Corruption in Somalia
Corruption in Somalia pertains to purported levels of corruption within Somalia's public and private sectors according to official metrics, anti-graft measures aimed at addressing those issues, as well as political dispensations and structural changes in government affecting transparency. Owing to a reported lack of accountability in the receipt and expenditure of public funds by the Transitional Federal Government, a federal Anti-Corruption Commission was put into place in 2011 so as to deter and eliminate graft. Somalia ranked joint last in Transparency International's 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, which measures the perception of public sector corruption around the world. In 2012, Somali and international stakeholders agreed to establish a joint financial management board in order to ensure transparent dispensation of government and donor funds; the public sector was completely reformed in mid-2012, following the end of the transitional period and the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia.
In 2013, the Somali federal government announced that it had launched a new Public Finance Management Policy to render more transparent and timely its public sector financial system, to strengthen the delivery capacity of the government's financial sector. A parliamentary finance committee was established in 2014, which oversees all withdrawal transactions from the Central Bank. Additionally, a Public Procurement and Disposal Act was passed, the Office of the Auditor General was established to audit all government institutions; the government began utilizing a free asset recovery system supported by the UNODC and World Bank, it concurrently launched an anti-graft Public Awareness Campaign. Corruption was deemed a widespread problem during the brief tenure of Somalia's coalition government; the unity administration was formed in 2008 after a UN-brokered conference in Djibouti between representatives of the Somali Transitional Federal Government and the moderate Islamist Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, which ended in an agreement calling for the expansion of parliament to 550 seats in order to accommodate the new ARS members.
Shortly afterwards, Transparency International ranked Somalia in last place on its annual Corruption Perceptions Index, a metric that purports to show the prevalence of corruption in a country's public sector. A 2012 World Bank report alleged that about $130 million or 68% of funds that the coalition government had received over this 2009 and 2010 period was unaccounted for. An earlier 2011 paper prepared for the TFG by the Public Finance Management Unit, a Somali government body tasked with overseeing the nation's fiscal management suggested that over $70 million in cash payments from Arab donor countries were missing over the same 2009-2010 period. Based on interviews with Mogadishu politicians who had witnessed the payments or received funds, the report alleged that a total of $300 million were unaccounted for once internal revenue was taken into consideration. By contrast, funds from Western nations nominally earmarked for security and social service-related initiatives in Somalia went directly to aid agencies, with little of it reaching the Somali authorities.
According to Finance Minister Hussein Halane, although government officials deposited foreign contributions in the Central Bank of Somalia, some of the money was first spent on legitimate and documented expenses. In July 2012, a report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea submitted to the UN Security Council again alleged that between 2009 and 2010, around 70 percent of funds, earmarked for development and reconstruction in Somalia were unaccounted for. President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed rebuked the claims, indicating in particular that a $3 million payment from the Government of Oman had gone toward legitimate government expenses, including loans, security forces and parliament. Ahmed asserted that the SEMG paper had been "timed to coincide with the end of transition period in order to discredit the TFG," and that the Monitoring Group was the "wrong approach for Somalia's peace and development." Additionally, the Prime Minister's Office released a statement describing the report as misleading and false, suggested that it would consider filing a defamation and libel lawsuit if some of the accusations contained in the paper were not retracted.
In 2010, a new technocratic administration was appointed to office, which enacted a number of reforms, including measures to tackle purported graft within the public sector. According to the Prime Minister, Cabinet ministers disclosed their assets and signed a code of ethics in order to improve transparency. An Anti-Corruption Commission with the power to carry out formal investigations and to review government decisions and protocols was established so as to more monitor all activities by public officials. Furthermore, unnecessary trips abroad by members of government were prohibited, all travel by ministers subsequently required the Prime Minister's consent. A budget outlining 2011's federal expenditures was put before and approved by members of parliament, with the payment of civil service employees prioritized. In addition, a full audit of government property and vehicles was put into place. Following the London Somalia Conference held in February 2012, Somali and international stakeholders further upheld existing plans to establish a joint financial management board in order to ensure a transparent dispensation of Somali and donor funds.
They pledged support for Somalia's stable regions, agreeing to form a new fund earmarked for local dispute resolution, job creation, basic service delivery and development of government sectors
Corruption in Eritrea
Corruption in Eritrea is a considered a serious and growing problem. The level of corruption used to be lower in Eritrea than in many other African countries. Indeed, it was traditionally viewed as having a “strong ‘anti-corruption’ culture” and considered “egalitarian and corruption-free.” In 2006, a report by Bertelsmann Stiftung stated that corruption, as of that date, was not a serious problem within Eritrea. While noting that there had been “cases of corruption since independence,” they existed on a negligible level, although politically-motivated corruption allegations have been made. But, in fact, corruption is said to have been growing worse since 1998, not long after the end of its decades-long war of independence, a border conflict with Ethiopia led to another war. Another source stated in 2015 that over the previous decade, corruption had become ingrained in Eritrean everyday life, with bribes required for most government services. Other alleged types of corruption include the payments of ransoms for hostages “under the eyes of the government.”On Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2014, Eritrea ranked at 166th out of 175 countries.
On a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being corrupt and 100 clean, its score in recent years has declined from 25 in 2012 to 20 in 2013 to 18 in 2014. Eritrea was a part of Ethiopia until 1991, when Eritreans won a civil war that had lasted for thirty years and were granted independence. After a UN-supervised referendum, in which Eritreans voted overwhelmingly for independence, Eritrea declared its independence in 1993. At that time, Eritrea had a weak private sector with few skilled workers, a situation that led the government to take steps to build a strong private sector. During the 1990s, the private sector began to flourish and the economy grew causing many observers in the West to view Eritrea “as a beacon of Africa.” The decades of war, had planted the seeds of many social and economic problems, corruption among them. A 1998 border conflict with Ethiopia led to another war, which ended in 2000. Despite the official end of the war, warfare has continued on a lower scale. Meanwhile the regime has been accused of clamping down on free speech, shutting down private newspapers, shrinking the private sector, imposing indefinite military service.
All of these moves against individual liberty, human rights, the free market have been factors in increased corruption. As of 2006, Eritrea had not yet held free elections. Since 2001, civil liberties had been “gradually restricted,” with “numerous arbitrary arrests” and human-rights violations on an “alarming” scale. From 126th place on Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, Eritrea dropped to 134th in 2012 and 166th in 2014; the increase in state ownership in Eritrea has been critiqued as a step back for economic freedom and for doing business partly because it has caused rising corruption. The 2012 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom named Eritrea the second-worst country in sub-Saharan Africa for economic liberty; the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Project Index for 2011 ranked Eritrea at 180th, with only three countries, Guinea Bissau, Central African Republic, Chad, scoring worse. It has been suggested that since the government maintains control over foreign exchange, friends of government personnel are allowed to bring goods into the country and sell them at great profit, thus increasing opportunities for corruption.
Nonetheless, economic growth has been strong since 2011 because of country's mining boom, which has placed Eritea among the fastest growing nations on earth. At the same time, the country has been ravaged by drought. Among the supposed factors breeding corruption in Eritrea is the intense concentration of power; the Eritrean Constitution calls for a separation of powers among the judiciary and legislative branches, but this has never been implemented. Isaias Afwerki, president since 1993, has usurped the Congress's constitutional powers and is viewed as being all-powerful; the 19-member Executive Council consists of presidential cronies. Eritrea's business community is composed of personal associates of the regime's economic officials, fronts for top-level officials of the ruling party, people who “enjoy the patronage of senior officers of the security and military establishments.” The government “controls all foreign exchanges” and is “virtually the only legal source of imports,” a situation that makes it possible for military and government officials to profit by collaborating with illegal smugglers.
The country's strict laws about importation and the inconsistency in the granting of exit visas enable customs and immigration officials to profit from bribery and money laundering. A 2014 report has described institutional corruption has "erode the foundations" of economic development; the state's control on the economy allows for little private investment, while low government salaries encourage corruption. An additional factor in the spread and persistence of corruption is the lack of an independent press to report on it. Eritrea has been described as “Africa's biggest prison for the media.” The only news media are governmen
Corruption in Singapore
Corruption in Singapore is perceived as low. Cases are handled by the Singapore Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, a government agency in Singapore that investigates and prosecutes corruption in the public and private sectors. Transparency International's 2018 Corruption Perception Index ranks the country 3rd place out of 180 countries; the highest corruption risk area are identified by Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index as Operations followed by Finance. Business executives surveyed in the World Economic Forum's 2014–2015 Global Competitiveness Report reported no problems doing business in Singapore; the political reasoning behind why Singaporean corruption is perceived as being low is due to the fact that compared to neighboring nations such as Thailand or Indonesia, there is a theory that the powers of the state were able to pressure private interests into funneling capital into sectors that would benefit the public in the long term. Former Singapore Land Authority deputy director of technology and infrastructure, Koh Seah Wee, former SLA manager, Christopher Lim Chai Meng, were sentenced to jail by the High Court on cheating and money laundering charges.
Koh was sentenced to 22 years of jail after admitting to 59 charges and Lim was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment after admitting to 49 charges. Of the $12.2 million laundered, $7.5 million was recovered from Koh. Koh and Lim cheated SLA by using false invoices issued by ex-swim coach Ho Yen Teck who set up seven sole proprietorships to provide fake IT maintenance services and goods that were not delivered. Ho was jailed for 10 years for the conspiracy. In January 2012, two senior civil servants were arrested under graft charges. Former head of the Singapore Civil Defence Force, Peter Lim Sin Pang, was arrested on 19 December 2011, while Central Narcotics Bureau chief, Ng Boon Gay, was taken in for questioning on 4 January 2012. Both men were arrested in connection with the Prevention of Corruption Act relating to an IT contract, in late January 2012, it was announced that both men are facing disciplinary action by the Public Service Commission, which oversees the conduct of civil servants.
After being interdicted, a step only taken when an individual “faces serious offences for which'criminal proceedings or proceedings for his dismissal or reduction in rank are being contemplated'”, the case provoked comment from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong who promised to punish both men if they are guilty of misconduct. The CPIB’s silence on this investigation came under the scrutiny of a number of MPs during a parliamentary sitting in February 2012. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs, Teo Chee Hean defended the CPIB, stating that any announcement on the outcome of the probe would have been premature and may have compromised the investigation, he assured concerned MPs that all the findings of the investigation would be publicly reported once they had been finalised. Peter Lim Sin Pang was dismissed from service formally in August 2013 and found guilty while Ng Boon Gay retired after being acquitted. In July 2012, National Parks Board's purchase of 26 Brompton bikes costing $2,200 each sparked a nationwide uproar after it was revealed by a whistleblower on online forum HardwareZone of possible corruption due numerous red flags in the way the procurement was done.
Khaw, who defended NPark's purchase of the high-end foldable bikes, was criticised for handling the saga poorly. Subsequent investigation by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau resulted in National Parks Board assistant director Bernard Lim Yong Soon being fined $5,000 for lying to auditors about his relationship with the bicycle firm, awarded the tender. On 23 July 2013, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau assistant director Edwin Yeo Seow Hionh was charged with misappropriating at least $1.7 million from the anti-graft agency between 2008 and 2012. Yeo was interdicted from his position as head of field research and technical support at CPIB to assist in a Commercial Affairs Department probe into his suspected financial impropriety. Eight of the charges were for misappropriating funds and criminal breach of trust, one was for forgery and the rest were in using part of his ill-gotten gains to gamble at the Marina Bay Sands casino. On 20 February 2014, Yeo was sentenced to 10 years jail.
On 20 February 2014, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs protocol chief Lim Cheng Hoe, 61, was sentenced to 15 months' jail for cheating. From February 2008 to May 2012, Lim made false claims for $89,000 worth of pineapple tarts and wine as gifts for foreign diplomats. General manager and secretary of Ang Mo Kio Town Council, Victor Wong Chee Meng, was removed from his position and placed under investigation by CPIB, after a complaint was lodged in September 2016 over "the way he handles contracts and dealings in the town council". Wong, a Public Service Medal recipient, was concurrently an employee of CPG Facilities Management, the appointed managing agent of the town council. On 14 March 2018, Wong is charged with 55 counts of corruption offence for receiving some $107,000 in bribes from Chia Sin Lan and Yip Fong Yin, directors of two building and repair companies. According to US prosecutors, Keppel’s offshore and marine arm, Keppel O&M, agreed to pay a US$422 million settlement to avoid a criminal trial for bribing Brazilian officials.
Court documents released by the US justice department revealed that Keppel O&M paid US$55 million in bribes between 2001 and 2014, to win 13 contracts with Petrobras and Sete Brasil – two Brazilian oil companies mired in the country’s wide-ranging Operation Car Wash graft scandal. Keppel Corporation is one of the Government-Linked Companies under Temasek Holdings. I
Corruption in Ghana
Corruption in Ghana has been common since independence. Since 2006, Ghana's score and ranking on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index has improved ranked higher than Italy and Brazil. However, there is a growing perception in Ghana. Ranked 64th in 2012, tied with Lesotho. Though corruption in Ghana is low when compared to other countries in Africa, businesses quote corruption as an obstacle for doing business in the country. Corruption occurs in locally funded contracts, companies are subject to bribes when operating in rural areas. In a 1975 book, Victor T. Le Vine wrote that bribery and embezzlement arose from reversion to a traditional winner-takes-all attitude in which power and family relationships prevailed over the rule of law. Corruption in Ghana is comparatively less prevalent than in other countries in the region. Ghana is not a signatory to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, it has, taken steps to amend laws on public financial administration and public procurement.
The public procurement law, passed in January 2004, seeks to harmonize the many public procurement guidelines used in the country and to bring public procurement into conformity with World Trade Organization standards. The new law aims to improve accountability, value for money and efficiency in the use of public resources. However, some in civil society have criticized the law as inadequate; the government, in conjunction with civil society representatives, is drafting a Freedom of Information bill, which will allow greater access to public information. Notwithstanding the new procurement law, companies cannot expect complete transparency in locally funded contracts. There continue to be allegations of corruption in the tender process and the government has in the past set aside international tender awards in the name of national interest. Businesses report being asked for "favors" from contacts in Ghana, in return for facilitating business transactions; the Government of Ghana has publicly committed to ensuring that government officials do not use their positions to enrich themselves.
Official salaries, are modest for low-level government employees, such employees have been known to ask for a "dash" in return for assisting with license and permit applications. Member of parliament for the Chiana-Paga constituency, Abuga Pele was convicted in February 2018 and charged with a six year jail term for willfully causing a loss of GH¢4.1 million to the state of Ghana. In June 2009, Mubarak Muntaka resigned from his position as Minister of Youth and Sports on the orders of president Mills following investigations into dozens of allegations leveled against him including financial malpractice and abuse of power. Ghana's Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice asked Mubarak Muntaka to refund misappropriated funds; the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice was petitioned by a pressure group in September 2009 to investigate Mahama Ayariga for acquiring 5 subsidized tractors from the ministry of Agriculture that were meant to support underprivileged farmers in rural communities.
Appointments Committee of Parliament suspended his approval of becoming a minister pending investigations, that cleared him afterwards. Mahama Ayariga claimed that his application to acquire the tractors "was approved" and he was unaware that there was an "affordable arrangements" scheme associated with purchasing the tractors; the investigation was reopened in July 2017 when a different political party formed a new government. The hospital or health sector are the last places. In 2017,the deputy minister of health, Kingsley Aboagye Gyedu, asserted that Ghana's health sector had high corruption rates because of its low level of accountability.. Doctors in Tamale Teaching hospital plant agents to direct patients from the hospital to their clinics and direct patients to procure drugs and lab tests outside the hospital thus reducing hospital revenue, they go into agreement with these pharmacies and labs so they profit from the referrals Ghana's health sector was ranked second most corrupt in Africa, with most of the allocated resources going into the pockets of private individuals.
The worst affected people are the poor individuals who are not sensitised on medical practices in the hospital. Medical practitioners end up selling adulterated drugs and request bribes to allow patients jump queues.. In Koforidua in the eastern region of Ghana, a combined team of US and Ghanaian medical professionals were supposed to undertake the "Operation Walk Syracuse", a surgical procedure for some selected arthritis patients, it was revealed that some of the local professionals in the St. Joseph's hospital had charged from prospective beneficiaries varying sums of money ranging from GHC100.00 to GHC6,000.00 to allow them access the procedure. Meanwhile, this was at the blind side of the US team; the 1992 Constitution provided for the establishment of a Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice. Among other things, the Commission is charged with investigating all instances of alleged and suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public funds by officials; the Commission is authorized to take appropriate steps, including providing reports to the Attorney General and the Auditor-General, in response to such investigations.
The Commission has a mandate to prosecute alleged offenders when there is sufficient evidence to initiate legal actions. The Commission, however, is under-resourced and few prosecutions have been made since its inception. In 1998, the Government of Ghana established an anti-corruption institution, called the Serious Fraud Office, to inve
Corruption in Iran
Corruption is a serious problem in Iran, being widespread in the government. Transparency International's 2017 Corruption Perception Index ranks the country 130 place out of 180 countries. Reformists and conservatives alike – at times the Supreme Leader – criticize corruption in the government. Then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has vouched to fight "economic/oil Mafia" at all echelons of government. President Ahmadinejad has proposed that lawmakers consider a bill, based on which the wealth and property of all officials who have held high governmental posts since 1979 could be investigated. Many Iranians believe the country's economic problems are a byproduct of mismanagement and corruption. On February 3, 2013, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad played a video tape in the Iranian parliament that tied the heads of two branches of the government, the legislative and judiciary, to a documented financial corruption case related to the Larijani brothers. One of the objectives of the Iranian revolution was to have no social classes in Iran.
Yet, Iran's Department of Statistics reports that 10 million Iranians live under the absolute poverty line and 30 million live under the relative poverty line. Iranian President Rouhani has linked social ills, including homelessness, to corruption; the Imperial state of Iran, the government of Iran during the Pahlavi dynasty, lasted from 1925 to 1979. Corruption was a serious problem in Pahlavi dynasty. Stephanie Cronin of Oriental Institute, describes corruption under rule of Reza Shah as "large-scale"; as oil prices rose in 1973, scale of corruption rose among royal family, their partners and friends. According to Manouchehr Ganji who created a study group for Farah Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza Shah was not sensitive to the issue, but addressed every now and petty matters of low-ranking officials; as Ganji writes, the group submitted at least 30 solid reports within 13 years on corruption of high-ranking officials and the royal circle, but Shah called the reports "false rumors and fabrications". Parviz Sabeti, a high-ranking official of SAVAK believed that the one important reason for success of regime's opposition is corruption.
According to report of a journal associated with The Pentagon, "By 1977 the sheer scale of corruption had reached a boiling point.... Conservative estimates indicate that such corruption involved at least a billion dollars between 1973 and 1976."In Michel Foucault's view, corruption was a "glue" that kept Pahlavi dynasty and modernization together. After the revolution, the Central Bank of Iran published a list of 177 prominent individuals who had transferred over $2 billion out of the country, among them: Jafar Sharif-Emami, some $31 million Gholam Ali Oveisi, $15 million Namazi, $9 million, Nasser Moghadam, $2 million "Mayor of Tehran", $6 million "Minister of Health", $7 million "Director of the National Iranian Oil Company", over $60 million Mohammad Gholi Majd of University of Pennsylvania believes that "for the corruption and greed of Reza Shah and his son, the people of Iran paid a heavy price". Built up by forced sales and confiscations of estates, Reza Shah was "the richest man in Iran" and "left to his heir a bank account of some 3 million pounds and estates totalling over 3 million acres.
A 1932 report of British Embassy in Tehran indicates that Reza Shah developed an "unholy interest in land" and jailed families until they agreed to sell their properties. In the 1950s, Mohammad Reza Shah founded Pahlavi Foundation which "penetrated every corner of the nation's economy". Bostock and Jones unambiguously declared that Pahlavi Foundation a "nominally charitable foundation fostered official corruption". According to Houchang Chehabi and Juan Linz, Alavi foundation's $1.05 billion assets, $81 million capital and its declared devined $4.2 million was the "tip of the iceberg of official and dynastical corruption and inside Iran". The foundation, one of his main wealth sources alongside estates left from Reza Shah and Iran's oil revenue, was a tax haven for his holdings. Many members of the Pahlavi clan were among the chief perpetrators of corruption in Iran. Royal court was described as "center of licentiousness and depravity, of corruption and influence peddling" in a mid-1970s CIA report.
Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda who served from 1965 to 1977 had no choice but to facilitate or condone "the ubiquitous corruption of the Pahlavi Clan" and ignore "the corruption that saturated the regime". The Shah's family members were involved in the illegal drug trade. In 1960, there were rumours that Princess Ashraf, Shah's twin sister was arrested in Geneva carrying a suitcase containing $2 million worth of heroin, she was regarded as Iran's main drug dealer until 1979. A 1976 CIA report declared that she has a "near legendary reputation for financial corruption" and his son Shahram controls some-twenty companies that serve as "cover for Ashraf's quasi-legal business ventures". Prince Hamid Reza, the Shah's half-brother, was ostracized from the royal family because of his widespread scandals of promiscuity and involvement in drug trade. According to William Shawcross, hundreds of call girls from Madame Claude's establishment in Paris passed through Tehran for Mohammad Reza Shah and members of his court.
Some scholars have raised the point that widespread corruption among officials and royal court led to the public dissatisfaction and helped the Iranian Revolution. In Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management, the Pahlavi dynasty is described as an example of governments losing legitimation because of corruption and facing a public service crisis as a result. According to Fakhreddin Azimi, Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, "the unbridled misconduct of the Pahl
Corruption in Angola
The legacy of a 30-year civil war and 20 years of Soviet command economy left Angola in ruins and produced a centralized government with authoritarian tendencies which made possible the ownership of the nation's resources. Angola's president, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has been accused of creating one of the most corrupt countries in Africa, he has ignored the everyday needs and concerns of citizens and has instead leveraged the country's oil wealth to accumulate a massive fortune for himself and his family. The president’s children, leading government officials and military officers have become wealthy, while much of the country's people live in poverty lacking access to basic services; the president and his associates used government apparatus allowing themselves and their patronage networks a variety of legal and extra-legal options to extract private profit from Angola's economy. In Angola's early post-independence history, most of these strategies involved the oil sector or the spending revenues derived from the oil sector, over time corruption evolved into to a variety of schemes involving companies controlled by the party elite and their patronage networks that operate in all sectors of the economy.
Systemic corruption is possible on this scale because all the vital organs of the state are operated by those who prioritize their private interests within the patronage system over the responsibilities of their public position. There are, some prospects for reform. A new President, João Lourenço was elected in August 2017 and has pledged to improve governance and combat corruption, he has removed the dos Santos family and their core associates from their state appointed positions and cancelled some of their patronage transfers, although it remains to be seen whether he intends to pursue true reform of the status quo. The 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index gave Angola a score of 18, ranking Angola 164th out of 176 countries, all of the countries ranked lower than Angola could be considered failed states; the 2009 World Bank Worldwide Governance Index, gave Angola low scores on the six aspects of governance assessed. Political stability improved from 19.2 in 2004 to 35.8 in 2009, but Angola scored much lower for accountability, regulatory standards, rule of law, corruption.
The 2010 Ibrahim Index, Angola ranked 43rd out of 53 sub-Saharan African countries. The 2010 Revenue Watch Institute’s Transparency Index ranked Angola 47th out of 55 countries: scoring 34 out of 100; the 2010 Open Budget Index gave Angola a score of 26 on fiscal transparency, a large improvement over its 2004 score of 3, but a far lower score than those of most of the other surveyed countries. The 2008 Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom ranked Angola 161st out of 179 countries, making Angola the seventh least free economy in sub-Saharan Africa; the freedom from corruption score was 19 of 100.<ref"Index of Economic Freedom". The Heritage Foundation. 2008. Retrieved 2008-01-21.</ref> Angola is listed on Global Integrity's Grand Corruption Watch List, only 15 other countries have weak enough anti-corruption safeguards to be on this list. Angola's corruption index rankings have not changed in the past decades. Ranking such as those above are based on perception surveys, their utility is questioned because: they measure perception, not occurrences of corruption.
Angola's colonial era ended with the Angolan War of Independence against Portugal occurred between 1970 and 1975. Independence did not produce a unified Angola, however. 30 years of war would produce historical legacies that combine to allow for the persistence of a corrupt government system. The Angolan civil war was fought between the pro-western UNITA and the communist MPLA and had the characteristics typical of a Cold War era proxy war combined with a resource fueled struggle for control of the state apparatus between two rival strongmen. Regional countries were involved according to their Cold war alignment, the MLPA was supported by Cuban troops. Oil production began to grow, but it was not a significant proportion of government revenue until towards the end of the period, most funding came from Soviet support; the Soviet influence produced a centralized and weakly institutionalized government system controlled by a small group of people close to the president. Angola's land and infrastructure were nationalized during this time, concentrating all of the countries wealth in the state.
The war precluded economic development in most of the country, only the oil sector and coastal cities were funded by the state. These consequences would have an enduring effect on Angola's political economy by centralizing the economy around the president and the military and regionalizing economic development. Appropriation of state assets is rumored to be have been high during this period, although the limited connection to the international economy combined with an absence of transparency limits the knowledge of details and precision of estimates. Withdrawal of foreign powers at the end of the Cold War and pressure fr
Corruption in Zimbabwe
Corruption in Zimbabwe has become endemic within its political and civil sectors. Zimbabwe ranks joint 154th out of 176 countries in the 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, ranking it alongside Turkmenistan. On a scale of 0 to 10, the Corruption Perceptions Index marked Zimbabwe 2.2. This marks an increase in corruption since 1999, when the country ranked 4.1. The findings of a 2000 survey commissioned by Transparency International Zimbabwe found that Zimbabwean citizens regarded the public sector as the most corrupt sector in the country. In this survey respondents favoured the police as being most corrupt followed by political parties, parliament/legislature, public officials/civil servants and the judiciary. In 2008, a Transparency International director announced that Zimbabwe loses US$5 million to corruption every day. In 2011, Finance Minister Tendai Biti claimed that at least US$1 billion in diamond-related revenue owed to the national treasury remains unaccounted for.
Biti has blamed corruption, misappropriation and a lack of transparency for the systematic underselling of diamonds and the failure to recoup losses. In an address to parliament, Biti said “it is worrying that there is no connection whatsoever between diamond exports made by Zimbabwe and the revenues realised thereof”. President Robert Mugabe and his politburo have come under criticism for making personal benefits by assigning lucrative concessions in the Marange diamond fields to Chinese firms and the Zimbabwean military; the Zimbabwean military, which oversees the Marange fields, has been accused of systematic human rights abuses and smuggling of diamonds to neighbouring Mozambique. In January 2000, Fallot Chawaua, the Master of Ceremonies of a promotional lottery organised by the Zimbabwe Banking Corporation, announced that Robert Mugabe won the Z$100,000 first prize jackpot; the lottery was open to all clients. In March 2008, President Mugabe formally approved the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Bill, which gave the government the right to seize a controlling 51% stake in foreign and white-owned businesses.
There are wide concerns that the beneficiaries of this Bill will be members of the ruling Zimbabwean elite after the enforcement of the Land Acquisition Act of 1992 and the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme Phase 2 of 1998 led to the misappropriation of commercial farm land and violent land invasions. Anti-corruption efforts in Zimbabwe are governed by the following legislation: The Prevention of Corruption Act; the Commission is a signatory to the Southern Africa Development Community Protocol as well as the African Union and United Nations Convention on Anti-Corruption. However, according to a 2009 report by Global Integrity, the Commission is inefficient and “has little authority to take steps aimed at stopping corruption in Zimbabwe”. Out of 147 corruption cases reviewed by the Commission in 2006, only four were completed; the ACC is chaired by Denfor Chirindo, appointed on 1 September 2011. Here is a list of reported corruption scandals in Zimbabwe since 1980: 1987 – Zisco Steel blast Furnace Scandal 1987 – Air Zimbabwe Fokker Plane Scandal – $100 million 1986 – National Railways Housing Scandal 1988 – Willowgate Scandal 1989 – ZRP Santana Scandal 1994 – War Victims Compensation Scandal 1995 – GMB Grain Scandal 1996 – VIP Housing Scandal 1998 – Boka Banking Scandal 1998 – ZESA YTL Soltran Scandal 1998 – Telecel Scandal 1998 – Harare City Council Refuse Tender Scandal 1999 – Housing Loan Scandal 1999 – Noczim Scandal 1999 – DRC timber and diamond Un reported scandals 1999 – GMB Scandal 1999 – Ministry of water and rural development Chinese tender scandal 1999 – VIP Land Grab Scandal 2001 – Harare Airport Scandal 2008-2014 - Airport Road Scandal 2016 - Zimdef Funds Jonathan Moyo Scandal 2018 -Zesa scam Involving Samuel Undenge’s criminal abuse of office