Armoured warfare, mechanised warfare or tank warfare is the use of armoured fighting vehicles in modern warfare. It is a major component of modern methods of war; the premise of armoured warfare rests on the ability of troops to penetrate conventional defensive lines through use of manoeuvre by armoured units. Much of the application of armoured warfare depends on the use of tanks and related vehicles used by other supporting arms such as infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, other combat vehicles, as well as mounted combat engineers and other support units; the doctrine of armoured warfare was developed to break the static nature of World War I trench warfare on the Western Front, return to the 19th century school of thought that advocated manoeuvre and "decisive battle" outcomes in military strategy. Modern armoured warfare began during the First World War with the need to break the tactical and strategic stalemates forced on commanders on the Western Front by the effectiveness of entrenched defensive infantry armed with machine guns—known as trench warfare.
Under these conditions, any sort of advance was very slow and caused massive casualties. The development of the tank was motivated by the need to return manoeuvre to warfare, the only practical way to do so was to provide caterpillar traction to guns allowing them to overcome trenches while at the same time offering them armour protection against small arms fire as they were moving. Tanks were first developed in Britain and France in 1915, as a way of navigating the barbed wire and other obstacles of no-man's land while remaining protected from machine-gun fire. British Mark I tanks first went to action at the Somme, on 15 September 1916, but did not manage to break the deadlock of trench warfare; the first French employment of tanks, on 16 April 1917, using the Schneider CA, was a failure. In the Battle of Cambrai British tanks were more successful, broke a German trenchline system, the Hindenburg Line. Despite the unpromising beginnings, the military and political leadership in both Britain and France during 1917 backed large investments into armoured vehicle production.
This led to a sharp increase in the number of available tanks for 1918. The German Empire to the contrary, produced only a few tanks, late in the war. Twenty German A7V tanks were produced during the entire conflict, compared to over 4,400 French and over 2,500 British tanks of various kinds. Nonetheless, World War I saw the first tank-versus-tank battle, during the Second Battle of Villers-Bretonneux in April 1918, when a group of three German A7V tanks engaged a group of three British Mark IV tanks they accidentally met. After the final German Spring Offensives of 1918, Entente tanks were used in mass at the Battle of Soissons and Battle of Amiens, which ended the stalemate imposed by trench warfare on the Western Front, thus ended the war. Tactically, the deployment of armour during the war was typified by a strong emphasis on direct infantry support; the tank's main tasks were seen as crushing barbed wire and destroying machine-gun nests, facilitating the advance of foot soldiers. Theoretical debate focused on the question whether a "swarm" of light tanks should be used for this or a limited number of potent heavy vehicles.
Though in the Battle of Cambrai a large concentration of British heavy tanks effected a breakthrough, it was not exploited by armour. The manoeuvrability of the tank should at least in theory regain armies the ability to flank enemy lines. In practice, tank warfare during most of World War I was hampered by the technical immaturity of the new weapon system causing mechanical failure, limited numbers, general underutilisation, a low speed and a short range. Strategic use of tanks was slow to develop during and after World War I due to these technical limitations but due to the prestige role traditionally accorded to horse-mounted cavalry. An exception, on paper, was the Plan 1919 of Colonel John Fuller, who envisaged using the expected vast increase in armour production during 1919 to execute deep strategic penetrations by mechanised forces consisting of tanks and infantry carried by lorries, supported by aeroplanes, to paralyse the enemy command structure. Following the First World War, the technical and doctrinal aspects of armoured warfare became more sophisticated and diverged into multiple schools of doctrinal thought.
During the 1920s, only few tanks were produced. There were however, important technical developments. Various British and French commanders who had contributed to the origin of the tank, such as Jean Baptiste Eugène Estienne, B. H. Liddell Hart and J. F. C. Fuller, theorised about a possible future use of independent armoured forces, containing a large concentration of tanks, to execute deep strategic penetrations. Liddell Hart wrote many books about the subject propagating Fuller's theories; such doctrines were faced with the reality that during the 1920s the armoured vehicles, as early road transport in general, were unreliable, could not be used in sustained operations. Mainstream thought on the subject was more conservative and tried to integrate armoured vehicles into the existing infantry and cavalry organisation and tactics. Technical development focussed on the improvement of the suspension system and engine, to create vehicles that were faster, more reliable and had a better range than their WW I predecessors.
To save weight, such designs had thin armour plating and this inspired fitting small-calibre high-velocity guns in turrets, giving tanks a good antitank capacity. Both France and Britain built specialised infantry tanks, more armoured to provide infantry
Battle of Marathon
The Battle of Marathon took place in 490 BC, during the first Persian invasion of Greece. It was fought between the citizens of Athens, aided by Plataea, a Persian force commanded by Datis and Artaphernes; the battle was the culmination of the first attempt by Persia, under King Darius I, to subjugate Greece. The Greek army decisively defeated the more numerous Persians, marking a turning point in the Greco-Persian Wars; the first Persian invasion was a response to Athenian involvement in the Ionian Revolt, when Athens and Eretria had sent a force to support the cities of Ionia in their attempt to overthrow Persian rule. The Athenians and Eretrians had succeeded in capturing and burning Sardis, but they were forced to retreat with heavy losses. In response to this raid, Darius swore to burn down Eretria. According to Herodotus, Darius had his bow brought to him and shot an arrow "upwards towards heaven", saying as he did so: "Zeus, that it may be granted me to take vengeance upon the Athenians!".
Herodotus further writes that Darius charged one of his servants to say "Master, remember the Athenians" three times before dinner each day. At the time of the battle and Athens were the two largest city-states in Greece. Once the Ionian revolt was crushed by the Persian victory at the Battle of Lade in 494 BC, Darius began plans to subjugate Greece. In 490 BC, he sent a naval task force under Datis and Artaphernes across the Aegean, to subjugate the Cyclades, to make punitive attacks on Athens and Eretria. Reaching Euboea in mid-summer after a successful campaign in the Aegean, the Persians proceeded to besiege and capture Eretria; the Persian force sailed for Attica, landing in the bay near the town of Marathon. The Athenians, joined by a small force from Plataea, marched to Marathon, succeeded in blocking the two exits from the plain of Marathon; the Athenians sent a message asking for support to the Spartans. When the messenger arrived in Sparta, the Spartans were involved in a religious festival and gave this as a reason for not coming to aid of the Athenians.
The Athenians and their allies chose a location for the battle, with marshes and mountainous terrain, that prevented the Persian cavalry from joining the Persian infantry. Miltiades, the Athenian general, ordered a general attack against the Persian forces, composed of missile troops, he reinforced his flanks. The inward wheeling flanks enveloped the Persians; the Persian army broke in panic towards their ships, large numbers were slaughtered. The defeat at Marathon marked the end of the first Persian invasion of Greece, the Persian force retreated to Asia. Darius began raising a huge new army with which he meant to subjugate Greece. After Darius died, his son Xerxes I restarted the preparations for a second invasion of Greece, which began in 480 BC; the Battle of Marathon was a watershed in the Greco-Persian wars, showing the Greeks that the Persians could be beaten. The battle showed the Greeks that they were able to win battles without the Spartans, as they had relied on Sparta previously; this victory was due to the Athenians, Marathon raised Greek esteem of them.
Since the following two hundred years saw the rise of the Classical Greek civilization, enduringly influential in western society, the Battle of Marathon is seen as a pivotal moment in Mediterranean and European history. The main source for the Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus. Herodotus, called the "Father of History", was born in 484 BC in Halicarnassus, Asia Minor, he wrote his Enquiries around 440–430 BC, trying to trace the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars, which would still have been recent history. Herodotus's approach was novel, at least in Western society, he does seem to have invented "history" as we know it; as Holland has it: "For the first time, a chronicler set himself to trace the origins of a conflict not to a past so remote so as to be utterly fabulous, nor to the whims and wishes of some god, nor to a people's claim to manifest destiny, but rather explanations he could verify personally." Some subsequent ancient historians, despite following in his footsteps, criticised Herodotus, starting with Thucydides.
Thucydides chose to begin his history where Herodotus left off, may therefore have felt that Herodotus's history was accurate enough not to need re-writing or correcting. Plutarch criticised Herodotus in his essay On the malice of Herodotus, describing Herodotus as "Philobarbaros", for not being pro-Greek enough, which suggests that Herodotus might have done a reasonable job of being even-handed. A negative view of Herodotus was passed on to Renaissance Europe. However, since the 19th century his reputation has been rehabilitated by archaeological finds which have confirmed his version of events; the prevailing modern view is that Herodotus did a remarkable job in his Historiai, but that some of his specific details should be viewed with skepticism. There are still some historians who believe Herodotus made up much of his story; the Sicilian historian Diodorus Siculus, writing in the 1st century BC in his Bibliotheca Historica provides an
Guerrilla warfare is a form of irregular warfare in which a small group of combatants, such as paramilitary personnel, armed civilians, or irregulars. Guerrilla groups are a type of violent non-state actor; the Spanish word "guerrilla" is the diminutive form of "guerra". The term became popular during the early-19th century Peninsular War, when the Spanish and Portuguese people rose against the Napoleonic troops and fought against a superior army using the guerrilla strategy. In correct Spanish usage, a person, a member of a "guerrilla" unit is a "guerrillero" if male, or a "guerrillera" if female; the term "guerrilla" was used in English as early as 1809 to refer to the fighters, to denote a group or band of such fighters. However, in most languages guerrilla still denotes the specific style of warfare; the use of the diminutive evokes the differences in number and scope between the guerrilla army and the formal, professional army of the state. Guerrilla warfare is a type of asymmetric warfare: competition between opponents of unequal strength.
It is a type of irregular warfare: that is, it aims not to defeat an enemy, but to win popular support and political influence, to the enemy's cost. Accordingly, guerrilla strategy aims to magnify the impact of a small, mobile force on a larger, more-cumbersome one. If successful, guerrillas weaken their enemy by attrition forcing them to withdraw. Tactically, guerrillas avoid confrontation with large units and formations of enemy troops, but seek and attack small groups of enemy personnel and resources to deplete the opposing force while minimizing their own losses; the guerrilla prizes mobility and surprise, organizing in small units and taking advantage of terrain, difficult for larger units to use. For example, Mao Zedong summarized basic guerrilla tactics at the beginning of the Chinese "Second Revolutionary Civil War" as:"The enemy advances, we retreat. At least one author credits the ancient Chinese work The Art of War with inspiring Mao's tactics. In the 20th century, other communist leaders, including North Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh used and developed guerrilla warfare tactics, which provided a model for their use elsewhere, leading to the Cuban "foco" theory and the anti-Soviet Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.
In addition to traditional military methods, guerrilla groups may rely on destroying infrastructure, using improvised explosive devices, for example. They also rely on logistical and political support from the local population and foreign backers, are embedded within it, many guerrilla groups are adept at public persuasion through propaganda. Many guerrilla movements today rely on children as combatants, porters, informants, in other roles, which has drawn international condemnation. There is no accepted definition of "terrorism", the term is used as a political tactic by belligerents to denounce opponents whose status as terrorists is disputed. Contrary to some terrorist groups, guerrillas work in open positions as armed units, try to hold and seize land, do not refrain from fighting enemy military force in battle and apply pressure to control or dominate territory and population. While the primary concern of guerrillas is the enemy's active military units, terrorists are concerned with non-military agents and target civilians.
Guerrilla forces principally fight in accordance with the law of war. In this sense, they respect the rights of innocent civilians by refraining from targeting them. According to the Ankara Center for Crisis and Policy Studies, terrorists do not limit their actions and terrorise civilians by putting fear in people's hearts and kill innocent foreigners in the country. Irregular warfare, based on elements characteristic of modern guerrilla warfare, has existed throughout the battles of many ancient civilizations; the growth of guerrilla warfare in the 20th century was inspired in part by theoretical works on guerrilla warfare, starting with the Manual de Guerra de Guerrillas by Matías Ramón Mella written in the 19th century and, more Mao Zedong's On Guerrilla Warfare, Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare, Lenin's text of the same name, all written after the successful revolutions carried by them in China and Russia, respectively. Those texts characterized the tactic of guerrilla warfare as, according to Che Guevara's text, being"used by the side, supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms for use in defense against oppression".
The Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu, in his The Art of War or 600 BC to 501 BC, was the earliest to propose the use of guerrilla warfare. This directly inspired the development of modern guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla tactics were employed by prehistoric tribal warriors against enemy tribes. Evidence of conventional warfare, on the other hand, did not emerge until 3100 BC in Egypt and Mesopotamia. Since the Enlightenment, ideologies such as nationalism, liberalism and religious fundamentalism have played an important role in shaping insurgencies and guerrilla warfare; the Moroccan national hero Mohamed ben Abdelkrim el-Khattabi, along with his father, unified the Moroccan
A counter-insurgency or counterinsurgency is defined by the United States Department of State as "comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes". An insurgency is a rebellion against a constituted authority when those taking part in the rebellion are not recognized as belligerents, it is "the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region. As such, it is a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political and influence activities to be effective." Counter-insurgency campaigns of duly-elected or politically recognized governments take place during war, occupation by a foreign military or police force, when internal conflicts that involve subversion and armed rebellion occur. The most effective counterinsurgency campaigns "integrate and synchronize political, security and informational components that reinforce governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the population.
COIN strategies should be designed to protect the population from insurgent violence. According to scholars, it is crucial to know what this strategy was designed for to understand it comprehensively. COIN strategy aims to achieve the support of local population for the government created by host nation; the main point of the modern counterinsurgency campaign is not kill and capture insurgents, but to improve living conditions, support government in providing services for people and eliminate any support for insurgency. Counter-insurgency is conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda, psy-ops, assassinations. Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military, political, economic and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency. To understand counter-insurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend the dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Insurgents capitalize on societal problems called gaps.
When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate. In The Insurgent Archipelago John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of the golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st-century, he defines this distinction as'Maoist' and'post-Maoist' insurgency. William B. Caldwell wrote: The law of armed conflict requires that, to use force, "combatants" must distinguish individuals presenting a threat from innocent civilians; this basic principle is accepted by all disciplined militaries. In the counterinsurgency, disciplined application of force is more critical because our enemies camouflage themselves in the civilian population. Our success in Iraq depends on our ability to treat the civilian population with humanity and dignity as we remain ready to defend ourselves or Iraqi civilians when a threat is detected; the third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado is the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counter-insurgency.
In his Reflexiones Militares, published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are due to real grievances: "A state rises up without the fault of its governors." He advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love". The majority of counter-insurgency efforts by major powers in the last century have been spectacularly unsuccessful; this may be attributed to a number of causes. First, as B. H. Liddell Hart pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach, a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force, he showed as a prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars. Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time.
However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon's army had no means of combatting the rebels, in the end their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had no choice but to abandon the situation. Counter-insurgency efforts may be successful when the insurgents are unpopular; the Philippine–American War, the Shining Path in Peru, the Malayan Emergency in Malaya have been the sites of failed insurgencies. Hart points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs' ability to materialize out of the desert and disappear again left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish the Turkish forces off.
In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietna
Defensive fighting position
A defensive fighting position is a type of earthwork constructed in a military context large enough to accommodate anything from one soldier to a fire team. Tobruk type positions are named after the system of defensive positions constructed by the Italian Army at Tobruk, Libya. After Tobruk fell to the Allies in January 1941, the existing positions were modified and expanded by the Australian Army which, along with other Allied forces, reused them in the Siege of Tobruk. A foxhole is one type of defensive strategic position, it is a "small pit used for cover for one or two personnel, so constructed that the occupants can fire from it". It is known more within United States Army slang as a "fighting position" or as a "ranger grave", it is known as a "fighting hole" in the United States Marine Corps, a "gun-pit" in Australian Army terminology, a "fighting pit" in the New Zealand Army. In British and Canadian military argot it equates to a range of terms including slit trench, or fire trench, a sangar or shell scrape, or simply—but less accurately—as a "trench".
During the American Civil War the term "rifle pit" was recognized by both U. S. Army and Confederate Army forces. A protected emplacement or concealed post in which one or several machine guns are set up is known in U. S. English as a machine gun nest. During the fighting in North Africa, U. S. forces employed the shell scrape. This was a shallow excavation allowing one soldier to lie horizontally while shielding his body from nearby shell bursts and small arms fire; the slit trench soon proved inadequate in this role, as the few inches of dirt above the soldier's body could be penetrated by bullets or shell fragments. It exposed the user to assault by enemy tanks, which could crush a soldier inside a shallow slit trench by driving into it making a simple half-turn. After the Battle of Kasserine Pass, U. S. troops adopted the modern foxhole, a vertical, bottle-shaped hole that allowed a soldier to stand and fight with head and shoulders exposed. The foxhole widened near the bottom to allow a soldier to crouch down while under intense artillery fire or tank attack.
Foxholes could be enlarged to two-soldier fighting positions, as well as excavated with firing steps for crew-served weapons or sumps for water drainage or live enemy grenade disposal. The Germans used hardened fortifications in North Africa and in other fortifications, such as the Atlantic Wall, that were in essence foxholes made from concrete; the Germans knew them as Ringstände. The Germans put a turret from an obsolete French or German tank on the foxhole; this gave the gunner protection from shrapnel and small arms. Modern militaries publish and distribute elaborate field manuals for the proper construction of DFPs in stages. A shallow "shell scrape" is dug, much like a shallow grave, which provides limited protection; each stage develops the fighting position increasing its effectiveness, while always maintaining functionality. In this way, a soldier can improve the position over time, while being able to stop at any time and use the position in a fight. A DFP is a pit or trench dug deep enough to stand in, with only the head exposed, a small step at the bottom, called a fire step, that allows the soldier to crouch into to avoid fire and tank treads.
The fire step slopes down into a deeper narrow slit called a grenade sump at the bottom to allow for live grenades to be kicked in to minimize damage from grenade fragments. When possible, DFPs are revetted with star pickets and wire or local substitutes. Ideally, the revetting will be dug in below ground level so as to minimise damage from fire and tank tracks; the revetting helps the DFP resist cave-in from near misses from artillery or mortars and tank tracks. Time permitting, DFPs can be enlarged to allow a machine gun crew and ammunition to be protected, as well as additional overhead cover via timbers. In training, DFPs are dug by hand or in some cases by mechanical trench diggers. On operations, explosives shaped charges, may be used to increase the speed of development. Developing and maintaining DFPs is a constant and ongoing task for soldiers deployed in combat areas. For this reason, in some armies, infantry soldiers are referred to as "gravel technicians", as they spend so much time digging.
Because of the large expenditure in effort and materials required to build a DFP, it is important to ensure that the DFP is sited. In order to site the DFP, the officer in charge should view the ground from the same level that the intended user's weapons will be sighted from; the OIC will need to lie on his belly to obtain the required perspective. This ensures. Pillbox Sangar Spider hole Shell scrape Tett turret Trench warfare All-around defense/Perimeter defense Entrenching tool Westrate, Edwin V.. Forward Observer. New York City: Stratford Press. U. S. WWII Newsmap, "Foxholes are Life Savers", hosted by the UNT Libraries Digital Collections
Jungle warfare is a term used to cover the special techniques needed for military units to survive and fight in jungle terrain. It has been the topic of extensive study by military strategists, was an important part of the planning for both sides in many conflicts, including World War II and the Vietnam War; the jungle has a variety of effects on military operations. Dense vegetation can limit lines of sight and arcs of fire, but can provide ample opportunity for camouflage and plenty of material with which to build fortifications. Jungle terrain without good roads, can be inaccessible to vehicles and so makes supply and transport difficult, which in turn places a premium on air mobility; the problems of transport make engineering resources important as they are needed to improve roads, build bridges and airfields, improve water supplies. Jungle environments can be inherently unhealthy, with various tropical diseases that have to be prevented or treated by medical services; the terrain can make it difficult to deploy armoured forces, or any other kind of forces on any large scale.
Successful jungle fighting emphasises effective small unit tactics and leadership. Throughout world history, forests have played significant roles in many of the most historic battles. For example, in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest between the Romans and the Germanic tribes in 9 CE, the Germans used the forest to ambush the Romans. In ancient China, the Chinese Empire planted forests on its strategic borderland to thwart nomadic attacks. For example, the Northern Song Dynasty constructed and maintained an extensive defensive forest in present-day Hebei. At the start of WW2 in the Far East, the Japanese Imperial Forces were able to advance on all fronts. In the Malayan Campaign and again they infiltrated through the jungle to bypass static British positions based on road blocks so that they could cut the British supply line and attack the British defences from all sides. In early 1942, the fighting in Burma at the start of the Burma Campaign took on a similar aspect and resulted in one of the longest retreats in British military history.
Most members of the British Indian Army left Burma with the belief that the Japanese were unstoppable in the jungle. The first action that began to dispel this myth of invincibility would come from the actions of the Chindits; the Chindits were a special force of 3,500 which in February 1942 launched a deep penetration raid, into Japanese occupied Burma. They went in on foot using mules to carry supplies; the operation was not a military success, but was a propaganda boost for the Allies, because it showed that Allied forces could move and fight in jungle terrain well away from roads. On the back of the propaganda success, Orde Wingate, the eccentric commander of the Chindits, was given the resources to increase his command to divisional size and the USAAF supplied the 1st Air Commando Group to support his operations; the availability of air transport revolutionized Wingate's operational choices. In February 1944 Operation Thursday was launched, air transport support supplied 1st Air to allow the Chindits to set up air supplied bases deep behind enemy lines from which aggressive combat patrols could be sent out to interdict Japanese supply lines and disrupt rear echelon forces.
This in turn forced the Japanese 18th Division to pull front-line troops from the battle against X Force, advancing through Northern Burma to protect the men building the Ledo Road. When the Japanese closed on a base and got within artillery range the base could be abandoned and set up in another remote location; the ability to sustain the bases that relied on air power in the coming decades would prove a template for many similar operations. After the first Chindits expedition, thanks to the training the regular forces were receiving and the example of the Chindits and new divisional tactics, the regular units of the Fourteenth Army started to get the measure of both the jungle and the enemy; when the Japanese launched their late 1943 Arakan offensive they infiltrated Allied lines to attack the 7th Indian Infantry Division from the rear, overrunning the divisional HQ. Unlike previous occasions on which this had happened, the Allied forces stood firm against the attack and supplies were dropped to them by parachute.
In the Battle of the Admin Box from 5 February to 23 February, the Japanese were unable to break through the defended perimeter of the box. The Japanese switched their attack to the central front but again the British fell back into defensive box of Imphal, the Kohima redoubt. In falling back to the defensive positions around Imphal the leading British formations found their retreat cut by Japanese forces, but unlike they took that attitude that if the Japanese where behind them they were just as cut off as the British; the situation maps of the fighting along the roads leading to Imphal resembled a slice of marble cake as both sides used the jungle to outflank each other. Another major change by the British was that use of air support both as an offensive weapon to replace artillery, as a logistical tool to transport men and equipment. For example, the 5th Indian Infantry Division was airlifted straight from the now quieter Arakan front up to the central front and were in action within days of arriving.
By the end of the campaigning season both Kohima and Imphal had been relieved and the Japanese were in full retreat. The lessons learnt in Burma of how to fight in the jungle and how to use air transport to move troops around would lay the foundations of how to conduct large scale jungle campaigns in future wars. After the fall of Malaya and Singapore in 1942, a few British officers, such as Freddie Spencer Chapman, eluded c
Area denial weapon
An area denial weapon or Anti Access/Area Denial weapon system is a device or a strategy used to prevent an adversary from occupying or traversing an area of land, sea or air. The specific method used does not have to be effective in preventing passage as long as it is sufficient to restrict, slow down, or endanger the opponent; some area denial weapons pose long-lasting risks to anyone entering the area to civilians, thus are controversial. In medieval warfare and sturdy stakes were buried at the bottom of long lines of ditches, pointed end up diagonally, in order to prevent cavalry charges in a given area. If the stakes were spotted, soldiers would be forced to dismount and give up their advantage as cavalry as well as becoming easier targets; the correct layout of these extensive lines of ditches and the quality control of stake size and placement was part of the craft of war. A more modern version, allowing quicker dispersal and providing the advantage of being hidden more are caltrops, though items bearing close similarity had been in use for most of antiquity.
Many variants were used, such as boards with metal hooks, as described during battles of Julius Caesar. Passive fortification—ditches and obstacles such as dragon's teeth and Czech hedgehogs—were used as anti-tank measures during World War II. Simple rows or clusters of sharpened sticks, the use of small caltrops have been a feature of anti-infantry warfare since antiquity. However, due to the difficulty of mass-producing them in the pre-modern age, they were used except in the defense of limited areas or chokepoints during sieges, where they were used to help seal breaches. Increasing ease of production still did not prevent these methods from falling out of favor from the late Middle Ages onward. Caltrops are still sometimes used in modern conflicts, such as during the Korean War, where Chinese troops wearing only light shoes, were vulnerable. In modern times, special caltrops are sometimes used against wheeled vehicles with pneumatic tires; some South American urban guerrillas such as the Tupamaros and Montoneros, who called them "miguelitos," have used caltrops to avoid pursuit after ambushes.
The most common planted by hand or dispersed by artillery. Some modern prototypes experiment with automatic guns or artillery-delivered ammunitions that are fired only after remote sensing detects enemies. Booby traps or improvised explosive devices in sufficient concentration qualify as area denial weapons, though they are much easier to clear and pose less long-term danger. During an armed conflict there are several methods of countering land mines; these include using armoured vehicles to negate the effects of anti-personnel land mines. Land mines can be cleared either by hand, or by using specialised equipment such as tanks equipped with flails. Explosives can be used to clear mine fields, either by artillery bombardment, or with specialised charges such as Bangalore torpedoes, the Antipersonnel Obstacle Breaching System and the Python Minefield Breaching System. 156 states are parties to the Ottawa Treaty under which they have agreed not to use, produce or transfer anti-personnel mines. Anti-ship missiles are a modern method of stopping a potential adversary from attacking by sea.
China, North Korea and Iran all have developed or imported such weapons in an effort to develop a modern anti-access or A2/AD strategy to counter modern United States weaponry. In response to China’s pursuit of such A2/AD capabilities, the United States has developed the AirSea Battle doctrine. Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy Studies has suggested that AirSea Battle is an escalatory military posture that entails restructuring United States military forces and ordering additional weapons systems, that AirSea Battle could “lead to an arms race with China, which could culminate in a nuclear war.”Other methods of area denial at a strategic level include aircraft carriers, surface-to-air missiles, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, electronic warfare and interceptor aircraft. Various CBRNE weapons can be used for area denial, as long. Fallout from nuclear weapons might be used in such a role. While never employed in this form, its use had been suggested by Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War.
Anthrax spores can contaminate the ground for long periods of time, thus providing a form of area denial. However, the short-term effects are to be low - the psychological effects on an opponent would be more significant; the massive use of defoliants such as Agent Orange can be used as an interdiction measure because they leave areas empty of any form of vegetation cover. In the desert-like terrain that ensues, it is impossible for the enemy to travel without being seen, there is little cover in case of an attack from the air. Many chemical weapons produce toxic effects on any personnel in an affected area. However, this has no tactical value, as the effects of indirect exposure do not develop fast or enough - though again, the psychological effect upon an enemy aware of the chemical usage may be considerable. There are however some chemical agents that are by design non-degrading, such as the nerve agent VX. Sulfur mustard was extensively used by both German and allied forces on the west front in World War I as an effective area-denial weapon through contaminating large land stripes by extensive shelling with HD/Gelbkreuz ordnance