Trevor Fetter is an American businessman, the lead independent director of The Hartford Financial Services Group, the former president, CEO, chairman of Tenet Healthcare. He is a senior lecturer in the General Management unit of Harvard Business School, teaching Leadership and Corporate Accountability in its MBA program, he has appeared several times on the “100 Most Influential People in Healthcare" list compiled by Modern Healthcare. Fetter was born and raised in La Jolla, where he graduated from La Jolla High School, he received his bachelor's degree in economics from Stanford University, in 1982 earned an M. B. A from Harvard Business School, in 1986. Fetter began his career with Merrill Lynch Capital Markets, providing corporate finance and advisory services for the entertainment and health care industries. In 1988, he joined Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. as executive vice-president, was promoted to chief financial officer. Fetter served as chairman, president and CEO of Tenet Healthcare between 2003 and 2017, where he oversaw corporate functions, including information systems, law, human resources and administration.

In February 2000, he left Tenet to serve as CEO of Broadlane, Inc.. In November 2002, he returned to Tenet to serve as company president, was named acting CEO in May 2003. Fetter now serves as the lead independent director of The Hartford Financial Services Group, is a senior lecturer of Business Administration at Harvard Business School, where he teaches leadership and corporate accountability, he has been named, several times, on Modern Healthcare's “100 Most Influential People in Healthcare" list, ranking No. 13 in 2014. Fetter was chairman of the Federation of American Hospitals, from March 2009 to March 2010, during the passage of The Affordable Care Act, he is a past member of the Business Roundtable. Other affiliations include: TowerBrook Capital Partners – senior advisory board member Stanford University School of Medicine Board of Fellows Trimedx, Inc. – independent director Catalina Island Conservancy – benefactor member United States of Care – Founder's Council member Smithsonian Institution National Board – member He is married to Melissa Foster, was wed in Episcopal Church by the same Bishop who had performed his parents' marriage ceremony 26 years earlier.

In 2017, Trevor and Melissa Fetter received the Humanitarian Award from the Anti-Defamation League. Melissa Fetter was appointed chair of the board of the Dallas Museum of Art in December 2018. Tenet Healthcare Video, "Strong Effect from Healthcare Reform", CNBC, May 6, 2014. "The Rebirth of Tenet Healthcare" by Bradford Pearson March 6, 2013. Retrieved 2019-01-04. "CEO to know: Trevor Fetter of Tenet Healthcare" Becker's Hospital Review, ASC COMMUNICATIONS, Dec 31, 2014. Retrieved 2019-01-04. "Trevor Fetter - President and chief executive officer, Tenet Healthcare Corporation" Reference for Business. Retrieved 2019-01-04. "Key Trends Shaping Healthcare in the U. S. and the Impact on Detroit" Economic Club of Detroit. Retrieved 2019-01-04. Forbes Wall Street Journal

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit imposing the death penalty for felony murder. The Supreme Court has created a two-part test to determine when the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for felony murder. Under Enmund v. Florida, the death penalty may not be imposed on someone who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place. However, under Tison v. Arizona, the death penalty may be imposed on someone, a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life; the Court's proportionality principle has three components, two of which are objective and one of, subjective. The objective evidence the Court looks for is the legislative judgment of the states and the behavior of sentencing juries. Examining nearly the same question a mere five years apart, the Court came to two different conclusions—that the Eighth Amendment allows the death penalty for felony murder in some cases but not others, that the dividing line is the situation presented by Tison.

In Coker v. Georgia, the Court had rejected the death penalty for rape because only one state—Georgia—allowed that punishment. Accordingly, the task for the Court was to count the number of states that allowed the death penalty for felony murder to see if the death penalty was a comparatively rare sanction for that crime; this enumeration was not as simple. In 1982, 36 states authorized the death penalty. In four, felony murder was not a capital crime. In 11 others, proof of some culpable mental state was an element of capital murder. In 13 states, aggravating circumstances above and beyond the fact of the murder itself were required before imposing the death penalty; this left eight states—out of 36—allowed the death penalty for participating in a felony in which a murder was committed. The Court concluded that this evidence "weighs on the side of rejecting capital punishment for the crime at issue"—felony murder for a minor participant who did not kill anyone or intend to kill anyone. By 1987, the counting of the states had shifted.

In response to Enmund, four states had modified their capital punishment statutes to reject the death penalty for murder committed in the course of a felony when the participant exhibited reckless indifference to human life. The Court observed in Tison that of the states that authorized the death penalty for felony murder, only 11 forbade it for major participants in the felony who exhibited reckless indifference to human life. By the time of Tison, some state supreme courts had expressly interpreted Enmund to allow the death penalty in these cases. "The jury... is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved" in the criminal justice system. In Enmund the Court recited that of 362 appellate decisions since 1954, only 6 involved a death sentence for a nontriggerman convicted of felony murder, all 6 executions took place in 1955; this was comparatively rarer than death sentences for rape, of which there had been 72 between 1955 and 1977.

As of October 1, 1981, there were 796 people on death row in the United States, of whom only 3 had been sentenced to death absent a finding that the defendant had killed someone or intended that a killing take place. In Tison, the fact that since Enmund, state appellate courts continued to review and approve death sentences for defendants convicted of felony murder who were major participants in the underlying felony and had exhibited extreme indifference to human life persuaded the Court that juries still considered the death penalty an appropriate punishment for at least some defendants convicted of felony murder. Faced with the objective evidence suggesting that legislatures and sentencing juries did not uniformly reject the death penalty for all defendants convicted of felony murder, the Court had to limit the death penalty to a discrete and narrow category of felony murder defendants based on its estimation of which category would best effectuate the goals of retribution and deterrence.

The Enmund Court stressed that the propriety of the death penalty must be measured in light of Enmund's own conduct. The Tison Court added that the individualized determination incorporates an assessment of the mental state with which the defendant commits a crime, because a more culpable mental state merits a more severe punishment. In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court had struck down a mandatory death penalty statute because it failed to provide for individualized consideration at sentencing; the rule fashioned by Enmund and Tison accommodated this concern by ensuring that only felony murder defendants who had a sufficiently culpable mental state received the death penalty. In an earlier case the Court had remarked that "capital punishment can serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation." The Tison rule retreats from this belief with its implicit assessment that the death penalty can deter those who act recklessly. "A narrow focus on the question of whether or not a given defendant intended to kill... is a unsatisfactory means of definitively distinguishing the most culpable and dangerous of murderers."

In the Court's estimation, "reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an intent to kill." Imposing the death penalty on a major participant in a felony who exhibits reckless indifference to human life is justified because of the interest in expressing retribution.