A sword is a bladed melee weapon intended for slashing or thrusting, longer than a knife or dagger, consisting of a long blade attached to a hilt. The precise definition of the term varies with the historical epoch or the geographic region under consideration; the blade can be curved. Thrusting swords have a pointed tip on the blade, tend to be straighter. Many swords are designed for both slashing; the sword developed in the Bronze Age, evolving from the dagger. The Iron Age sword remained short and without a crossguard; the spatha, as it developed in the Late Roman army, became the predecessor of the European sword of the Middle Ages, at first adopted as the Migration Period sword, only in the High Middle Ages, developed into the classical arming sword with crossguard. The word sword continues the Old English, sweord; the use of a sword is known as swordsmanship or, in a modern context, as fencing. In the Early Modern period, western sword design diverged into two forms, the thrusting swords and the sabers.

Thrusting swords such as the rapier and the smallsword were designed to impale their targets and inflict deep stab wounds. Their long and straight yet light and well balanced design made them maneuverable and deadly in a duel but ineffective when used in a slashing or chopping motion. A well aimed lunge and thrust could end a fight in seconds with just the sword's point, leading to the development of a fighting style which resembles modern fencing; the saber and similar blades such as the cutlass were built more and were more used in warfare. Built for slashing and chopping at multiple enemies from horseback, the saber's long curved blade and forward weight balance gave it a deadly character all its own on the battlefield. Most sabers had sharp points and double-edged blades, making them capable of piercing soldier after soldier in a cavalry charge. Sabers continued to see battlefield use until the early 20th century; the US Navy kept tens of thousands of sturdy cutlasses in their armory well into World War II and many were issued to marines in the Pacific as jungle machetes.

Non-European weapons called "sword" include single-edged weapons such as the Middle Eastern scimitar, the Chinese dao and the related Japanese katana. The Chinese jìan is an example of a non-European double-edged sword, like the European models derived from the double-edged Iron Age sword; the first weapons that can be described as "swords" date to around 3300 BC. They have been found in Arslantepe, are made from arsenical bronze, are about 60 cm long; some of them are inlaid with silver. The sword developed from the dagger. A knife is unlike a dagger in that a knife has only one cutting surface, while a dagger has two cutting surfaces. Construction of longer blades became possible during the 3rd millennium BC in the Middle East, first in arsenic copper in tin-bronze. Blades longer than 60 cm were rare and not practical until the late Bronze Age because the Young's modulus of bronze is low, longer blades would bend easily; the development of the sword out of the dagger was gradual. These are the "type A" swords of the Aegean Bronze Age.

One of the most important, longest-lasting, types swords of the European Bronze Age was the Naue II type known as Griffzungenschwert. This type first appears in c. the 13th century BC in Northern Italy, survives well into the Iron Age, with a life-span of about seven centuries. During its lifetime, metallurgy changed from bronze to iron, but not its basic design. Naue II swords were exported from Europe to the Aegean, as far afield as Ugarit, beginning about 1200 BC, i.e. just a few decades before the final collapse of the palace cultures in the Bronze Age collapse. Naue II swords could be as long as 85 cm. Robert Drews linked the Naue Type II Swords, which spread from Southern Europe into the Mediterranean, with the Bronze Age collapse. Naue II swords, along with Nordic full-hilted swords, were made with functionality and aesthetics in mind; the hilts of these swords were beautifully crafted and contained false rivets in order to make the sword more visually appealing. Swords coming from northern Denmark and northern Germany contained three or more fake rivets in the hilt.

Sword production in China is attested from the Bronze Age Shang Dynasty. The technology for bronze swords reached its high point during the Warring States period and Qin Dynasty. Amongst the Warring States period swords, some unique technologies were used, such as casting high tin edges over softer, lower tin cores, or the application of diamond shaped patterns on the blade. Unique for Chinese bronzes is the consistent use of high tin bronze, hard and breaks if stressed too far, whereas other cultures preferred lower tin bronze, which bends if stressed too far. Although iron swords were made alongside bronze, it was not until the early Han period that iron replaced bronze. In the Indian subcontinent, earliest available Bronze age swords of copper were discovered in the Indus Valley Civilization sites in the northwestern regions of South Asia. Swords have been recovered in

Edgar Stuart, Duke of Cambridge

Edgar Stuart, Duke of Cambridge was the fourth son of James, Duke of York and his first wife Anne Hyde. He was second in the line of succession to the Scottish thrones. Edgar was born on 14 September 1667 at St James's Palace and baptized there with the Duke of Albemarle, the Marquis of Worcester, the Countess of Suffolk as sponsors; the name "Edgar" had ancient roots in both the Scottish monarchies. On 7 October 1667 he was created Earl of Cambridge and Baron of Dauntsey, his elder brother Charles had died at the age of six months in 1661 before the patent for the title of Duke of Cambridge was passed and another brother, James was formally created Duke of Cambridge before his death in 1667 at the age of three. Edgar’s titles became extinct until the birth of another son named Charles, in 1677, his mother was ill for months following his birth and never recovered, though she gave birth twice more to daughters who died before their first birthdays. Edgar died at Richmond Palace on 8 June 1671 and was entombed in the royal vault in the Henry VII Chapel in Westminster Abbey on 12 June 1671, his coffin placed atop that of his mother.

The town of Edgartown, Massachusetts, on Martha's Vineyard, settled in 1642, was named for him when incorporated in 1671, shortly before news of his death reached North America. Martha’s Vineyard was part of the proprietary colony of New York, gifted to Edgar's father the Duke of York in 1664 by Charles II. Edgar bore a coat of arms, as a grandson of a British Sovereign, consisting those of the kingdom, differenced by a label argent of five points ermine. Lundy, Darryl. "Edgar Stuart, Duke of Cambridge". Retrieved 18 October 2018

Parker v. Brown

Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, was a United States Supreme Court case on the scope of US antitrust law. It held; the case was an appeal from a decree of a district court of three judges enjoining the enforcement, against the appellee, of a marketing program adopted pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act. The Supreme Court held there was a general principle that actions taken by state governments were exempt from the Sherman Act, it held, first, A suit in a federal court to enjoin enforcement of a state agricultural proration program, in which the validity of the program is challenged as in conflict with federal antitrust laws, is a suit "arising under" a "law regulating commerce" and is maintainable without regard to the amount in controversy. A majority of the Court took the view that suit to enjoin enforcement of a marketing plan adopted under the California Agricultural Prorate Act is within the equity jurisdiction of the district court, since the complaint alleges and the evidence shows threatened irreparable injury to the complainant's business and threatened prosecutions by reason of his having marketed his crop under the protection of the district court's injunction.

A prorate marketing program under the California Agricultural Prorate Act, adopted by the State for regulating the handling and prices of raisins produced in California, a large part of which go into interstate and foreign commerce, held not within the intended scope of, not a violation of, the Sherman Act. P. 350. A program pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act for marketing the 1940 raisin crop, adopted with the collaboration of officials of the U. S. Department of Agriculture and aided by loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation recommended by the Secretary of Agriculture, held not in conflict with the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, where the Secretary had not proposed or promulgated any order under that Act applicable to the marketing of raisins. Pp. 352, 358. The marketing program for the 1940 raisin crop, adopted pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, the declared purpose of, to "conserve the agricultural wealth of the State" and to "prevent economic waste in the marketing of agricultural products" of the State, which operates to eliminate competition among producers in respect of the terms of sale of the crop and to impose restrictions on the sale and distribution to buyers who subsequently sell and ship in interstate commerce, held a regulation of state industry of local concern which, in the circumstances detailed in the opinion, is not prohibited by the commerce clause in the absence of Congressional legislation prohibiting or regulating transactions affected by the state program.

Pp. 359, 368. The Court noted that the Sherman Act "makes no mention of the state as such, gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action or official action directed by a state." The Act is applicable to "persons," including corporations, it authorizes suits under it by persons and corporations. A state may maintain a suit for damages under it, Georgia v. Evans, 316 U. S. 159, but the United States may not, United States v. Cooper Corp. 312 U. S. 600 -- "conclusions derived not from the literal meaning of the words "person" and "corporation," but from the purpose, the subject matter, the context and the legislative history of the statute." The Court added that "there is no suggestion of a purpose to restrain state action in the Act's legislative history." The sponsor of the bill, enacted as the Sherman Act declared that it prevented only "business combinations." Thus, the conclusion that its purpose was to suppress combinations to restrain competition and attempts to monopolize by individuals and corporations "abundantly appears from its legislative history."

The restrictions which the state program imposes upon the intrastate sale of a commodity by its producer to a processor who contemplates doing, in fact does, work upon the commodity before packing it and shipping it in interstate commerce, do not violate the Commerce Clause. P. 359. Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co. 258 U. S. 50, Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co. 268 U. S. 189, distinguished. P. 361. When Congress has not exerted its power under the Commerce Clause, state regulation of matters of local concern is so related to interstate commerce that it operates as a regulation of that commerce, the reconciliation of such power of Congress with that reserved to the State is to be attained by the accommodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests involved. P. 362. State regulations affecting interstate commerce are to be sustained, not because they are "indirect" rather than "direct," not because they affect rather than command the operations of interstate commerce, but because, upon a consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances, the matter appears an appropriate one for local regulations, for which there may be wide scope without materially obstructing the free flow of commerce.

P. 362. Examination of the evidence in this case and of available data of the raisin industry in California, of which the Court may take judicial notice, leaves no doubt that the evils attending the production and marketing of raisins in that State present a problem local in character and urgently demanding state action for the economic protection of those engaged in one of its important industries. P. 363. Where the Secretary of Agriculture, who could have adopted a marketing program for raisins under the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, has instead, as that Act authorizes, cooperated in promoting the state marketing program, the court cannot say that the effect of the state program on in