Sir Robert Filmer was an English political theorist who defended the divine right of kings. His best known work, published posthumously in 1680, was the target of numerous Whig attempts at rebuttal, including Algernon Sidney's Discourses Concerning Government, James Tyrrell's Patriarcha Non Monarcha and John Locke's Two Treatises of Government. Filmer wrote critiques of Thomas Hobbes, John Milton, Hugo Grotius and Aristotle; the eldest child of Sir Edward Filmer and Elizabeth Filmer of East Sutton in Kent, he studied at Trinity College, where he matriculated in 1604. He did not take a degree and was admitted to Lincoln's Inn on 24 January 1605, he was called to the bar in 1613 but there is no evidence he practised law. He bought the porter's lodge at Westminster Abbey for use as his town house. On 8 August 1618 he married Anne Heton in St Leonard's Church in London, with their first child baptised in February 1620. On 24 January 1619, King James I knighted Filmer at Newmarket. Filmer's father died in November 1629 and Filmer, as the oldest child, took over his father's manor house and estate.
He became an officer of the county militia in the 1630s. Filmer's eldest son Sir Edward was active in opposing the Long Parliament and Filmer stood surety for £5000 to ensure the release of his friend Sir Roger Twysden, imprisoned for his part in the Kentish petition; the Parliamentary army looted his manor house in September 1642 and by the next year his properties in Westminster and Kent were being taxed to fund the Parliamentary cause. Filmer was investigated by the county committee on suspicion of supporting the King, though no firm evidence was uncovered. Filmer asked the investigators to note "how far he hath binn from medling on either side in deeds or so much as words." However one of his tenants claimed that Filmer had hidden arms for the Royalists, although this was a false charge. For that reason, Filmer was imprisoned for some years in Leeds Castle and his estates were sequestered. Filmer died on or about 23 May 1653, his funeral took place in East Sutton on 30 May, where he was buried in the church, surrounded by descendants of his to the tenth generation.
He was survived by his wife, three sons and one daughter, one son and one daughter having predeceased him. His son Robert, was created the first of the Filmer baronets in 1674, his other son, Beversham Filmer, became the owner of Luddenham Court, near Faversham, who passed it on through his family. Filmer was middle-aged when the controversy between the King and the House of Commons roused him to literary activity, his writings provide examples of the doctrines held by the extreme section of the Divine Right party. The fullest expression of Filmer's thoughts is found in Patriarcha, or the Natural Power of Kings, published posthumously in 1680, but begun in the 1620s and certainly completed before the Civil War began in 1642. According to Christopher Hill, "The whole argument of... Patriarcha, of his works published earlier in the 1640s and 1650s, is based on Old Testament history from Genesis onwards". Filmer's modern proponents counter this by noting that the focus on Filmer's biblical arguments neglects his stronger arguments from history and logic.
His position was enunciated by the works. Of the Blasphemie against the Holy Ghost, from 1646 or 1647, argued against Calvinists, starting from John Calvin's doctrine on blasphemy; the Freeholders Grand Inquest concerned English constitutional history. Filmer's early published works did not receive much attention, while Patriarcha circulated only in manuscript. Anarchy of a Limited and Mixed Monarchy was an attack on a treatise about monarchy by Philip Hunton, who had maintained that the king's prerogative was not superior to the authority of the Houses of Parliament. Filmer's Observations concerning the Original of Government upon Mr Hobbes's Leviathan, Mr Milton against Salmasius, H. Grotius' De jure belli ac pacis appeared in 1652. In line with its title, it attacks several political classics, the De jure belli ac pacis of Grotius, the Defensio pro Populo Anglicano of John Milton, the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes, it is the source for the famous quotation from Hobbes, asserting that people "as mushrooms... sprung out of the earth without any obligation one to another."
The pamphlet entitled The Power of Kings, in particular, of the King of England was first published in 1680. Filmer's theory is founded upon the statement that the government of a family by the father is the true origin and model of all government. In the beginning God gave authority to Adam, who had complete control over his descendants over life and death itself. From Adam this authority was inherited by Noah. Here Filmer is most to be quoting the legend of Noah sailing up the Mediterranean and allocating the three continents of the Old World to the rule of his three sons; this assumes that from Shem and Japheth the patriarchs inherited the absolute power which they exercised over their families and servants, that it is from these patriarchs that all kings and governors derive their authority, therefore absolute, founded on divine right. The difficulty inherent in judging the validity of claims to power by men who claim to be acting upon the "secret" will of God was disregarded by Filmer, who held that it altered in no way the nature of such power, based on the natural right of a supreme father to hold sway.
The king is free from all human control. He can not be bound by the acts of his predecessors.
Tabula rasa is the epistemological theory that individuals are born without built-in mental content and that therefore all knowledge comes from experience or perception. Proponents of tabula rasa disagree with the doctrine of innatism which holds that the mind is born in possession of certain knowledge. Proponents of the tabula rasa theory favour the "nurture" side of the nature versus nurture debate when it comes to aspects of one's personality and emotional behaviour and sapience. Tabula rasa is a Latin phrase translated as "clean slate" in English and originates from the Roman tabula used for notes, blanked by heating the wax and smoothing it; this equates to the English term "blank slate" which refers to the emptiness of a slate prior to it being written on with chalk. Both may be renewed by melting the wax of the tablet or by erasing the chalk on the slate. In Western philosophy, the concept of tabula rasa can be traced back to the writings of Aristotle who writes in his treatise "Περί Ψυχῆς" of the "unscribed tablet."
In one of the more well-known passages of this treatise he writes that: Haven't we disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element, when we said that mind is in a sense whatever is thinkable, though it is nothing until it has thought? What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing stands written: this is what happens with mind; this idea was further developed in Ancient Greek philosophy by the Stoic school. Stoic epistemology emphasizes that the mind starts blank, but acquires knowledge as the outside world is impressed upon it; the doxographer Aetius summarizes this view as "When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanding part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon." Diogenes Laërtius attributes a similar belief to the Stoic Zeno of Citium when he writes in Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers that: Perception, again, is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal.
In the eleventh century, the theory of tabula rasa was developed more by the Persian philosopher Avicenna. He argued that the "...human intellect at birth resembled a tabula rasa, a pure potentiality, actualized through education and comes to know," and that knowledge is attained through "...empirical familiarity with objects in this world from which one abstracts universal concepts," which develops through a "...syllogistic method of reasoning. He further argued that the intellect itself "...possesses levels of development from the static/material intellect, that potentiality can acquire knowledge to the active intellect, the state of the human intellect at conjunction with the perfect source of knowledge."In the twelfth century, the Andalusian-Islamic philosopher and novelist, Ibn Tufail, known as "Abubacer" or "Ebn Tophail" in the West, demonstrated the theory of tabula rasa as a thought experiment through his Arabic philosophical novel, Hayy ibn Yaqzan, in which he depicted the development of the mind of a feral child "from a tabula rasa to that of an adult, in complete isolation from society" on a desert island, through experience alone.
The Latin translation of his philosophical novel, entitled Philosophus Autodidactus, published by Edward Pococke the Younger in 1671, had an influence on John Locke's formulation of tabula rasa in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas brought the Aristotelian and Avicennian notions to the forefront of Christian thought; these notions contrasted with the held Platonic notions of the human mind as an entity that preexisted somewhere in the heavens, before being sent down to join a body here on Earth. St. Bonaventure was one of the fiercest intellectual opponents of Aquinas, offering some of the strongest arguments toward the Platonic idea of the mind; the writings of Avicenna, Ibn Tufail, Aquinas on the tabula rasa theory stood unprogressed and untested for several centuries. For example, the late medieval English jurist Sir John Fortescue, in his work In Praise of the Laws of England, takes for granted the notion of tabula rasa, stressing it as the basis of the need for the education of the young in general, of young princes specifically.
"Therefore, whilst you are young and your mind is as it were a clean slate, impress on it these things, lest in future it be impressed more pleasurably with images of lesser worth." The modern idea of the theory, however, is attributed to John Locke's expression of the idea in Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In Locke's philosophy, tabula rasa was the theory that at birth the mind is a "blank slate" without rules for processing data, that data is added and rules for processing are form
Benjamin Ricketson Tucker was an American 19th-century proponent of individualist anarchism which he called "unterrified Jeffersonianism" and editor and publisher of the American individualist anarchist periodical Liberty. Born on April 17, 1854 in South Dartmouth, Tucker made his editorial debut in anarchist circles in 1876, when Ezra Heywood published Tucker's English translation of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's classic work What is Property?. In 1877, he published his first original journal Radical Review. From August 1881 to April 1908, Tucker published the periodical Liberty, "widely considered to be the finest individualist-anarchist periodical issued in the English language"; the periodical was instrumental in developing and formalizing the individualist anarchist philosophy through publishing essays and serving as a format for debate. Beside Tucker, contributors included Lysander Spooner, Gertrude Kelly, Auberon Herbert, Dyer Lum, Joshua K. Ingalls, John Henry Mackay, Victor Yarros, Wordsworth Donisthorpe, James L. Walker, J. William Lloyd, Florence Finch Kelly, Voltairine de Cleyre, Steven T. Byington, John Beverley Robinson, Jo Labadie, Lillian Harman and Henry Appleton.
Included in its masthead is a quote from Proudhon saying that liberty is "Not the Daughter But the Mother of Order". After moving Liberty from Boston to New York in 1892, Tucker opened his Unique Book Shop in New York in 1906, promoting "Egoism in Philosophy, Anarchism in Politics, Iconoclasm in Art". In 1908, a fire destroyed Tucker's uninsured printing equipment and his thirty-year stock of books and pamphlets. Tucker's lover Pearl Johnson, twenty-five years his junior, was pregnant with their daughter Oriole Tucker. Six weeks after his daughter's birth, Tucker closed both Liberty and the book shop and retired with his family to France. In 1913, he came out of retirement for two years to contribute articles and letters to The New Freewoman which he called "the most important publication in existence". Tucker became much more pessimistic about the prospects for anarchism. In 1926, Vanguard Press published a selection of his writings entitled Individual Liberty in which Tucker added a postscript to "State Socialism and Anarchism" which stated the following: "Forty years ago, when the foregoing essay was written, the denial of competition had not yet effected the enormous concentration of wealth that now so gravely threatens social order.
It was not yet too late to stem the current of accumulation by a reversal of the policy of monopoly. The Anarchistic remedy was still applicable". Furthermore, Tucker argued: Today the way is not so clear; the four monopolies, have made possible the modern development of the trust, the trust is now a monster which I fear the freest banking, could it be instituted, would be unable to destroy. If this be true monopoly, which can be controlled permanently only for economic forces, has passed for the moment beyond their reach, must be grappled with for a time by forces political or revolutionary; until measures of forcible confiscation, through the State or in defiance of it, shall have abolished the concentrations that monopoly has created, the economic solution proposed by Anarchism and outlined in the forgoing pages – and there is no other solution. Will remain a thing to be taught to the rising generation, that conditions may be favorable to its application after the great leveling, but education is a slow process, may not come too quickly.
Anarchists who endeavor to hasten it by joining in the propaganda of State Socialism or revolution make a sad mistake indeed. They help to so force the march of events that the people will not have time to find out, by the study of their experience, that their troubles have been due to the rejection of competition. By 1930, Tucker had concluded that centralization and advancing technology had doomed both anarchy and civilization: The matter of my famous'Postscript' now sinks into insignificance. We may last a couple of centuries yet; the dark ages sure enough. The Monster, Mechanism, is devouring mankind. According to American individualist anarchist historian James J. Martin, Tucker wrote the following in a private correspondence when referring to the world scene of the mid-1930s: "Capitalism is at least tolerable, which cannot be said of Socialism or Communism". Martin states how Tucker went on to observe that "under any of these regimes a sufficiently shrewd man can feather his nest". Susan Love Brown claims that this unpublished private letter served in "providing the shift further illuminated in the 1970s by anarcho-capitalists".
However, the editors of the 1970 edition of Martin's book Men Against the State state on the back cover that while believing a "new generation has prompted the reissuance of this book", they pointed to renewed interest in the views of Tucker and the other individualist anarchists and their free-market socialism rather than capitalism or anarcho-capitalism. In 1939, Tucker died in the company of his family in Monaco which his daughter Oriole reported as such: Father's attitude towards communism never changed one whit, nor about religion. In his last months he called in the French housekeeper.'I want her,' he said,'to be a witness that on my death bed I'm not recanting. I do not believe in God! Tucker said that he became an anarchist at the age of 18. Tucker's contribution to individualist anarchism was as much through his publishing as his own writing. Tucker was the first to publish an English translation of Max St
Robert Nozick was an American philosopher. He held the Joseph Pellegrino University Professorship at Harvard University, was president of the American Philosophical Association, he is best known for his books Philosophical Explanations, which included his counterfactual theory of knowledge, Anarchy and Utopia, a libertarian answer to John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, in which Nozick presented his own theory of utopia as one in which people can choose the rules of the society they enter into. His other work involved ethics, decision theory, philosophy of mind and epistemology, his final work before his death, introduced his theory of evolutionary cosmology, by which he argues invariances, hence objectivity itself, emerged through evolution across possible worlds. Nozick was born in Brooklyn to a family of Kohenic descent, his mother was born Sophie Cohen, his father was a Jew from the Russian shtetl, born with the name Cohen and who ran a small business. He attended the public schools in Brooklyn.
At one point he joined the youth branch of Norman Thomas's Socialist Party. In addition, at Columbia he founded the local chapter of the Student League for Industrial Democracy, which in 1962 changed its name to Students for a Democratic Society; that same year, after receiving his bachelor of arts degree in 1959, he married Barbara Fierer. They had two children and David; the Nozicks divorced and he remarried, to the poet Gjertrud Schnackenberg. Nozick died in 2002 after a prolonged struggle with stomach cancer, he was interred at Mount Auburn Cemetery in Massachusetts. Nozick was educated at Columbia, where he studied with Sidney Morgenbesser, at Princeton under Carl Hempel, at Oxford as a Fulbright Scholar. For Anarchy and Utopia Nozick received a National Book Award in category Philosophy and Religion. There, Nozick argues that only a minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection against "force, fraud and administering courts of law" could be justified without violating people's rights.
For Nozick, a distribution of goods is just if brought about by free exchange among consenting adults from a just starting position if large inequalities subsequently emerge from the process. Nozick appealed to the Kantian idea that people should be treated as ends, not as a means to some other end. Nozick challenged the partial conclusion of John Rawls' Second Principle of Justice of his A Theory of Justice, that "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society." Anarchy and Utopia claims a heritage from John Locke's Second Treatise on Government and seeks to ground itself upon a natural law doctrine, but reaches some different conclusions from Locke himself in several ways. Most controversially, Nozick argued that a consistent upholding of the non-aggression principle would allow and regard as valid consensual or non-coercive enslavement contracts between adults, he rejected the notion of inalienable rights advanced by Locke and most contemporary capitalist-oriented libertarian academics, writing in Anarchy and Utopia that the typical notion of a "free system" would allow adults to voluntarily enter into non-coercive slave contracts.
In Philosophical Explanations, which received the Phi Beta Kappa Society's Ralph Waldo Emerson Award, Nozick provided novel accounts of knowledge, free will, personal identity, the nature of value, the meaning of life. He put forward an epistemological system which attempted to deal with both the Gettier problem and those posed by skepticism; this influential argument eschewed justification as a necessary requirement for knowledge. Nozick's four conditions for S's knowing that P were: P is true S believes that P If it were the case that, S would not believe that P If it were the case that P, S would believe that PNozick's third and fourth conditions are counterfactuals, he called this the "tracking theory" of knowledge. Nozick believed the counterfactual conditionals bring out an important aspect of our intuitive grasp of knowledge: For any given fact, the believer's method must reliably track the truth despite varying relevant conditions. In this way, Nozick's theory is similar to reliabilism.
Due to certain counterexamples that could otherwise be raised against these counterfactual conditions, Nozick specified that: If P weren't the case and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether or not P S wouldn't believe, via M, that P. If P were the case and S were to use M to arrive at a belief whether or not P S would believe, via M, that P. Where M stands for the method by which S came to arrive at a belief whether or not P. A major criticism of Nozick's theory of knowledge is his rejection of the principle of deductive closure; this principle states that if S knows X and S knows that X implies Y S knows Y. Nozick's truth tracking conditions do not allow for the principle of deductive closure. Nozick believes that the truth tracking conditions are more fundamental to human intuition than the principle of deductive closure; the Examined Life, pitched to a broader public, explores love, faith and the meaning of life. According to Stephen Metcalf, Nozick expresses serious misgivings about capitalist libertarianism, going so far as to reject much of the foundations of the theory on the grounds that personal freedom can sometimes only be actualized via a collectivist politics and that wealth is at times justly redistributed via taxation to protect the freedom o
A Letter Concerning Toleration
A Letter Concerning Toleration by John Locke was published in 1689. Its initial publication was in Latin, though it was translated into other languages. Locke's work appeared amidst a fear that Catholicism might be taking over England, responds to the problem of religion and government by proposing religious toleration as the answer; this "letter" is addressed to an anonymous "Honored Sir": this was Locke's close friend Philipp van Limborch, who published it without Locke's knowledge. In the wake of discovery of the Rye House Plot and Charles II's persecution of the Whigs, Locke fled England to Amsterdam, Holland in September 1683. Throughout his life, Locke had taken an interest in the debate about religious toleration; the question was much debated in Holland during Locke's stay and in October 1685 Louis XIV of France Revoked the Edict of Nantes that had guaranteed religious toleration for French Protestants. In Holland, Locke met Philipp van Limborch, a Professor of Divinity, it was to be a discussion with Limborch that persuaded Locke to temporarily put aside his work on An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and put forth his ideas on toleration.
Locke wrote the Letter during the winter of 1685-86. One of the founders of Empiricism, Locke develops a philosophy, contrary to the one expressed by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, in supporting toleration for various Christian denominations. Hobbes did allow for individuals to maintain their own religious beliefs as long as they outwardly expressed those of the state, it has been argued that Locke's rejection of Catholic Imperialism was the ultimate basis for his rejection of government's interest in spiritual salvation. Unlike Hobbes, who saw uniformity of religion as the key to a well-functioning civil society, Locke argues that more religious groups prevent civil unrest. Locke argues that civil unrest results from confrontations caused by any magistrate's attempt to prevent different religions from being practiced, rather than tolerating their proliferation. Locke's primary goal is to "distinguish the business of civil government from that of religion." He seeks to persuade the reader that government is instituted to promote external interests, relating to life and the general welfare, while the church exists to promote internal interests, i.e. salvation.
The two serve separate functions, so, must be considered to be separate institutions. For Locke, the only way a Church can gain genuine converts is through persuasion and not through violence; this relates to his central conclusion, that the government should not involve itself in care of souls. In support of this argument he presents three main reasons: individuals, according to Locke, cannot divest control over their souls to secular forces, as God does not appoint the magistrate. Locke argued that those who believed that "faith need not be kept with heretics" and that "kings excommunicated forfeit their kingdoms" had "no right to be tolerated by the magistrate". Neither did "those who refuse to teach that dissenters from their own religion should be tolerated"; this was because those who believed such doctrines would, given the opportunity, attack the laws and the liberty and property of the citizen. These people, Locke argued, sought religious toleration "only until they have supplies and forces enough to make the attempt" on liberty.
The doctrines that "faith need not be kept with heretics" and that "kings excommunicated forfeit their kingdoms" were held to be Catholic beliefs by Protestants. During his visit to France in 1676, Locke recorded that the belief that "faith does not have to be kept with heretics" was an important factor in the intolerance shown to the Protestant Huguenots."That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate," Locke argued, "which is so constituted that all who enter it ipso facto pass into the allegiance and service of another prince". If this were to be tolerated, "the magistrate would make room for a foreign jurisdiction in his own territory and...allow for his own people to be enlisted as soldiers against his own government". This has been interpreted by historians as a reference to the Catholic Church, with the Pope being the prince to whom Catholics owed allegiance. However, more scholars have challenged the idea that Locke opposed the toleration of Catholics in all circumstances.
Mark Goldie argues that the traditional interpretation of Locke's position on Catholics "needs finessing, since he did not, in fact, exclude the theoretical possibility of tolerating Catholics...if Catholics could discard their uncivil beliefs, they could be tolerated". Goldie asserts that Locke was opposed not to Catholicism as such but antinomianism, the belief that ordinary moral laws are superseded by religious truth. Scott Sowerby claims that Locke left open the possibility that Catholics could be tolerated if they adopted tolerant principles and rejected political allegiance to the Pope. John Marshall has argued that a number of passages in the Letter demonstrate that Locke believed that Catholics "in their terms of worship and religious speculative beliefs...deserved their worship to be free". Marshall notes that "The combination of Locke’s comments in the Letter suggest that during composition... Locke was once again struggling over how to discriminate between the series of associated political principles which for him made Catholics intolerable, the religious worship and other religious
Labor theory of value
The labor theory of value is a heterodox theory of value that argues that the economic value of a good or service is determined by the total amount of "socially necessary labor" required to produce it, rather than by the use or pleasure its owner gets from it and its scarcity value. LTV is associated with Marxian economics, though it appears in the theories of earlier classical liberal economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo and also in anarchist economics. Smith saw the price of a commodity in terms of the labor that the purchaser must expend to buy it, which embodies the concept of how much labor a commodity, a tool for example, can save the purchaser; the LTV is central to Marxist theory, which holds that the working class is exploited under capitalism, dissociates price and value. Marx never referred to his own theory of value as a "labour theory of value" once. Neoclassical economics tends to reject the need for a LTV, concentrating instead on a theory of price determined by supply and demand.
When speaking in terms of a labor theory of value, "value," without any qualifying adjective should theoretically refer to the amount of labor necessary to produce a marketable commodity, including the labor necessary to develop any real capital used in the production. Both David Ricardo and Karl Marx tried to quantify and embody all labor components in order to develop a theory of the real price, or natural price of a commodity; the labor theory of value as presented by Adam Smith did not require the quantification of past labor, nor did it deal with the labor needed to create the tools that might be used in producing a commodity. Smith's theory of value was similar to the utility theories in that Smith proclaimed that a commodity was worth whatever labor it would command in others or whatever labor it would "save" the self, or both. However, this "value" is subject to supply and demand at a particular time: The real price of every thing, what every thing costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.
What every thing is worth to the man who has acquired it, who wants to dispose of it or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, which it can impose upon other people. Smith's theory of price has nothing to do with the past labor spent in producing a commodity, it speaks only of the labor. If there is no use for a buggy whip the item is economically worthless in trade or in use, regardless of all the labor spent in creating it. Value "in use" is the usefulness of its utility. A classical paradox comes up when considering this type of value. In the words of Adam Smith: The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object conveys; the one may be called "value in use". The things which have the greatest value in use have little or no value in exchange. Nothing is more useful than water: but it will purchase scarce anything.
A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use. Value "in exchange" is the relative proportion with which this commodity exchanges for another commodity, it is relative to labor as explained by Adam Smith: The value of any commodity, to the person who possesses it, who means not to use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or command. Labour, therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all commodities. Value is the labor embodied in a commodity under a given structure of production. Marx defined the value of the commodity by the third definition. In his terms, value is the'socially necessary abstract labor' embodied in a commodity. To David Ricardo and other classical economists, this definition serves as a measure of "real cost", "absolute value", or a "measure of value" invariable under changes in distribution and technology. Ricardo, other classical economists and Marx began their expositions with the assumption that value in exchange was equal to or proportional to this labor value.
They thought this was a good assumption from which to explore the dynamics of development in capitalist societies. Other supporters of the labor theory of value used the word "value" in the second sense to represent "exchange value". Since the term "value" is understood in the LTV as denoting something created by labor, its "magnitude" as something proportional to the quantity of labor performed, it is important to explain how the labor process both preserves value and adds new value in the commodities it creates; the value of a commodity increases in proportion to the duration and intensity of labor performed on average for its production. Part of what the LTV means by "socially necessary" is that the value only increases in proportion to this labor as it is performed with average skill and average productivity. So though workers may labor with greater skill or more productivity than others, these more skillful and more productive workers thus produce more value through the production of greater quantities of the fini
The homestead principle is the principle by which one gains ownership of an unowned natural resource by performing an act of original appropriation. Appropriation could be enacted by putting an unowned resource to active use, joining it with acquired property or by marking it as owned. Proponents of intellectual property hold that ideas can be homesteaded by creating a virtual or tangible representation of them. Others however argue that since tangible manifestations of a single idea will be present in many places, including within the minds of people, this precludes their being owned in most or all cases. Homesteading is one of the foundations of Rothbardian anarcho-capitalism. Enlightenment philosopher John Locke in his work Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690 advocated the Lockean proviso, which allows for homesteading. Locke famously sees the "mixing of labour" with land as the source of ownership via homesteading, he writes: Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person.
This nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, are properly his. Whatsoever he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, joined to it something, his own, thereby makes it his property. However, Locke held that individuals have a right to homestead private property from nature only so long as "there is enough, as good, left in common for others"; the Lockean proviso maintains that appropriation of unowned resources is a diminution of the rights of others to it, would only be acceptable if it does not make anyone else worse off. Libertarian philosopher and Austrian School economist Murray Rothbard argues that homesteading includes all the rights needed to engage in the homesteading action, including nuisance and pollution rights, he writes: Most of us think of homesteading unused resources in the old-fashioned sense of clearing a piece of unowned land and farming the soil. … Suppose, for example, that an airport is established with a great deal of empty land around it.
The airport exudes a noise level of, say, X decibels, with the sound waves traveling over the empty land. A housing development buys land near the airport; some time the homeowners sue the airport for excessive noise interfering with the use and quiet enjoyment of the houses. Excessive noise can be considered a form of aggression but in this case the airport has homesteaded X decibels worth of noise. By its prior claim, the airport now "owns the right" to emit X decibels of noise in the surrounding area. In legal terms, we can say that the airport, through homesteading, has earned an easement right to creating X decibels of noise; this homesteaded easement is an example of the ancient legal concept of "prescription," in which a certain activity earns a prescriptive property right to the person engaging in the action. Rothbard interprets the physical extent to which a homesteading act establishes ownership in terms of the relevant "technological unit", the minimal amount necessary for the practical use of the resource.
He writes: If A uses a certain amount of a resource, how much of that resource is to accrue to his ownership? Our answer is; the size of that unit depends on the type of good or resource in question, must be determined by judges, juries, or arbitrators who are expert in the particular resource or industry in question. Hungarian political philosopher Anthony de Jasay argued that a homesteader, having a claim prior to any other, must be prima facie considered the owner of the resource, in accordance with the principle "let ownership stand", he writes: taking first possession of a thing is a feasible act of his, admissible if it is not a tort and violates no right. Taking exclusive possession of it is, in terms of our classification of possible acts, a liberty, as such only a contrary right can obstruct or oppose it. 14 The opponent of this simple thesis is trying to have it both ways: he is both asserting that the thing has no legitimate first owner from whom a second or nth owner could have legitimately obtained it by agreed transfer, that there is somebody, still is entitled to use the thing and therefore can validly object to being excluded from it.
But an entitlement to use the thing is an at least partial antecedent ownership claim needing an owner, or the permission of an owner, before it can be made. If, on the other hand, the objectors have been using the thing without being entitled to it, because no third party had excluded them by taking first possession, because they were unable, unwilling, or uninterested to perform the act of taking first possession themselves, their enjoyment of the thing was precarious, not vested, its appropriation by a third party may have deprived them of an uncovenanted advantage, but it did not violate their rights. To de-Jasay, Hans Hermann Hoppe argues that the denial of the homesteading rule entails a performative contradiction; that is because honest argumentation must presuppose an intersubjectively ascertainable norm, all norms not relying on the original establishment of a physical link to the owner are subjective in nature, therefore contradict the presuppositions of argumentation. He writes: Further, if one were not allowed