Intelligence has been defined in many ways, including: the capacity for logic, self-awareness, emotional knowledge, planning, critical thinking, problem solving. More it can be described as the ability to perceive or infer information, to retain it as knowledge to be applied towards adaptive behaviors within an environment or context. Intelligence is most studied in humans but has been observed in both non-human animals and in plants. Intelligence in machines is called artificial intelligence, implemented in computer systems using programs and, appropriate hardware; the word "intelligence" derives from the Latin nouns intelligentia or intellēctus, which in turn stem from the verb intelligere, to comprehend or perceive. In the Middle Ages, the word intellectus became the scholarly technical term for understanding, a translation for the Greek philosophical term nous; this term, was linked to the metaphysical and cosmological theories of teleological scholasticism, including theories of the immortality of the soul, the concept of the Active Intellect.
This entire approach to the study of nature was rejected by the early modern philosophers such as Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, all of whom preferred the word "understanding" in their English philosophical works. Hobbes for example, in his Latin De Corpore, used "intellectus intelligit", translated in the English version as "the understanding understandeth", as a typical example of a logical absurdity; the term "intelligence" has therefore become less common in English language philosophy, but it has been taken up in more contemporary psychology. The definition of intelligence is controversial; some groups of psychologists have suggested the following definitions: From "Mainstream Science on Intelligence", an op-ed statement in the Wall Street Journal signed by fifty-two researchers: A general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas and learn from experience. It is not book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts.
Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings—"catching on," "making sense" of things, or "figuring out" what to do. From Intelligence: Knowns and Unknowns, a report published by the Board of Scientific Affairs of the American Psychological Association: Individuals differ from one another in their ability to understand complex ideas, to adapt to the environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, to overcome obstacles by taking thought. Although these individual differences can be substantial, they are never consistent: a given person's intellectual performance will vary on different occasions, in different domains, as judged by different criteria. Concepts of "intelligence" are attempts to organize this complex set of phenomena. Although considerable clarity has been achieved in some areas, no such conceptualization has yet answered all the important questions, none commands universal assent. Indeed, when two dozen prominent theorists were asked to define intelligence, they gave two dozen, somewhat different, definitions.
Besides those definitions and learning researchers have suggested definitions of intelligence such as: Human intelligence is the intellectual power of humans, marked by complex cognitive feats and high levels of motivation and self-awareness. Intelligence enables humans to remember descriptions of things and use those descriptions in future behaviors, it is a cognitive process. It gives humans the cognitive abilities to learn, form concepts and reason, including the capacities to recognize patterns, comprehend ideas, solve problems, use language to communicate. Intelligence enables humans to think. Note that much of the above definition applies to the intelligence of non-human animals. Although humans have been the primary focus of intelligence researchers, scientists have attempted to investigate animal intelligence, or more broadly, animal cognition; these researchers are interested in studying both mental ability in a particular species, comparing abilities between species. They study various measures of problem solving, as well as verbal reasoning abilities.
Some challenges in this area are defining intelligence so that it has the same meaning across species, operationalizing a measure that compares mental ability across different species and contexts. Wolfgang Köhler's research on the intelligence of apes is an example of research in this area. Stanley Coren's book, The Intelligence of Dogs is a notable book on the topic of dog intelligence. Non-human animals noted and studied for their intelligence include chimpanzees and other great apes, elephants and to some extent parrots and ravens. Cephalopod intelligence provides important comparative study. Cephalopods appear to exhibit characteristics of significant intelligence, yet their nervous systems differ radically from those of backboned animals. Vertebrates such as mammals, birds and fish have shown a high degree of intellect that varies according to each species; the same is true with arthropods. Evidence of a general factor of intell
Self-awareness is the capacity for introspection and the ability to recognize oneself as an individual separate from the environment and other individuals. It is not to be confused with consciousness in the sense of qualia. While consciousness is being aware of one's environment and body and lifestyle, self-awareness is the recognition of that awareness. Self-awareness is how an individual consciously knows and understands their own character, feelings and desires. There are two broad categories of self-awareness: internal self-awareness and external self-awareness. There are questions regarding what part of the brain allows us to be self-aware and how we are biologically programmed to be self-aware. V. S. Ramachandran has speculated that mirror neurons may provide the neurological basis of human self-awareness. In an essay written for the Edge Foundation in 2009, Ramachandran gave the following explanation of his theory: "... I speculated that these neurons can not only help simulate other people's behavior but can be turned'inward'—as it were—to create second-order representations or meta-representations of your own earlier brain processes.
This could be the neural basis of introspection, of the reciprocity of self awareness and other awareness. There is a chicken-or-egg question here as to which evolved first, but... The main point is that the two co-evolved, mutually enriching each other to create the mature representation of self that characterizes modern humans." Bodily awareness is related to proprioception and visualization In health and medicine, body-awareness is a construct that refers to a person’s overall ability to direct their focus on various internal sensations accurately. Both proprioception and interoception allow individuals to be consciously aware of various sensations. Proprioception allows individuals and patients to focus on sensations in their muscles and joints and balance, while interoception is used to determine sensations of the internal organs, such as fluctuating heartbeat, lung pain, or satiety. Over-acute body-awareness, under-acute body-awareness, distorted body-awareness are symptoms present in a variety of health disorders and conditions, such as obesity, anorexia nervosa, chronic joint pain.
For example, a distorted perception of satiety present in a patient suffering from anorexia nervosa Bodily self-awareness in human development refers to one’s awareness of their body as a physical object, with physical properties, that can interact with other objects. Tests have shown that at the age of only a few months old, toddlers are aware of the relationship between the proprioceptive and visual information they receive; this is called first-person self-awareness. At around 18 months old and children begin to develop reflective self-awareness, the next stage of bodily awareness and involves children recognizing themselves in reflections and pictures. Children who have not obtained this stage of bodily self-awareness yet will tend to view reflections of themselves as other children and respond accordingly, as if they were looking at someone else face to face. In contrast, those who have reached this level of awareness will recognize that they see themselves, for instance seeing dirt on their face in the reflection and touching their own face to wipe it off.
After toddlers become reflectively self-aware, they begin to develop the ability to recognize their bodies as physical objects in time and space that interact and impact other objects. For instance, a toddler placed on a blanket, when asked to hand someone the blanket, will recognize that they need to get off it to be able to lift it; this is called objective self-awareness. Studies have been done on primates to test if self-awareness is present. Apes, monkeys and dolphins have been studied most frequently; the most relevant studies to this day that represent self-awareness in animals have been done on chimpanzees and magpies. Self-awareness in animals is tested through mirror self recognition. Animals that show mirror self recognition go through four stages 1) social response, 2) physical mirror inspection, 3) repetitive mirror testing behavior, 4) the mark test. David DeGrazia states; this sense of awareness allows animals to understand that they are different from the rest of the environment.
Bodily-awareness includes proprioception and sensation. The second type of self-awareness in animals is, social self-awareness; this type of awareness is seen in social animals and is the awareness that they have a role within themselves in order to survive. This type of awareness allows animals to interact with each other; the final type of self-awareness is introspective awareness. This awareness is responsible for animals to understand feelings and beliefs; the Red Spot Technique experimented by Gordon Gallup studies self-awareness in animals. In this technique, a red odorless spot is placed on an anesthetized primate's forehead; the spot is placed on the forehead. Once the individual awakens, independent movements toward the spot after seeing their reflection in a mirror are observed. During the Red Spot Technique, after looking in the mirror, chimpanzees used their fingers to touch the red dot, on their forehead and, after touching the red dot they would smell their fingertips. "Animals that can recognize themselves in mirrors can conceive o
Personhood is the status of being a person. Defining personhood is a controversial topic in philosophy and law and is tied with legal and political concepts of citizenship and liberty. According to law, only a natural person or legal personality has rights, privileges and legal liability. Personhood continues to be a topic of international debate and has been questioned critically during the abolition of human and nonhuman slavery, in theology, in debates about abortion and in fetal rights and/or reproductive rights, in animal rights activism, in theology and ontology, in ethical theory, in debates about corporate personhood and the beginning of human personhood. Processes through which personhood is recognized and vary cross-culturally, demonstrating that notions of personhood are not universal. Anthropologist Beth Conklin has shown how personhood is tied to social relations among the Wari' people of Rondônia, Brazil. Bruce Knauft's studies of the Gebusi people of Papua New Guinea depict a context in which individuals become persons incrementally, again through social relations.
Jane C. Goodale has examined the construction of personhood in Papua New Guinea. Capacities or attributes common to definitions of personhood can include human nature, self-awareness, a notion of the past and future, the possession of rights and duties, among others. However, the concept of a person is difficult to define in a way, universally accepted, due to its historical and cultural variability and the controversies surrounding its use in some contexts. In philosophy, the word "person" may refer to various concepts. According to the "naturalist" epistemological tradition, from Descartes through Locke and Hume, the term may designate any human agent who: possesses continuous consciousness over time. According to Charles Taylor, the problem with the naturalist view is that it depends on a "performance criterion" to determine what is an agent. Thus, other things that exhibit "similarly complex adaptive behaviour" could not be distinguished from persons. Instead, Taylor proposes a significance-based view of personhood: What is crucial about agents is that things matter to them.
We thus cannot identify agents by a performance criterion, nor assimilate animals to machines... There are matters of significance for human beings which are peculiarly human, have no analogue with animals. Others, such as American Philosopher Francis J. Beckwith, argue that personhood is not linked to function at all, but rather that it is the underlying personal unity of the individual. What is crucial morally is the being of a person, not his or her functioning. A human person does not come into existence when human function arises, but rather, a human person is an entity who has the natural inherent capacity to give rise to human functions, whether or not those functions are attained. …A human person who lacks the ability to think rationally is still a human person because of her nature. It makes sense to speak of a human being’s lack if and only if she is an actual person. Philosopher J. P. Moreland clarifies this point: It is because an entity has an essence and falls within a natural kind that it can possess a unity of dispositions, capacities and properties at a given time and can maintain identity through change.
Harry G. Frankfurt writes that, "What philosophers have come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not analysis of that concept at all." He suggests that the concept of a person is intimately connected to free will, describes the structure of human volition according to first- and second-order desires: Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, may want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the first order," which are desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation, manifested in the formation of second-order desires; the criteria for being a person... are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives.
According to Nikolas Kompridis, there might be an intersubjective, or interpersonal, basis to personhood: What if personal identity is constituted in, sustained through, our relations with others, such that were we to erase our relations with our significant others we would erase the conditions of our self-intelligibility? As it turns out, this erasure... is what is experimentally dramatized in the “science fiction” film, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, a far more philosophically sophisticated meditation on personal identity than is found in most of the contemporary literature on the topic. Other philosophers have defined persons in different ways. Boethius gives the definition of "person" as "an individual substance of a rational nature". Mary Midgley defines a “person” as being a conscious, thinking being, which knows that it is a person. Philosopher Thomas I. White argues that the criteria for a person are as follows: is alive, is aware, feels positive and negative sensations, has emotions, has a sense
In philosophy and certain models of psychology, qualia are defined to be individual instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form of the Latin adjective quālis meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in a specific instance like "what it is like to taste a specific apple, this particular apple now". Examples of qualia include the perceived sensation of pain of a headache, the taste of wine, as well as the redness of an evening sky; as qualitative characters of sensation, qualia stand in contrast to "propositional attitudes", where the focus is on beliefs about experience rather than what it is directly like to be experiencing. Philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett once suggested that qualia was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us". Much of the debate over their importance hinges on the definition of the term, various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia.
The nature and existence of various definitions of qualia remains controversial due to qualia not being a pragmatically verifiable matter. There are many definitions of qualia. One of the simpler, broader definitions is: "The `; the way it feels to have mental states such as pain, seeing red, smelling a rose, etc."Clarence Irving Lewis, in his book Mind and the World Order, was the first to use the term "qualia" in its agreed upon modern sense. There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, are thus a sort of universals, but although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories; the quale is directly intuited, is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective. Frank Jackson defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations but of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes".
Daniel Dennett identifies four properties that are ascribed to qualia. According to these, qualia are: ineffable. Intrinsic. Private. Directly or apprehensible in consciousness. If qualia of this sort exist a sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in such a way that a listener who has never experienced color will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. Though it is possible to make an analogy, such as "red looks hot", or to provide a description of the conditions under which the experience occurs, such as "it's the color you see when light of 700-nm wavelength is directed at you", supporters of this kind of qualia contend that such a description is incapable of providing a complete description of the experience. Another way of defining qualia is as "raw feels". A raw feel is a perception in and of itself, considered in isolation from any effect it might have on behavior and behavioral disposition. In contrast, a cooked feel is that perception seen as existing in terms of its effects.
For example, the perception of the taste of wine is an ineffable, raw feel, while the experience of warmth or bitterness caused by that taste of wine would be a cooked feel. Cooked feels are not qualia. According to an argument put forth by Saul Kripke in his paper "Identity and Necessity", one key consequence of the claim that such things as raw feels can be meaningfully discussed—that qualia exist—is that it leads to the logical possibility of two entities exhibiting identical behavior in all ways despite one of them lacking qualia. While few claim that such an entity, called a philosophical zombie exists, the mere possibility is claimed to be sufficient to refute physicalism. Since it is by definition impossible to convey qualia verbally, it is impossible to demonstrate them directly in an argument. Arguments for qualia come in the form of thought experiments designed to lead one to the conclusion that qualia exist. Although it does not mention the word "qualia", Thomas Nagel's paper "What Is it Like to Be a Bat?" is cited in debates over qualia.
Nagel argues that consciousness has an subjective character, a what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism." Nagel suggests that the subjective aspect of the mind may not be sufficiently accounted for by the objective methods of reductionistic science. He claims that "if we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the subjective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available conception gives us a clue about how this could be done." Furthermore, he states that "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be contemplated until more thought has been given to the general problem of subjective and objective." The inverted
Feeling is the nominalization of the verb to feel. The word was first used in the English language to describe the physical sensation of touch through either experience or perception; the word is used to describe experiences other than the physical sensation of touch, such as "a feeling of warmth" and of sentience in general. In Latin, sentire meant to hear or smell. In psychology, the word is reserved for the conscious subjective experience of emotion. Phenomenology and heterophenomenology are philosophical approaches that provide some basis for knowledge of feelings. Many schools of psychotherapy depend on the therapist achieving some kind of understanding of the client's feelings, for which methodologies exist. Perception of the physical world does not result in a universal reaction among receivers, but varies depending upon one's tendency to handle the situation, how the situation relates to the receiver's past experiences, any number of other factors. Feelings are known as a state of consciousness, such as that resulting from emotions, sentiments or desires.
People buy products in hopes that the product will make them feel a certain way: either happy, excited or beautiful. Or, they find the product useful in some way indirectly such as to support a charity or for altruistic economic reasons; some people buy beauty products in hopes of achieving a state of happiness or a sense of self beauty or as an act or expression of beauty. Past events are used in our lives to form schemas in our minds, based on those past experiences, we expect our lives to follow a certain script. However, storytelling and reservation of commemoration and investigation, many other activities can help settle uneasy feelings without "scripting", without the ambivalence that feeling can only be "handled" by proxy, not always true. A social psychologist, Daniel Gilbert, conducted a study on the influence of feelings on events alongside other researchers; the results showed that when the participants predicted a positive feeling for an event, the higher the chances that they wanted to relive the event.
Predicted feelings did not correlate to what the participant expected. Individuals in society predict that something will give them feeling. Indulging in what one might have thought would've made them happy or excited might only cause a temporary thrill, or it might result in the opposite of what was expected. Events and experiences are relived to satisfy one's feelings. Details and information about the past is used to make decisions, as past experiences of feelings influence current decision-making, how people will feel in the future, if they want to feel that way again. Gilbert and Wilson conducted a study to show how pleased a person would feel if they purchased flowers for themselves for no specific reason and how long they thought that feeling would last. People who had no experience of purchasing flowers for themselves and those who had experienced buying flowers for themselves were tested. Results showed that those who had purchased flowers in the past for themselves felt happier and that feeling lasted longer for them than for a person who had never experienced purchasing flowers for themselves.
Arlie Russell Hochschild, a sociologist, depicted two accounts of emotion. The organismic emotion is the outburst of feelings. In organismic emotion, emotions/feelings are expressed. Social and other factors do not influence how the emotion is perceived, so these factors have no control on how or if the emotion is suppressed or expressed. In interactive emotion and feelings are controlled; the individual is considering how to react or what to suppress. In interactive emotion, unlike in organismic emotion, the individual is aware of their decision on how they feel and how they show it. Erving Goffman, a sociologist and writer, compared how actors withheld their emotions to the everyday individual. Like actors, individuals can control how the emotions are expressed, but they cannot control their inner emotions or feelings. Inner feelings can only be suppressed in order to achieve the expression one wants people to see on the outside. Goffman explains that emotions and emotional experience are an ongoing thing that an individual is consciously and working through.
Individuals want to conform to society with outer feelings. Anger, joy and excitement are some of the feelings that can be experienced in life. In response to these emotions, our bodies react as well. For example, nervousness can lead to the sensation of knots in the stomach. Feelings can lead to harm; when an individual is dealing with an overwhelming amount of stress and problems in their lives, it can lead to self-harm. When one is in a good state of feeling, they never want it to end. Inflicting harm or pain to oneself is sometimes the answer for many individuals because they want something to keep their mind off the real problem; these individuals cut and starve themselves in an effort to feel something other than what they feel, as they believe the pain to be not as bad as their actual problem. Distraction is not the only reason; some people inflict self-harm to punish themselves for feeling a certain way. A gut feeling, or gut reaction, is a visceral emotional reaction to something, it may be positive, such as a feeling of trust.
Gut feelings are regarded as not modulated by conscious thought, but sometime
Tibetan Buddhism is the form of Buddhist doctrine and institutions named after the lands of Tibet, but found in the regions surrounding the Himalayas and much of Central Asia. It derives from the latest stages of Indian Buddhism and preserves "the Tantric status quo of eighth-century India." It has been spread outside of Tibet due to the Mongol power of the Yuan dynasty, founded by Kublai Khan, that ruled China. Tibetan Buddhism applies Tantric practices deity yoga, aspires to Buddhahood or the rainbow body. Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet has four major schools, namely Nyingma, Kagyu and Gelug; the Jonang is a smaller school, the Rimé movement is an eclectic movement involving the Sakya and Nyingma schools. Among the prominent proponents of Tibetan Buddhism are the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama, the leaders of Gelug school in Tibet. Westerners unfamiliar with Tibetan Buddhism turned to China for an understanding. There the term used; the term was taken up by western scholars including Hegel, as early as 1822.
Insofar as it implies a discontinuity between Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, the term has been discredited. Another term, "Vajrayāna" is used mistakenly for Tibetan Buddhism. More it signifies a certain subset of practices included in, not only Tibetan Buddhism, but other forms of Buddhism as well; the native Tibetan term for all Buddhism is "doctrine of the internalists". In the west, the term "Indo-Tibetan Buddhism" has become current, in acknowledgement of its derivation from the latest stages of Buddhist development in northern India. Buddhism was formally introduced into Tibet during the Tibetan Empire. Sanskrit Buddhist scriptures from India were first translated into Tibetan under the reign of the Tibetan king Songtsän Gampo, In the 8th century King Trisong Detsen established it as the official religion of the state. Trisong Detsen invited Indian Buddhist scholars to his court, including Padmasambhāva and Śāntarakṣita ), who founded the Nyingma, The Ancient Ones, the oldest school of Tibetan Buddhism.
There was influence from the Sarvāstivādins from Kashmir to the southwest and Khotan to the northwest. Trisong Detsen invited the Chan master Moheyan to transmit the Dharma at Samye Monastery. According to Tibetan sources, Moheyan lost the socalled council of Lhasa, a debate sponsored by Trisong Detsen on the nature of emptiness with the Indian master Kamalaśīla, the king declared Kamalaśīlas philosophy should form the basis for Tibetan Buddhism. A reversal in Buddhist influence began under King Langdarma, his death was followed by the socalled Era of Fragmentation, a period of Tibetan history in the 9th and 10th centuries. During this era, the political centralization of the earlier Tibetan Empire collapsed; the late 10th and 11th century saw a revival of Buddhism in Tibet. Coinciding with the early discoveries of "hidden treasures", the 11th century saw a revival of Buddhist influence originating in the far east and far west of Tibet. In the west, Rinchen Zangpo founded temples and monasteries.
Prominent scholars and teachers were again invited from India. In 1042 Atiśa arrived in Tibet at the invitation of a west Tibetan king; this renowned exponent of the Pāla form of Buddhism from the Indian university of Vikramashila moved to central Tibet. There his chief disciple, Dromtonpa founded the Kadampa school of Tibetan Buddhism, under whose influence the New Translation schools of today evolved; the Sakya, the Grey Earth school, was founded by Khön Könchok Gyelpo, a disciple of the great Lotsawa, Drogmi Shākya. It is headed by the Sakya Trizin, traces its lineage to the mahasiddha Virūpa, represents the scholarly tradition. A renowned exponent, Sakya Pandita, was the great-grandson of Khön Könchok Gyelpo. Other seminal Indian teachers were his student Naropa; the Kagyu, the Lineage of the Word, is an oral tradition, much concerned with the experiential dimension of meditation. Its most famous exponent was an 11th-century mystic, it contains one major and one minor subsect. The first, the Dagpo Kagyu, encompasses those Kagyu schools that trace back to the Indian master Naropa via Marpa Lotsawa and Gampopa Tibetan Buddhism exerted a strong influence from the 11th century CE among the peoples of Inner Asia the Mongols.
The Mongols invaded Tibet in 1240 and 1244. The Mongols had annexed Kham to the east. Sakya Paṇḍita was appointed Viceroy of Central Tibet by the Mongol court in 1249. Tibet was incorporated into the Mongol Empire, retaining nominal power over religious and regional political affairs, while the Mongols managed a structural and administrative rule over the region, reinforced by the rare military intervention. Tibetan Buddhism was adopted as the de facto state religion by the Mongol Yuan dynasty, founded by Kublai Khan, whose capital is Xanadu. With the decline of the Yuan dynansty and the loose administration of the following Ming dynasty, Central Tibet was ruled by successive local families from the 14th to the 17th century, Tibet would gain de facto a high autonomy after the 14th century. Jangchub Gyaltsän became the strongest political family in the mid 14th century. During this period the reformist scholar Je Tso
Animal cognition describes the mental capacities of non-human animals and the study of those capacities. The field developed from comparative psychology, including the study of animal conditioning and learning, it has been influenced by research in ethology, behavioral ecology, evolutionary psychology, hence the alternative name cognitive ethology is sometimes used. Many behaviors associated with the term animal intelligence are subsumed within animal cognition. Researchers have examined animal cognition in mammals, reptiles and invertebrates. Coined by 19th-century British psychologist C. Lloyd Morgan, Morgan's Canon remains a fundamental precept of comparative psychology. In its developed form, it states that: In no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it can be interpreted in terms of processes which stand lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development. In other words, Morgan believed that anthropomorphic approaches to animal behavior were fallacious, that people should only consider behaviour as, for example, purposive or affectionate, if there is no other explanation in terms of the behaviours of more primitive life-forms to which we do not attribute those faculties.
The behavior of non-human animals has captivated human imagination from antiquity, over the centuries many writers have speculated about the animal mind, or its absence. Speculation about animal intelligence yielded to scientific study after Darwin placed humans and animals on a continuum, although Darwin's anecdotal approach to the topic would not pass scientific muster on. Unsatisfied with the anecdotal method of Darwin and his protégé J. G. Romanes, E. L. Thorndike brought animal behavior into the laboratory for objective scrutiny. Thorndike's careful observations of the escape of cats and chicks from puzzle boxes led him to conclude that what appears to the naive human observer to be intelligent behavior may be attributable to simple associations. According to Thorndike, using Morgan's Canon, the inference of animal reason, insight, or consciousness is unnecessary and misleading. At about the same time, I. P. Pavlov began his seminal studies of conditioned reflexes in dogs. Pavlov abandoned attempts to infer canine mental processes.
He was, willing to propose unseen physiological processes that might explain his observations. The work of Thorndike, Pavlov and a little of the outspoken behaviorist John B. Watson set the direction of much research on animal behavior for more than half a century. During this time there was considerable progress in understanding simple associations. Many experiments on conditioning followed; the most explicit dismissal of the idea that mental processes control behavior was the radical behaviorism of Skinner. This view seeks to explain behavior, including "private events" like mental images by reference to the environmental contingencies impinging on the human or animal. Despite the predominantly behaviorist orientation of research before 1960, the rejection of mental processes in animals was not universal during those years. Influential exceptions included, for example, Wolfgang Köhler and his insightful chimpanzees and Edward Tolman whose proposed cognitive map was a significant contribution to subsequent cognitive research in both humans and animals.
Beginning around 1960, a "cognitive revolution" in research on humans spurred a similar transformation of research with animals. Inference to processes not directly observable became acceptable and commonplace. An important proponent of this shift in thinking was Donald O. Hebb, who argued that "mind" is a name for processes in the head that control complex behavior, that it is both necessary and possible to infer those processes from behavior. Animals came to be seen as "goal seeking agents that acquire, store and internally process information at many levels of cognitive complexity"; the remainder of this article touches many areas of research that have appeared or progressed since this seminal change in thinking, many of the theoretical and empirical findings that have captured wide attention. The acceleration of research on animal cognition in the last 50 years or so has led to a rapid expansion in the variety of species studied and methods employed; the remarkable behavior of large-brained animals such as primates and cetacea has claimed special attention, but all sorts of mammals large and small, fish, ants and others have been brought into the laboratory or observed in controlled field studies.
In the laboratory, animals push levers, pull strings, dig for food, swim in water mazes, or respond to images on computer screens in discrimination, attention and categorization experiments. Careful field studies explore memory for food caches, navigation by stars, tool use, identification of conspecifics, many other matters. Studies focus on the behavior of animals in their natural environments and discuss the putative function of the behavior for the propagation and survival of the species; these develop