Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius
The Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius Campaign was a political propaganda campaign started by Mao Zedong and his wife, Jiang Qing, the leader of the Gang of Four. It lasted from 1973 until the end of the Cultural Revolution, in 1976; the campaign produced detailed Maoist interpretations of Chinese history, was used as a tool by the Gang of Four to attack their enemies. The campaign continued in several phases, beginning as an academic attempt to interpret Chinese history according to Mao's political theories. In 1974 the campaign was joined with another, pre-existent campaign to attack Lin Biao, who had attempted to assassinate Mao in a failed coup before his death in 1971. In early 1975 the campaign was modified to indirectly attack China's Premier, Zhou Enlai, other senior Chinese leaders. In mid-1975 the Gang of Four introduced debate on The Water Margin as a tool to attack their enemies; the campaign only ended in 1976, when the Gang of Four were arrested, ending the Cultural Revolution.
The events that occurred during the "Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius" campaign were "complex and confusing", but can be identified as occurring through four main phases. The first phase of the campaign began after the 1st Plenary Session of the 10th CCP Central Committee, in 1973. Following this session, Mao encouraged public discussions focused on criticizing Confucius and Confucianism, on interpreting aspects of historical Chinese society within a Maoist theoretical perspective; these initial debates focused on interpreting the issues of slavery and the relationship between Confucianism and Legalism according to the social theories published by Mao and Karl Marx. In late 1973 - early 1974 begins the second phase of the campaign, when as the main critics of Confucius were the masses; the universities were organized special courses, preparing a program of criticism of certain provisions of the Confucius used by Lin Biao. Tens of thousands of workers and peasants were trained in these courses, swelling the ranks of "Marxist theoretician."The attacks on Confucius merged with a pre-existent campaign to criticize Lin Biao.
With the deployment of the campaign it became clear that "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius" was directed not so much against the "enemies of the past," as against the "enemies of today." During this phase, Mao's image was identified with that of Qin Shihuang. Hyperbolic praise was given to Qin based on his popular association with Mao. In the article "What kind of man Confucius", published in the seventh issue of the Red Flag magazine in 1974, paint a portrait of the ancient sage who reminds the reader of Zhou Enlai. Based on People's Daily articles, Russian researcher Leo Delyusin believed that locals formally belonging to the campaign "criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" sabotaged it, it was clear that Beijing was not satisfied with the progress of the campaign, from time to time Beijing heard complaints and accusations at those who tried to change the direction of the campaign and give it a different shape, different goals. The attempts to disrupt and distort the meaning of the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius combined with a formal public statement about the importance of the campaign, in practice - curtail it and to address specific cases.
Under the guise of criticism of the ideas of Confucius education, Tang Xiaowen in the article "I was popular educator Confucius?", attacked those who moved away from the installations of the "cultural revolution." He tried to prove that in the saying of Confucius' all "contained class meaning", had a detrimental effect on the organization of the education system, serving as the basis of the revisionist line. Declaring that "Confucius harbored a fierce hatred of the social changes of the time," the author attributed his intention "to make all slaves China obedient and submissive." In his school, "he picked up the students with the intention to train "humane", "purposeful," "noble," "virtuous "men who adhere to" the orders of the Zhou Dynasty, having achieved success in their studies, would be officials and promoted to thereby restore the slave system of the Western Zhou". In the criticism of the private schools established by Confucius, aimed at the restoration of the old order, the Chinese reader found the familiar features of the "reactionary political line in the field of education".
The third phase began after Zhou Enlai reorganized the State Council during the 4th National People's Congress, in January 1975. At the People's Congress, Zhou Enlai brought many cadres back to work, purged during the 1966-1969 phase of the Cultural Revolution. In comparison with the first stage of the "cultural revolution", the rehabilitated leaders led by Premier Zhou Enlai had sufficient influence in the center. Feeling strong support from his supporters on 31 January 1974 at the enlarged meeting of the Politburo, he was able to request not to involve the armed forces in a campaign "four great freedoms", writing, free expression of opinions and extensive discussion, general criticism; because they had supported the purging of many career Communist Party veterans during the early Cultural Revolution, the Gang of Four opposed Zhou's efforts, began to use the campaign to subtly criticize Zhou and his policies. The fourth and final phase of the campaign coincided with Zhou's hospitalization.
After the 1974 campaign "criticize Lin Biao and Confucius" reached its climax, soon subsided. Beginning in the summer of 1975 the Gang of Four deployed a new campaign, introducing public debates on The Water Margin and the "war on empiricism"
Qin Shi Huang
Qin Shi Huang was the founder of the Qin dynasty and was the first emperor of a unified China. He was born a prince of the state of Qin, he became Zheng, the King of Qin when he was thirteen China's first emperor when he was 38 after the Qin had conquered all of the other Warring States and unified all of China in 221 BC. Rather than maintain the title of "king" borne by the previous Shang and Zhou rulers, he ruled as the First Emperor of the Qin dynasty from 220 to 210 BC, his self-invented title "emperor", as indicated by his use of the word "First", would continue to be borne by Chinese rulers for the next two millennia. During his reign, his generals expanded the size of the Chinese state: campaigns south of Chu permanently added the Yue lands of Hunan and Guangdong to the Chinese cultural orbit. Qin Shi Huang worked with his minister Li Si to enact major economic and political reforms aimed at the standardization of the diverse practices of the earlier Chinese states, he is traditionally said to have banned and burned many books and executed scholars, though a closer examination renders the account doubtful.
His public works projects included the unification of diverse state walls into a single Great Wall of China and a massive new national road system, as well as the city-sized mausoleum guarded by the life-sized Terracotta Army. He ruled until his death in 210 BC during his fourth tour of Eastern China, his achievements made him one of the most respected and influential individuals in world history, a legacy among the Chinese. Modern Chinese sources give the personal name of Qin Shi Huang as Ying Zheng, with Ying taken as the surname and Zheng the given name. In ancient China however the naming convention differed, Zhao may be used as the surname. Unlike modern Chinese names, the nobles of ancient China had two distinct surnames: the ancestral name comprised a larger group descended from a prominent ancestor said to have lived during the time of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors of Chinese legend, the clan name comprised a smaller group that showed a branch's current fief or recent title.
The ancient practice was to list men's names separately—Sima Qian's "Basic Annals of the First Emperor of Qin" introduces him as "given the name Zheng and the surname Zhao"—or to combine the clan surname with the personal name: Sima's account of Chu describes the sixteenth year of the reign of King Kaolie as "the time when Zhao Zheng was enthroned as King of Qin". However, since modern Chinese surnames use the same character as the old ancestral names, it is much more common in modern Chinese sources to see the emperor's personal name written as Ying Zheng, using the ancestral name of the Ying family; the rulers of Qin had styled themselves kings from the time of King Huiwen in 325 BC. Upon his ascension, Zheng became known as King Zheng of Qin; this title made him the nominal equal of the rulers of Shang and of Zhou, the last of whose kings had been deposed by King Zhaoxiang of Qin in 256 BC. Following the surrender of Qi in 221 BC, King Zheng had reunited all of the lands of the former Kingdom of Zhou.
Rather than maintain his rank as king, however, he created a new title of huángdì for himself. This new title combined two titles—huáng of the mythical Three Sovereigns and the dì of the legendary Five Emperors of Chinese prehistory; the title was intended to appropriate some of the prestige of the Yellow Emperor, whose cult was popular in the Warring States period and, considered to be a founder of the Chinese people. King Zheng chose the new regnal name of First Emperor on the understanding that his successors would be successively titled the "Second Emperor", "Third Emperor", so on through the generations; the new title carried religious overtones. For that reason, Sinologists—starting with Peter Boodberg or Edward Schafer—sometimes translate it as "thearch" and the First Emperor as the First Thearch; the First Emperor intended that his realm would remain intact through the ages but, following its overthrow and replacement by Han after his death, it became customary to prefix his title with Qin.
Thus: 秦, Qín or Ch‘in, "of Qin" 始, Shǐ or Shih, "first" 皇帝, Huángdì or Huang-ti, "emperor", a new term coined from 皇, Huáng or Huang "shining" or "splendid" and most applied "as an epithet of Heaven", the high god of the Zhou 帝, Dì or Ti, the high god of the Shang composed of their divine ancestors, used by the Zhou as a title of the legendary Five Emperors the Yellow EmperorAs early as Sima Qian, it was common to shorten the resulting four-character Qin Shi Huangdi to 秦始皇, variously transcribed as Qin Shihuang or Qin Shi Huang. Following his elevation as emperor, both Zheng's personal name 政 and its homophone 正 became taboo; the First Emperor arrogated the first-person Chinese pronoun 朕 for his exclusive use and in 212 BC began calling himself The Immortal. Others were to address him as "Your Majesty" in person and "Your Highness"
The Art of War
The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise dating from the Late Spring and Autumn Period. The work, attributed to the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, is composed of 13 chapters; each one is devoted to an aspect of warfare. For 1,500 years it was the lead text in an anthology that would be formalised as the Seven Military Classics by Emperor Shenzong of Song in 1080; the Art of War remains the most influential strategy text in East Asian warfare and has influenced both Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond. The book contained a detailed explanation and analysis of the Chinese military, from weapons and strategy to rank and discipline. Sun Tzu stressed the importance of intelligence operatives and espionage to the war effort; because Sun Tzu has long been considered to be one of history's finest military tacticians and analysts, his teachings and strategies formed the basis of advanced military training for centuries to come.
The book was translated into French and published in 1772 by the French Jesuit Jean Joseph Marie Amiot. A partial translation into English was attempted by British officer Everard Ferguson Calthrop in 1905 under the title The Book of War; the first annotated English translation was completed and published by Lionel Giles in 1910. Military and political leaders such as the Chinese communist revolutionary Mao Zedong, Japanese daimyō Takeda Shingen, Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap, American military general Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. have drawn inspiration from the book. The Art of War is traditionally attributed to a military general from the late 6th century BC known as "Master Sun", though its earliest parts date to at least 100 years later. Sima Qian's 1st century BC work Records of the Grand Historian, the first of China's 24 dynastic histories, records an early Chinese tradition stating that a text on military matters was written by a "Sun Wu" from the State of Qi, that this text had been read and studied by King Helü of Wu.
This text was traditionally identified with the received Master Sun's Art of War. The conventional view—which is still held in China—was that Sun Wu was a military theorist from the end of the Spring and Autumn period who fled his home state of Qi to the southeastern kingdom of Wu, where he is said to have impressed the king with his ability to train dainty palace ladies in warfare and to have made Wu's armies powerful enough to challenge their western rivals in the state of Chu; the prominent strategist and warlord Cao Cao in the early 3rd century AD authored the earliest known commentary to the Art of War. Cao's preface makes clear that he edited the text and removed certain passages, but the extent of his changes were unclear historically; the Art of War appears throughout the bibliographical catalogs of the Chinese dynastic histories, but listings of its divisions and size varied widely. In the early 20th century, the Chinese writer and reformer Liang Qichao theorized that the text was written in the 4th century BC by Sunzi's purported descendant Sun Bin, as a number of historical sources mention a military treatise he wrote.
Around the 12th century, some scholars began to doubt the historical existence of Sunzi on the grounds that he is not mentioned in the historical classic The Commentary of Zuo, which mentions most of the notable figures from the Spring and Autumn period. The name "Sun Wu" does not appear in any text prior to the Records of the Grand Historian, has been suspected to be a made-up descriptive cognomen meaning "the fugitive warrior": the surname "Sun" is glossed as the related term "fugitive", while "Wu" is the ancient Chinese virtue of "martial, valiant", which corresponds to Sunzi's role as the hero's doppelgänger in the story of Wu Zixu. Unlike Sun Wu, Sun Bin appears to have been an actual person, a genuine authority on military matters, may have been the inspiration for the creation of the historical figure "Sunzi" through a form of euhemerism. In 1972, the Yinqueshan Han slips were discovered in two Han dynasty tombs near the city of Linyi in Shandong Province. Among the many bamboo slip writings contained in the tombs, sealed around 134 and 118 BC were two separate texts, one attributed to "Sunzi", corresponding to the received text, another attributed to Sun Bin, which explains and expands upon the earlier The Art of War by Sunzi.
The Sun Bin text's material overlaps with much of the "Sunzi" text, the two may be "a single, continuously developing intellectual tradition united under the Sun name". This discovery showed that much of the historical confusion was due to the fact that there were two texts that could have been referred to as "Master Sun's Art of War", not one; the content of the earlier text is about one-third of the chapters of the modern The Art of War, their text matches closely. It is now accepted that the earlier The Art of War was completed sometime between 500 and 430 BC; the Art of War is divided into 13 chapters. Detail assessment and planning explores the five fundamental factors and seven elements that determine the outcomes of military engagements. By thinking and comparing these points, a commander can calculate his chances of victory. Habitual deviation from these calculations will ensure failure via improper action; the text stresses that war is a ver
The Jixiao Xinshu or New Treatise on Military Efficiency is a military manual written during the 1560s and 1580s by the Ming dynasty general Qi Jiguang. Its primary significance is in advocating for a combined arms approach to warfare using five types of infantry and two type of support. Qi Jiguang separated infantry into five separate categories: firearms, archers with fire arrows, ordinary archers, spearmen, he split support crews into horse archers and artillery units. The Jixiao Xinshu is one of the earliest extant Asian extant texts to address the relevance of martial arts to military training and warfare. Several contemporary martial arts styles of Qi's era are mentioned in the book, including the staff method of the Shaolin temple. In the late 16th century the military of the Ming dynasty was in poor condition; as the Mongol forces of Altan Khan raided the northern frontier, China's coastline fell prey to wokou pirates, who were ostensibly Japanese in origin. Qi Jiguang was assigned to the defense of Zhejiang in 1555, where he created his own standards of military organization, tactics and procedures.
He published his thoughts on military techniques and strategies in the Jixiao Xinshu after achieving several victories in battle. There are two editions of the Jixiao Xinshu; the first edition consists of 18 chapters. It is known as the 18 chapter edition; the second edition, published in 1584 during Qi's forced retirement, included re-edited and new material compiled in 14 chapters. It is known as the 14 chapter edition; the chapters included in the 18-chapter edition are as follows: In the Jixiao Xinshu, Qi Jiguang recommended a 12-man team known as the "mandarin duck formation", which consisted of 11 soldiers and one person for logistics. 4 men with long lances 2 men with sabers and rattan shields, one on each side of the lancers 2 men with multiple tip bamboo spears 2 men with tridents or swords 1 corporal 1 cook/porter The mandarin duck formation was ideally symmetrical. Excluding the corporal and cook/porter, the ten remaining men could be split into two identical five-man squads; this was so that when Japanese pirates made it past the long lances, the saber-and-shield men formed a protective screen for the vulnerable lancers.
In battle, the two saber-and-shield men had different roles. The one on the right would hold the advance position of the squad, while the one on the left was to throw javelins and lure the enemy closer; the two men with multiple tip bamboo spears would entangle the pirates while the lancers attacked them. The trident carriers guarded rear. After suffering several defeats to pirates, Qi made a recommendation for a concerted campaign to integrate musket teams into the army, based on their superior range and firepower compared to bows and arrows. Qi became enamored with the musket after his defeats and became one of the primary proponents of their use in the Ming army, he favored it for its ability to penetrate armor. Ideally an entire musket team would have 10 musketeers, but had 4 or 2 in practice; the optimal musket formation that Qi proposed was a 12 man musket team similar to the melee mandarin duck formation. However, instead of fighting in a hand to hand formation, they operated on the principle of volley fire, which Qi pioneered prior to the publication of the first edition of the Jixiao Xinshu.
The teams could be arranged in a single line, formed two layers deep with five musketeers each, or five layers deep with two muskets per layer. Once the enemy was within range, each layer would fire in succession, afterwards a unit armed with traditional close combat weapons would move forward ahead of the musketeers; the troops would enter into melee combat with the enemy together. Alternatively, the musketeers could be placed behind wooden stockades or other fortifications and reloading continuously by turns; each squad was drilled in coordinated and mutually-supportive combat scenarios with defined roles. Because Qi's troops were recruited from peasant stock, were not considered the equals of their Japanese foes, Qi Jiguang emphasized the use of combined arms and squad tactics. Units were rewarded or punished collectively: an officer was executed if his entire unit fled the enemy, if a squad leader was killed in battle, the whole squad would be put to death; the standard procedure for the procurement of weapons for a commander such as Qi Jiguang was for production quotas to be assigned by provincial officials to each local district under the commander's responsibility.
The resulting weapons produced under this system varied in quality. Muskets in particular exploded with alarming frequency, leading Qi to eschew reliance on firearms in favor of using melee tools such as swords, rattan shields, sharpened bamboo poles; however in his career Qi became a strong proponent of integrating muskets after suffering several defeats to the pirates. Qi's reconsideration of firearms in warfare led to the creation of the first well drilled musket teams in China. Qi was a pioneer of the musket volley fire technique, which would be adopted throughout China and Korea. Included in the manual are several passages detailing the usage of muskets, the volley fire technique, an estimation of the percentage of firearms that would fail to fire; the manual provides the following description of the forging of swords: The last chapter of the Jixiao Xinshu, the Quanjing Jieyao Pian, co
Zhang Juzheng, courtesy name Shuda, pseudonym Taiyue, was a Chinese reformer and statesman who served as Grand Secretary in the late Ming dynasty during the reigns of the Longqing and Wanli emperors. He represented what might be termed the "new Legalism," aiming to ensure that the gentry worked for the state. Alluding to performance evaluations, he said "Everyone is talking about real responsibility, but without a clear reward and punishment system, going to risk life and hardship for the country?" One of his chief goals was to reform the gentry and rationalize the bureaucracy together with his political rival Gao Gong, concerned that offices were providing income with little responsibility. Taking the Emperor Hongwu as his standard and ruling as de facto Prime Minister, Zhang's true historical significance comes from his centralization of existing reforms, positing the reformative agency of the state over that of the gentry - the "Legalist" idea of the sovereignty of the state; the Wanli Emperor respected Zhang as a mentor and valued minister.
During the first ten years of the Wanli era, the Ming dynasty's economy and military power prospered in a way not seen since the Yongle Emperor and the Rule of Ren and Xuan from 1402 to 1435. However, after Zhang's death, the Wanli Emperor felt free to act independently, reversed many of Zhang's administrative improvements. Zhang Juzheng was born in Jiangling County, in modern-day Jingzhou, Hubei province, in 1525, was renowned for his intelligence at an early age, passing the county shengyuan examinations at the age of 12 and enrolling for the provincial juren examinations the next year, where the chief examiner failed him to prevent his becoming complacent. In 1547, he passed the imperial examination and was appointed as an editor in the Hanlin Academy. Zhang was embroiled in deep political turmoil from the start of his career, owing to the factionalism prevalent in the Ming bureaucracy at the time, he was one of few officials who had cordial relations with both Yan Song and Xu Jie, the leaders of the respective factions, but assisted Xu in overthrowing Yan Song.
Subsequently, under Xu's patronage, Zhang became a Privy Secretary in 1567, outlasting Xu himself and sharing power with his political rival Gao Gong. Gao was ejected from office in 1572, shortly after the accession of the Wanli Emperor by Zhang and his ally, the eunuch Feng Bao, on charges that he had questioned the ability of the child emperor to rule; this left Zhang as the sole Grand Secretary, in effect controlling the entire Ming bureaucracy during the first ten years of the Wanli era. Zhang's reforms consisted of fiscal measures in order to address the persistent revenue shortages that plagued the government. At the same time, laws were instituted from 1573 onwards to tighten monitoring and assessment of officials, in an attempt to restore discipline to an corrupt bureaucracy. Other major measures included the large-scale retrenchment of officials to achieve savings, as well as efforts to reclaim tax-exempt lands and expand the revenue base. In 1580 the single whip law was instituted, commuting all taxes and labour obligations into silver payments, while an empire-wide land survey was ordered.
In military affairs, Zhang promoted and supported competent generals such as Qi Jiguang in order to strengthen the empire's northern borders. Zhang played a important role as mentor and regent during the early years of the reign of the Wanli Emperor, he influenced and guided the emperor through his teenage years. However, the strict upbringing he imposed on the emperor aroused resentment, while his attempts to centralise government and improve its finances affected the interests of large sections of the bureaucracy, leading to frequent controversy. One example of this was the death of Zhang's father in 1577. In the subsequent dispute over the propriety of Zhang's actions, several opposing officials were subjected to punishment by caning, which only increased the impression of Zhang's domineering nature. Zhang's fiscal policies met with only mixed success, due to the institutional resistance to his reforms. While the fiscal situation of the imperial government was much improved, the coffers were refilled with silver, most of the reforms he instituted either failed to achieve their aims, such as the empire-wide land survey, or were discarded after his death in 1582.
At the same time, his luxurious lifestyle - which included meals with over a hundred dishes, a palanquin carried by 32 men - exposed him to charges of hypocrisy as he imposed austerity measures on the rest of the bureaucracy. After his death, Zhang's political opponents accused him and Feng Bao of several major charges, including corruption and factionalism; as a result, his family was purged and his wealth and estate confiscated on the Wanli Emperor's orders, while several of his political allies were forced to retire. Zhang's reputation would only be rehabilitated more than half a century just before the downfall of the Ming dynasty. In 1573, Zhang presented the Wanli Emperor with a commentary on the Four Books of the Confucian canon, entitled "Colloquial Commentary on the Four Books", it was published some time between 1573 and 1584. The book was not destroyed during the posthumous disgrace of Zhang, enjoyed a measure of renown among the Chinese literati a century during the early decades of the Qing dynasty, when several editions of it
The Han Feizi is an ancient Chinese text attributed to foundational political philosopher, "Master" Han Fei. It comprises a selection of essays in the "Legalist" tradition on theories of state power, synthesizing the methodologies of his predecessors, its 55 chapters, most of which date to the Warring States period mid-3rd century BC, are the only such text to survive intact. One of the most important philosophical classics in ancient China, it touches on administration, diplomacy and economics, is valuable for its abundance of anecdotes about pre-Qin China. Han Fei's writings were influential on the future first emperor of China, Qin Shi Huang. After the early demise of the Qin dynasty, Han Fei's philosophy was vilified by the following Han Dynasty. Despite its outcast status throughout the history of imperial China, his political theory continued to influence every dynasty thereafter, the Confucian ideal of a rule without laws was never again realized. Shu Han's chancellor Zhuge Liang demanded emperor Liu Shan read the Han Feizi for learning the way of ruling.
Though differing in style, the coherency of the essays lend themselves to the possibility that they were written by Han Fei himself, are considered more philosophically engaging than the Book of Lord Shang. Han's worldview describes an interest-driven human nature together with the political methodologies to work with it in the interest of the state and Sovereign, engaging in wu-wei, systematically using Fa to maintain leadership and manage human resources. Rather than rely too much on worthies, who might not be trustworthy, Han binds their programs to systematic reward and penalty, fishing the subjects of the state by feeding them with interests; that being done, the ruler minimizes his own input. Like Shang Yang and other Fa philosophers, he admonishes the ruler not to abandon Fa for any other means, considering it a more practical means for the administration of both a large territory and personnel near at hand. Han's philosophy proceeds from the regicide of his era. Goldin writes: "Most of what appears in the Han Feizi deals with the ruler’s relations with his ministers, were regarded as the party most in practice, to cause him harm."
Han Fei quotes the Springs and Autumns of Tao Zuo: “'Less than half of all rulers die of illness.' If the ruler of men is unaware of this, disorders will be unrestrained. Thus it is said: If those who benefit from a lord’s death are many, the ruler will be imperiled." Devoting the entirety of Chapter 14, "How to Love the Ministers", to "persuading the ruler to be ruthless to his ministers", Han Fei's enlightened ruler strikes terror into his ministers by doing nothing. The qualities of a ruler, his "mental power, moral excellence and physical prowess" are irrelevant, he discards his private reason and morality, shows no personal feelings. What is important is his method of government. Fa require no perfection on the part of the ruler. Han Fei's use of Wu-Wei may have been derivative of Taoism, but emphasizes autocracy and Shu as arguably more of a "practical principle of political control" than any state of mind, he nonetheless begins by waiting "empty and still." Tao is the beginning of the standard of right and wrong.
That being so, the intelligent ruler, by holding to the beginning, knows the source of everything, and, by keeping to the standard, knows the origin of good and evil. Therefore, by virtue of resting empty and reposed, he waits for the course of nature to enforce itself so that all names will be defined of themselves and all affairs will be settled of themselves. Empty, he knows the essence of fullness: reposed, he becomes the corrector of motion. Who utters a word creates himself a name. Compare forms and names and see if they are identical; the ruler will find nothing to worry about as everything is reduced to its reality. Tao exists in invisibility. Be empty and reposed and have nothing to do-Then from the dark see defects in the light. See but never be seen. Hear but never be heard. Know but never be known. If you hear any word uttered, do not change it nor move it but compare it with the deed and see if word and deed coincide with each other. Place every official with a censor. Do not let them speak to each other.
Everything will be exerted to the utmost. Cover conceal sources; the ministers cannot trace origins. Leave your wisdom and cease your ability. Your subordinates cannot guess at your limitations; the bright ruler is undifferentiated and quiescent in waiting, causing names to define themselves and affairs to fix themselves. If he is undifferentiated he can understand when actuality is pure, if he is quiescent he can understand when movement is correct. Han Fei's commentary on the Tao Te Ching asserts that perspectiveless knowledge – an absolute point of view – is possible, though the chapter may have been one of his earlier writings. Han Fei was notoriously focused on what he termed Xing-Ming, which Sima Qian and Liu Xiang define as "holding actual outcome accountable to Ming." In line with both the Confucian and Mohist rectification of names, it is relatable to the Confucian tradition in which a promise or undertaking in relation to a government aim, entails punishment or reward, though the tight, centralized control emphasized by both his and his predecessor Shen Buhai's philosophy confl
The Chinese statesman Shen Buhai was Chancellor of the Han state under Marquis Zhao of Han for fifteen years, from 354 BC to 337 BC. A contemporary of syncretist Shi Jiao and Legalist Shang Yang, he was born in the State of Zheng, was a minor official there. After Han conquered Zheng in 375 BC, he rose up in the ranks of the Han officialdom, dividing up its territories and reforming it. Though not dealing in penal law himself, his administrative innovations would be taken into "Chinese Legalist" statecraft by Han Fei, his most famous successor, Shen Buhai's book most resembles the Han Feizi, he died of natural causes while in office. Though Chinese administration cannot be traced to any one individual, emphasizing a merit system figures like 4th century BC reformer Shen Buhai may have had more influence than any other, might be considered its founder, if not valuable as a rare pre-modern example of abstract theory of administration. Sinologist Herrlee G. Creel sees in Shen Buhai the "seeds of the civil service examination", and, if one wished to exaggerate, the first political scientist, while the correlation between Shen's conception of the inactive ruler and the handling of claims and titles informed the Taoist conception of the formless Tao that "gives rise to the ten thousand things."
He is attributed the dictum "The Sage ruler does not rely on wisdom. Shen was known for his cryptic writing style; because the writings attributed to him appear to be pre-Han dynasty, he is credited with writing a now extinct two chapter text, the Shenzi, concerned exclusively with the philosophy of governmental administration. In 141 BC, under the influence of Confucians, the reign of Emperor Wu of Han saw Shen Buhai's name was listed with other legalist thinkers whose ideas were banned from the government. Read in Han times, in comparison to the still-complete Han Feizi the Shenzi was listed as lost by the Liang dynasty. Appearing again in the bibliographies of both Tang histories, it's only traces remain as quotes in surviving texts in Qunshu Zhiyao, compiled in 631, Yilin, compiled around 786. During the Qing Dynasty, three major attempts were made to reconstruct the contents of the work, the last mention occurring in 1616, in a library catalogue from 1700, its fragments were re-assembled by Sinologist Herrlee G. Creel in Shen Pu-Hai: A Chinese Political Philosopher of the Fourth Century B. C.
The Huainanzi says that when Shen Buhai lived the officials of the state of Han were at cross-purposes and did not know what practices to follow. Though not unifying the laws as Shang Yang did, what Shen appears to have realized is that the "methods for the control of a bureaucracy" could not be mixed with the survivals of feudal government, or staffed by "getting together a group of'good men'", but rather must be men qualified in their jobs. Unlike Shang Yang, Shen therefore emphasizes the importance of selecting able officials as much as Confucius did, but insists on "constant vigilance over their performance", never mentioning virtue. In comparison with Han Fei on the other hand his system required a strong ruler at the center, emphasizing that he trust no one minister. Ideally, Shen Buhai's ruler had the widest possible sovereignty, was intelligent, had to make all crucial decisions himself, had unlimited control of the bureaucracy - over which, in contrast to Shang Yang, he is the head.
Championing Fa, Shen believed that the greatest threat to a ruler's power came from within, unlike Han Fei, never preaches to his ministers about duty or loyalty. He insisted that the ruler must be informed on the state of his realm, but couldn't afford to get caught up in details and was advised to listen to no one - and does not, as Sinologist Herrlee G. Creel says, have the time to do so; the way to see and hear independently is by grouping particulars into categories through mechanical or operational decision making. Shen's doctrines, posthumously referred to by Han Fei as Shu or Techniques, are described as concerned exclusively with the "ruler's role and the methods by which he may control a bureaucracy", that is, its management and personnel control: the selection of capable ministers, their performance, the monopolization of power, the control of and power relations between ruler and minister which he characterized as Wu Wei, they can therefore be considered the most crucial element in controlling a bureaucracy.
More Shen Buhai's methods focused on "scrutinizing achievement and on that ground alone to give rewards, to bestow office on the basis of ability". Liu Xiang wrote that Shen Buhai advised the ruler of men use technique rather than punishment, relying on persuasion to supervise and hold responsible, though strictly. Liu considered Shen's "principle tenant". Representing applied checks against the power of officials, Xing-Ming seeks the right person for the job through the examination of skill and seniority. Shen Buhai's personnel control, or rectification of names worked through "strict performance control", correlating performance and posts, it would become a central tenant of its Taoistic derivatives. The correlation between