Economic history of India

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The economic history of India prior to 1947 encompasses the economy of the Indian subcontinent, corresponding to the modern nations of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. India's economic history begins with the Indus Valley Civilisation (3300–1300 BC), whose economy appears to have depended significantly on trade, which was facilitated by advances in transport, around 600 BC, the Mahajanapadas minted punch-marked silver coins. The period was marked by intensive trade activity and urban development. By 300 BC, the Maurya Empire united most of the Indian subcontinent, the political unity and military security allowed for a common economic system and enhanced trade and commerce, with increased agricultural productivity.

The Maurya Empire was followed by classical and early medieval kingdoms, including the Cholas, Guptas, Western Gangas, Harsha, Palas, Rashtrakutas and Hoysalas. During this period, India is estimated to have had the largest economy between 1 CE and 1000 CE, controlling between one-third and one-fourth of the world's wealth at the time, though GDP was stagnant. India experienced GDP growth in the late medieval era after 1000, during the Delhi Sultanate, but was overtaken by Ming China as the largest economy by 1500. After most of the subcontinent was reunited under the Mughal Empire, India returned to being the largest economy by 1700, controlling about a quarter of the world economy, before declining under British rule in the late 18th century.[1][2] According to the Balance of Economic Power, India had the largest and most advanced economy for most of the time span between the 1st century and 18th century, the most of any country for a large part of the last two millennia.[3]

During the Mughal Empire, India was the world leader in manufacturing,[4] producing 25% of the world's industrial output up until the mid-18th century, prior to British rule.[5] Due to its ancient history as a trading zone and later its colonial status, colonial India remained economically integrated with the world, with high levels of trade, investment, and migration,[6] yet India experienced deindustrialization under British rule,[5] with its share of the world economy declining from 24.4% in 1700 to 4.2% in 1950,[7] and its share of global industrial output declining from 25% in 1750 to 2% in 1900.[5]

The Republic of India, founded in 1947, has followed central planning for most of its independent history, which have included extensive public ownership, regulation, red tape, and trade barriers.[8][9] After the 1991 economic crisis, the central government launched economic liberalisation. India has turned towards a more capitalist system and has emerged as one of the fastest growing large economies of the world.[8][10]

Indus Valley Civilization[edit]

Indus Valley Civilisation, the first known permanent and predominantly urban settlement that flourished between 3500 BCE and 1800 BCE boasted of an advanced and thriving economic system. Its citizens practised agriculture, domesticated animals, made sharp tools and weapons from copper, bronze and tin and traded with other cities.[11] Evidence of well laid streets, layouts, drainage system and water supply in the valley's major cities, Harappa, Lothal, Mohenjo-daro and Rakhigarhi reveals their knowledge of urban planning.

Ancient and medieval characteristics[edit]

Though ancient India had a significant urban population, much of India's population resided in villages, whose economy was largely isolated and self-sustaining. Agriculture was the predominant occupation of the populace and satisfied a village's food requirements besides providing raw materials for hand based industries like textile, food processing and crafts. Besides farmers, other classes of people were barbers, carpenters, doctors (Ayurvedic practitioners), goldsmiths, weavers etc.[12]


Religion, especially, played an influential role in shaping economic activities.

Pilgrimage towns like Allahabad, Benares, Nasik and Puri, mostly centred around rivers, developed into centres of trade and commerce. Religious functions, festivals and the practice of taking a pilgrimage resulted in a flourishing pilgrimage economy.[13]

Economics in Jainism is influenced by Mahavira and his principles and philosophies, his philosophies have been used to explain the economics behind it. He was the last of the 24 Tirthankars, who spread Jainism; in the Economics context he explains the importance of the concept of 'anekanta'(non-absolutism).[14]

Family business[edit]

In the joint family system, members of a family pooled their resources to maintain the family and invest in business ventures, the system ensured younger members were trained and employed in the family business and the older and disabled persons would be supported by the family. The system, by preventing the agricultural land from being split ensured higher yield because of the benefits of scale, such sanctions curbed the spirit of rivality in junior members and made a peculiar sense of obedience.[15]

Organisational entities[edit]

Along with the family-run business and individually owned business enterprises, ancient India possessed a number of other forms of engaging in business or collective activity, including the gana, pani, puga, vrata, sangha, nigama and sreni. Nigama, pani and sreni refer most often to economic organisations of merchants, craftspeople and artisans, and perhaps even para-military entities; in particular, the sreni was a complex organisational entity that shares many similarities with modern corporations, which were being used in India from around the 8th century BCE until around the 10th century CE. The use of such entities in ancient India was widespread including virtually every kind of business, political and municipal activity.[16]

The sreni was a separate legal entity which had the ability to hold property separately from its owners, construct its own rules for governing the behaviour of its members, and for it to contract, sue and be sued in its own name, some ancient sources such as Laws of Manu VIII and Chanakya's Arthashastra have rules for lawsuits between two or more sreni and some sources make reference to a government official (Bhandagarika) who worked as an arbitrator for disputes amongst sreni from at least the 6th century BCE onwards.[17] There were between 18 and 150 sreni at various times in ancient India covering both trading and craft activities, this level of specialisation of occupations is indicative of a developed economy in which the sreni played a critical role. Some sreni could have over 1000 members as there were apparently no upper limits on the number of members.

The sreni had a considerable degree of centralised management, the headman of the sreni represented the interests of the sreni in the king's court and in many official business matters. The headman could also bind the sreni in contracts, set the conditions of work within the sreni, often received a higher salary, and was the administrative authority within the sreni, the headman was often selected via an election by the members of the sreni, who could also be removed from power by the general assembly. The headman often ran the enterprise with two to five executive officers, who were also elected by the assembly.[citation needed]


Punch marked silver ingots, in circulation around the 5th century BCE and the first metallic coins were minted around the 6th century BCE by the Mahajanapadas of the Gangetic plains were the earliest traces of coinage in India. While India's many kingdoms and rulers issued coins, barter was still widely prevalent.[18][not in citation given] Villages paid a portion of their agricultural produce as revenue while its craftsmen received a stipend out of the crops at harvest time for their services, each village, as an economic unit, was mostly self-sufficient.[19]

Maurya Empire[edit]

During the Maurya Empire (c. 321–185 BCE), there were a number of important changes and developments to the Indian economy. It was the first time most of India was unified under one ruler, with an empire in place, the trade routes throughout India became more secure thereby reducing the risk associated with the transportation of goods. The empire spent considerable resources building roads and maintaining them throughout India, the improved infrastructure combined with increased security, greater uniformity in measurements, and increasing usage of coins as currency enhanced trade.[20]

Delhi Sultanate[edit]

Before and during the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526 CE), Islamic civilization was a cosmopolitan civilization, with wide-ranging international networks, including social and economic networks, spanning large parts of Afro-Eurasia, leading to escalating circulation of goods, peoples, technologies and ideas. While initially disruptive, the Delhi Sultanate was responsible for integrating the Indian subcontinent into a growing world system, drawing India into a wider international network.[21]

In terms of GDP per capita, India's per-capita income was lower than the Middle East from 1 CE (16% lower) to 1000 CE (about 40% lower), but by the late Delhi Sultanate era in 1500, India's GDP per capita had increased to being almost on-par with the Middle East.[22]

GDP estimates[edit]

According to economic historian Angus Maddison in his book Contours of the world economy, 1–2030 CE: essays in macro-economic history, India had the world's largest economy from 1 CE to 1000 CE, during the classical to early medieval eras. But while the economy was large, it was also stagnant during this time, with no GDP growth for a thousand years. Between 1000 and 1500, in the late medieval era (during the Delhi Sultanate), India began to experience GDP growth for the first time in a thousand years, but at a slower rate compared to China, which overtook India to become the world's largest economy during that time, with India the second largest economy. Ming China remained the largest economy through to 1600, with India still the second largest. India experienced its fastest economic growth under the Mughal Empire during the 16th–18th centuries, establishing Mughal India as the world's largest economy by 1700, larger than Qing China, the Indian subcontinent also had a larger economy than Western Europe from the 1st century up until the 18th century.[23]

GDP (PPP) in 1990 international dollars
Year Indian subcontinent GDP GDP growth rate per century Period
1 33,750,000,000 Classical era
1000 33,750,000,000 0% Early medieval era
1500 60,500,000,000 12.7% Late medieval era
1600 74,250,000,000 20.9% Mughal era
1700 90,750,000,000 20.9%

Mughal Empire[edit]

The Indian economy was large and prosperous under the Mughal Empire (1526–1858) up until the early 18th century,[24] during the Mughal period in the 16th century, the gross domestic product of India was estimated at about 25.1% of the world economy.

An estimate of India's pre-colonial economy puts the annual revenue of Emperor Akbar the Great's treasury in 1600 at £17.5 million (in contrast to the entire treasury of Great Britain two hundred years later in 1800, which totaled £16 million). The gross domestic product of Mughal India in 1600 was estimated at about 24.3% the world economy, the second largest in the world.[25]

By the late 17th century, the Mughal Empire was as its peak and had expanded to include almost 90 per cent of South Asia, and enforced a uniform customs and tax-administration system; in 1700, the exchequer of the Emperor Aurangzeb reported an annual revenue of more than £100 million, or $450 million, more than ten times that of his contemporary Louis XIV of France.[26]

By 1700, Mughal India had become the world's largest economy, ahead of Qing China and Western Europe, with India controlling about a quarter of the world economy at the time.[27] Mughal India also produced about 25% of the world's industrial output up until the early 18th century.[5] India's GDP growth increased under the Mughal Empire, with India's GDP having a faster growth rate during the Mughal era than in the 1,500 years prior to the Mughal era,[28] the Mughals were responsible for building an extensive road system, creating a uniform currency, and the unification of the country.[29] The empire had an extensive road network, which was vital to the economic infrastructure, built by a public works department set up by the Mughals which designed, constructed and maintained roads linking towns and cities across the empire, making trade easier to conduct,[24] the Mughals adopted and standardized the rupee currency introduced by Sur Emperor Sher Shah Suri during his brief rule.[30] The Mughals minted coins in the tens of millions, with high purity, never dropping below 96%, and without any debasement until the 1720s,[31] the empire had a strong export-driven economy, with global demand for Indian agricultural and industrial products.[32]

Cities and towns boomed under the Mughal Empire, which had a relatively high degree of urbanization for its time, with 15% of its population living in urban centres, higher than the percentage of the urban population in contemporary Europe at the time and higher than that of British India in the 19th century.[33] A number of cities in India had a population between a quarter-million and half-million people,[33] with larger cities including Agra (in Agra Subah) with up to 800,000 people[34] and Dhaka (in Bengal Subah) with over 1 million people.[35] 64% of Mughal India's workforce were in the primary sector (including agriculture), while 36% were in the secondary and tertiary sectors.[36] Mughal India's workforce had a higher percentage in the non-primary sectors than Europe at the time; in 1700, 65–90% of Europe's workforce were in agriculture, and in 1750, 65–75% were in agriculture.[37]


Indian agricultural production increased under the Mughal Empire.[24] A variety of crops were grown, including food crops such as wheat, rice, and barley, and non-food cash crops such as cotton, indigo and opium. By the mid-17th century, Indian cultivators begun to extensively grow two new crops from the Americas, maize and tobacco.[24] Bengali peasants also rapidly learned techniques of mulberry cultivation and sericulture, establishing Bengal Subah as a major silk-producing region of the world.[38] Mughal Indian agriculture was advanced compared to Europe at the time, such as the common use of the seed drill among Indian peasants before its adoption in European agriculture.[39]

The Mughal administration emphasized agrarian reform, which began under the non-Mughal emperor Sher Shah Suri, the work of which Akbar adopted and furthered with more reforms,[40] the Mughal government funded the building of irrigation systems across the empire, which produced much higher crop yields and increased the net revenue base, leading to increased agricultural production.[24]

A major Mughal reform introduced by Akbar was a new land revenue system called zabt, he replaced the tribute system, previously common in India and used by Tokugawa Japan at the time, with a monetary tax system based on a uniform currency.[41] The revenue system was biased in favour of higher value cash crops such as cotton, indigo, sugar cane, tree-crops, and opium, providing state incentives to grow cash crops, in addition to rising market demand.[38] Under the zabt system, the Mughals also conducted extensive cadastral surveying to assess the area of land under plow cultivation, with the Mughal state encouraging greater land cultivation by offering tax-free periods to those who brought new land under cultivation.[42]

According to evidence cited by the economic historians Immanuel Wallerstein, Irfan Habib, Percival Spear, and Ashok Desai, per-capita agricultural output and standards of consumption in 17th-century Mughal India was higher than in 17th-century Europe and early 20th-century British India.[43]

Industrial manufacturing[edit]

A woman in Dhaka clad in fine Bengali muslin, 18th century.

Up until the 18th century, Mughal India was the most important center of manufacturing in international trade.[44] Up until 1750, India produced about 25% of the world's industrial output.[5] Manufactured goods and cash crops from the Mughal Empire were sold throughout the world. Key industries included textiles, shipbuilding, and steel. Processed products included cotton textiles, yarns, thread, silk, jute products, metalware, and foods such as sugar, oils and butter.[24] The growth of manufacturing industries in the Indian subcontinent during the Mughal era in the 17th–18th centuries has been referred to as a form of proto-industrialization, similar to 18th-century Western Europe prior to the Industrial Revolution.[45]

In early modern Europe, there was significant demand for products from Mughal India, particularly cotton textiles, as well as goods such as spices, peppers, indigo, silks, and saltpeter (for use in munitions).[24] European fashion, for example, became increasingly dependent on Mughal Indian textiles and silks. From the late 17th century to the early 18th century, Mughal India accounted for 95% of British imports from Asia, and the Bengal Subah province alone accounted for 40% of Dutch imports from Asia.[46] In contrast, there was very little demand for European goods in Mughal India, which was largely self-sufficient, thus Europeans had very little to offer, except for some woolens, unprocessed metals and a few luxury items. The trade imbalance caused Europeans to export large quantities of gold and silver to Mughal India in order to pay for South Asian imports.[24] Indian goods, especially those from Bengal, were also exported in large quantities to other Asian markets, such as Indonesia and Japan.[47]

The largest manufacturing industry in the Mughal Empire was cotton textile manufacturing, which included the production of piece goods, calicos, and muslins, available unbleached and in a variety of colours. The cotton textile industry was responsible for a large part of the empire's international trade,[24] the most important center of cotton production was the Bengal Subah province, particularly around its capital city of Dhaka.[48] Bengal alone accounted for more than 50% of textiles and around 80% of silks imported by the Dutch from Asia, for example.[46] Bengali silk and cotton textiles were exported in large quantities to Europe, Indonesia and Japan.[47]

Mughal India had a large shipbuilding industry, particularly in the Bengal Subah province; in terms of shipbuilding tonnage during the 16th–18th centuries, the annual output of Bengal alone totaled around 2,232,500 tons, larger than the output of the Dutch (450,000–550,000 tons), the British (340,000 tons), and North America (23,061 tons).[49]

Bengal Subah[edit]

The wealthiest province of the Mughal Empire was Bengal Subah, which generated 50% of the empire's GDP and 12% of the world's GDP,[50] globally dominant in industries such as textile manufacturing and shipbuilding.[51][52][53] Bengal's capital city Dhaka was the empire's financial capital, with a population exceeding a million people, and an exporter of silk and cotton textiles, steel, saltpeter, and agricultural and industrial produce.[50]

Domestically, much of India depended on Bengali products such as rice, silks and cotton textiles. Overseas, Europeans depended on Bengali products such as cotton textiles, silks and opium; Bengal accounted for 40% of Dutch imports from Asia, for example, including more than 50% of textiles and around 80% of silks.[46] From Bengal, saltpeter was also shipped to Europe, opium was sold in Indonesia, raw silk was exported to Japan and the Netherlands, and cotton and silk textiles were exported to Europe, Indonesia and Japan.[47]

Post-Mughal states[edit]

In the early half of the 18th century, Mughal Empire fell into decline, leading to the emergence of post-Mughal states, the Mughals were replaced by the Marathas as the dominant military power in much of India, while the other smaller regional kingdoms who were mostly late Mughal tributaries, such as the Nawabs in the north and the Nizams in the south, declared autonomy. However, the efficient Mughal tax administration system was left largely intact.

Among the post-Mughal states that emerged in the 18th century, the dominant economic powers were Bengal Subah (under the Nawabs of Bengal) and the South Indian Kingdom of Mysore (under Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan), both of which had higher real wages and living standards than Britain at the time.[4] However, the former was devastated by the Maratha invasions of Bengal[54][55] and then British colonization in the mid-18th century, after which the economy of the Kingdom of Mysore overtook that of Bengal, establishing Mysore as the subcontinent's dominant economic power in the late 18th century, with Mysore maintaining higher real wages and living standards than Britain.[4] Mysore's average per-capita income was five times higher than subsistence level,[56] i.e. five times higher than $400 (1990 international dollars),[57] or $2,000 per capita. In comparison, the highest national per-capita incomes in 1820 were $1,838 for the Netherlands and $1,706 for Britain.[58]

Jeffrey G. Williamson has argued that India went through a period of deindustrialization in the latter half of the 18th century as an indirect outcome of the collapse of the Mughal Empire, with British rule later causing further deindustrialization.[5] According to Williamson, the decline of the Mughal Empire led to a decline in agricultural productivity, which drove up food prices, then nominal wages, and then textile prices, which led to India losing a share of the world textile market to Britain even before it had superior factory technology,[59] though Indian textiles still maintained a competitive advantage over British textiles up until the 19th century.[60] Prasannan Parthasarathi, however, has argued that there wasn't any such economic decline for several post-Mughal states, notably Bengal and Mysore, which were comparable to Britain in the late 18th century, until British colonial policies caused deindustrialization.[4]

British rule[edit]

The British East India Company conquered Bengal Subah at the Battle of Plassey in 1757. After gaining the right to collect revenue in Bengal in 1765, the East India Company largely ceased importing gold and silver, which it had hitherto used to pay for goods shipped back to Britain;[61] in addition, as under Mughal rule, land revenue collected in the Bengal Presidency helped finance the Company's wars in other part of India.[61] Consequently, in the period 1760–1800, Bengal's money supply was greatly diminished; furthermore, the closing of some local mints and close supervision of the rest, the fixing of exchange rates, and the standardization of coinage, paradoxically, added to the economic downturn.[61] During the period, 1780–1860, India changed from being an exporter of processed goods for which it received payment in bullion, to being an exporter of raw materials and a buyer of manufactured goods.[61] More specifically, in the 1750s, mostly fine cotton and silk was exported from India to markets in Europe, Asia, and Africa; by the second quarter of the 19th century, raw materials, which chiefly consisted of raw cotton, opium, and indigo, accounted for most of India's exports.[62] Also, from the late 18th century British cotton mill industry began to lobby the government to both tax Indian imports and allow them access to markets in India.[62] Starting in the 1830s, British textiles began to appear in—and soon to inundate—the Indian markets, with the value of the textile imports growing from £5.2 million 1850 to £18.4 million in 1896.[63] The abolition of slavery encouraged New World plantations to organize the import of South Asian labor.[64]

The British colonial rule created an institutional environment that stabilized law and order to a large extent, the British foreign policies however stifled the trade with rest of the world. They created a well-developed system of railways, telegraphs and a modern legal system, the infrastructure the British created was mainly geared towards the exploitation of resources in the world and totally stagnant, with industrial development stalled, agriculture unable to feed a rapidly accelerating population. They were subject to frequent famines, had one of the world's lowest life expectancies, suffered from pervasive malnutrition and were largely illiterate.

Declining share of world GDP[edit]

The global contribution to world's GDP by major economies from 1 CE to 2003 CE according to Angus Maddison's estimates.[65] Up until the early 18th century, China and India were the two largest economies by GDP output.

There is no doubt that our grievances against the British Empire had a sound basis, as the painstaking statistical work of the Cambridge historian Angus Maddison has shown, India's share of world income collapsed from 22.6% in 1700, almost equal to Europe's share of 23.3% at that time, to as low as 3.8% in 1952. Indeed, at the beginning of the 20th century, "the brightest jewel in the British Crown" was the poorest country in the world in terms of per capita income.

British economist Angus Maddison argues that India's share of the world income went from 27% in 1700 (compared to Europe's share of 23%) to 3% in 1950. India's GDP (PPP) per capita was stagnant during the Mughal Empire and began to decline prior to the onset of British rule.[25] India's share of global industrial output also declined from 25% in 1750 down to 2% in 1900,[5] at the same time, the United Kingdom's share of the world economy rose from 2.9% in 1700 up to 9% in 1870,[7] and Britain replaced India as the world's largest textile manufacturer in the 19th century.[60] Mughal India also had a higher per-capita income in the late 16th century than British India had in the early 20th century, and the secondary sector contributed a higher percentage to the Mughal economy (18.2%) than it did to the economy of early 20th-century British India (11.2%).[67] In terms of urbanization, Mughal India also had a higher percentage of its population (15%) living in urban centers in 1600 than British India did in the 19th century.[33]

Modern economic historians have blamed the colonial rule for the dismal state of India's economy, with investment in Indian industries limited since it was a colony.[68][69] Under British rule, India experienced deindustrialization, the decline of India's native manufacturing industries.[70][60][71] India also underwent a period of deindustrialization in the latter half of the 18th century as an indirect outcome of the collapse of the Mughal Empire,[5] during the British East India Company's rule in India, there was a decreased production of food crops, mass impoverishment and destitution of farmers, and numerous famines.[72] The economic policies of the British Raj caused a severe decline in the handicrafts and handloom sectors, with reduced demand and dipping employment;[73] the yarn output of the handloom industry, for example, declined from 419 million pounds in 1850 down to 240 million pounds in 1900.[5] Due to the colonial policies of the British, the result was a significant transfer of capital from India to England, which led to a massive drain of revenue rather than any systematic effort at modernisation of the domestic economy.[74]

Several economic historians in the 21st century ague that in the 18th century real wages were falling in India, and were "far below European levels" according to Jan de Vries,[75] this has been disputed by several other economic historians, who have argued that real wage decline occurred in the early 19th century, or possibly beginning in the very late 18th century, largely as a result of British imperialism.[5] According to 18th-century earnings data from economic historian Prasannan Parthasarathi, real wages and living standards in Bengal Subah and the South Indian Kingdom of Mysore were higher than in Britain (see Post-Mughal states above), which in turn had the highest living standards in Europe.[76][5]

British East India Company rule[edit]

During this period, the East India Company began tax administration reforms in a fast expanding empire spread over 250 million acres (1,000,000 km2), or 35 per cent of Indian domain. Indirect rule was also established on protectorates and buffer states.

Ray (2009) raises three basic questions about the 19th-century cotton textile industry in Bengal: when did the industry begin to decay, what was the extent of its decay during the early 19th century, and what were the factors that led to this? Since there is no data on production, Ray uses the industry's market performance and its consumption of raw materials. Ray challenges the prevailing belief that the industry's permanent decline started in the late 18th century or the early 19th century, the decline actually started in the mid-1820s. The pace of its decline was, however, slow though steady at the beginning, but reached crisis point by 1860, when 563,000 workers lost their jobs. Ray estimates that the industry shrank by about 28% by 1850. However, it survived in the high-end and low-end domestic markets. Ray agrees that British discriminatory policies undoubtedly depressed the industry's export outlet, but suggests its decay is better explained by technological innovations in Britain.[77]

Other historians point to the colonization of India as a major factor in both India's deindustrialization and Britain's Industrial Revolution.[51][52][53][78] The capital amassed from Bengal following its 1757 conquest helped to invest in British industries such as textile manufacture during the Industrial Revolution as well as increase British wealth, while contributing to deindustrialization and famines in Bengal;[51][52][53][50] following the British conquest, a devastating famine broke out in Bengal in the early 1770s, killing a third of the Bengali population and 5 percent of the national population.[79] British colonization forced open the large Indian market to British goods, which could be sold in India without any tariffs or duties, compared to local Indian producers who were heavily taxed, while in Britain protectionist policies such as bans and high tariffs were implemented to restrict Indian textiles from being sold there, whereas raw cotton was imported from India without tariffs to British factories which manufactured textiles from Indian cotton and sold them back to the Indian market. British economic policies gave them a monopoly over India's large market and cotton resources.[70][60][71] India served as both a significant supplier of raw goods to British manufacturers and a large captive market for British manufactured goods.[80]

Indian textiles had maintained a competitive advantage over British textiles up until the 19th century, when Britain eventually overtook India as the world's largest cotton textile manufacturer;[60] in 1811, Bengal was still a major exporter of cotton cloth to the Americas and the Indian Ocean. However, Bengali exports declined over the course of the early 19th century, as British imports to Bengal increased, from 25% in 1811 to 93% in 1840.[81] By 1820, India had fallen from the top rank to become the second-largest economy in the world, behind China.[25]

Absence of industrialisation[edit]

Historians have questioned why India did not undergo industrialisation in the 19th century in the way that Britain did; in the 17th century, India was a relatively urbanised and commercialised nation with a buoyant export trade, devoted largely to cotton textiles, but also including silk, spices, and rice. By the end of the century, India was the world’s main producer of cotton textiles and had a substantial export trade to Britain, as well as many other European countries, via the East India Company. Yet as British cotton industry underwent a technological revolution in the late 18th century, the Indian industry stagnated, and industrialisation in India was delayed until the 20th century. Several historians have suggested that this was because India was still a largely agricultural nation with low wages levels, arguing that wages were high in Britain so cotton producers had the incentive to invent and purchase expensive new labour-saving technologies, and that wages levels were low in India so producers preferred to increase output by hiring more workers rather than investing in technology.[82]

Several economic historians such as Prasannan Parthasarathi have criticized this argument, pointing to earnings data that show real wages in 18th-century Bengal and Mysore were higher than in Britain.[76][5] Instead, Parthasarathi argues that Indian textile prices were lower because of India's lower food prices, which was the result of higher agricultural productivity. Compared to Britain, the silver coin prices of grain were about one-half in Mysore and one-third in Bengal, resulting in lower silver coin prices for Indian textiles, giving them a price advantage in global markets up until the 18th century.[76] According to evidence cited by the economic historians Immanuel Wallerstein, Irfan Habib, Percival Spear, and Ashok Desai, per-capita agricultural output and standards of consumption in 17th-century Mughal India was higher than in 17th-century Europe and early 20th-century British India.[43]

Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta gave the following comparative estimates for Indian and UK populations and GDP per capita during 1600–1871 in terms of 1990 international dollars.[83][84][85]

Year India ($) UK ($) Ratio (%) India population (m) UK population (m)
1600 792 1,104 72 142 5
1650 746 904 83 142 5.8
1700 728 1,477 49.3 164 8.8
1751 669 1,678 39.9 190 9.2
1801 646 1,985 32.6 207 16.3
1811 617 2,083 29.6 215 18.5
1821 587 2,080 28.2 205 21.0
1831 592 2,228 26.6 216 24.1
1841 592 2,404 24.6 212 26.9
1851 594 2,718 21.9 232 27.5
1861 562 3,124 18.0 244 29.1
1871 533 3,676 14.5 256 31.6

However, the per-capita GDP estimates from Broadberry and Gupta above for the 17th and 18th centuries have been criticized by economic historian Prasannan Parthasarathi, whose earnings data shows that real wages and living standards in 18th-century Mysore and Bengal were higher than in Britain, which in turn had the highest living standards in Europe.[76][5] Workers in the textile industry, for example, earned more in Bengal and Mysore than they did in Britain, while agricultural labour in Britain had to work longer hours to earn the same amount as in Mysore.[76] Others such as Andre Gunder Frank, Robert A. Denemark, Kenneth Pomeranz and Amiya Kumar Bagchi have also criticized estimates that grossly underestimate per-capita income and GDP growth rates in Asia (especially China and India) prior to the 19th century, pointing to contemporary research that demonstrates significantly higher per-capita income and growth rates in China and India during that period.[86]

The economic historian Sashi Sivramkrishna estimates Mysore's average per-capita income in the late 18th century to be five times higher than subsistence level,[56] i.e. five times higher than $400 (1990 international dollars),[57] or $2,000 per capita. In comparison, the highest national per-capita incomes in 1820 were $1,838 for the Netherlands and $1,706 for Britain.[58] According to economic historian Paul Bairoch, India as well as China had a higher GNP per capita than Europe in 1750,[87][88] for 1750, Bairoch estimated the GNP per capita for the Western world to be $182 in 1960 US dollars ($804 in 1990 dollars) and for the non-Western world to be $188 in 1960 dollars ($830 in 1990 dollars), with China and India being higher than this as they were the wealthiest.[89] Other estimates he gives include $150–190 for England in 1700 and $160–210 for India in 1800.[90] Bairoch estimated that it was only after 1800 that Western European per-capita income pulled ahead.[91]

British Raj[edit]

The formal dissolution of the declining Mughal Dynasty heralded a change in British treatment of Indian subjects, during the British Raj, massive railway projects were begun in earnest and government jobs and guaranteed pensions attracted a large number of upper caste Hindus into the civil service for the first time. British cotton exports reach 55 per cent of the Indian market by 1875.[92] Industrial production as it developed in European factories was unknown in India until the 1850s when the first cotton mills were opened in Bombay, posing a challenge to the cottage-based home production system based on family labour.[93]

The worldwide Great Depression of 1929 had a small direct impact on traditional India, with relatively little impact on the modern secondary sector, the government did little to alleviate distress, and was focused mostly on shipping gold to Britain.[94] The worst consequences involved deflation, which increased the burden of the debt on villagers while lowering the cost of living;[95] in terms of volume of total economic output, there was no decline between 1929 and 1934. Falling prices for jute (and also wheat) hurt larger growers, the worst hit sector was jute, based in Bengal, which was an important element in overseas trade; it had prospered in the 1920s but was hard hit in the 1930s.[96] In terms of employment, there was some decline, while agriculture and small-scale industry also exhibited gains,[97] the most successful new industry was sugar, which had meteoric growth in the 1930s.[98][99]

The newly independent but weak Union government's treasury reported annual revenue of £334 million in 1950; in contrast, Nizam Asaf Jah VII of south India was widely reported to have a fortune of almost £668 million then.[100] About one-sixth of the national population were urban by 1950.[101] A US Dollar was exchanged at 4.79 Rupees.

Fall of the Rupee[edit]

Price of Silver – Rate of Exchange: 1871–72 to 1892–93
Period Price of Silver (in pence per Troy ounce) Rupee exchange rate (in pence)
1871–1872 60½ 23 ⅛
1875–1876 56¾ 21⅝
1879–1880 51¼ 20
1883–1884 50½ 19½
1887–1888 44⅝ 18⅞
1890–1951 47 11/16 18⅛
1891–1892 45 16¾
1892–1893 39 15
Source: B.E. Dadachanji. History of Indian Currency and Exchange, 3rd enlarged ed.

(Bombay: D.B. Taraporevala Sons & Co, 1934), p. 15

See also: The crisis of silver currency and bank notes (1750–1870)

After its victory in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), Germany extracted a huge indemnity from France of £200,000,000, and then moved to join Britain on a gold standard for currency. France, the US and other industrialising countries followed Germany in adopting a gold standard throughout the 1870s, at the same time, countries, such as Japan, which did not have the necessary access to gold or those, such as India, which were subject to imperial policies that determined that they did not move to a gold standard, remained mostly on a silver standard. A huge divide between silver-based and gold-based economies resulted, the worst affected were economies with a silver standard that traded mainly with economies with a gold standard. With discovery of more and more silver reserves, those currencies based on gold continued to rise in value and those based on silver were declining due to demonetisation of silver, for India which carried out most of its trade with gold based countries, especially Britain, the impact of this shift was profound. As the price of silver continued to fall, so too did the exchange value of the rupee, when measured against sterling.

Agriculture and industry[edit]

The Indian economy grew at about 1% per year from 1880 to 1920, and the population also grew at 1%,[102] the result was, on average, no long-term change in income levels. Agriculture was still dominant, with most peasants at the subsistence level. Extensive irrigation systems were built, providing an impetus for growing cash crops for export and for raw materials for Indian industry, especially jute, cotton, sugarcane, coffee and tea.[103]

The entrepreneur Jamsetji Tata (1839–1904) began his industrial career in 1877 with the Central India Spinning, Weaving, and Manufacturing Company in Bombay. While other Indian mills produced cheap coarse yarn (and later cloth) using local short-staple cotton and cheap machinery imported from Britain, Tata did much better by importing expensive longer-stapled cotton from Egypt and buying more complex ring-spindle machinery from the United States to spin finer yarn that could compete with imports from Britain.[104]

In the 1890s, Tata launched plans to expand into heavy industry using Indian funding, the Raj did not provide capital, but aware of Britain's declining position against the U.S. and Germany in the steel industry, it wanted steel mills in India so it is did promise to purchase any surplus steel Tata could not otherwise sell.[105] The Tata Iron and Steel Company (TISCO), headed by his son Dorabji Tata (1859–1932), opened its plant at Jamshedpur in Bihar in 1908, it became the leading iron and steel producer in India, with 120,000 employees in 1945.[106] TISCO became an India's proud symbol of technical skill, managerial competence, entrepreneurial flair, and high pay for industrial workers.[107]


Railway map of India in 1871
Railway map of India in 1909

British investors built a modern railway system in the late 19th century—it became the then fourth largest in the world and was renowned for quality of construction and service,[108] the government was supportive, realising its value for military use, as well as its value for economic growth. All the funding and management came from private British companies, the railways at first were privately owned and operated, and run by British administrators, engineers and skilled craftsmen. At first, only the unskilled workers were Indians.[109]

A plan for a rail system in India was first put forward in 1832, the first train in India ran from Red Hills to Chintadripet bridge in Madras in 1837. It was called Red Hill Railway,[110] it was used for freight transport only. Few more short lines were built in 1830s and 1840s but they did not interconnect and were used for freight transport only, the East India Company (and later the colonial government) encouraged new railway companies backed by private investors under a scheme that would provide land and guarantee an annual return of up to five percent during the initial years of operation. The companies were to build and operate the lines under a 99-year lease, with the government having the option to buy them earlier;[110] in 1854 Governor-General Lord Dalhousie formulated a plan to construct a network of trunk lines connecting the principal regions of India. Encouraged by the government guarantees, investment flowed in and a series of new rail companies were established, leading to rapid expansion of the rail system in India.[111]

In 1853, the first passenger train service was inaugurated between Bori Bunder in Bombay and Thane, covering a distance of 34 km (21 mi).[112] The route mileage of this network increased from 1,349 km (838 mi) in 1860 to 25,495 km (15,842 mi) in 1880 – mostly radiating inland from the three major port cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta.[113] Most of the railway construction was done by Indian companies supervised by British engineers, the system was heavily built, in terms of sturdy tracks and strong bridges. Soon several large princely states built their own rail systems and the network spread to almost all the regions in India. [110] By 1900 India had a full range of rail services with diverse ownership and management, operating on broad, metre and narrow gauge networks.[114]

In the First World War, the railways were used to transport troops and grains to the ports of Bombay and Karachi en route to Britain, Mesopotamia, and East Africa, with shipments of equipment and parts from Britain curtailed, maintenance became much more difficult; critical workers entered the army; workshops were converted to making artillery; some locomotives and cars were shipped to the Middle East. The railways could barely keep up with the increased demand.[115] By the end of the war, the railways had deteriorated badly;[116][114] in the Second World War the railways rolling stock was diverted to the Middle East, and the railway workshops were converted into munitions workshops. This severely crippled the railways.[117]

Headrick argues that both the Raj lines and the private companies hired only European supervisors, civil engineers, and even operating personnel, such as locomotive engineers, the government's Stores Policy required that bids on railway contracts be made to the India Office in London, shutting out most Indian firms. The railway companies purchased most of their hardware and parts in Britain. There were railway maintenance workshops in India, but they were rarely allowed to manufacture or repair locomotives. TISCO could not obtain orders for rails until the 1920s.[118]Christensen (1996) looks at of colonial purpose, local needs, capital, service, and private-versus-public interests, he concludes that making the railways a creature of the state hindered success because railway expenses had to go through the same time-consuming and political budgeting process as did all other state expenses. Railway costs could therefore not be tailored to the timely needs of the railways or their passengers.[119]

In 1951, forty-two separate railway systems, including thirty-two lines owned by the former Indian princely states, were amalgamated to form a single unit named the Indian Railways, the existing rail systems were abandoned in favor of zones in 1951 and a total of six zones came into being in 1952.[114]

Economic impact of imperialism[edit]

This map shows the change in per capita GDP of India from 1820 CE to 2015 CE. All GDP numbers are inflation adjusted to 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. Data Source: Tables of Prof. Angus Maddison (2010), the per capita GDP over various years and population data can be downloaded in a spreadsheet from here. The 2015 estimate is retrieved from the International Monetary Fund.

Debate continues about the economic impact of British imperialism on India, the issue was actually raised by conservative British politician Edmund Burke who in the 1780s vehemently attacked the East India Company, claiming that Warren Hastings and other top officials had ruined the Indian economy and society. Indian historian Rajat Kanta Ray (1998) continues this line of reasoning, saying the new economy brought by the British in the 18th century was a form of plunder and a catastrophe for the traditional economy of Mughal India. According to the economic drain theory, supported by Ray, the British depleted the food and money stocks and imposed high taxes that helped cause the terrible famine of 1770, which killed a third of the people of Bengal.[120]

P. J. Marshall, a British historian known for his work on the British empire, has a reinterpretation of the view that the prosperity of the formerly being Mughal rule gave way to poverty and anarchy. Marshall argues the British takeover did not make any sharp break with the past. British control was delegated largely through regional rulers and was sustained by a generally prosperous economy for the rest of the 18th century, except the frequent famines with very high fatality rate (Famine in India). Marshall notes the British raised revenue through local tax administrators and kept the old Mughal rates of taxation. Instead of the Indian nationalist account of the British as alien aggressors, seizing power by brute force and impoverishing all of India, Marshall presents a British nationalist interpretation in which the British were not in full control but instead were controllers in what was primarily an Indian play and in which their ability to keep power depended upon excellent cooperation with Indian elites. Marshall admits that much of his interpretation is still rejected by many historians.[121]

Republic of India[edit]

After the independence India adopted a socialist-inspired economic model with elements of capitalism. India adopted a USSR-like centralized and nationalized economic programs called Five-Year Plans, this Nehruvian policy suppressed economic growth for several decades.

Socialist rate of growth[edit]

Compare India (orange) with South Korea (yellow). Both started from about the same income level in 1950, the graph shows GDP per capita of South Asian economies and South Korea as a percent of the American GDP per capita.

The "Nehruvian Socialist rate of growth" is used to refer to the low annual growth rate of the economy of India before 1991, it stagnated at around 3.5% from the 1950s to 1980s, while per capita income growth averaged extremely low 1.3% a year.[122] At the same time, South Korea grew by 10% and Taiwan by 12%,[123] this phenomenon was called the "Hindu rate of growth", by the leading Indian economist Raj Krishna.[124]

Socialist reforms (1950–1975)[edit]

In 1975 the GDP size (in 1990 US dollars) was $545 billion in India, $1561 billion in the USSR, $1266 billion in Japan, and $3517 billion in the US.[125]

Before independence a large share of tax revenue was generated by the land tax, which was in effect a lump sum tax on land, since then land taxes have steadily declined as a share of revenues and completely replaced by sales taxes.[126]

Moreover, the structural economic problems inherited at independence were exacerbated by the costs associated with the partition of British India, which had resulted in about 2 to 4 million refugees fleeing past each other across the new borders between India and Pakistan, the settlement of refugees was a considerable financial strain. Partition also divided India into complementary economic zones. Under the British, jute and cotton were grown in the eastern part of Bengal, the area that became East Pakistan (after 1971, Bangladesh), but processing took place mostly in the western part of Bengal, which became the Indian state of West Bengal in 1947. As a result, after independence India had to employ land previously used for food production to cultivate cotton and jute in Bengal and for its mills.[127]

Government was assigned an important role in the process of alleviating poverty, and since 1951 a series of plans had guided the country's economic development, although there was considerable growth in the 1950s, the long-term rates of real growth were less positive than India's politicians expected.[128]

Toward the end of Nehru's term as prime minister, India would continue to face serious food shortages despite hoped for progress and increases in agricultural production.

Since 1950, India ran into trade deficits that increased in magnitude in the 1960s, the Government of India had a budget deficit problem and therefore could not borrow money from abroad or from the private sector, which itself had a negative savings rate. As a result, the government issued bonds to the RBI, which increased the money supply, leading to inflation; in 1966, foreign aid, which was hitherto a key factor in preventing devaluation of the rupee was finally cut off and India was told it had to liberalise its restrictions on trade before foreign aid would again materialise. The response was the politically unpopular step of devaluation accompanied by liberalisation, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 led the US and other countries friendly towards Pakistan to withdraw foreign aid to India, which further necessitated devaluation. Defence spending in 1965/1966 was 24.06% of total expenditure, the highest in the period from 1965 to 1989. This, accompanied by the drought of 1965/1966, led to a severe devaluation of the rupee. Current GDP per capita grew 33% in the 1960s, reaching a peak growth of 142% in the 1970s, decelerating sharply back to 41% in the 1980s and 20% in the 1990s.[129]

From FY 1951 to FY 1979, the economy grew at an average rate of about 3.1 percent a year in constant prices, or at an annual rate of 1.0 percent per capita.[130] During this period, industry grew at an average rate of 4.5 percent a year, compared with an annual average of 3.0 percent for agriculture. They managed to tamp down on the natural business acumen and abilities of the population, yet some economists differed over the relative importance of those factors.[131]

This is a chart of trend of gross domestic product of India at market prices estimated by Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation[132] with figures in millions of Indian Rupees.

Year Gross Domestic Product per USD[1] Per Capita Income
(as % of US)
1950 100,850 4.79 3.12
1955 110,300 4.79 2.33
1960 174,070 4.77 2.88
1965 280,160 4.78 3.26
1970 462,490 7.56 2.23
1975 842,210 8.39 2.18


The Union government treasury reported annual revenue of £5–6 billion in 1975 thus registering an average annual growth of almost 12 per cent during the third quarter of the 20th century. Nevertheless, prime minister Indira proclaimed emergency and suspended the Constitution in 1975. About one-fifth of the national population were urban by 1975.[134]


Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, a believer in socialism, decided that the technological revolution in India needed maximisation of steel production. He, therefore, formed a government-owned company, Hindustan Steel Limited (HSL) and set up three steel plants in the 1950s.[135]


Service markets which would enjoy much lighter burden of regulation and other obstacles became more successful than still regulated sectors. For example, world-famous business process services are very lightly regulated.[8]

Economic liberalisation in India in the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century led to large changes in the economy.

This is a chart of trend of gross domestic product and foreign trade of India at market prices estimated by Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation with figures in millions of Indian Rupees. See also the IMF database.

Year Gross Domestic Product Exports Imports per USD[2] Inflation Index (2000=100) Per Capita Income
(as % of US)
1975 842,210 8.39 2.18
1980 1,380,334 90,290 135,960 7.86 18 2.08
1985 2,729,350 149,510 217,540 12.36 28 1.60
1990 5,542,706 406,350 486,980 17.50 42 1.56
1995 11,571,882 1,307,330 1,449,530 32.42 69 1.32
2000 20,791,898 2,781,260 2,975,230 44.94 100 1.26

[136] About one-fourth of the national population was urban by 2000.[137]


The Indian steel industry began expanding into Europe in the 21st century; in January 2007 India's Tata Steel made a successful $11.3 billion offer to buy European steel maker Corus Group. In 2006 Mittal Steel (based in London but with Indian management) acquired Arcelor for $34.3 billion to become the world's biggest steel maker, ArcelorMittal, with 10% of the world's output.[138]

The gross domestic product of India in 2007 was estimated at about 8 per cent that of the US. National Democratic Alliance led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), was in helm of economic affairs from 1998 to 2004. One of the many economic achievements of the government was the universal license in telecommunication field, which allows CDMA license holders to provide GSM services and vice versa, the BJP led government started off the Golden Quadrilateral road network connecting main metros of Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai and Kolkata along with various Indian regions. The project, completed in January 2012, was the most ambitious infrastructure projects of independent India.[139][140] Simultaneously, North-South and East-West highway projects were planned and construction was started,[141] but the later plans were dropped by Congress government.

The top 3% of the population still contribute 50% of the GDP. Education was made a fundamental right by amending the constitution of India[when?] and huge amount of money was pumped into the project under the name of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan.

Currently, the economic activity in India has taken on a dynamic character which is at once curtailed by creaky infrastructure, for example dilapidated roads and severe shortages of electricity, and cumbersome justice system[142] yet at the same time accelerated by the sheer enthusiasm and ambition of industrialists and the populace.[citation needed]

This is a chart of trend of gross domestic product and foreign trade of India at market prices estimated by Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation with figures in millions of Indian Rupees.

Year Gross Domestic Product Exports Imports per USD Inflation Index (2000=100) Per Capita Income
(as % of US)
2000 21,774,130 2,781,260 2,975,230 44.94 100 1.26
2005 36,933,690 7,120,870 8,134,660 44.09 121 1.64
2010 77,953,140 17,101,930 20,501,820 45.83 185 2.01
2012 100,020,620 23,877,410 31,601,590 54.93 219 2.90

For purchasing power parity comparisons, the US Dollar is exchanged at 9.46 Rupees only. Despite steady growth and continuous reforms since the Nineties, Indian economy is still mired in bureaucratic hurdles from coast to coast, this was confirmed by a World Bank report published in late 2006 ranking Pakistan (at 74th) well ahead of India (at 134th) based on ease of doing business.[143]

GDP history of India after Independence[edit]

India GDP Growth (at constant 2004–05 price)
GDP history of India after Independence[144]
Year India's GDP at Current Prices
(in crores INR)
India's GDP at Constant 2004–2005 Prices
(in crores INR)
Real Growth Rate
1950–51 ₹10,036 ₹279,618
1951–52 ₹10,596 ₹286,147 2.33%
1952–53 ₹10,449 ₹294,267 2.84%
1953–54 ₹11,378 ₹312,177 6.09%
1954–55 ₹10,689 ₹325,431 4.25%
1955–56 ₹10,861 ₹333,766 2.56%
1956–57 ₹12,965 ₹352,766 5.69%
1957–58 ₹13,255 ₹348,500 −1.21%
1958–59 ₹14,827 ₹374,948 7.59%
1959–60 ₹15,574 ₹383,153 2.19%
1960–61 ₹17,049 ₹410,279 7.08%
1961–62 ₹17,992 ₹423,011 3.10%
1962–63 ₹19,238 ₹431,960 2.12%
1963–64 ₹21,986 ₹453,829 5.06%
1964–65 ₹25,686 ₹488,247 7.58%
1965–66 ₹26,895 ₹470,402 −3.65%
1966–67 ₹30,613 ₹475,190 1.02%
1967–68 ₹35,976 ₹513,860 8.14%
1968–69 ₹37,938 ₹527,270 2.61%
1969–70 ₹41,722 ₹561,630 6.52%
1970–71 ₹44,382 ₹589,787 5.01%
1971–72 ₹47,221 ₹595,741 1.01%
1972–73 ₹51,943 ₹593,843 −0.32%
1973–74 ₹63,658 ₹620,872 4.55%
1974–75 ₹74,930 ₹628,079 1.16%
1975–76 ₹79,582 ₹684,634 9.00%
1976–77 ₹85,545 ₹693,191 1.25%
1977–78 ₹97,633 ₹744,972 7.47%
1978–79 ₹104,930 ₹785,965 5.50%
1979–80 ₹114,500 ₹745,083 −5.20%
1980–81 ₹136,838 ₹798,506 7.17%
1981–82 ₹160,214 ₹843,426 5.63%
1982–83 ₹178,985 ₹868,092 2.92%
1983–84 ₹209,356 ₹936,270 7.85%
1984–85 ₹230,526 ₹973,357 3.96%
1985–86 ₹262,717 ₹1,013,866 4.16%
1986–87 ₹292,924 ₹1,057,612 4.31%
1987–88 ₹332,068 ₹1,094,993 3.53%
1988–89 ₹396,295 ₹1,206,243 10.16%
1989–90 ₹456,540 ₹1,280,228 6.13%
1990–91 ₹531,814 ₹1,347,889 5.29%
1991–92 ₹613,528 ₹1,367,171 1.43%
1992–93 ₹703,723 ₹1,440,504 5.36%
1993–94 ₹805,486 ₹1,522,344 5.68%
1994–95 ₹955,386 ₹1,619,694 6.39%
1995–96 ₹1,118,586 ₹1,737,741 7.29%
1996–97 ₹1,301,788 ₹1,876,319 7.97%
1997–98 ₹1,447,613 ₹1,957,032 4.30%
1998–99 ₹1,668,739 ₹2,087,828 6.68%
1999–00 ₹1,858,205 ₹2,254,942 8.00%
2000–01 ₹2,000,743 ₹2,348,481 4.15%
2001–02 ₹2,175,260 ₹2,474,962 5.39%
2002–03 ₹2,343,864 ₹2,570,935 3.88%
2003–04 ₹2,625,819 ₹2,775,749 7.97%
2004–05 ₹2,971,464 ₹2,971,464 7.05%
2005–06 ₹3,390,503 ₹3,253,073 9.48%
2006–07 ₹3,953,276 ₹3,564,364 9.57%
2007–08 ₹4,582,086 ₹3,896,636 9.32%
2008–09 ₹5,303,567 ₹4,158,676 6.72%
2009–10 ₹6,108,903 ₹4,516,071 8.59%
2010–11 ₹7,248,860 ₹4,918,533 8.91%
2011–12 ₹8,391,691 ₹5,247,530 6.69%
2012–13 ₹9,388,876 ₹5,482,111 4.47%
2013–14 ₹10,472,807 ₹5,741,791 4.74%

See also[edit]


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Pre 1947[edit]

  • Anstey, Vera. The economic development of India (4th ed. 1952), 677pp; thorough scholarly coverage; focus on 20th century down to 1939
  • Bowen, H. V. Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833 (2006), 304pp
  • Balachandran, G., ed. India and the World Economy, 1850–1950 Oxford University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-19-567234-8.
  • Chaudhuri, K. N.Trade and Civilization in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750 (1985)
  • Derbyshire, I. D. (1987), "Economic Change and the Railways in North India, 1860–1914", Population Studies, 21 (3): 521–45, JSTOR 312641, doi:10.1017/s0026749x00009197 
  • Dutt, Romesh C. The Economic History of India under early British Rule, first published 1902, 2001 edition by Routledge, ISBN 978-0-415-24493-0
  • Farnie, DA (1979), The English Cotton Industry and the World Market, 1815–1896, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Pp. 414, ISBN 0-19-822478-8 
  • Ludden, David, ed. New Cambridge History of India: An Agrarian History of South Asia (1999).
  • Habib, Irfan. Agrarian System of Mughal India (1963, revised edition 1999).
  • Habib, Irfan. Atlas of the Mughal Empire: Political and Economic Maps (1982).
  • Habib, Irfan. Indian Economy, 1858–1914 (2006).
  • Kazanas, Nicholas, Economic principles in the Vedic tradition (2010)
  • Kumar, Dharma and Meghnad Desai, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of India: Volume 2, c. 1757–2003 (2nd ed. 2005).
  • Kumar, Prakash. Indigo Plantations and Science in Colonial India (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 334 pp
  • Lal, Deepak. The Hindu Equilibrium: India c. 1500 B.C.–2000 A.D. (2nd ed. 2005).
  • Lockwood, David. ‘’The Indian Bourgeoisie: A Political History of the Indian Capitalist Class in the Early Twentieth Century’’ (I.B. Tauris, 2012) 315 pages; focus on Indian entrepreneurs who benefited from the Raj, but ultimately sided with the Indian National Congress.
  • Mahajan, Nupam P. (1999) India's First Coinage. Retrieved 24 Feb 2005.
  • Micklethwait, John & Wooldridge, Adrian (2003). The Company: a short history of a revolutionary idea. Modern library chronicles. ISBN 0-679-64249-8.
  • Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (1946)
  • Peers, Douglas M. (2006), India under Colonial Rule 1700–1885, Harlow and London: Pearson Longmans. Pp. xvi, 163, ISBN 978-0582317383 .
  • Raychaudhuri, Tapan and Irfan Habib, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of India: Volume 1, c. 1200–c. 1750 (1982).
  • Roy, Tirthankar. The Economic History of India 1857–1947 (2002, 2006, 2011).
  • Roy, Tirthankar. India in the World Economy from Antiquity to the Present (2012).
  • Roy, Tirthankar (Summer 2002), "Economic History and Modern India: Redefining the Link", The Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, 16 (3): 109–30, JSTOR 3216953, doi:10.1257/089533002760278749 
  • Simmons, Colin (1985), "'De-Industrialization', Industrialization and the Indian Economy, c. 1850–1947", Modern Asian Studies, 19 (3): 593–622, JSTOR 312453, doi:10.1017/s0026749x00007745 
  • Tomlinson, B. R. The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970 (The New Cambridge History of India) (1996) excerpt and text search
  • Tomlinson, B. H. "India and the British Empire, 1880–1935," Indian Economic and Social History Review, (Oct 1975), 12#4 pp. 337–80
  • Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism

Gazetteers and statistics[edit]

  • The Imperial Gazetteer of India (26 vol, 1908–31), highly detailed description of all of India in 1901. online edition
  • Statistical abstract relating to British India, from 1895–96 to 1904–05 (London, 1906) full text online, 278pp

Since 1947[edit]

  • Bardhan, Pranab. Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India by (Princeton University Press; 2010) 172 pages;
  • Datt, Ruddar & Sundharam, K.P.M. (1965). Indian Economy (51st Revised ed. (2005)). S.Chand. ISBN 81-219-0298-3.
  • Das, Gurcharan. India Unbound: The Social and Economic Revolution from Independence to the Global Information Age (2002).
  • Frankel, Francine R. India's Political Economy, 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution (1978).
  • Kumar, Dharma and Meghnad Desai, eds. The Cambridge Economic History of India: Volume 2, c. 1751–c. 1970 (2nd ed. 2005) 1115pp; essays by scholars
  • Lal, Deepak. The Hindu Equilibrium: India c. 1500 B.C.-2000 A.D. (2nd ed. 2005).
  • Larue, C. Steven. The India Handbook (1997) (Regional Handbooks of Economic Development).
  • Majumdar, Sumit K. India's Late, Late Industrial Revolution: Democratizing Entrepreneurship (Cambridge University Press; 2012), 426 pages; focus on the entrepreneur-led revolution since 1990
  • Myrdal, Gunnar. Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (3 vol, 1968) 2284 pages; also 4th vol. on methodology (1970), focus on India and neighbors; by winner of Nobel prize in economics
  • Robb, Peter (2004), A History of India (Palgrave Essential Histories), Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Pp. xiv, 344, ISBN 0-333-69129-6 .
  • Roy, Tirthankar. Economic History of India 1857–1947 (3d ed., 2011).
  • Rudolph, Lloyd I. In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State (1987).
  • Sabhlok, Sanjeev. Breaking Free of Nehru (2008), Anthem Press. ISBN 978-81-905835-8-9.
  • Sankaran, S. Indian Economy: Problems, Policies and Development (Margham Publications, 7th ed. 1994).
  • Tomlinson, B. R. et al. The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970 (1996) (The New Cambridge History of India)
  • Ravinder Kaur (2012). "India Inc. and its Moral Discontent". Economic and Political Weekly. 
  • Wolpert, Stanley, ed. Encyclopedia of India (4 vol. 2005) comprehensive coverage by scholars

External links[edit]