as a drift mine. In 1812 Russian engineer Pavel Shilling exploded an underwater mine using an electrical circuit. In 1842 Samuel Colt used an electric detonator to destroy a moving vessel to demonstrate an underwater mine of his own design to the United States Navy and President John Tyler. However, opposition from former President John Quincy Adams scuttled the project as "not fair and honest warfare." In 1854, during the unsuccessful attempt of the Anglo-French fleet to seize the Kronstadt fortress, British steamships HMS Merlin, HMS Vulture and HMS Firefly suffered damage due to the underwater explosions of Russian naval mines.
Russian naval specialists set more than 1500 naval mines, or infernal machines, designed by Moritz von Jacobi and by Immanuel Nobel, in the Gulf of Finland during the Crimean War of 1853-1856. The mining of Vulcan led to the world's first minesweeping operation. During the next 72 hours, 33 mines were swept; the Jacobi mine was designed by German-born, Russian engineer Jacobi, in 1853. The mine was tied to the sea bottom by an anchor. A cable connected it to a galvanic cell which powered it from the shore, the power of its explosive charge was equal to 14 kilograms of black powder. In the summer of 1853, the production of the mine was approved by the Committee for Mines of the Ministry of War of the Russian Empire. In 1854, 60 Jacobi mines were laid in the vicinity of the Forts Pavel and Alexander, to deter the British Baltic Fleet from attacking them, it phased out its direct competitor the Nobel mine on the insistence of Admiral Fyodor Litke. The Nobel mines were bought from Swedish industrialist Immanuel Nobel who had entered into collusion with Russian head of navy Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov.
Despite their high cost t
Captain is the name most given in English-speaking navies to the rank corresponding to command of the largest ships. The rank is equal to the army rank of colonel. Equivalent ranks worldwide include "ship-of-the-line captain", "captain of sea and war", "captain at sea" and "captain of the first rank"; the NATO rank code is OF-5, although the United States of America uses the code O-6 for the equivalent rank. Any naval officer who commands a ship is addressed by naval custom as "captain" while aboard in command, regardless of his or her actual rank though technically an officer of below the rank of captain is more titled the commanding officer, or C. O. Officers with the rank of captain travelling aboard a vessel they do not command should be addressed by their rank and name, but they should not be referred to as "the captain" to avoid confusion with the vessel's captain; the naval rank should not be confused with the army, air force, or marine ranks of captain, which all have the NATO code of OF-2.
On large US ships, the executive officer may be a captain in rank, in which case it would be proper to address him by rank. The XO prefers to be called "XO" to avoid confusion with the CO, a captain in rank and the captain of the ship; the same applies to senior commanders on board US aircraft carriers, where the commander and deputy commander of the embarked carrier air wing are both captains in rank, but are addressed by the titles of "CAG" and "DCAG", respectively. Captains with sea commands command ships of cruiser size or larger. In the Royal Navy, a captain might command an aircraft carrier, an amphibious assault ship, or the Ice Patrol Ship, while naval aviator and naval flight officer captains in the U. S. Navy command aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious assault ships, carrier air wings, maritime patrol air wings, functional and specialized air wings and air groups. Maritime battlestaff commanders of one-star rank will embark on large capital ships such as aircraft carriers, which will function as the flagship for their strike group or battle group, but a captain will retain command of the actual ship, assume the title of "flag captain".
When a senior officer, in the ship's captain's chain of command is present, all orders are given through the captain. The following articles deal with the rank of captain. Captain Captain Captain Capitaine de vaisseau Kapitän zur See Kapitan of the 1st rank Kapitan of the 1st rank Sea captain Post captain Captain's cabin
A radar picket is a radar-equipped station, submarine, aircraft, or vehicle used to increase the radar detection range around a force to protect it from surprise attack air attack. Radar picket vessels may be equipped to direct friendly fighters to intercept the enemy. In British terminology the radar picket function is called aircraft direction. Several detached radar units encircle a force to provide increased cover in all directions. Airborne radar pickets are referred to as airborne early warning. Radar picket ships first came into being in the US Navy during World War II to aid in the Allied advance to Japan; the number of radar pickets was increased after the first major employment of kamikaze aircraft by the Japanese in the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944. Fletcher- and Sumner-class destroyers were pressed into service with few modifications at first. Additional radars and fighter direction equipment were fitted, along with more light anti-aircraft guns for self-defense sacrificing torpedo tubes to make room for the new equipment the large height-finding radars of the era.
Deploying some distance from the force to be protected along directions of attack, radar pickets were the nearest ships to the Japanese airfields. Thus, they were the first vessels seen by incoming waves of kamikazes, were heavily attacked; the radar picket system saw its ultimate development in World War II in the Battle of Okinawa. A ring of 15 radar picket stations was established around Okinawa to cover all possible approaches to the island and the attacking fleet. A typical picket station had one or two destroyers supported by two landing ships landing craft support or landing ship medium, for additional AA firepower; the number of destroyers and supporting ships were doubled at the most threatened stations, combat air patrols were provided as well. In early 1945, 26 new construction Gearing-class destroyers were ordered as radar pickets without torpedo tubes, to allow for extra radar and AA equipment, but only some of these were ready in time to serve off Okinawa. Seven destroyer escorts were completed as radar pickets.
The radar picket mission was vital, but it was costly to the ships performing it. Out of 101 destroyers assigned to radar picket stations, 10 were sunk and 32 were damaged by kamikaze attacks; the 88 LCSs assigned to picket stations had two sunk and 11 damaged by kamikazes, while the 11 LSMs had three sunk and two damaged. From 1943 Nazi Germany's Kriegsmarine operated several radar-equipped night fighter guide ships, including NJL Togo., equipped with a FuMG A1 Freya radar for early warning and a Würzburg-Riese gun laying radar, plus night fighter communications equipment. From October 1943, the NJL Togo cruised the Baltic Sea under the operational control of the Luftwaffe. In March 1944, after the three great Soviet bombing raids on Helsinki, she arrived in the Gulf of Finland to provide night fighter cover for Tallinn and Helsinki; the Imperial Japanese Navy modified two Ha-101 class submarines as dedicated radar pickets in the first half of 1945, but reconverted them to an more important role as tanker submarines in June of that year.
During the Cold War, the United States Navy expanded the radar picket concept. The wartime radar picket destroyers were retained, additional DDRs, destroyer escorts, submarines were converted and built 1946-1955; the concept was that every carrier group would have radar pickets deployed around it for early warning of the increasing threat of Soviet air-to-surface missile attack. The 26 Gearing-class DDRs were supplemented by nine additional conversions during the early 1950s; the seven wartime DERs were relegated to secondary roles. However, twelve additional DER conversions were performed 1954-58. Ten of these were conversions of diesel-powered DEs, which had a longer at-sea endurance than their steam-powered equivalents; the slow DERs were used in combination with Guardian-class radar picket ships and Lockheed WV-2 Warning Star aircraft to extend the Distant Early Warning line in the North Atlantic and North Pacific, to warn of Soviet bomber attacks. These assets formed two Barrier Forces known as BarLant and BarPac and operated 1955-1965.
The aircraft patrolled lines extending from Argentia, Newfoundland to the Azores in the Atlantic, from Midway to Adak, Alaska in the Pacific. The DERs maintained picket stations near these lines; the Guardian-class backed up the outer barriers with picket stations 400–500 miles from each coast. There were three oil-rig-type offshore radar stations known as "Texas Towers" off the New England coast. While on station, all of these assets were operationally controlled by the Aerospace Defense Command; the high casualties off Okinawa gave rise to the radar picket submarine, which had the option of diving when under attack. It was planned to employ converted radar picket submarines should the invasion of Japan become necessary. Two submarines received rudimentary radar conversions during the war, in 1946 two more extensive conversions were performed; the radar equipment of these diesel submarines took the place of torpedoes and their tubes in the stern torpedo rooms. By 1953, a total of 10 SSR conversions had been performed, with radar suites called Migraine I, II, III, the most extensive conversion adding a 24-foot compartment as an expanded combat information center.
In 1956 two large, purpose-built diesel SSRs, the Sailfish class, were commissioned. These were designed for a high surface speed with the intent of scouting in advance of carrier g
The Panama Canal is an artificial 82 km waterway in Panama that connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean. The canal is a conduit for maritime trade. Canal locks are at each end to lift ships up to Gatun Lake, an artificial lake created to reduce the amount of excavation work required for the canal, 26 m above sea level, lower the ships at the other end; the original locks are 34 m wide. A third, wider lane of locks was constructed between September 2007 and May 2016; the expanded canal began commercial operation on June 26, 2016. The new locks allow transit of larger, post-Panamax ships, capable of handling more cargo. France began work on the canal in 1881, but stopped due to engineering problems and a high worker mortality rate; the United States took over the project in 1904 and opened the canal on August 15, 1914. One of the largest and most difficult engineering projects undertaken, the Panama Canal shortcut reduced the time for ships to travel between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, enabling them to avoid the lengthy, hazardous Cape Horn route around the southernmost tip of South America via the Drake Passage or Strait of Magellan.
Colombia and the United States controlled the territory surrounding the canal during construction. The US continued to control the canal and surrounding Panama Canal Zone until the 1977 Torrijos–Carter Treaties provided for handover to Panama. After a period of joint American–Panamanian control, in 1999, the canal was taken over by the Panamanian government, it is now operated by the government-owned Panama Canal Authority. Annual traffic has risen from about 1,000 ships in 1914, when the canal opened, to 14,702 vessels in 2008, for a total of 333.7 million Panama Canal/Universal Measurement System tons. By 2012, more than 815,000 vessels had passed through the canal, it takes 11.38 hours to pass through the Panama Canal. The American Society of Civil Engineers has ranked the Panama Canal one of the seven wonders of the modern world; the earliest mention of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama occurred in 1534, when Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, ordered a survey for a route through the Americas that would ease the voyage for ships traveling between Spain and Peru.
Such a route would have given the Spanish a military advantage over the Portuguese. In 1668, the English physician and philosopher Sir Thomas Browne speculated in his encyclopaedic endeavour Pseudodoxia Epidemica - "some Isthmus have been eat through by the Sea, others cut by the spade: And if policy would permit, that of Panama in America were most worthy the attempt: it being but few miles over, would open a shorter cut unto the East Indies and China". In 1788, American Thomas Jefferson Minister to France, suggested that the Spanish should build the canal since it would be a less treacherous route for ships than going around the southern tip of South America, that tropical ocean currents would widen the canal thereafter. During an expedition from 1788 to 1793, Alessandro Malaspina outlined plans for its construction. Given the strategic location of Panama and the potential offered by its narrow isthmus separating two great oceans, other trade links in the area were attempted over the years.
The ill-fated Darien scheme was launched by the Kingdom of Scotland in 1698 to set up an overland trade route. Inhospitable conditions thwarted the effort and it was abandoned in April 1700. Numerous canals were built in other countries in the late early 19th centuries; the success of the Erie Canal in the United States in the 1820s and the collapse of the Spanish Empire in Latin America led to a surge of American interest in building an inter-oceanic canal. Beginning in 1826, US officials began negotiations with Gran Colombia, hoping to gain a concession for the building of a canal. Jealous of their newly obtained independence and fearing that they would be dominated by an American presence, the president Simón Bolívar and New Granada officials declined American offers; the new nation was politically unstable, Panama rebelled several times during the 19th century. Another effort was made in 1843. According to the New York Daily Tribune, August 24, 1843, a contract was entered into by Barings of London and the Republic of New Granada for the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Darien.
They referred to it as the Atlantic and Pacific Canal, it was a wholly British endeavor. It was expected to be completed in five years. At nearly the same time, other ideas were floated, including a canal across Mexico's Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Nothing came of that plan, either. In 1846, the Mallarino–Bidlack Treaty, negotiated between the US and New Granada, granted the United States transit rights and the right to intervene militarily in the isthmus. In 1848, the discovery of gold in California, on the West Coast of the United States, created great interest in a crossing between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. William H. Aspinwall, the man who won the federal subsidy for the building and operating the Pacific mail steamships at around the same time, benefited from this discovery. Aspinwall's route included steamship legs from New York City to Panama and from Panama to California, with an overland portage through Panama; the route between California and Panama was soon traveled, as it provided one of the fastest links between San Francisco and the East Coast cities, about 40 days' transit in total.
Nearly all the gold, shipped out of California went by the fast Panama route. Several new and larger paddle steamers were soon plying
Mark 15 torpedo
The Mark 15 torpedo, the standard American destroyer-launched torpedo of World War II, was similar in design to the Mark 14 torpedo except that it was longer and had greater range and a larger warhead. It was developed by the Naval Torpedo Station Newport concurrently with the Mark 14 and was first deployed in 1938, it replaced the Mark 8 torpedo on surface ships with tubes that could accommodate the longer Mark 15. Older destroyers the Wickes and Clemson classes, continued to use the Mark 8, as did PT boats early in World War II. During the war 9,700 were produced at Newport and at the Naval Ordnance Station Forest Park, Illinois; the Mark 15 had the same basic design problems that plagued the Mark 14 for the first 20 months following U. S. entry into the war, though this was not realized nearly as by the destroyer crews as it was by the submariners. One major shared deficiency was the Mark 6 exploder, which caused duds. Another was a tendency to run deeper than set missing the target. Surface-combatant torpedo attacks often included confusing splashes from gunnery and aerial bombs, obscuring smoke screens, quick maneuvering to evade counterattack.
Was a destroyer given a chance for a slow, careful surprise attack. Torpedo results were difficult to estimate under these circumstances; the correction of the Mark 15's problems would depend on the submariners solving theirs. Another problem with early war-built Mark 15s was the substitution of zinc for cadmium as interior plating for air flask sections and water compartments, due to a wartime shortage of cadmium; this resulted in zinc oxide clogging water strainers, leading to erratic runs and engine failures. After the failure of corrosion inhibition efforts, the ultimate solution was to re-coat the areas with cadmium or phenolic resin; the Battle of Vella Gulf on the night of August 6–7, 1943, was the first in which a surprise torpedo attack by U. S. gave the Americans an overwhelming advantage in the following gun battle, though one Japanese warship was hit by a dud torpedo and escaped. By September 1943, effective methods of torpedo deployment were beginning to be distributed to all U. S. destroyers.
Anticipating the possibility of war with Japan, the United States planned to move their battleships across the Pacific with the fleet train. Cruisers and destroyers would be responsible for defending this large formation at night. Fleet exercises held during the 1930s revealed the confusing nature of close range engagements during hours of darkness. In 1932, during Fleet Problem XIII, "attacking" destroyers closed to within 500 yd of USS Saratoga before being detected. Fleet Problem XV in 1934 placed the destroyer screen 7 nmi beyond the battleship formation, but the battleships were unable to differentiate "friend" from "foe" at that distance. Screening destroyers were subsequently stationed at 3 nmi. Recognition improved at that distance, but torpedo hit probability increased as evasive maneuvering of the large, compact force was restricted within the closer screen. United States Navy War Instructions published in 1934 remained in effect through the initial 1942 engagements in the Solomon Islands.
The instructions emphasized defense to avoid the attrition objective of Japanese planning: Cruisers were advised to avoid night action unless conditions were favorable. Destroyers were to attack at once with guns. Searchlight illumination range covered launch positions of United States torpedoes, but not the Japanese Type 93 torpedo. Japanese ships could remain outside of illumination range, launching torpedoes at American ships revealing their position with gunfire and searchlights. American 21 inch torpedo Rowland, Buford. US Navy Bureau of Ordnance in World War II. Washington, DC: US Navy Bureau of Ordnance, Department of the Navy
Underwater Demolition Team
The Underwater Demolition Teams were an elite special-purpose force established by the United States Navy during World War II. They served during the Korean War and the Vietnam War, their primary function was to reconnoiter and destroy enemy defensive obstacles on beaches prior to amphibious landings. They were the frogmen who retrieved astronauts after splash down in the Mercury program through Apollo manned space flight programs; the UDTs reconnoitered beaches and the waters just offshore, locating reefs and shoals that would interfere with landing craft. They used explosives to demolish underwater obstacles planted by the enemy; as the U. S. Navy's elite combat swimmers, they were employed to breach the cables and nets protecting enemy harbors, plant limpet mines on enemy ships, locate and mark mines for clearing by minesweepers, they conducted river surveys and foreign military training. The UDTs pioneered combat swimming, closed-circuit diving, underwater demolitions, midget submarine operations.
They were the precursor to the present-day United States Navy SEALs. In 1983, after additional SEAL training, the UDTs were re-designated as SEAL Teams or Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Teams. SDVTs have since been re-designated SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams; the United States Navy studied the problems encountered by the disastrous Allied amphibious landings during the Gallipoli Campaign of World War I. This contributed to the experimentation of new landing techniques in the mid-1930s. In August 1941, landing trials were performed and one hazardous operation led to Army Second Lieutenant Lloyd E. Peddicord being assigned the task of analyzing the need for a human intelligence capability; when the U. S. entered World War II, the Navy realized that in order to strike at the Axis powers the U. S. forces would need to perform a large number of amphibious attacks. The Navy decided that men would have to go in to reconnoiter the landing beaches, locate obstacles and defenses, as well as guide the landing forces ashore.
In August 1942, Peddicord set up a recon school for his new unit, Navy Scouts and Raiders, at the amphibious training base at Little Creek, Virginia. In 1942, the Army and Navy jointly established the Amphibious Scout and Raider School at Fort Pierce, Florida. Here Lieutenant Commander Phil H. Bucklew, the "Father of Naval Special Warfare", helped organize and train what became the Navy's'first group' to specialize in amphibious raids and tactics. Pressure to further implement human intelligence gathering prior to landings heightened after Naval amphibious landing craft were damaged by coral reefs during the Battle of Tarawa in November 1943. Aerial reconnaissance incorrectly showed the reefs were submerged deep enough to allow the landing craft to float over. Sailors and Marines were forced to abandon their craft in chest deep water a thousand yards from shore, helping Japanese gunners inflict heavy U. S. casualties. After that experience, Rear admiral Kelley Turner, Commander of the V Amphibious Corps, directed that 30 officers and 150 enlisted men be moved to Waimanalo ATB to form the nucleus of a reconnaissance and demolition training program.
It is here. In war, the Army Engineers passed down demolition jobs to the U. S. Navy, it became the Navy's responsibility to clear any obstacles and defenses in the near shore area. A memorial to the founding of the UDT has been built at Bellows Air Force Station near the original Amphibious Training Base Waimanalo. In early 1942 it became apparent that the Navy needed that capability to destroy submerged obstacles, natural or man-made, for amphibious landings. In late 1942, a group of Navy salvage personnel received a one-week concentrated course on demolitions, explosive cable cutting and commando raiding techniques; the Navy Scouts and Raiders unit was first employed in Operation Torch, the invasion of North Africa in November 1942. During Torch, this unit cut the cable and net barrier across a river in North Africa, allowing Rangers to land upstream and capture an airfield. In early May 1943, a two-phase "Naval Demolition Project" was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations "to meet a present and urgent requirement".
The first phase began at Amphibious Training Base Solomons, Maryland with the establishment of Operational Naval Demolition Unit No. 1. Six Officers and eighteen enlisted men reported from NTC Camp Peary dynamiting and demolition school for a four-week course; those Seabees were sent to participate in the invasion of Sicily where they were divided in three groups that landed on the beaches near Licata and Scoglitti. In 1943 the Navy decided to create a component dedicated to eliminating amphibious obstructions, they were called Naval Combat Demolition Units consisting of one junior Civil Engineer Corps officer and five enlisted men. A NCDU was to clear beach obstacles for an invasion force with the team coming ashore in an LCRS inflatable boat. On May 7, Admiral Ernest J. King, the CNO, picked Lieutenant Commander Draper L. Kauffman USNR to lead the training; the first six classes graduated from "Area E" at NTC Camp Peary. From there the NCDU training was moved to Fort Pierce. Despite the move, Camp Peary was Kauffman's source of manpower.
"He would go up to Camp Peary and the Dynamite School, assemble the in the auditorium and say,'I need volunteers for hazardous and distant duty.'" Most of Kauffman's volunteers came from the Seabees, the U. S. Marines, U. S. Army combat engineers. Training commenced with one grueling week designed to "separate the men from the boys"; some said that "the men had sense enough to quit, leaving Kauffman with the b