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Sheku Kamara

Sheku Kamara is a defender and a convicted criminal. Having been an apprentice at Charlton Athletic, Kamara signed professional forms for Watford in June 2006 after a trial spell. Kamara's 2006-07 pre-season was disrupted with a knee injury which it was feared would keep him out for the entire season; however the injury was proved to be less serious than thought, only keeping him out of action for around a month. Kamara made his first professional appearance on 19 September 2006, coming on as a second-half substitute for Dominic Blizzard in the League Cup second round victory over Accrington Stanley. In November 2006 Kamara joined Grays Athletic on a six-week loan deal, he played for the Essex club 4 times during his time at the club before returning to Watford the following January. Following a number of trials, Sheku rejoined the Essex outfit on non-contract terms and made his second debut in front of the Setanta Sports cameras against Halifax Town, coming on as a substitute. On 1 May 2008, Sheku Kamara was sentenced to eight years in jail for his involvement in an armed robbery.

He was arrested as part of a gang of criminals who would confront civilians with a gun and ask for their possessions, including mobile phones and pin numbers. In passing sentence, the judge described the men's actions as well-planned and intentional banditry of the worst order, he commended the arresting officers for their bravery and the investigating team for the professionalism of their work. The three men were identified and arrested, in late November 2007, after local police increased patrols and CCTV was monitored in response to a spate of similar robberies in the area during November 2007; the victims of these robberies were threatened at gunpoint and had credit cards and other valuables stolen. They would be forced to provide their PIN and one of the robbers would go to a nearby cash machine and withdraw money. Kamara was charged with five counts of robbery and five counts of possession of a firearm with intent to cause fear of violence. Two firearms believed to have been used in the robberies were recovered during the investigation, a gas-powered airsoft gun, modelled on a Smith & Wesson pistol and a.177 calibre air pistol.

Sheku Kamara at Soccerbase

Two-dimensionalism

Two-dimensionalism is an approach to semantics in analytic philosophy. It is a theory of how to determine the sense and reference of a word and the truth-value of a sentence, it is intended to resolve the puzzle: How is it possible to discover empirically that a necessary truth is true? Two-dimensionalism provides an analysis of the semantics of words and sentences that makes sense of this possibility; the theory was first developed by Robert Stalnaker, but it has been advocated by numerous philosophers since, including David Chalmers. Any given sentence, for example, the words, "Water is H2O"is taken to express two distinct propositions referred to as a primary intension and a secondary intension, which together compose its meaning; the primary intension of a word or sentence is its sense, i.e. is the idea or method by which we find its referent. The primary intension of "water" might be a description, such as watery stuff; the thing picked out by the primary intension of "water" could have been otherwise.

For example, on some other world where the inhabitants take "water" to mean watery stuff, where the chemical make-up of watery stuff is not H2O, it is not the case that water is H2O for that world. The secondary intension of "water" is whatever thing "water" happens to pick out in this world, whatever that world happens to be. So, if we assign "water" the primary intension watery stuff the secondary intension of "water" is H2O, since H2O is watery stuff in this world; the secondary intension of "water" in our world is H2O, H2O in every world because unlike watery stuff it is impossible for H2O to be other than H2O. When considered according to its secondary intension, "Water is H2O". If two-dimensionalism is workable it solves some important problems in the philosophy of language. Saul Kripke has argued that "Water is H2O" is an example of a necessary truth, true a posteriori, since we had to discover that water was H2O, but given that it is true it cannot be false, it would be absurd to claim that something, water is not H2O, for these are known to be identical.

However, this contention that one and the same proposition can be both a posteriori and necessary is considered absurd by some philosophers. For example, Robert Stalnaker's account of knowledge represents knowledge as a relation on possible worlds, which entails that it is impossible for a proposition to fail to be a priori given that it is necessary; this can be proven as follows: If a proposition P is necessary it is true in all possible worlds. If P is true at all possible worlds and what we know are sets of possible worlds it is not possible not to know that P, for P is the case at all possible worlds in the set of worlds that we know. So if P is necessary we know it and ipso facto we know it a priori. Under two-dimensionalism, the problem disappears; the primary intension of "Water is H2O" is the a posteriori component, since it is contingent that the referent of "water" is H2O, while the secondary intension is the necessary component of the sentence, since it is necessary that the stuff we in fact call water is H2O.

Neither intension gives us both an a posteriori component. But one gets the false impression that the sentence expresses a necessary a posteriori proposition because this single sentence expresses two propositions, one a posteriori and one necessary. Two-dimensional semantics has been used by David Chalmers to counter objections to the various arguments against materialism in the philosophy of mind. Chalmers deploys two-dimensional semantics to "bridge the epistemic and modal domains" in arguing from knowability or epistemic conceivability to what is necessary or possible; the reason Chalmers employs two-dimensional semantics is to avoid objections to conceivability implying possibility. For instance, it's claimed that we can conceive of water not having been H2O, but it's not possible that water isn't H2O. Chalmers replies that it is 1-possible that water wasn't H2O because we can imagine another substance XYZ with watery properties, but it's not 2-possible. Hence, objections to conceivability implying possibility are unfounded when these words are used more carefully.

Chalmers advances the following "two-dimensional argument against materialism". Define P as all physical truths about the universe and Q as a truth about phenomenal experience, such as that someone is conscious. Let "1-possible" refer to possibility relative to primary intension and "2-possible" relative to secondary intension. P&~Q is conceivable If P&~Q is conceivable P&~Q is 1-possible If P&~Q is 1-possible P&~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true. If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false. Materialism is false or Russellian monism is true. Scott Soames is a notable opponent of two-dimensionalism, which he sees as an attempt to revive Russelian-Fregean descriptivism and to overturn what he sees as a "revolution" in semantics begun by Kripke and others. Soames argues that two-dimensionalism stems from a misreading of passages in Kripke as well as Kaplan. David Kaplan Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel. Two-Dimensional Semantics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0-19-927202-6; the Character of Consciousness.

Oxford University Press, USA. 2010. ISBN 978-0-19-531110-5. Two-Dimensional Semantics Two-Dimensional Semantics Assertion by Robert Stalnaker Two dimensional semantics--the basics Christian Nimtz The Case of Hyper-intensionality in Two-Dimensional Modal Semantics: Alexandra Arapinis Two-Dimensionalism and Kripkean A Posteriori